The Same, On the Lex Julia et Papia, Book I. We should consider him to be freeborn who has been legally declared such, even though he is in fact a freedman; for the reason that whatever is judicially determined is accepted as truth.

Ulpianus, On the Lex Julia et Papia, Book I. We should understand by the terms “the son of a Senator”, not only a natural son but also an adopted one, and it does not matter by whom or in what way he has been adopted. Nor does it make any difference whether he was already invested with Senatorial rank when he adopted him, or whether this was done subsequently.

Ulpianus, On the Lex Julia et Papia, Book I. It is established that the son of a Senator emancipated by his father is always considered a Senator’s son. 1Labeo also declares that a child born after the death of his father who was a Senator, shall be considered the son of the Senator. Proculus and Pegasus are of the opinion, however, that a child who was conceived and born after the expulsion of its father from the Senate, should not be considered a Senator’s son. This opinion is correct, for he whose father has been expelled from the Senate before he was born, cannot properly be called the son of a Senator; but where a child has been conceived before its father was expelled from the Senate, and born after his father had lost his rank, the better opinion is that he should be understood to be the son of a Senator. It is held by many that the time of conception should only be considered under such circumstances. 2Anyone whose father and grandfather have been Senators is understood to be both the son and the grandson of a Senator; if, however, his father lost his rank before the conception of the former, the question might arise whether he should not be considered the grandson of a Senator, even though he was no longer regarded as the son of one? It is the better opinion that he ought to be, so that the rank of his grandfather may be of advantage to him, rather than he should be injured by the condition of his father.

Ulpianus, On the Lex Julia et Papia, Book I. We hold that a woman openly practices prostitution, not only where she does so in a house of ill-fame, but also if she is accustomed to do this in taverns, or in other places where she manifests no regard for her modesty. 1We understand the word “openly” to mean indiscriminately, that is to say, without choice, and not if she commits adultery or fornication, but where she sustains the role of a prostitute. 2Moreover, where a woman, having accepted money, has intercourse with only one or two persons, she is not considered to have openly prostituted herself. 3Octavenus, however, says very properly that where a woman publicly prostitutes herself without doing so for money, she should be classed as a harlot. 4The law brands with infamy not only a woman who practices prostitution, but also one who has formerly done so, even though she has ceased to act in this manner; for the disgrace is not removed even if the practice is subsequently discontinued. 5A woman is not to be excused who leads a vicious life under the pretext of poverty. 6The occupation of a pander is not less disgraceful than the practice of prostitution. 7We designate those women as procuresses who prostitute other women for money. 8We understand the term “procuress” to mean a woman who lives this kind of a life on account of another. 9Where one woman conducts a tavern, and keeps others in it who prostitute themselves, as many are accustomed to do under the pretext of employing women for the service of the house; it must be said that they are included in the class of procuresses. 10The Senate decreed that it was not proper for a Senator to marry or keep a woman who had been convicted of a criminal offence, the accusation for which could be made by any of the people; unless he was prohibited by law from bringing such an accusation in court. 11Where a woman has been publicly convicted of having made a false accusation, or prevarication, she is not held to have been convicted of a criminal offence. 12Where a woman is caught in adultery, she is considered to have been convicted of a criminal offence. Hence if she is proved to have been guilty of adultery, she will be branded with infamy, not only because she was caught flagrante delicto, but also because she was convicted of a criminal offence. If, however, she was not caught, but was, nevertheless, found guilty, she becomes infamous because she was convicted of a criminal offence; and, indeed, if she was caught but was not convicted, she would still be infamous. I think that even if she should be acquitted after having been caught, she will still remain infamous, because it is certain that she was taken in adultery, and the law renders the act infamous and does not make this dependent upon the judicial decision. 13It is not mentioned here, as in the Lex Julia on adultery, by whom or where the woman must be caught; hence she is considered infamous whether she was caught by her husband or by anyone else. She will also be infamous according to the terms of the law, even if she was not caught in the house of her husband or her father.

