Ad legem Iuliam et Papiam libri
Ex libro I
Dig. 1,5,25Idem libro primo ad legem Iuliam et Papiam. Ingenuum accipere debemus etiam eum, de quo sententia lata est, quamvis fuerit libertinus: quia res iudicata pro veritate accipitur.
The Same, On the Lex Julia et Papia, Book I. We should consider him to be freeborn who has been legally declared such, even though he is in fact a freedman; for the reason that whatever is judicially determined is accepted as truth.
Dig. 1,9,5Ulpianus libro primo ad legem Iuliam et Papiam. Senatoris filium accipere debemus non tantum eum qui naturalis est, verum adoptivum quoque: neque intererit, a quo vel qualiter adoptatus fuerit nec interest, iam in senatoria dignitate constitutus eum susceperit an ante dignitatem senatoriam.
Ulpianus, On the Lex Julia et Papia, Book I. We should understand by the terms “the son of a Senator”, not only a natural son but also an adopted one, and it does not matter by whom or in what way he has been adopted. Nor does it make any difference whether he was already invested with Senatorial rank when he adopted him, or whether this was done subsequently.
Dig. 1,9,7Ulpianus libro primo ad legem Iuliam et Papiam. Emancipatum a patre senatore quasi senatoris filium haberi placet. 1Item Labeo scribit etiam eum, qui post mortem patris senatoris natus sit, quasi senatoris filium esse. sed eum, qui posteaquam pater eius de senatu motus est, concipitur et nascitur, Proculus et Pegasus opinantur non esse quasi senatoris filium, quorum sententia vera est: nec enim proprie senatoris filius dicetur is, cuius pater senatu motus est antequam iste nasceretur. si quis conceptus quidem sit, antequam pater eius senatu moveatur, natus autem post patris amissam dignitatem, magis est ut quasi senatoris filius intellegatur: tempus enim conceptionis spectandum plerisque placuit. 2Si quis et patrem et avum habuerit senatorem, et quasi filius et quasi nepos senatoris intellegitur. sed si pater amiserit dignitatem ante conceptionem huius, quaeri poterit an, quamvis quasi senatoris filius non intellegatur, quasi nepos tamen intellegi debeat: et magis est ut debeat, ut avi potius ei dignitas prosit, quam obsit casus patris.
Ulpianus, On the Lex Julia et Papia, Book I. It is established that the son of a Senator emancipated by his father is always considered a Senator’s son. 1Labeo also declares that a child born after the death of his father who was a Senator, shall be considered the son of the Senator. Proculus and Pegasus are of the opinion, however, that a child who was conceived and born after the expulsion of its father from the Senate, should not be considered a Senator’s son. This opinion is correct, for he whose father has been expelled from the Senate before he was born, cannot properly be called the son of a Senator; but where a child has been conceived before its father was expelled from the Senate, and born after his father had lost his rank, the better opinion is that he should be understood to be the son of a Senator. It is held by many that the time of conception should only be considered under such circumstances. 2Anyone whose father and grandfather have been Senators is understood to be both the son and the grandson of a Senator; if, however, his father lost his rank before the conception of the former, the question might arise whether he should not be considered the grandson of a Senator, even though he was no longer regarded as the son of one? It is the better opinion that he ought to be, so that the rank of his grandfather may be of advantage to him, rather than he should be injured by the condition of his father.
Dig. 23,2,43Ulpianus libro primo ad legem Iuliam et Papiam. Palam quaestum facere dicemus non tantum eam, quae in lupanario se prostituit, verum etiam si qua (ut adsolet) in taberna cauponia vel qua alia pudori suo non parcit. 1Palam autem sic accipimus passim, hoc est sine dilectu: non si qua adulteris vel stupratoribus se committit, sed quae vicem prostitutae sustinet. 2Item quod cum uno et altero pecunia accepta commiscuit, non videtur palam corpore quaestum facere. 3Octavenus tamen rectissime ait etiam eam, quae sine quaestu palam se prostituerit, debuisse his connumerari. 4Non solum autem ea quae facit, verum ea quoque quae fecit, etsi facere desiit, lege notatur: neque enim aboletur turpitudo, quae postea intermissa est. 5Non est ignoscendum ei, quae obtentu paupertatis turpissimam vitam egit. 6Lenocinium facere non minus est quam corpore quaestum exercere. 7Lenas autem eas dicimus, quae mulieres quaestuarias prostituunt. 8Lenam accipiemus et eam, quae alterius nomine hoc vitae genus exercet. 9Si qua cauponam exercens in ea corpora quaestuaria habeat (ut multae adsolent sub praetextu instrumenti cauponii prostitutas mulieres habere), dicendum hanc quoque lenae appellatione contineri. 10Senatus censuit non conveniens esse ulli senatori uxorem ducere aut retinere damnatam publico iudicio, quo iudicio cuilibet ex populo experiri licet, nisi si cui lege aliqua accusandi publico iudicio non est potestas. 11Si qua calumniae iudicio damnata sit ex causa publici iudicii et quae praevaricationis damnata est, publico iudicio damnata esse non videtur. 12Quae in adulterio deprehensa est, quasi publico iudicio damnata est. proinde si adulterii condemnata esse proponatur, non tantum quia deprehensa est erit notata, sed quia et publico iudicio damnata est. quod si non sit deprehensa, damnata autem, idcirco notetur, quia publico iudicio damnata est, at si deprehensa quidem sit, damnata autem non sit, notata erit? ego puto, etsi absoluta sit post deprehensionem, adhuc tamen notam illi obesse debere, quia verum est eam in adulterio deprehensam, quia factum lex, non sententiam notaverit. 13Non adicitur hic ut in lege Iulia de adulteriis a quo vel ubi deprehensam: proinde sive maritus sive quis alius deprehendisse proponatur, videtur notata: sed et si non in domo mariti vel patris sui deprehensa sit, erit notata secundum verba legis.
Ulpianus, On the Lex Julia et Papia, Book I. We hold that a woman openly practices prostitution, not only where she does so in a house of ill-fame, but also if she is accustomed to do this in taverns, or in other places where she manifests no regard for her modesty. 1We understand the word “openly” to mean indiscriminately, that is to say, without choice, and not if she commits adultery or fornication, but where she sustains the role of a prostitute. 2Moreover, where a woman, having accepted money, has intercourse with only one or two persons, she is not considered to have openly prostituted herself. 3Octavenus, however, says very properly that where a woman publicly prostitutes herself without doing so for money, she should be classed as a harlot. 4The law brands with infamy not only a woman who practices prostitution, but also one who has formerly done so, even though she has ceased to act in this manner; for the disgrace is not removed even if the practice is subsequently discontinued. 5A woman is not to be excused who leads a vicious life under the pretext of poverty. 6The occupation of a pander is not less disgraceful than the practice of prostitution. 7We designate those women as procuresses who prostitute other women for money. 8We understand the term “procuress” to mean a woman who lives this kind of a life on account of another. 9Where one woman conducts a tavern, and keeps others in it who prostitute themselves, as many are accustomed to do under the pretext of employing women for the service of the house; it must be said that they are included in the class of procuresses. 10The Senate decreed that it was not proper for a Senator to marry or keep a woman who had been convicted of a criminal offence, the accusation for which could be made by any of the people; unless he was prohibited by law from bringing such an accusation in court. 11Where a woman has been publicly convicted of having made a false accusation, or prevarication, she is not held to have been convicted of a criminal offence. 12Where a woman is caught in adultery, she is considered to have been convicted of a criminal offence. Hence if she is proved to have been guilty of adultery, she will be branded with infamy, not only because she was caught flagrante delicto, but also because she was convicted of a criminal offence. If, however, she was not caught, but was, nevertheless, found guilty, she becomes infamous because she was convicted of a criminal offence; and, indeed, if she was caught but was not convicted, she would still be infamous. I think that even if she should be acquitted after having been caught, she will still remain infamous, because it is certain that she was taken in adultery, and the law renders the act infamous and does not make this dependent upon the judicial decision. 13It is not mentioned here, as in the Lex Julia on adultery, by whom or where the woman must be caught; hence she is considered infamous whether she was caught by her husband or by anyone else. She will also be infamous according to the terms of the law, even if she was not caught in the house of her husband or her father.
