Ulpianus, On Sabinus, Book III. Laws are not established for individuals, but for general purposes.

The Same, On Sabinus, Book III. A man gave a slave mortis causa to his wife, and then appointed him his heir with the grant of his freedom. The question arises, is such an appointment valid? I think that if he appointed him his heir because he said that he changed his mind, the appointment will be valid, and the slave will become the necessary heir of his master. But if after he appointed him his heir, he gave him away, the donation will have greater weight; or if he gave him away before he did this, but still did not grant him his liberty with the intention of depriving him of it, the result will be the same.

The Same, On Sabinus, Book III. It is established that every man can appoint a posthumous child his heir, whether he is married or not. For, indeed, a husband can repudiate his wife, and one who has not contracted marriage can subsequently do so; and where a husband appoints a posthumous heir, it is held that this does not only apply to a child who is born of the present wife of the testator, but also to one who is unborn, and indeed may be born of any wife whomsoever.

Ulpianus, On Sabinus, Book III. The question arose whether a man who has not complete power of reproduction can appoint a posthumous heir. Cassius and Javolenus say that he can do so, because he can marry and adopt children. Labeo and Cassius state that one who is temporarily impotent can also appoint a posthumous heir, since in this instance neither age nor sterility can be considered as impediments. 1Where, however, the individual in question has been castrated, Julianus, following the opinion of Proculus, does not think that he can appoint a posthumous heir. This is the modern practice. 2An hermaphrodite can appoint a posthumous heir, if the male organs predominate in his physical conformation.

The Same, On Sabinus, Book III. Posthumous children who descend through the male sex are disinherited by name, just in the same way as the living children of the testator, unless they break the will by their birth. 1We only style those children “posthumous” who are born after the death of their father; those who are born after the execution of the will are, in accordance with the Lex Velleia, forbidden to break the will, where they are disinherited by name. 2Wherefore, children can be also disinherited either before the appointment of an heir, or between the appointment of several heirs, or between the different degrees of inheritance; for the Divine Marcus decreed that the same rule should be observed with reference to a posthumous child, as in the case of a living one, since no reason for establishing a difference can be given. 3From these matters it is apparent that a difference exists between living children and those subsequently born. The former always render the will illegal, the latter break it, and when they are born do not find themselves disinherited. 4Where a former will by which a posthumous child is disinherited exists, it is established that it is broken, whether the child is born after the death of the testator, or during his lifetime; the first one is broken by the second, and the second by the birth of the posthumous child. 5A posthumous child is also considered to be expressly disinherited where the testator says: “Let any child whosoever that is born to me be disinherited, whether it has been brought forth by Seia, or whether it is still unborn.” If, however, he should say: “Let my posthumous child be disinherited”; and it is born either after the death, or during the life of the testator, it will not break the will. 6However, even though a posthumous child who has been passed over breaks a will by its birth, still, it sometimes happens that only a portion of the will is broken; as, for example, where the posthumous child was disinherited in the first degree, and passed over in the second; for in this instance the appointment in the first degree will be valid, if that in the second is void.

The Same, On Sabinus, Book III. Where anyone is appointed an heir under some condition, by which a posthumous child is not disinherited, still, the degree is broken while the condition is pending, as Julianus stated. But when someone is substituted, even where the condition upon which the appointment in the first degree depends is not fulfilled, the substituted heir will not be admitted to the succession from which the posthumous heir has not been disinherited. I think, therefore, that if the condition of the appointment under the first degree is complied with, the posthumous heir will have the preference. However, the birth of the posthumous child, after failure to comply with the condition, does not destroy the appointment in the first degree, because the latter becomes null and void. By breaking the will, the posthumous child makes a place for himself, even though the son causes the second degree from which he was disinherited to become valid. Where, however, the posthumous child who was passed over in the first degree and disinherited in the second is born at the time when one of the appointed heirs is living, the entire will is broken; for, by destroying the first degree, he makes a place for himself in the succession.

The Same, On Sabinus, Book III. A slave who belongs entirely, or partly, to another, can be appointed the heir of the testator, without the grant of his freedom. 1If I appoint my slave to be absolutely my heir, but grant him his freedom under a certain condition, his appointment will be deferred until the time when his freedom is granted him. 2Where a party stated in his will: “If Titius shall be my heir, let Seius be my heir and let Titius be my heir”; the acceptance of Titius is awaited as a condition for Seius to become the heir. And, indeed, this is reasonable, and seems so to Julianus and Tertyllianus. 3Where an heir has accepted a trust by which freedom is conditionally granted to a slave, the said slave can be appointed heir by the former, with an absolute grant of his freedom, without waiting for the fulfillment of the condition, and he will obtain both his freedom and the estate. In the meantime, he will be a necessary heir, and will become a voluntary heir when the condition is fulfilled, so that he will not cease to be an heir, but the right of succession will be changed so far as he is concerned. 4Delay in opening a will does not affect the rights of a necessary heir, as we are accustomed to hold where anyone is substituted for a minor. For it has been established that if the substitute gives himself to be arrogated by the minor, as the son of the deceased, he will become his necessary heir.

The Same, On Sabinus, Book III. An heir who has no right to enter upon an estate is not considered to have refused to do so.

Ulpianus, On Sabinus, Book III. When a slave is sold under the condition that he shall be manumitted during the lifetime of the purchaser, when the latter dies, he will immediately be entitled to his freedom.

The Same, On Sabinus, Book III. A slave cannot obtain his freedom if, after having been banished, he remains in the City.

The Same, On Sabinus, Book III. He who can consent openly can likewise do so by not refusing.