Ulpianus, On the Lex Julia et Papia, Book I. Julianus says that, in estimating the portion due under the Falcidian Law, the following rule should be observed, namely, where there are two promising, or two stipulating debtors, and they are partners, the common obligation should be divided between them; just as if each one had stipulated or promised to pay the amount individually. If, however, no partnership existed between them, the matter would remain in abeyance, and a calculation should be made in order to determine what is due to the estates of the creditors, or what should be deducted from those of the debtors. 1Any property belonging to the estate of the deceased must be estimated at its value, that is to say, at the price it will bring at the present time; and it should be understood that the appraisement must not be made of the value which the property would have under certain conditions.

Ulpianus, On the Lex Julia et Papia, Book I. A freedman who has obtained the right to wear a gold ring (although he may obtain the right attaching to the condition of being freeborn, reserving the rights of his patron), is still considered as freeborn. This the Divine Hadrian stated in a Rescript.

Ulpianus, On the Lex Julia et Papia, Book I. Where a freedman, through collusion, has been declared to be entitled to the rights of a freeborn person, and the collusion has been established, he is, in some respects regarded, as a freedman. In the meantime, however, before the collusion has been exposed, and after the decision with reference to his rights as a freeborn person has been rendered, he will be regarded as freeborn.

Ulpianus, On the Lex Julia et Papia, Book I. The term “eunuch” is one of general application, and under it are included not only persons who are eunuchs by nature, but also those made such by crushing or pressure, as well as every other kind of eunuch whatsoever.

Ulpianus, On the Lex Julia et Papia, Book I. Where a matter has been decided, it is considered as true.

Ulpianus, On the Lex Julia et Papia, Book II. Where a freedwoman is living in concubinage with her patron, she can leave him without his consent, and unite with another man, either in matrimony or in concubinage. I think, however, that a concubine should not have the right to marry if she leaves her patron without his consent, since it is more honorable for a freedwoman to be the concubine of a patron than to become the mother of a family. 1I hold with Atilicinus, that only those women who are not disgraced by such a connection can be kept in concubinage without the fear of committing a crime. 2Where a man keeps in concubinage a woman who has been convicted of adultery, I do not think that the Lex Julia de Adulteriis will be applicable, although he will be liable if he should marry her. 3If a woman has lived in concubinage with her patron, and then maintains the same relation with his son or grandson, I do not think that she is acting properly, because a connection of this kind closely approaches one that is infamous, and therefore such scandalous conduct should be prohibited. 4It is clear that anyone can keep a concubine of any age unless she is less than twelve years old.

Ulpianus, On the Lex Julia et Papia, Book II. It is established that whenever an estate, or anything else, is acquired through some person who is under the control of another, it is immediately acquired by the latter, and does not remain for a moment vested in him by whom it is acquired, and hence it is directly obtained by the party entitled to it.

Ulpianus, On the Lex Julia et Papia, Book II. Anyone can very properly say that an estate which falls to a person as heir at law, or by will, legally belongs to him, because by the Law of the Twelve Tables testamentary estates are confirmed.

Ulpianus, On the Lex Julia et Papia, Book III. A Rescript of the Emperors Antoninus and Commodus which forbade Senators to marry certain persons, did not mention anything with reference to betrothals; still, it is properly held that betrothals made under such conditions are void by operation of law; in order to supply what is lacking in the Rescript.

Ulpianus, On the Lex Julia et Papia, Book III. Where a man of Senatorial rank has as a wife a woman who has been manumitted, although, in the meantime, she may not legally be his wife, still, she occupies such a position that if he should lose his rank she will become his wife.

Ulpianus, On the Lex Julia et Papia, Book III. It is stated that Ateius Capito, during his consulate, issued a decree of this kind. It must be observed, however, that this rule does not apply where a patron emancipated a female slave in order to marry her.