Dig. 35,2,62Ulpianus libro primo ad legem Iuliam et Papiam. In lege Falcidia hoc esse servandum Iulianus ait, ut, si duo rei promittendi fuerint vel duo rei stipulandi, si quidem socii sint in ea re, dividi inter eos debere obligationem, atque si singuli partem pecuniae stipulati essent vel promisissent: quod si societas inter eos nulla fuisset, in pendenti esse, in utrius bonis computari oporteat id quod debetur vel ex cuius bonis detrahi. 1Corpora si qua sunt in bonis defuncti, secundum rei veritatem aestimanda erunt, hoc est secundum praesens pretium: nec quicquam eorum formali pretio aestimandum esse sciendum est.
Ulpianus, On the Lex Julia et Papia, Book I. Julianus says that, in estimating the portion due under the Falcidian Law, the following rule should be observed, namely, where there are two promising, or two stipulating debtors, and they are partners, the common obligation should be divided between them; just as if each one had stipulated or promised to pay the amount individually. If, however, no partnership existed between them, the matter would remain in abeyance, and a calculation should be made in order to determine what is due to the estates of the creditors, or what should be deducted from those of the debtors. 1Any property belonging to the estate of the deceased must be estimated at its value, that is to say, at the price it will bring at the present time; and it should be understood that the appraisement must not be made of the value which the property would have under certain conditions.
Dig. 40,10,6Ulpianus libro primo ad legem Iuliam et Papiam. Libertinus si ius anulorum impetraverit, quamvis iura ingenuitatis salvo iure patroni nactus sit, tamen ingenuus intellegitur: et hoc divus Hadrianus rescripsit.
Ulpianus, On the Lex Julia et Papia, Book I. A freedman who has obtained the right to wear a gold ring (although he may obtain the right attaching to the condition of being freeborn, reserving the rights of his patron), is still considered as freeborn. This the Divine Hadrian stated in a Rescript.
Dig. 40,16,4Ulpianus libro primo ad legem Iuliam et Papiam. Si libertinus per collusionem fuerit pronuntiatus ingenuus, conlusione detecta in quibus causis quasi libertinus incipit esse. medio tamen tempore, antequam collusio detegatur et post sententiam de ingenuitate latam, utique quasi ingenuus accipitur.
Ulpianus, On the Lex Julia et Papia, Book I. Where a freedman, through collusion, has been declared to be entitled to the rights of a freeborn person, and the collusion has been established, he is, in some respects regarded, as a freedman. In the meantime, however, before the collusion has been exposed, and after the decision with reference to his rights as a freeborn person has been rendered, he will be regarded as freeborn.
Dig. 50,16,128Ulpianus libro primo ad legem Iuliam et Papiam. Spadonum generalis appellatio est: quo nomine tam hi, qui natura spadones sunt, item thlibiae thlasiae, sed et si quod aliud genus spadonum est, continentur.
Ulpianus, On the Lex Julia et Papia, Book I. The term “eunuch” is one of general application, and under it are included not only persons who are eunuchs by nature, but also those made such by crushing or pressure, as well as every other kind of eunuch whatsoever.
Dig. 50,17,207Ulpianus libro primo ad legem Iuliam et Papiam. Res iudicata pro veritate accipitur.
Ulpianus, On the Lex Julia et Papia, Book I. Where a matter has been decided, it is considered as true.
Ex libro II
Dig. 25,7,1Ulpianus libro secundo ad legem Iuliam et Papiam. Quae in concubinatu est, ab invito patrono poterit discedere et alteri se aut in matrimonium aut in concubinatum dare? ego quidem probo in concubina adimendum ei conubium, si patronum invitum deserat, quippe cum honestius sit patrono libertam concubinam quam matrem familias habere. 1Cum Atilicino sentio et puto solas eas in concubinatu habere posse sine metu criminis, in quas stuprum non committitur. 2Qui autem damnatam adulterii in concubinatu habuit, non puto lege Iulia de adulteriis teneri, quamvis, si uxorem eam duxisset, teneretur. 3Si qua in patroni fuit concubinatu, deinde filii esse coepit vel in nepotis, vel contra, non puto eam recte facere, quia prope nefaria est huiusmodi coniunctio, et ideo huiusmodi facinus prohibendum est. 4Cuiuscumque aetatis concubinam habere posse palam est, nisi minor annis duodecim sit.
Ulpianus, On the Lex Julia et Papia, Book II. Where a freedwoman is living in concubinage with her patron, she can leave him without his consent, and unite with another man, either in matrimony or in concubinage. I think, however, that a concubine should not have the right to marry if she leaves her patron without his consent, since it is more honorable for a freedwoman to be the concubine of a patron than to become the mother of a family. 1I hold with Atilicinus, that only those women who are not disgraced by such a connection can be kept in concubinage without the fear of committing a crime. 2Where a man keeps in concubinage a woman who has been convicted of adultery, I do not think that the Lex Julia de Adulteriis will be applicable, although he will be liable if he should marry her. 3If a woman has lived in concubinage with her patron, and then maintains the same relation with his son or grandson, I do not think that she is acting properly, because a connection of this kind closely approaches one that is infamous, and therefore such scandalous conduct should be prohibited. 4It is clear that anyone can keep a concubine of any age unless she is less than twelve years old.
Dig. 29,2,79Ulpianus libro secundo ad legem Iuliam et Papiam. Placet, quotiens adquiritur per aliquem hereditas vel quid aliud ei cuius quis in potestate est, confestim adquiri ei cuius est in potestate, neque momento aliquo subsistere in persona eius per quem adquiritur et sic adquiri ei cui adquiritur.
Ulpianus, On the Lex Julia et Papia, Book II. It is established that whenever an estate, or anything else, is acquired through some person who is under the control of another, it is immediately acquired by the latter, and does not remain for a moment vested in him by whom it is acquired, and hence it is directly obtained by the party entitled to it.
Dig. 50,16,130Ulpianus libro secundo ad legem Iuliam et Papiam. Lege obvenire hereditatem non inproprie quis dixerit et eam, quae ex testamento defertur, quia lege duodecim tabularum testamentariae hereditates confirmantur.
Ulpianus, On the Lex Julia et Papia, Book II. Anyone can very properly say that an estate which falls to a person as heir at law, or by will, legally belongs to him, because by the Law of the Twelve Tables testamentary estates are confirmed.
Ex libro III
Dig. 23,1,16Ulpianus libro tertio ad legem Iuliam et Papiam. Oratio imperatorum Antonini et commodi, quae quasdam nuptias in personam senatorum inhibuit, de sponsalibus nihil locuta est. recte tamen dicitur etiam sponsalia in his casibus ipso iure nullius esse momenti, ut suppleatur quod orationi deest.
Ulpianus, On the Lex Julia et Papia, Book III. A Rescript of the Emperors Antoninus and Commodus which forbade Senators to marry certain persons, did not mention anything with reference to betrothals; still, it is properly held that betrothals made under such conditions are void by operation of law; in order to supply what is lacking in the Rescript.
Dig. 23,2,27Ulpianus libro tertio ad legem Iuliam et Papiam. Si quis in senatorio ordine agens libertinam habuerit uxorem, quamvis interim uxor non sit, attamen in ea condicione est, ut, si amiserit dignitatem, uxor esse incipiat.
Ulpianus, On the Lex Julia et Papia, Book III. Where a man of Senatorial rank has as a wife a woman who has been manumitted, although, in the meantime, she may not legally be his wife, still, she occupies such a position that if he should lose his rank she will become his wife.
Dig. 23,2,29Ulpianus libro tertio ad legem Iuliam et Papiam. quod et Ateius Capito consulatu suo fertur decrevisse. hoc tamen ita observandum est, nisi patronus ideo eam manumisit, ut uxorem eam ducat.
Ulpianus, On the Lex Julia et Papia, Book III. It is stated that Ateius Capito, during his consulate, issued a decree of this kind. It must be observed, however, that this rule does not apply where a patron emancipated a female slave in order to marry her.
Dig. 23,2,45Ulpianus libro tertio ad legem Iuliam et Papiam. In eo iure, quod dicit invito patrono libertam, quae ei nupta est, alii nubere non posse, patronum accipimus (ut rescripto imperatoris nostri et divi patris eius continetur) et eum qui hac lege emit, ut manumittat, quia manumissa liberta emptoris habetur. 1Qui autem iuravit se patronum, hoc idem non habebit. 2Ne is quidem debet habere, qui non suis nummis comparavit. 3Plane si filius familias miles esse proponatur, non dubitamus, si castrensis peculii ancillam manumiserit, competere ei hoc ius: est enim patronus secundum constitutiones nec patri eius hoc ius competit. 4Hoc caput ad nuptam tantum libertam pertinet, ad sponsam non pertinet: et ideo invito patrono nuntium sponsa liberta si miserit, cum alio conubium habet. 5Deinde ait lex ‘invito patrono’: invitum accipere debemus eum, qui non consentit ad divortium: idcirco nec a furioso divertendo solvit se huius legis necessitate nec si ab ignorante divorterit: rectius enim hic invitus dicitur quam qui dissensit. 6Si ab hostibus patronus captus esse proponatur, vereor ne possit ista conubium habere nubendo, quemadmodum haberet, si mortuus esset. et qui Iuliani sententiam probant, dicerent non habituram conubium: putat enim Iulianus durare eius libertae matrimonium etiam in captivitate propter patroni reverentiam. certe si in aliam servitutem patronus sit deductus, procul dubio dissolutum esset matrimonium.
