Ulpianus, On the Lex Julia et Papia, Book III. A Rescript of the Emperors Antoninus and Commodus which forbade Senators to marry certain persons, did not mention anything with reference to betrothals; still, it is properly held that betrothals made under such conditions are void by operation of law; in order to supply what is lacking in the Rescript.

Ulpianus, On the Lex Julia et Papia, Book III. Where a man of Senatorial rank has as a wife a woman who has been manumitted, although, in the meantime, she may not legally be his wife, still, she occupies such a position that if he should lose his rank she will become his wife.

Ulpianus, On the Lex Julia et Papia, Book III. It is stated that Ateius Capito, during his consulate, issued a decree of this kind. It must be observed, however, that this rule does not apply where a patron emancipated a female slave in order to marry her.

Ulpianus, On the Lex Julia et Papia, Book III. In that law which provides that where a freedwoman has been married to her patron, after separation from him she cannot marry another without his consent; we understand the patron to be one who has bought a female slave under the condition of manumitting her (as is stated in the Rescript of our Emperor and his father), because, after having been manumitted, she becomes the freedwoman of the purchaser. 1This rule does not apply to anyone who has sworn that he is the patron of the woman. 2Nor should he be considered her patron who did not purchase the woman with his own money. 3It is clear that we must not doubt that a son under paternal control, who is a soldier, acquires this right if he manumits a female slave by means of his castrense peculium; for he becomes her patron in accordance with the Imperial Constitutions, and this privilege does not belong to his father. 4This section of the law has reference only to a freedwoman who is married, and does not apply to one who is betrothed; hence, if a freedwoman, who has been betrothed, notifies her patron of her repudiation of the contract, she can contract matrimony with another, even if her patron should be unwilling. 5The law says in the next place: “If her patron should be unwilling,” and we should understand the term “unwilling” to refer to a party who consents to a divorce, and therefore she who is divorced from an insane husband, is not exempt from the consequences of this law; nor where she does so while the latter is ignorant of the fact, for her patron is more properly said to be unwilling than one who dissents. 6Where a patron is captured by enemies, I apprehend that she can marry just as would be the case if her patron was dead. Those who adopt the opinion of Julianus hold that she could not contract marriage, for he thinks that the marriage of a freedwoman lasts even during the captivity of her patron, on account of the respect which she owes him. It is evident, however, that if her patron should be reduced to any other kind of servitude, the marriage would unquestionably be dissolved.

Ulpianus, On the Lex Julia et Papia, Book III. Where the law says: “The right of a freedwoman, who is married to her patron, to obtain a divorce shall not be allowed,” this is not held to have made the divorce ineffective, because marriage is ordinarily dissolved by the Civil Law; therefore we cannot say that the marriage exists, as a separation has taken place. Again, Julianus says that a wife is not under such circumstances entitled to an action to recover her dowry; hence it is reasonable that when her patron desires her to remain his wife she cannot marry anyone else. For, as the legislator understood that the marriage was, to a certain extent, dissolved by the act of the freedwoman, he prevented her marriage with another, wherefore if she should marry anyone else, she will be considered as not married. Julianus, indeed, goes farther, for he thinks that such a woman cannot even live in concubinage with anyone except her patron. 1The law says: “As long as the patron desires her to remain his wife.” This means that the patron wishes her to be his wife, and that his relationship towards her should continue to exist; therefore where he either ceases to be her patron, or to desire that she should remain his wife, the authority of the law is at an end. 2It has been most justly established that the benefit of this law terminated whenever the patron, by any indication of his will whatsoever, is understood to have relinquished his desire to keep the woman as his wife. Hence, when he institutes proceedings against his freedwoman on the ground of the removal of property, after she had divorced him without his consent, our Emperor and his Divine Father stated in a Rescript that the party was understood to be unwilling that the woman should remain his wife, when he brings this action or another like it, which it is not customary to do unless in case of divorce. Wherefore, if the husband accuses her of adultery or of some other crime of which no one can accuse a wife but her husband, the better opinion is that the marriage is dissolved; for it should be remembered that the wife is not deprived of the right to marry another except where the patron himself desires to retain her in that capacity. Hence, whenever even a slight reason indicates that the husband does not desire her to remain his wife, it must be said that the freedwoman has already acquired the right to contract marriage with another. Therefore, if the patron has betrothed himself to, or destined himself for some other woman, or has sought marriage with another, he must be considered to no longer desire the freedwoman to be his wife. The same rule will apply where he keeps the woman as his concubine.

Ulpianus, On the Lex Julia et Papia, Book III. Even women can obtain the right to wear a gold ring, as well as that of being considered freeborn, and be restored to the privileges they are entitled to by their birth.

The Same, On the Lex Julia et Papia, Book III. Fraud is one thing, and the penalty for it another; for fraud can exist without a penalty, but there cannot be a penalty for it without a fraud. A penalty is the punishment of an offence, a fraud is the offence itself and is, as it were, a kind of preparation for the penalty. 1A great difference exists between a fine and a penalty, for the term “penalty” is a general one, and means the punishment of all crimes; but a fine is imposed for some particular offence, whose punishment is, at present, a pecuniary one. A penalty, however, is not only pecuniary, but usually implies the loss of life and reputation. A fine is left to the discretion of the magistrate who passes sentence; a penalty is not inflicted unless it is expressly imposed by law, or by some other authority. And, indeed, a fine is inflicted where a special penalty has not been prescribed. Moreover, he can impose a penalty upon whom jurisdiction has been conferred. Magistrates and Governors of provinces alone are permitted by the Imperial Mandates to impose fines; anyone, however, who has a right to take judicial cognizance of a crime or a misdemeanor can inflict the penalty.