Ulpianus, On the Lex Julia et Papia, Book III. In that law which provides that where a freedwoman has been married to her patron, after separation from him she cannot marry another without his consent; we understand the patron to be one who has bought a female slave under the condition of manumitting her (as is stated in the Rescript of our Emperor and his father), because, after having been manumitted, she becomes the freedwoman of the purchaser. 1This rule does not apply to anyone who has sworn that he is the patron of the woman. 2Nor should he be considered her patron who did not purchase the woman with his own money. 3It is clear that we must not doubt that a son under paternal control, who is a soldier, acquires this right if he manumits a female slave by means of his castrense peculium; for he becomes her patron in accordance with the Imperial Constitutions, and this privilege does not belong to his father. 4This section of the law has reference only to a freedwoman who is married, and does not apply to one who is betrothed; hence, if a freedwoman, who has been betrothed, notifies her patron of her repudiation of the contract, she can contract matrimony with another, even if her patron should be unwilling. 5The law says in the next place: “If her patron should be unwilling,” and we should understand the term “unwilling” to refer to a party who consents to a divorce, and therefore she who is divorced from an insane husband, is not exempt from the consequences of this law; nor where she does so while the latter is ignorant of the fact, for her patron is more properly said to be unwilling than one who dissents. 6Where a patron is captured by enemies, I apprehend that she can marry just as would be the case if her patron was dead. Those who adopt the opinion of Julianus hold that she could not contract marriage, for he thinks that the marriage of a freedwoman lasts even during the captivity of her patron, on account of the respect which she owes him. It is evident, however, that if her patron should be reduced to any other kind of servitude, the marriage would unquestionably be dissolved.

Ulpianus, On the Lex Julia et Papia, Book III. Where the law says: “The right of a freedwoman, who is married to her patron, to obtain a divorce shall not be allowed,” this is not held to have made the divorce ineffective, because marriage is ordinarily dissolved by the Civil Law; therefore we cannot say that the marriage exists, as a separation has taken place. Again, Julianus says that a wife is not under such circumstances entitled to an action to recover her dowry; hence it is reasonable that when her patron desires her to remain his wife she cannot marry anyone else. For, as the legislator understood that the marriage was, to a certain extent, dissolved by the act of the freedwoman, he prevented her marriage with another, wherefore if she should marry anyone else, she will be considered as not married. Julianus, indeed, goes farther, for he thinks that such a woman cannot even live in concubinage with anyone except her patron. 1The law says: “As long as the patron desires her to remain his wife.” This means that the patron wishes her to be his wife, and that his relationship towards her should continue to exist; therefore where he either ceases to be her patron, or to desire that she should remain his wife, the authority of the law is at an end. 2It has been most justly established that the benefit of this law terminated whenever the patron, by any indication of his will whatsoever, is understood to have relinquished his desire to keep the woman as his wife. Hence, when he institutes proceedings against his freedwoman on the ground of the removal of property, after she had divorced him without his consent, our Emperor and his Divine Father stated in a Rescript that the party was understood to be unwilling that the woman should remain his wife, when he brings this action or another like it, which it is not customary to do unless in case of divorce. Wherefore, if the husband accuses her of adultery or of some other crime of which no one can accuse a wife but her husband, the better opinion is that the marriage is dissolved; for it should be remembered that the wife is not deprived of the right to marry another except where the patron himself desires to retain her in that capacity. Hence, whenever even a slight reason indicates that the husband does not desire her to remain his wife, it must be said that the freedwoman has already acquired the right to contract marriage with another. Therefore, if the patron has betrothed himself to, or destined himself for some other woman, or has sought marriage with another, he must be considered to no longer desire the freedwoman to be his wife. The same rule will apply where he keeps the woman as his concubine.

Ulpianus, On the Lex Julia et Papia, Book III. Even women can obtain the right to wear a gold ring, as well as that of being considered freeborn, and be restored to the privileges they are entitled to by their birth.

The Same, On the Lex Julia et Papia, Book III. Fraud is one thing, and the penalty for it another; for fraud can exist without a penalty, but there cannot be a penalty for it without a fraud. A penalty is the punishment of an offence, a fraud is the offence itself and is, as it were, a kind of preparation for the penalty. 1A great difference exists between a fine and a penalty, for the term “penalty” is a general one, and means the punishment of all crimes; but a fine is imposed for some particular offence, whose punishment is, at present, a pecuniary one. A penalty, however, is not only pecuniary, but usually implies the loss of life and reputation. A fine is left to the discretion of the magistrate who passes sentence; a penalty is not inflicted unless it is expressly imposed by law, or by some other authority. And, indeed, a fine is inflicted where a special penalty has not been prescribed. Moreover, he can impose a penalty upon whom jurisdiction has been conferred. Magistrates and Governors of provinces alone are permitted by the Imperial Mandates to impose fines; anyone, however, who has a right to take judicial cognizance of a crime or a misdemeanor can inflict the penalty.