Ulpianus, On the Lex Julia et Papia, Book III. In that law which provides that where a freedwoman has been married to her patron, after separation from him she cannot marry another without his consent; we understand the patron to be one who has bought a female slave under the condition of manumitting her (as is stated in the Rescript of our Emperor and his father), because, after having been manumitted, she becomes the freedwoman of the purchaser. 1This rule does not apply to anyone who has sworn that he is the patron of the woman. 2Nor should he be considered her patron who did not purchase the woman with his own money. 3It is clear that we must not doubt that a son under paternal control, who is a soldier, acquires this right if he manumits a female slave by means of his castrense peculium; for he becomes her patron in accordance with the Imperial Constitutions, and this privilege does not belong to his father. 4This section of the law has reference only to a freedwoman who is married, and does not apply to one who is betrothed; hence, if a freedwoman, who has been betrothed, notifies her patron of her repudiation of the contract, she can contract matrimony with another, even if her patron should be unwilling. 5The law says in the next place: “If her patron should be unwilling,” and we should understand the term “unwilling” to refer to a party who consents to a divorce, and therefore she who is divorced from an insane husband, is not exempt from the consequences of this law; nor where she does so while the latter is ignorant of the fact, for her patron is more properly said to be unwilling than one who dissents. 6Where a patron is captured by enemies, I apprehend that she can marry just as would be the case if her patron was dead. Those who adopt the opinion of Julianus hold that she could not contract marriage, for he thinks that the marriage of a freedwoman lasts even during the captivity of her patron, on account of the respect which she owes him. It is evident, however, that if her patron should be reduced to any other kind of servitude, the marriage would unquestionably be dissolved.
Dig. 24,2,11Ulpianus libro tertio ad legem Iuliam et Papiam. Quod ait lex: ‘divortii faciendi potestas libertae, quae nupta est patrono, ne esto’, non infectum videtur effecisse divortium, quod iure civili dissolvere solet matrimonium. quare constare matrimonium dicere non possumus, cum sit separatum. denique scribit Iulianus de dote hanc actionem non habere. merito igitur, quamdiu patronus eius eam uxorem suam esse vult, cum nullo alio conubium ei est nam quia intellexit legis lator facto libertae quasi diremptum matrimonium, detraxit ei cum alio conubium. quare cuicumque nupserit, pro non nupta habebitur. Iulianus quidem amplius putat nec in concubinatu eam alterius patroni esse posse. 1Ait lex: ‘quamdiu patronus eam uxorem esse volet’. et velle debet uxorem esse et patronus durare: si igitur aut patronus esse aut velle desierit, finita est legis auctoritas. 2Illud rectissime placuit, qualiquali voluntate intellegi possit patronus animum habere desisse quasi in uxorem, finiri legis huius beneficium. proinde cum patronus rerum amotarum cum liberta, quae ab invito eo divorterat, vellet experiri, imperator noster cum divo patre suo rescripsit intellegi eum hoc ipso nolle nuptam sibi, qui eam actionem vel aliam inportet, quae non solet nisi ex divortio oriri. quare si accusare eam adulterii coeperit vel alio crimine postulare, quod uxori nemo obicit, magis est, ut diremptum sit matrimonium: etenim meminisse oportet ideo adimi cum alio conubium, quia patronus sibi nuptam cupit. ubicumque igitur vel tenuis intellectus videri potest nolentis nuptam, dicendum est iam incipere libertae cum alio esse conubium. proinde si patronus sibi desponderit aliam vel destinaverit vel matrimonium alterius appetierit, credendus est nolle hanc nuptam: et si concubinam sibi adhibuerit, idem erit probandum.
Ulpianus, On the Lex Julia et Papia, Book III. Where the law says: “The right of a freedwoman, who is married to her patron, to obtain a divorce shall not be allowed,” this is not held to have made the divorce ineffective, because marriage is ordinarily dissolved by the Civil Law; therefore we cannot say that the marriage exists, as a separation has taken place. Again, Julianus says that a wife is not under such circumstances entitled to an action to recover her dowry; hence it is reasonable that when her patron desires her to remain his wife she cannot marry anyone else. For, as the legislator understood that the marriage was, to a certain extent, dissolved by the act of the freedwoman, he prevented her marriage with another, wherefore if she should marry anyone else, she will be considered as not married. Julianus, indeed, goes farther, for he thinks that such a woman cannot even live in concubinage with anyone except her patron. 1The law says: “As long as the patron desires her to remain his wife.” This means that the patron wishes her to be his wife, and that his relationship towards her should continue to exist; therefore where he either ceases to be her patron, or to desire that she should remain his wife, the authority of the law is at an end. 2It has been most justly established that the benefit of this law terminated whenever the patron, by any indication of his will whatsoever, is understood to have relinquished his desire to keep the woman as his wife. Hence, when he institutes proceedings against his freedwoman on the ground of the removal of property, after she had divorced him without his consent, our Emperor and his Divine Father stated in a Rescript that the party was understood to be unwilling that the woman should remain his wife, when he brings this action or another like it, which it is not customary to do unless in case of divorce. Wherefore, if the husband accuses her of adultery or of some other crime of which no one can accuse a wife but her husband, the better opinion is that the marriage is dissolved; for it should be remembered that the wife is not deprived of the right to marry another except where the patron himself desires to retain her in that capacity. Hence, whenever even a slight reason indicates that the husband does not desire her to remain his wife, it must be said that the freedwoman has already acquired the right to contract marriage with another. Therefore, if the patron has betrothed himself to, or destined himself for some other woman, or has sought marriage with another, he must be considered to no longer desire the freedwoman to be his wife. The same rule will apply where he keeps the woman as his concubine.
Dig. 40,10,4Ulpianus libro tertio ad legem Iuliam et Papiam. Etiam feminae ius anulorum aureorum impetrare et natalibus restitui poterunt.
Ulpianus, On the Lex Julia et Papia, Book III. Even women can obtain the right to wear a gold ring, as well as that of being considered freeborn, and be restored to the privileges they are entitled to by their birth.
Dig. 50,16,131Idem libro tertio ad legem Iuliam et Papiam. Aliud ‘fraus’ est, aliud ‘poena’: fraus enim sine poena esse potest, poena sine fraude esse non potest. poena est noxae vindicta, fraus et ipsa noxa dicitur et quasi poenae quaedam praeparatio. 1Inter ‘multam’ autem et ‘poenam’ multum interest, cum poena generale sit nomen omnium delictorum coercitio, multa specialis peccati, cuius animadversio hodie pecuniaria est: poena autem non tantum pecuniaria, verum capitis et existimationis irrogari solet. et multa quidem ex arbitrio eius venit, qui multam dicit: poena non irrogatur, nisi quae quaque lege vel quo alio iure specialiter huic delicto imposita est: quin immo multa ibi dicitur, ubi specialis poena non est imposita. item multam is dicere potest, cui iudicatio data est: magistratus solos et praesides provinciarum posse multam dicere mandatis permissum est. poenam autem unusquisque inrogare potest, cui huius criminis sive delicti exsecutio competit.
The Same, On the Lex Julia et Papia, Book III. Fraud is one thing, and the penalty for it another; for fraud can exist without a penalty, but there cannot be a penalty for it without a fraud. A penalty is the punishment of an offence, a fraud is the offence itself and is, as it were, a kind of preparation for the penalty. 1A great difference exists between a fine and a penalty, for the term “penalty” is a general one, and means the punishment of all crimes; but a fine is imposed for some particular offence, whose punishment is, at present, a pecuniary one. A penalty, however, is not only pecuniary, but usually implies the loss of life and reputation. A fine is left to the discretion of the magistrate who passes sentence; a penalty is not inflicted unless it is expressly imposed by law, or by some other authority. And, indeed, a fine is inflicted where a special penalty has not been prescribed. Moreover, he can impose a penalty upon whom jurisdiction has been conferred. Magistrates and Governors of provinces alone are permitted by the Imperial Mandates to impose fines; anyone, however, who has a right to take judicial cognizance of a crime or a misdemeanor can inflict the penalty.
Ex libro IV
Dig. 1,6,10Ulpianus libro quarto ad legem Iuliam et Papiam. Si iudex nutriri vel ali oportere pronuntiaverit, dicendum est de veritate quaerendum, filius sit an non: neque enim alimentorum causa veritati facit praeiudicium.
Ulpianus, On the Lex Julia et Papia, Book IV. Where a judge decides that a child is to be brought up or supported, it should be held that it must be certainly ascertained whether it is his son or not; a ruling as to support cannot prejudice the truth.
Dig. 1,7,46Ulpianus libro quarto ad legem Iuliam et Papiam. In servitute mea quaesitus mihi filius in potestatem meam redigi beneficio principis potest: libertinum tamen eum manere non dubitatur.
Ulpianus, On the Lex Julia et Papia, Book IV. A son begotten by me while in slavery can be brought under my authority by the indulgence of the Emperor; still, there is no question that such a son remains in the class of freedmen.
Dig. 36,2,23Ulpianus libro quarto ad legem Iuliam et Papiam. Cum in annos singulos legatum relinquitur, sine dubio per annos singulos inspecta condicione legatarii aut capere. et si plurium servus sit, singulorum dominorum erunt personae spectandae.
Ulpianus, On the Lex Julia et Papia, Book IV. Where a legacy is bequeathed payable every year, it is said that there is no doubt that the condition of the legatee should be investigated every year, to determine whether he is capable of receiving it; and if he is a slave belonging to several masters, the condition of the different masters must be investigated.
Dig. 49,15,9Ulpianus libro quarto ad legem Iuliam et Papiam. Apud hostes susceptus filius si postliminio redierit, filii iura habet: habere enim eum postliminium nulla dubitatio est post rescriptum imperatoris Antonini et divi patris eius ad Ovinium Tertullum praesidem provinciae Mysiae inferioris.
Ulpianus, On the Lex Julia et Papia, Book IV. When a child born in the hands of the enemy returns under the law of postliminium, he will be entitled to the privileges of a son; for, according to a Rescript of the Emperor Antoninus and his Divine Father, addressed to Ovinius Tertullus, Governor of the Province of lower Mysia, there is no doubt that he has the right of postliminium.
Dig. 50,16,133Ulpianus libro quarto ad legem Iuliam et Papiam. Si quis sic dixerit ‘ut intra diem mortis eius aliquid fiat’, ipse quoque dies, quo quis mortuus est, numeratur.
Ulpianus, On the Lex Julia et Papia, Book IV. Where anyone provides that something shall be done before his death, the very day on which he died is counted.
Dig. 50,16,135Ulpianus libro quarto ad legem Iuliam et Papiam. Quaeret aliquis si portentosum vel monstrosum vel debilem mulier ediderit vel qualem visu vel vagitu novum, non humanae figurae, sed alterius, magis animalis quam hominis, partum, an, quia enixa est, prodesse ei debeat? et magis est, ut haec quoque parentibus prosint: nec enim est quod eis imputetur, quae qualiter potuerunt, statutis obtemperaverunt, neque id quod fataliter accessit, matri damnum iniungere debet.
Ulpianus, On the Lex Julia et Papia, Book IV. Where a woman brings forth a child that is deformed, or a monster, or defective, or which has something unusual in its appearance or its voice, and which has no resemblance to a human being, but seems to be rather an animal than a man, someone may ask, will it be any benefit to her to have brought such a creature into the world? The better opinion is, that consideration must be had for its parents, for they ought not to be censured, as they have done their duty as far as they could, nor should the mother be prejudiced, because an unfortunate occurrence has taken place.
Dig. 50,17,209Ulpianus libro quarto ad legem Iuliam et Papiam. Servitutem mortalitati fere comparamus.
Ulpianus, On the Lex Julia et Papia, Book IV. We, to a certain extent, compare slavery with death.
Ex libro V
Dig. 37,14,14Ulpianus libro quinto ad legem Iuliam et Papiam. Si iuravero me patronum esse, dicendum est non esse me quantum ad successionem patronum, quia iusiurandum patronum non facit: aliter atque si patronum esse pronuntiatum sit: tunc enim sententia stabitur.
Ulpianus, On the Lex Julia et Papia, Book V. If I should swear in court that I am the patron of a certain slave, it must be held that I am not entitled to his estate in that capacity, because an oath does not constitute a patron. The case would, however, be different, if it had been judicially decided that I was his patron, for then the judgment will stand.
Dig. 38,10,6Ulpianus libro quinto ad legem Iuliam et Papiam. Labeo scribit nepotis ex filia mea nati uxorem nurum mihi esse. 1Generi et nurus appellatione sponsus quoque et sponsa continetur: item socri et socrus appellatione sponsorum parentes contineri videntur.
Ulpianus, On the Lex Julia et Papia, Book V. Labeo says that the wife of my grandson, the son of my daughter, is my granddaughter. 1Persons who are betrothed are included in the terms son-in-law and daughter-in-law, likewise the parents of such persons are considered to be included in the terms father-in-law and mother-in-law.
Dig. 50,16,136Idem libro quinto ad legem Iuliam et Papiam. ‘Generi’ appellatione et neptis et proneptis tam ex filio quam ex filia editorum ceterarumque maritos contineri manifestum est.
The Same, On the Lex Julia et Papia, Book V. It is evident that, under the term “son-in-law” are included the husbands of granddaughters, and great-granddaughters, and their descendants; whether they are the offspring of a son or a daughter.
Ex libro VI
Dig. 4,6,36Ulpianus libro sexto ad legem Iuliam et Papiam. Rei publicae causa abesse eos solos intellegimus, qui non sui commodi causa, sed coacti absunt.
Ulpianus, On the Lex Julia et Papia, Book VI. We only understand those to be absent on public business who are absent not for their own convenience, but from necessity.
Dig. 4,6,38Ulpianus libro sexto ad legem Iuliam et Papiam. Si cui in provincia sua princeps adsidere speciali beneficio permiserit, puto eum rei publicae causa abesse: quod si non ex permissu hoc fecerit, consequenter dicemus, cum crimen admisit, non habere eum privilegia eorum, qui rei publicae causa absunt. 1Tamdiu rei publicae causa abesse quis videbitur, quamdiu officio aliquo praeest: quod si finitum fuerit officium, iam desinit abesse rei publicae causa. sed ad revertendum illi tempora computabimus statim atque desiit rei publicae causa abesse ea quibus reverti in urbem potuit: et erit moderatum tempora ei dare, quae lex revertentibus praestitit. quare si quo deflexerit suae rei causa, non dubitamus id tempus ei non proficere, habitaque dinumeratione temporis, quo reverti potuit, statim eum dicemus desisse rei publicae causa abesse. plane si infirmitate impeditus continuare iter non potuit, habebitur ratio humanitatis, sicuti haberi solet et hiemis et navigationis et ceterorum quae casu contingunt.
Ulpianus, On the Lex Julia et Papia, Book VI. I am of the opinion that he is absent in the service of the State whom the Emperor, as a special favor, has permitted to act as assessor in his own province; but if he does not so act by his permission, we must hold that, by doing so, he is guilty of an offence, and is not entitled to the privileges of those who are absent in the service of the State. 1A party is considered to be absent in the service of the State, as long as he fills some office, but as soon as his term of office is ended, he ceases to be absent on public business. We, however, calculate the time allowed him for his return from the date when he ceased to be absent in the public service, that is to say, as much as he requires to return to the City, and it will be reasonable to grant him the time which the law allows to other returning officials. Wherefore, if he turns aside on account of some affair of his own; there is no doubt that the time so consumed will not be granted him, but will be calculated with reference to the period within which he could have returned; and when this has elapsed we must say that he has ceased to be absent in the service of the State. It is evident that if he is prevented from continuing his journey by illness, humane considerations must prevail; just as is customary in case of bad weather, difficulties of navigation, and other things which accidentally happen.
Dig. 23,2,31Ulpianus libro sexto ad legem Iuliam et Papiam. Si senatori indulgentia principis fuerit permissum libertinam iustam uxorem habere, potest iusta uxor esse.
Ulpianus, On the Lex Julia et Papia, Book VI. Where a Senator is permitted to marry a freedwoman by the consent of the Emperor, she will be his lawful wife.