Ulpianus, On the Lex Julia et Papia, Book IV. Where a judge decides that a child is to be brought up or supported, it should be held that it must be certainly ascertained whether it is his son or not; a ruling as to support cannot prejudice the truth.

Ulpianus, On the Lex Julia et Papia, Book IV. A son begotten by me while in slavery can be brought under my authority by the indulgence of the Emperor; still, there is no question that such a son remains in the class of freedmen.

Ulpianus, On the Lex Julia et Papia, Book IV. Where a legacy is bequeathed payable every year, it is said that there is no doubt that the condition of the legatee should be investigated every year, to determine whether he is capable of receiving it; and if he is a slave belonging to several masters, the condition of the different masters must be investigated.

Ulpianus, On the Lex Julia et Papia, Book IV. When a child born in the hands of the enemy returns under the law of postliminium, he will be entitled to the privileges of a son; for, according to a Rescript of the Emperor Antoninus and his Divine Father, addressed to Ovinius Tertullus, Governor of the Province of lower Mysia, there is no doubt that he has the right of postliminium.

Ulpianus, On the Lex Julia et Papia, Book IV. Where anyone provides that something shall be done before his death, the very day on which he died is counted.

Ulpianus, On the Lex Julia et Papia, Book IV. Where a woman brings forth a child that is deformed, or a monster, or defective, or which has something unusual in its appearance or its voice, and which has no resemblance to a human being, but seems to be rather an animal than a man, someone may ask, will it be any benefit to her to have brought such a creature into the world? The better opinion is, that consideration must be had for its parents, for they ought not to be censured, as they have done their duty as far as they could, nor should the mother be prejudiced, because an unfortunate occurrence has taken place.

Ulpianus, On the Lex Julia et Papia, Book IV. We, to a certain extent, compare slavery with death.

Ulpianus, On the Lex Julia et Papia, Book V. If I should swear in court that I am the patron of a certain slave, it must be held that I am not entitled to his estate in that capacity, because an oath does not constitute a patron. The case would, however, be different, if it had been judicially decided that I was his patron, for then the judgment will stand.

Ulpianus, On the Lex Julia et Papia, Book V. Labeo says that the wife of my grandson, the son of my daughter, is my granddaughter. 1Persons who are betrothed are included in the terms son-in-law and daughter-in-law, likewise the parents of such persons are considered to be included in the terms father-in-law and mother-in-law.

The Same, On the Lex Julia et Papia, Book V. It is evident that, under the term “son-in-law” are included the husbands of granddaughters, and great-granddaughters, and their descendants; whether they are the offspring of a son or a daughter.

Ulpianus, On the Lex Julia et Papia, Book VI. We only understand those to be absent on public business who are absent not for their own convenience, but from necessity.

Ulpianus, On the Lex Julia et Papia, Book VI. I am of the opinion that he is absent in the service of the State whom the Emperor, as a special favor, has permitted to act as assessor in his own province; but if he does not so act by his permission, we must hold that, by doing so, he is guilty of an offence, and is not entitled to the privileges of those who are absent in the service of the State. 1A party is considered to be absent in the service of the State, as long as he fills some office, but as soon as his term of office is ended, he ceases to be absent on public business. We, however, calculate the time allowed him for his return from the date when he ceased to be absent in the public service, that is to say, as much as he requires to return to the City, and it will be reasonable to grant him the time which the law allows to other returning officials. Wherefore, if he turns aside on account of some affair of his own; there is no doubt that the time so consumed will not be granted him, but will be calculated with reference to the period within which he could have returned; and when this has elapsed we must say that he has ceased to be absent in the service of the State. It is evident that if he is prevented from continuing his journey by illness, humane considerations must prevail; just as is customary in case of bad weather, difficulties of navigation, and other things which accidentally happen.

Ulpianus, On the Lex Julia et Papia, Book VI. Where a Senator is permitted to marry a freedwoman by the consent of the Emperor, she will be his lawful wife.