Ex libro VII
Dig. 24,3,64Ulpianus libro septimo ad legem Iuliam et Papiam. Si vero negotium gerens mulieris non invitae maritus dotalem servum voluntate eius manumiserit, debet uxori restituere quidquid ad eum pervenit. 1Sed et si quid libertatis causa maritus ei imposuit, id uxori praestabit. 2Plane si operae fuerint marito exhibitae, non aestimatio earum, non erit aequum hoc nomine uxori maritum quippiam praestare. 3Sed si post manumissionem aliquid ei fuerit liberto impositum, id uxori praestandum est. 4Sed et si reum maritus acceperit adpromissoremve, aeque adversus ipsum obligationem debet praestare. 5Item quidquid ad eum ex bonis liberti pervenerit, aeque praestare cogetur, si modo ad eum quasi ad patronum pervenerit: ceterum si alio iure, non cogetur praestare: nec enim beneficium quod in eum libertus contulit, hoc uxori debet, sed id tantum, quod iure patronatus adsequitur vel adsequi potuit. plane si ex maiore parte quam debet heres scriptus fuerit, quod amplius est non praestabit: et si forte, cum ei nihil deberet libertus, heredem eum scripsit, nihil uxori restituet. 6Dabit autem, ut ait lex, quod ad eum pervenit. pervenisse accipimus, sive iam exegit sive exigere potest, quia actio ei delata est. 7Adicitur in lege, ut et, si dolo malo aliquid factum sit, quo minus ad eum perveniat, teneatur. 8Si filium exheredaverit patronus et ad eum bona liberti pertineant, videndum est, an heres hoc nomine teneatur. et cum nihil neque ad ipsum patronum neque ad heredem eius perveniat, quomodo fieri potest, ut hoc nomine teneatur? 9De viro heredeque eius lex tantum loquitur: de socero successoribusque soceri nihil in lege scriptum est: et hoc Labeo quasi omissum adnotat. in quibus igitur casibus lex deficit, non erit nec utilis actio danda. 10Quod ait lex: ‘quanta pecunia erit tantam pecuniam dato’, ostendit aestimationem hereditatis vel bonorum liberti, non ipsam hereditatem voluisse legem praestare, nisi maritus ipsas res tradere maluerit: et hoc enim benignius admitti debet.
Ulpianus, On the Lex Julia et Papia, Book VII. Where, however, a husband who is transacting the business of his wife, with her consent, manumits a dotal slave, with her permission, he must restore to his wife whatever may have come into his hands through the said slave. 1If he imposes any conditions upon the slave in consideration of his freedom, he must be responsible for this to his wife. 2It is evident if any services should be performed by the freedman for the husband, and no appraisement of them should be made, it will not be just for the husband to pay anything to the wife on this account. 3But if any charge was imposed upon the freedman after manumission, this must be accounted for to the wife. 4Where, however, the freedman is the debtor of the husband, or has rendered himself liable for any other obligation, he must assign the claim which he holds against him to his wife. 5He is also compelled to deliver to his wife any of the property of the freedman, which may come into his hands, provided he acquired it in the capacity of patron. If, however, he acquires it in any other way, he is not compelled to transfer it, for he is not liable to his wife for anything which the freedman gives to him gratuitously, but only for what he acquires, or can acquire under his rights as patron. It is evident that if he is appointed heir by the freedman to the greater portion of the debt which the latter owes him, he will not be responsible for the excess; and if the freedman should constitute him his heir when he is not indebted to him, he will not be bound to give anything to his wife. 6He must, however (as the law declares), give “whatever may come into his hands”. We understand this to mean whatever he collects, or can collect, because a right of action to do so is granted him. 7It is added in the law that the husband shall be liable where he has committed any fraudulent act to prevent the property from coming into his hands. 8If a patron disinherits his son, and the property of the freedman should be obtained by the latter, it must be considered whether the heir will be liable on this ground. And, also, where nothing comes into the hands of the patron himself, or into the hands of his heir, how can be become liable on this account? 9The law only speaks of the husband and his heir. Nothing is mentioned in it with reference to a father-in-law and his successors; and Labeo notices this as having been omitted. In these instances, therefore, the law is defective, and not even a prætorian action can be granted. 10Where the law says that the husband shall give up the money which he has received, it is evident that it did not intend that he should surrender the estate itself, but only the value of the same, or of the property of the freedman; unless the husband should prefer to surrender the property itself, and this should be admitted as the more favorable construction.
Dig. 50,16,139Ulpianus libro septimo ad legem Iuliam et Papiam. Aedificia ‘Romae’ fieri etiam ea videntur, quae in continentibus Romae aedificiis fiant. 1‘Perfecisse’ aedificium is videtur, qui ita consummavit, ut iam in usu esse possit.
Ulpianus, On the Lex Julia et Papia, Book VII. Houses are considered to be built at Rome when they are erected contiguous to the city. 1He is considered to have finished a house who has completed it so that it can be occupied.
Ex libro VIII
Dig. 31,51Ulpianus libro octavo ad legem Iuliam et Papiam. Si ita quis testamento suo cavisset: ‘illi quantum plurimum per legem accipere potest dari volo’, utique tunc, cum quando capere potuerit, videtur ei relictum. sed et si dixerit: ‘quam maximam partem dare possum, damnas esto heres meus ei dare’, idem erit dicendum. 1Is cui in tempus liberorum tertia pars relicta est, utique non poterit adoptando tertiam partem consequi.
Ulpianus, On the Lex Julia et Papia, Book VIII. Where a testator made the following provision in his will, “I desire that there be given to So-and-So all that he is permitted to receive by law,” then this bequest is considered to refer to the time when the legatee could receive the property under the will. If, however, the testator had said, “Let my heir be charged to give the largest share of my estate that I can dispose of,” it must be said that the same rule will apply. 1A person to whom the third part of an estate is left to vest at a time when he will have children cannot obtain the third part of said estate by the adoption of children.
Dig. 35,1,61Ulpianus libro octavo ad legem Iuliam et Papiam. Si vir uxori ad tempus liberorum legaverit, dubitari potest, an de his dumtaxat filiis sensisset testator qui post mortem eius nati fuissent an et de his, qui vivo eo ab eo suscepti fuissent post testamentum factum, cum manente matrimonio decessisset: verum aequum est proficere, sive vivo marito sive post mortem nascatur.
Ulpianus, On the Lex Julia et Papia, Book VIII. Where a man leaves a legacy to his wife payable at the time that she has children, some doubt may arise whether the testator only had reference to such children as might be born after his death, or whether he had in his mind those also who were born to him after his will was made, if he died while the marriage continued to exist. I think it is but proper that this should apply not only to children born during the lifetime of the husband, but also to those born after his death.
Dig. 39,6,36Ulpianus libro octavo ad legem Iuliam et Papiam. Quod condicionis implendae causa datur, licet non ex bonis mortui proficiscitur, capere tamen supra modum non poterit is, cui certum modum ad capiendum lex concessit. certe quod a statulibero condicionis implendae causa datur, indubitate modo lege concesso imputatur: sic tamen, si mortis tempore in peculio id habuit. ceterum si post mortem, vel etiam si alius pro eo dedit, quia non fuit ex his bonis, quae mortis tempore testator habuit, in eadem erunt causa, in qua sunt, quae a legatariis dantur.
Ulpianus, On the Lex Julia et Papia, Book VIII. Where anything is given for the purpose of complying with a condition, although it may not be derived from the estate of the deceased, still, he whom the law says shall only receive a certain amount cannot receive a larger sum than that fixed by law. It is certain that where a sum of money is paid by a slave for the purpose of complying with the condition, the amount will be regulated in accordance with that which the legatee is legally entitled to receive, provided the slave had that much in his peculium at the time of his death. If, however, the sum was acquired after his death, or if another person gave it for him, as it did form part of the property which the testator had when he died, the case will be the same as where charges are imposed on legatees.
Dig. 48,8,15Ulpianus libro octavo ad legem Iuliam et Papiam. Nihil interest, occidat quis an causam mortis praebeat.
Ulpianus, On the Lex Julia et Papia, Book VIII. It makes no difference whether one actually kills another, or is merely the cause of his death.
Dig. 49,17,3Idem libro octavo ad legem Iuliam et Papiam. Si mulier filio viri militi ad castrenses vel militares forte res comparandas reliquerit pecuniam, utique castrense peculio ea quae comparantur adnumerari incipiunt.
The Same, On the Lex Julia et Papia, Book VIII. If a woman should leave money for the purchase of articles suitable for military service to the son of her husband, who is in the army, anything purchased with it by him will be included in his castrense peculium.
Dig. 50,16,141Ulpianus libro octavo ad legem Iuliam et Papiam. Etiam ea mulier cum moreretur creditur filium habere, quae exciso utero edere possit. nec non etiam alio casu mulier potest habere filium, quem mortis tempore non habuit, ut puta eum qui ab hostibus remeabit.
Ulpianus, On the Lex Julia et Papia, Book VIII. As a woman, when moribund, is considered to have had a child if it is taken from her by means of the Cæsarean operation; so, under other circumstances, she can be held to have had a child whom she did not bring forth at the time of her death; for instance, one who returns from the hands of the enemy.
Ex libro IX
Dig. 26,5,4Idem libro nono ad legem Iuliam et Papiam. Praetor ipse se tutorem dare non potest, sicut nec pedaneus iudex nec compromissarius ex sua sententia fieri potest.
The Same, On the Lex Julia et Papia, Book IX. The Prætor cannot appoint himself a guardian, just as a judge cannot appoint himself to a judicial office, or an arbiter be created by his own decision.
Dig. 50,16,143Ulpianus libro nono ad legem Iuliam et Papiam. Id ‘apud se’ quis ‘habere’ videtur, de quo habet actionem: habetur enim quod peti potest.
Ulpianus, On the Lex Julia et Papia, Book IX. Anyone is considered to have property if he is entitled to an action to recover it, for he has anything which he has a right to demand.
Ex libro X
Dig. 37,14,11Ulpianus libro decimo ad legem Iuliam et Papiam. Is autem nec ad legitimam hereditatem, quae ex lege duodecim tabularum defertur, admittitur.
Ulpianus, On the Lex Julia et Papia, Book X. Moreover, he will not be admitted to the succession of his intestate freedman which is granted him by the Law of the Twelve Tables.
Dig. 37,14,16Ulpianus libro decimo ad legem Iuliam et Papiam. Si libertus minorem se centenario in fraudem legis fecerit, ipso iure non valebit id quod factum est, et ideo quasi in centenarii liberti bonis locum habebit patronus: quidquid igitur quaqua ratione alienavit, ea alienatio nullius momenti est. plane si qua alienaverit in fraudem patroni, adhuc tamen post alienationem maior centenario remaneat, alienatio quidem vires habebit, verumtamen per Favianam et Calvisianam actionem revocabuntur ea quae per fraudem sunt alienata: et ita Iulianus saepissime scribit eoque iure utimur. diversitatis autem ea ratio est. quotiens in fraudem legis fit alienatio, non valet quod actum est: in fraudem autem fit, cum quis se minorem centenario facit ad hoc, ut legis praeceptum evertat. at cum alienatione facta nihilo minus centenarius est, non videtur in fraudem legis factum, sed tantum in fraudem patroni: idcirco Faviano vel Calvisiano iudicio revocabitur id quod alienatum est. 1Si quis plures res simul alienando minorem se centenario fecerit, quarum una revocata vel omnium partibus maior centenario efficitur: utrum revocamus omnes an pro rata ex singulis, ut centenarium eum faciamus? magisque est, ut omnium rerum alienato facta nullius momenti sit. 2Si quis plane non semel alienaverit, sed quasdam res ante, quasdam postea, alienatio earum rerum quae postea alienatae sunt ipso iure non revocabitur, sed priorum: in posterioribus Favianae locus erit.
Ulpianus, On the Lex Julia et Papia, Book X. When a freedman commits a fraud against the law, in order that he may die worth less than a hundred thousand sesterces, his act is void by operation of law; and therefore his patron will succeed him as a freedman possessed an estate of that amount. Hence, everything which he has alienated, for any reason whatsoever, will be of no force or effect. It is evident that if he should alienate any property for the purpose of defrauding his patron, and, after doing so, he should remain worth more than a hundred thousand sesterces, the alienation will be valid, but any property which was fraudulently disposed of can be recovered by the Favian or the Calvisian action. Julianus has frequently stated this, and it is our practice. The reason for this difference is that whenever an alienation of anything is made for the purpose of defrauding the law the act is void. Moreover, he is guilty of fraud who diminishes the value of his estate to less than a hundred thousand sesterces for the purpose of evading the provisions of the law. But if, after the alienation has taken place, he still remains the owner of property worth a hundred thousand sesterces, he is not considered to have committed a fraud against the law, but only against his patron; and therefore the property which he has disposed of can be recovered by either the Favian or the Calvisian Action. 1Where anyone, for the purpose of diminishing the value of his property to an amount under a hundred thousand sesterces, alienates several articles at once, so that by revoking the sale of one, or of portions of all of them, he will be worth more than a hundred thousand sesterces, will it be necessary for us to revoke the sale of all the articles, or that of each one pro rata, in order to render his fortune equal to a hundred thousand sesterces? The better opinion is that the alienation of all the articles is of no force or effect. 2If anyone should not sell all of his property at once, but a part of it at one time, and a part of it at another, the subsequent alienation will not be revoked by operation of law, but the former one will be; and there will be ground for the institution of the Favian Action with reference to the property last disposed of.
Dig. 50,16,145Ulpianus libro decimo ad legem Iuliam et Papiam. ‘Virilis’ appellatione interdum etiam totam hereditatem contineri dicendum est.
Ulpianus, On the Lex Julia et Papia, Book X. It must be said that by the term “individual share” the entire estate sometimes is meant.
Ex libro XI
Dig. 37,14,17Idem libro undecimo ad legem Iuliam et Papiam. Divi fratres in haec verba rescripserunt: ‘Comperimus a peritioribus dubitatum aliquando, an nepos contra tabulas aviti liberti bonorum possessionem petere possit, si eum libertum pater patris, cum annorum viginti quinque esset, capitis accusasset, et Proculum, sane non levem iuris auctorem, in hac opinione fuisse, ut nepoti in huiusmodi causa non putaret dandam bonorum possessionem. cuius sententiam nos quoque secuti sumus, cum rescriberemus ad libellum Caesidiae Longinae: sed et Volusius Maecianus amicus noster ut et iuris civilis praeter veterem et bene fundatam peritiam anxie diligens religione rescripti nostri ductus sit ut coram nobis adfirmavit non arbitratum se aliter respondere debere. sed cum et ipso Maeciano et aliis amicis nostris iuris peritis adhibitis plenius tractaremus, magis visum est nepotem neque verbis neque sententia legis aut edicti praetoris ex persona vel nota patris sui excludi a bonis aviti liberti: plurium etiam iuris auctorum, sed et Salvi Iuliani amici nostri clarissimi viri hanc sententiam fuisse’. 1Item quaesitum est, si patroni filius capitis accusaverit libertum, an hoc noceat liberis ipsius. et Proculus quidem in hac fuit opinione notam adspersam patroni filio liberis eius nocere, Iulianus autem negavit: sed hic idem quod Iulianus erit dicendum.
The Same, On the Lex Julia et Papia, Book XI. The Divine Brothers stated the following in a Rescript: “We have ascertained from those who are the most learned in the law that it was sometimes doubtful whether a grandson could demand prætorian possession of the estate of his grandfather contrary to the provisions of the will, if his father, who was over twenty-five years of age, had accused him of a capital crime. It is true that Proculus, a jurist of great authority, was of the opinion that, in a case of this kind, prætorian possession should not be given to the grandson; and we adopted this opinion when we issued a Rescript in answer to the application of Cæsidia Longina. But, our friend Volusius Mæcianus, Prætor of the Civil Law, and one who pays the greatest attention to old and well-founded precedents, being influenced by his respect for Our Rescript (as he stated to Us) did not think that he could decide otherwise. But as We have discussed this point very fully with Mæcianus himself, and with others of our friends learned in the law, the better opinion seems to be that a grandson will not be excluded from the estate of his freedman’s grandfather, either by the words or the spirit of the law, or by the Edict of the Prætor, or on his own account, or by the stigma attaching to his father. We are also aware that this opinion has been adopted by many eminent jurists, as well as by that most illustrious man Salvius Julianus, our friend.” 1The question also arose, if a son accused the freedman of his father of a capital offence, whether this would prejudice the rights of his children. Proculus held that the stigma attaching to the son of the patron would prejudice his children. Julianus, however, denies that this is the case; and it must be held that the opinion of Julianus should be adopted.
Dig. 38,1,36Ulpianus libro undecimo ad legem Iuliam et Papiam. Labeo ait libertatis causa societatem inter libertum et patronum factam ipso iure nihil valere palam esse.