Ulpianus, On the Lex Julia et Papia, Book VII. Where, however, a husband who is transacting the business of his wife, with her consent, manumits a dotal slave, with her permission, he must restore to his wife whatever may have come into his hands through the said slave. 1If he imposes any conditions upon the slave in consideration of his freedom, he must be responsible for this to his wife. 2It is evident if any services should be performed by the freedman for the husband, and no appraisement of them should be made, it will not be just for the husband to pay anything to the wife on this account. 3But if any charge was imposed upon the freedman after manumission, this must be accounted for to the wife. 4Where, however, the freedman is the debtor of the husband, or has rendered himself liable for any other obligation, he must assign the claim which he holds against him to his wife. 5He is also compelled to deliver to his wife any of the property of the freedman, which may come into his hands, provided he acquired it in the capacity of patron. If, however, he acquires it in any other way, he is not compelled to transfer it, for he is not liable to his wife for anything which the freedman gives to him gratuitously, but only for what he acquires, or can acquire under his rights as patron. It is evident that if he is appointed heir by the freedman to the greater portion of the debt which the latter owes him, he will not be responsible for the excess; and if the freedman should constitute him his heir when he is not indebted to him, he will not be bound to give anything to his wife. 6He must, however (as the law declares), give “whatever may come into his hands”. We understand this to mean whatever he collects, or can collect, because a right of action to do so is granted him. 7It is added in the law that the husband shall be liable where he has committed any fraudulent act to prevent the property from coming into his hands. 8If a patron disinherits his son, and the property of the freedman should be obtained by the latter, it must be considered whether the heir will be liable on this ground. And, also, where nothing comes into the hands of the patron himself, or into the hands of his heir, how can be become liable on this account? 9The law only speaks of the husband and his heir. Nothing is mentioned in it with reference to a father-in-law and his successors; and Labeo notices this as having been omitted. In these instances, therefore, the law is defective, and not even a prætorian action can be granted. 10Where the law says that the husband shall give up the money which he has received, it is evident that it did not intend that he should surrender the estate itself, but only the value of the same, or of the property of the freedman; unless the husband should prefer to surrender the property itself, and this should be admitted as the more favorable construction.

Ulpianus, On the Lex Julia et Papia, Book VII. Houses are considered to be built at Rome when they are erected contiguous to the city. 1He is considered to have finished a house who has completed it so that it can be occupied.

Ulpianus, On the Lex Julia et Papia, Book VIII. Where a testator made the following provision in his will, “I desire that there be given to So-and-So all that he is permitted to receive by law,” then this bequest is considered to refer to the time when the legatee could receive the property under the will. If, however, the testator had said, “Let my heir be charged to give the largest share of my estate that I can dispose of,” it must be said that the same rule will apply. 1A person to whom the third part of an estate is left to vest at a time when he will have children cannot obtain the third part of said estate by the adoption of children.

Ulpianus, On the Lex Julia et Papia, Book VIII. Where a man leaves a legacy to his wife payable at the time that she has children, some doubt may arise whether the testator only had reference to such children as might be born after his death, or whether he had in his mind those also who were born to him after his will was made, if he died while the marriage continued to exist. I think it is but proper that this should apply not only to children born during the lifetime of the husband, but also to those born after his death.

Ulpianus, On the Lex Julia et Papia, Book VIII. Where anything is given for the purpose of complying with a condition, although it may not be derived from the estate of the deceased, still, he whom the law says shall only receive a certain amount cannot receive a larger sum than that fixed by law. It is certain that where a sum of money is paid by a slave for the purpose of complying with the condition, the amount will be regulated in accordance with that which the legatee is legally entitled to receive, provided the slave had that much in his peculium at the time of his death. If, however, the sum was acquired after his death, or if another person gave it for him, as it did form part of the property which the testator had when he died, the case will be the same as where charges are imposed on legatees.

Ulpianus, On the Lex Julia et Papia, Book VIII. It makes no difference whether one actually kills another, or is merely the cause of his death.

The Same, On the Lex Julia et Papia, Book VIII. If a woman should leave money for the purchase of articles suitable for military service to the son of her husband, who is in the army, anything purchased with it by him will be included in his castrense peculium.

Ulpianus, On the Lex Julia et Papia, Book VIII. As a woman, when moribund, is considered to have had a child if it is taken from her by means of the Cæsarean operation; so, under other circumstances, she can be held to have had a child whom she did not bring forth at the time of her death; for instance, one who returns from the hands of the enemy.

The Same, On the Lex Julia et Papia, Book IX. The Prætor cannot appoint himself a guardian, just as a judge cannot appoint himself to a judicial office, or an arbiter be created by his own decision.

Ulpianus, On the Lex Julia et Papia, Book IX. Anyone is considered to have property if he is entitled to an action to recover it, for he has anything which he has a right to demand.

Ulpianus, On the Lex Julia et Papia, Book X. Moreover, he will not be admitted to the succession of his intestate freedman which is granted him by the Law of the Twelve Tables.

Ulpianus, On the Lex Julia et Papia, Book X. When a freedman commits a fraud against the law, in order that he may die worth less than a hundred thousand sesterces, his act is void by operation of law; and therefore his patron will succeed him as a freedman possessed an estate of that amount. Hence, everything which he has alienated, for any reason whatsoever, will be of no force or effect. It is evident that if he should alienate any property for the purpose of defrauding his patron, and, after doing so, he should remain worth more than a hundred thousand sesterces, the alienation will be valid, but any property which was fraudulently disposed of can be recovered by the Favian or the Calvisian action. Julianus has frequently stated this, and it is our practice. The reason for this difference is that whenever an alienation of anything is made for the purpose of defrauding the law the act is void. Moreover, he is guilty of fraud who diminishes the value of his estate to less than a hundred thousand sesterces for the purpose of evading the provisions of the law. But if, after the alienation has taken place, he still remains the owner of property worth a hundred thousand sesterces, he is not considered to have committed a fraud against the law, but only against his patron; and therefore the property which he has disposed of can be recovered by either the Favian or the Calvisian Action. 1Where anyone, for the purpose of diminishing the value of his property to an amount under a hundred thousand sesterces, alienates several articles at once, so that by revoking the sale of one, or of portions of all of them, he will be worth more than a hundred thousand sesterces, will it be necessary for us to revoke the sale of all the articles, or that of each one pro rata, in order to render his fortune equal to a hundred thousand sesterces? The better opinion is that the alienation of all the articles is of no force or effect. 2If anyone should not sell all of his property at once, but a part of it at one time, and a part of it at another, the subsequent alienation will not be revoked by operation of law, but the former one will be; and there will be ground for the institution of the Favian Action with reference to the property last disposed of.

Ulpianus, On the Lex Julia et Papia, Book X. It must be said that by the term “individual share” the entire estate sometimes is meant.

The Same, On the Lex Julia et Papia, Book XI. The Divine Brothers stated the following in a Rescript: “We have ascertained from those who are the most learned in the law that it was sometimes doubtful whether a grandson could demand prætorian possession of the estate of his grandfather contrary to the provisions of the will, if his father, who was over twenty-five years of age, had accused him of a capital crime. It is true that Proculus, a jurist of great authority, was of the opinion that, in a case of this kind, prætorian possession should not be given to the grandson; and we adopted this opinion when we issued a Rescript in answer to the application of Cæsidia Longina. But, our friend Volusius Mæcianus, Prætor of the Civil Law, and one who pays the greatest attention to old and well-founded precedents, being influenced by his respect for Our Rescript (as he stated to Us) did not think that he could decide otherwise. But as We have discussed this point very fully with Mæcianus himself, and with others of our friends learned in the law, the better opinion seems to be that a grandson will not be excluded from the estate of his freedman’s grandfather, either by the words or the spirit of the law, or by the Edict of the Prætor, or on his own account, or by the stigma attaching to his father. We are also aware that this opinion has been adopted by many eminent jurists, as well as by that most illustrious man Salvius Julianus, our friend.” 1The question also arose, if a son accused the freedman of his father of a capital offence, whether this would prejudice the rights of his children. Proculus held that the stigma attaching to the son of the patron would prejudice his children. Julianus, however, denies that this is the case; and it must be held that the opinion of Julianus should be adopted.