Ulpianus, On the Lex Julia et Papia, Book XI. Labeo says that it is clear that a partnership formed between a freedman and a patron, in consideration of freedom being granted to the former, is void in law.
Dig. 38,2,37Ulpianus libro undecimo ad legem Iuliam et Papiam. Iulianus ait, si patronus libertatis causa imposita libertae revendiderit, filium eius a bonorum possessione summoveri, scilicet quia nec contra tabulas testamenti liberti bonorum possessionem accipiat, quotiens pater eius donum munus operas liberto revendiderit. plane si patroni filius libertatis causa imposita revendiderit, nihilo minus familiam bonorum possessionem contra tabulas liberti accipere ait, quia filius revendendo libertatis causa imposita fratrem suum non summovet. 1Si libertus heredem scripserit isque prius, quam de familia quaestionem haberet, adierit hereditatem, patronum ad contra tabulas bonorum possessionem non admitti Iulianus ait: debuit enim et patronus liberti necem vindicare. quod et in patrona erit dicendum.
Ulpianus, On the Lex Julia et Papia, Book XI. Julianus says that if a patron should sell to his freedman the obligations which had been imposed upon him in consideration of liberating him from slavery, his son can be barred from obtaining prætorian possession of the estate of the freedman, for the reason that he does not obtain possession of the said estate in opposition to the terms of the will, as his father sold to him the gift, present, or services for which he obtained his freedom. He says that it is evident if the son of the patron should sell to him the services which were imposed upon the latter in consideration of giving him his liberty, that the brother of the patron can, nevertheless, obtain possession of the freedman’s estate contrary to the provisions of the will, because the son, by selling to the latter the services which were the consideration of his freedom, did not bar his uncle from asserting the claim. 1If the freedman should appoint an heir, and the latter should enter upon the estate before having put the slaves of the deceased to torture, Julianus says that the patron will not be permitted to obtain possession of the estate in opposition to the terms of the will, for he also should avenge the death of the freedman. This rule, likewise, is applicable to the patroness.
Ex libro XIII
Dig. 1,3,31Idem libro XIII ad legem Iuliam et Papiam. Princeps legibus solutus est: Augusta autem licet legibus soluta non est, principes tamen eadem illi privilegia tribuunt, quae ipsi habent.
The Same, On the Lex Julia et Papia. The Emperor is free from the operation of the law, and though the Empress is undoubtedly subject to it, still, the Emperors generally confer upon her the same privileges which they themselves enjoy.
Dig. 8,1,7Ulpianus libro tertio decimo ad legem Iuliam et Papiam. Ius cloacae mittendae servitus est.
Ulpianus, On the Lex Julia et Papia, Book XIII. The right of building a sewer is a servitude.
Dig. 29,2,81Ulpianus libro tertio decimo ad legem Iuliam et Papiam. Totiens videtur heres institutus etiam in causa substitutionis adisse, quotiens adquirere sibi possit: nam si mortuus esset, ad heredem non transferret substitutionem.
Ulpianus, On the Lex Julia et Papia, Book XIII. An appointed heir is held to have signified his acceptance even in case of substitution, whenever he can acquire the property for himself; for if he should die, he will not transfer the substitution to his heir.
Dig. 29,3,10Ulpianus libro tertio decimo ad legem Iuliam et Papiam. Si in duobus exemplariis scriptum sit testamentum, alterutro patefacto apertae tabulae sunt. 1Si sui natura tabulae patefactae sunt, apertum videri testamentum non dubitatur: non enim quaeremus, a quo aperiantur. 2Si tabulae non compareant vel exustae sint, futurum est, ut subvenire legatariis debeat. idem est, si subpressae vel occultae sint.
Ulpianus, On the Lex Julia et Papia, Book XIII. Where there are two copies of a will, and one of them remains unsealed, the will is held to be opened. 1Where the will itself is unsealed, there is no doubt that it should be considered as opened; for we do not inquire by whom it is to be opened. 2If a will should not be produced, or has been burned, it follows that relief should be granted to the legatees; and the same rule applies where the will has been suppressed, or concealed.
Dig. 29,3,12Ulpianus libro tertio decimo ad legem Iuliam et Papiam. Si quis fecerit testamentum et exemplum eius, exemplo quidem aperto nondum apertum est testamentum: quod si authenticum patefactum est totum, apertum.
Ulpianus, On the Lex Julia et Papia, Book XIII. Where anyone makes a will and also a copy of it, and the copy is open, the will is not considered to be open; but when the original will is open, everything else is likewise.
Dig. 34,8,4Ulpianus libro tertio decimo ad legem Iuliam et Papiam. Si eo tempore, quo alicui legatum adscribebatur, in rebus humanis non erat, pro non scripto hoc habebitur. 1Sed et si in hostium potestate erat, quo testamentum fiebat, neque ab hostibus rediit, pro non scripto erit: et ita Iulianus scribit.
Ulpianus, On the Lex Julia et Papia, Book XIII. Where a bequest is made to anyone at a time when he is already dead, it is considered as not having been written. 1Moreover, where a legatee is in the power of the enemy at the time that the will is made, and does not return from captivity, the legacy is held not to have been written. This was also stated by Julianus.
Dig. 35,1,59Ulpianus libro tertio decimo ad legem Iuliam et Papiam. Intercidit legatum, si ea persona decesserit, cui legatum est sub condicione. 1Quid ergo, si non decesserit, sed in civitate esse desierit? puta alicui legatum ‘si consul fuerit’ et is in insulam deportatus est: numquid non interim exstinguitur legatum, quia restitui in civitate potest? quod probabilius esse arbitror. 2Non idem erit dicendum, si ea poena in eum statuta fuerit, quae irrogat servitutem, quia servitus morti adsimulatur.
Ulpianus, On the Lex Julia et Papia, Book XIII. A legacy becomes of no effect, if the person to whom it was bequeathed conditionally should die before the condition is fulfilled. 1But what if he should not die, but should lose his civil rights? For instance, where a bequest was made to a certain man, “if he should become Consul,” and he is deported to an island, will the legacy not be extinguished in the meantime, because he can be restored to his civil rights? I think that this is extremely probable. 2The same rule cannot be said to apply where a penalty involving servitude is imposed upon him, because servitude resembles death.
Dig. 35,2,64Ulpianus libro tertio decimo ad legem Iuliam et Papiam. Si in testamento ita scriptum sit: ‘heres meus Lucio Titio decem dare damnas esto et quanto quidem minus per legem Falcidiam capere poterit, tanto amplius ei dare damnas esto’, sententiae testatoris standum est.
Ulpianus, On the Lex Julia et Papia, Book XIII. Where the following provision is included in a will, “Let my heir be charged with the payment of ten aurei to Lucius Titius, and let as much more be given him as he will lose by the operation of the Falcidian Law,” the will of the testator must be executed.
Ex libro XIV
Dig. 34,9,9Ulpianus libro quarto decimo ad legem Iuliam et Papiam. Si inimicitiae capitales intervenerunt inter legatarium et testatorem et verisimile esse coeperit testatorem noluisse legatum sive fideicommissum praestari ei, cui adscriptum relictum est, magis est, ut legatum ab eo peti non possit. 1Sed et si palam et aperte testatori maledixerit et infaustas voces adversus eum iactaverit, idem erit dicendum. 2Si autem status eius controversiam movit, denegatur eius quod testamento accepit persecutio: ex qua specie statim fisco deferetur.
Ulpianus, On the Lex Julia et Papia, Book XIV. If mortal hatred should have arisen between a legatee and the testator, and it should be probable that the latter was unwilling that he to whom a legacy, or the benefit of a trust was bequeathed, should enjoy the benefit of the same, the better opinion is that the legacy cannot be claimed by him. 1Again, where he has openly and publicly abused the testator, and made malicious speeches against him, the same rule will apply. 2Where, however, the civil condition of the testator is the cause of the controversy, raised by the legatee, the latter will not be entitled to what has been left him, which will, in this instance, immediately be forfeited to the Treasury.
Ex libro XV
Dig. 33,2,22Ulpianus libro quinto decimo ad legem Iuliam et Papiam. ‘Patrimonii mei reditum omnibus annis uxori meae dari volo’. Aristo respondit ad heredem uxoris non transire, quia aut usui fructui simile esset aut huic legato ‘in annos singulos’.
Ulpianus, On the Lex Julia et Papia, Book XV. “I desire the income of my estate to be paid every year to my wife.” Aristo gives as his opinion that this legacy will not pass to the heir of the wife, because it resembles either an usufruct, or a legacy to be paid annually.