Ulpianus, On the Lex Julia et Papia, Book XI. Labeo says that it is clear that a partnership formed between a freedman and a patron, in consideration of freedom being granted to the former, is void in law.

Ulpianus, On the Lex Julia et Papia, Book XI. Julianus says that if a patron should sell to his freedman the obligations which had been imposed upon him in consideration of liberating him from slavery, his son can be barred from obtaining prætorian possession of the estate of the freedman, for the reason that he does not obtain possession of the said estate in opposition to the terms of the will, as his father sold to him the gift, present, or services for which he obtained his freedom. He says that it is evident if the son of the patron should sell to him the services which were imposed upon the latter in consideration of giving him his liberty, that the brother of the patron can, nevertheless, obtain possession of the freedman’s estate contrary to the provisions of the will, because the son, by selling to the latter the services which were the consideration of his freedom, did not bar his uncle from asserting the claim. 1If the freedman should appoint an heir, and the latter should enter upon the estate before having put the slaves of the deceased to torture, Julianus says that the patron will not be permitted to obtain possession of the estate in opposition to the terms of the will, for he also should avenge the death of the freedman. This rule, likewise, is applicable to the patroness.

The Same, On the Lex Julia et Papia. The Emperor is free from the operation of the law, and though the Empress is undoubtedly subject to it, still, the Emperors generally confer upon her the same privileges which they themselves enjoy.

Ulpianus, On the Lex Julia et Papia, Book XIII. The right of building a sewer is a servitude.

Ulpianus, On the Lex Julia et Papia, Book XIII. An appointed heir is held to have signified his acceptance even in case of substitution, whenever he can acquire the property for himself; for if he should die, he will not transfer the substitution to his heir.

Ulpianus, On the Lex Julia et Papia, Book XIII. Where there are two copies of a will, and one of them remains unsealed, the will is held to be opened. 1Where the will itself is unsealed, there is no doubt that it should be considered as opened; for we do not inquire by whom it is to be opened. 2If a will should not be produced, or has been burned, it follows that relief should be granted to the legatees; and the same rule applies where the will has been suppressed, or concealed.

Ulpianus, On the Lex Julia et Papia, Book XIII. Where anyone makes a will and also a copy of it, and the copy is open, the will is not considered to be open; but when the original will is open, everything else is likewise.

Ulpianus, On the Lex Julia et Papia, Book XIII. Where a bequest is made to anyone at a time when he is already dead, it is considered as not having been written. 1Moreover, where a legatee is in the power of the enemy at the time that the will is made, and does not return from captivity, the legacy is held not to have been written. This was also stated by Julianus.

Ulpianus, On the Lex Julia et Papia, Book XIII. A legacy becomes of no effect, if the person to whom it was bequeathed conditionally should die before the condition is fulfilled. 1But what if he should not die, but should lose his civil rights? For instance, where a bequest was made to a certain man, “if he should become Consul,” and he is deported to an island, will the legacy not be extinguished in the meantime, because he can be restored to his civil rights? I think that this is extremely probable. 2The same rule cannot be said to apply where a penalty involving servitude is imposed upon him, because servitude resembles death.

Ulpianus, On the Lex Julia et Papia, Book XIII. Where the following provision is included in a will, “Let my heir be charged with the payment of ten aurei to Lucius Titius, and let as much more be given him as he will lose by the operation of the Falcidian Law,” the will of the testator must be executed.

Ulpianus, On the Lex Julia et Papia, Book XIV. If mortal hatred should have arisen between a legatee and the testator, and it should be probable that the latter was unwilling that he to whom a legacy, or the benefit of a trust was bequeathed, should enjoy the benefit of the same, the better opinion is that the legacy cannot be claimed by him. 1Again, where he has openly and publicly abused the testator, and made malicious speeches against him, the same rule will apply. 2Where, however, the civil condition of the testator is the cause of the controversy, raised by the legatee, the latter will not be entitled to what has been left him, which will, in this instance, immediately be forfeited to the Treasury.

Ulpianus, On the Lex Julia et Papia, Book XV. “I desire the income of my estate to be paid every year to my wife.” Aristo gives as his opinion that this legacy will not pass to the heir of the wife, because it resembles either an usufruct, or a legacy to be paid annually.

The Same, On the Lex Julia et Papia, Book XV. Generally speaking, it must be remembered that donations mortis causa are comparable to legacies. Therefore, any rule of law which applies to legacies must be understood also to apply to donations mortis causa. 1Julianus says that if anyone should during the lifetime of the donor sell a slave given to him as a donation mortis causa, the latter will be entitled to a personal action to recover the price, if he should regain his health, and choose to do so; otherwise, the donee will be compelled to return the slave himself.

Ulpianus, On the Lex Julia et Papia, Book XVI. Julianus says that if a son, who was an heir, should be charged with the payment of a legacy to Seius, and Seius is charged with a trust, under a condition, to pay it to Titius, and Titius dies before the condition has been fulfilled, the trust remains with Seius, and will not belong to the son who is the heir, because the Senate intended that, in the case of a trust, the condition of him who had been selected as trustee should be the better.

Ulpianus, On the Lex Julia et Papia, Book XVIII. Neither gross ignorance of the facts should be tolerated, nor scrupulous inquiry be exacted, but such knowledge should be demanded that neither excessive negligence, too great unconcern, nor the inquisitiveness that characterizes informers may be exhibited.

Ulpianus, On the Lex Julia et Papia, Book XVIII. If anyone should be tacitly requested to surrender to another the entire share of an estate to which he has been appointed heir, it is evident that he can receive nothing by accrual, because he is not considered to be entitled to the property.

Ulpianus, On the Lex Julia et Papia, Book XVIII. If Titius and Mævius should be appointed heirs by a testator who left four hundred aurei, and he charged Titius with a legacy of two hundred, and whomever might become his heir with a hundred, and Mævius, his heir, should not enter upon the estate; Titius will be responsible for the payment of three hundred aurei. 1Julianus, indeed, says that if one of two heirs at law who was charged with a trust rejects the estate, his co-heir cannot be compelled to execute the trust, for his share will belong to the co-heir without an obligation of any kind. However, after the Rescript of Severus, by which it is provided that where an appointed heir is charged with a trust, and rejects it, it must be executed by the substitute, in this case the heir at law will obtain the share by accrual, just as the substitute will acquire it with its burden.

Ulpianus, On the Lex Julia et Papia, Book XVIII. The following must be noted with reference to the operation of the Falcidian Law, where a legacy is bequeathed to anyone conditionally, or payable after a certain time. If ten aurei should be bequeathed to someone under a condition, and the condition is fulfilled, for instance, after the lapse of ten years, the said ten aurei will not be considered to have been bequeathed to the legatee, but a smaller amount, for the interval, and the interest during that interval cause reduction of the original sum of ten aurei. 1Just as legacies are not payable unless a balance remains after deducting the amount of the debts from the property of the estate, so donations mortis causa will not be due, but may be annulled by the indebtedness of the estate. Therefore, if the indebtedness is very large, no one can receive property given to him mortis causa, out of the funds of the estate.

Ulpianus, On the Lex Julia et Papia, Book XVIII. The Divine Trajan says, “Whoever shall have stated.” We must understand “whoever” to mean either a man or a woman, for although women are forbidden to act as informers, still they are permitted to denounce themselves by the privilege of Trajan. Likewise, it does not make any difference what the age of the informer may be, whether he is of lawful age, or a minor, for minors are permitted to denounce themselves in cases where they are not entitled to receive property.

The Same, On the Lex Julia et Papia, Book XIX. Nor will a minor obtain possession of his property from his curators any sooner on account of his having children; for what is provided by the law, namely: that a year is remitted for every child, the Divine Severus states has reference to capacity for public office, and not for the management of property.

Ulpianus, On the Lex Julia et Papia, Book XX. Proconsuls are only entitled to six lictors.

Ulpianus, On the Lex Julia et Papia, Book XX. Where children are lost in war, this fact affords a valid excuse for release from guardianship. A question arose, however, as to who these children are, whether they are such as are killed in battle, or whether they include all those who are taken from their parents on account of war; as, for instance, those lost in a siege. The preferable opinion is that only those who are killed in battle, without reference to their sex or age, should afford a valid cause for release, for they have lost their lives for their country.