Dig. 39,6,37Idem libro quinto decimo ad legem Iuliam et Papiam. Illud generaliter meminisse oportebit donationes mortis causa factas legatis comparatas: quodcumque igitur in legatis iuris est, id in mortis causa donationibus erit accipiendum. 1Iulianus ait: si quis servum mortis causa sibi donatum vendiderit et hoc vivo donatore fecerit, pretii condictionem donator habebit, si convaluisset et hoc donator elegerit. alioquin et ipsum servum restituere compellitur.
The Same, On the Lex Julia et Papia, Book XV. Generally speaking, it must be remembered that donations mortis causa are comparable to legacies. Therefore, any rule of law which applies to legacies must be understood also to apply to donations mortis causa. 1Julianus says that if anyone should during the lifetime of the donor sell a slave given to him as a donation mortis causa, the latter will be entitled to a personal action to recover the price, if he should regain his health, and choose to do so; otherwise, the donee will be compelled to return the slave himself.
Ex libro XVI
Dig. 31,60Ulpianus libro sexto decimo ad legem Iuliam et Papiam. Iulianus ait, si a filio herede legatum sit Seio fideique eius commissum fuerit sub condicione ut Titio daret, et Titius pendente condicione decesserit, fideicommissum deficiens apud Seium manet, non ad filium heredem pertinet, quia in fideicommissis potiorem causam habere eum, cuius fides electa sit, senatus voluit.
Ulpianus, On the Lex Julia et Papia, Book XVI. Julianus says that if a son, who was an heir, should be charged with the payment of a legacy to Seius, and Seius is charged with a trust, under a condition, to pay it to Titius, and Titius dies before the condition has been fulfilled, the trust remains with Seius, and will not belong to the son who is the heir, because the Senate intended that, in the case of a trust, the condition of him who had been selected as trustee should be the better.
Ex libro XVIII
Dig. 22,6,6Ulpianus libro octavo decimo ad legem Iuliam et Papiam. Nec supina ignorantia ferenda est factum ignorantis, ut nec scrupulosa inquisitio exigenda: scientia enim hoc modo aestimanda est, ut neque neglegentia crassa aut nimia securitas satis expedita sit neque delatoria curiositas exigatur.
Ulpianus, On the Lex Julia et Papia, Book XVIII. Neither gross ignorance of the facts should be tolerated, nor scrupulous inquiry be exacted, but such knowledge should be demanded that neither excessive negligence, too great unconcern, nor the inquisitiveness that characterizes informers may be exhibited.
Dig. 29,2,83Ulpianus libro octavo decimo ad legem Iuliam et Papiam. Si totam an partem, ex qua quis heres institutus est, tacite rogatus sit restituere, apparet nihil ei debere adcrescere, quia rem non videtur habere.
Ulpianus, On the Lex Julia et Papia, Book XVIII. If anyone should be tacitly requested to surrender to another the entire share of an estate to which he has been appointed heir, it is evident that he can receive nothing by accrual, because he is not considered to be entitled to the property.
Dig. 31,61Ulpianus libro octavo decimo ad legem Iuliam et Papiam. Si Titio et Maevio heredibus institutis qui quadringenta relinquebat a Titio ducenta legaverit et, quisquis heres esset, centum, neque Maevius hereditatem adierit, trecenta Titius debebit. 1Iulianus quidem ait, si alter ex legitimis heredibus repudiasset portionem, cum essent ab eo fideicommissa relicta, coheredem eius non esse cogendum fideicommissa praestare: portionem enim ad coheredem sine onere pertinere. sed post rescriptum Severi, quo fideicommissa ab instituto relicta a substitutis debentur, et hic quasi substitutus cum suo onere consequetur adcrescentem portionem.
Ulpianus, On the Lex Julia et Papia, Book XVIII. If Titius and Mævius should be appointed heirs by a testator who left four hundred aurei, and he charged Titius with a legacy of two hundred, and whomever might become his heir with a hundred, and Mævius, his heir, should not enter upon the estate; Titius will be responsible for the payment of three hundred aurei. 1Julianus, indeed, says that if one of two heirs at law who was charged with a trust rejects the estate, his co-heir cannot be compelled to execute the trust, for his share will belong to the co-heir without an obligation of any kind. However, after the Rescript of Severus, by which it is provided that where an appointed heir is charged with a trust, and rejects it, it must be executed by the substitute, in this case the heir at law will obtain the share by accrual, just as the substitute will acquire it with its burden.
Dig. 35,2,66Ulpianus libro octavo decimo ad legem Iuliam et Papiam. Circa legem Falcidiam in eo, quod sub condicione vel in diem alicui relictum est, hoc observandum est: si decem sub condicione alicui fuerint relicta eaque condicio post decennium forte exstiterit, non videntur decem huic legata, sed minus decem, quia intervallum temporis et interusurium huius spatii minorem facit quantitatem decem. 1Sicuti legata non debentur, nisi deducto aere alieno aliquid supersit, nec mortis causa donationes debebuntur, sed infirmantur per aes alienum. quare si immodicum aes alienum interveniat, ex re mortis causa sibi donata nihil aliquis consequitur.
Ulpianus, On the Lex Julia et Papia, Book XVIII. The following must be noted with reference to the operation of the Falcidian Law, where a legacy is bequeathed to anyone conditionally, or payable after a certain time. If ten aurei should be bequeathed to someone under a condition, and the condition is fulfilled, for instance, after the lapse of ten years, the said ten aurei will not be considered to have been bequeathed to the legatee, but a smaller amount, for the interval, and the interest during that interval cause reduction of the original sum of ten aurei. 1Just as legacies are not payable unless a balance remains after deducting the amount of the debts from the property of the estate, so donations mortis causa will not be due, but may be annulled by the indebtedness of the estate. Therefore, if the indebtedness is very large, no one can receive property given to him mortis causa, out of the funds of the estate.
Dig. 49,14,16Ulpianus libro octavo decimo ad legem Iuliam et Papiam. Ait divus Traianus: ‘quicumque professus fuerit’. ‘quicumque’ accipere debemus tam masculum quam feminam: nam feminis quoque, quamvis delationibus prohibentur, tamen ex beneficio Traiani deferre se permissum est. nec non illud aeque non intererit, cuius aetatis sit is qui se defert, utrum iustae an pupillaris: nam pupillis etiam permittitur deferre se, ex quibus non capiunt.
Ulpianus, On the Lex Julia et Papia, Book XVIII. The Divine Trajan says, “Whoever shall have stated.” We must understand “whoever” to mean either a man or a woman, for although women are forbidden to act as informers, still they are permitted to denounce themselves by the privilege of Trajan. Likewise, it does not make any difference what the age of the informer may be, whether he is of lawful age, or a minor, for minors are permitted to denounce themselves in cases where they are not entitled to receive property.
Ex libro XIX
Dig. 4,4,2Idem libro nono decimo ad legem Iuliam et Papiam. Nec per liberos suos rem suam maturius a curatoribus recipiat. quod enim legibus cavetur, ut singuli anni per singulos liberos remittantur, ad honores pertinere divus Severus ait, non ad rem suam recipiendam.
The Same, On the Lex Julia et Papia, Book XIX. Nor will a minor obtain possession of his property from his curators any sooner on account of his having children; for what is provided by the law, namely: that a year is remitted for every child, the Divine Severus states has reference to capacity for public office, and not for the management of property.
Ex libro XX
Dig. 1,16,14Ulpianus libro vicensimo ad legem Iuliam et Papiam. Proconsules non amplius quam sex fascibus utuntur.
Ulpianus, On the Lex Julia et Papia, Book XX. Proconsuls are only entitled to six lictors.
Dig. 27,1,18Ulpianus libro vicensimo ad legem Iuliam et Papiam. Bello amissi ad tutelae excusationem prosunt: quaesitum est autem, qui sunt isti, utrum hi, qui in acie sunt interempti an vero omnes omnino, qui per causam belli parentibus sunt abrepti, in obsidione forte. melius igitur probabitur eos solos, qui in acie amittuntur, prodesse debere, cuiuscumque sexus vel aetatis sint: hi enim pro re publica ceciderunt.
Ulpianus, On the Lex Julia et Papia, Book XX. Where children are lost in war, this fact affords a valid excuse for release from guardianship. A question arose, however, as to who these children are, whether they are such as are killed in battle, or whether they include all those who are taken from their parents on account of war; as, for instance, those lost in a siege. The preferable opinion is that only those who are killed in battle, without reference to their sex or age, should afford a valid cause for release, for they have lost their lives for their country.