Gaius, On the Lex Julia et Papia, Book I. Just and necessary reasons often exist for protracting a betrothal, for one, two, three, or four years, and even for a longer time; as, for instance, the illness of either of the parties, the death of their parents, accusations of capital crimes, or long journeys made through necessity.

Gaius, On the Lex Julia et Papia, Book I. Those who have been sentenced to death immediately lose both their citizenship and their freedom. Therefore, this condition attaches to them while living, and sometimes affects them for a long time; which happens to those who are condemned to be thrown to wild beasts, for they are frequently kept after having been sentenced, in order that they may be tortured to obtain evidence against others.

Gaius, On the Lex Julia et Papia, Book II. A pretended marriage is of no force or effect.

Gaius, On the Lex Julia et Papia, Book III. Where several heirs mentioned in a will were substituted for someone, as follows: “If he should not be my heir, let whoever will be inherit his share of my estate”, it is settled that each heir will be called to the share of the heir of him who is lacking; and it does not make any difference whether he who becomes heir to the larger portion of the estate does so by virtue of his appointment, or whether he has obtained it through some law by which he was granted the share of another.

Gaius, On the Lex Julia et Papia, Book II. Where a legacy was bequeathed as follows, “If she should not marry Titius,” or, “If she should marry neither Titius, Seius, nor Mævius,” and finally a large number of persons were included in the prohibition, it was held to be the better opinion that the woman would lose her legacy if she married any one of them; for it does not appear that widowhood was imposed by such a condition, because she could very easily marry someone else. 1Let us see what would be the case if a legacy was bequeathed to a woman under the condition that she married Titius. And, indeed, if she could marry Titius honorably, there can be no doubt that she would be excluded from the legacy, unless she complied with the condition. If, however, the said Titius was unworthy of contracting marriage with her, it must be said that she can marry anyone that she pleases, by the beneficent provision of the law. For when she was ordered to marry Titius, she was forbidden to marry anyone else, and therefore, if Titius is unworthy of her, the provision is the same as if it had been stated in general terms, “If she should not marry.” And, moreover, if she entertains a genuine affection, this condition is harder than the one, “If she should not marry,” for she is forbidden to marry anyone else but Titius, with whom her marriage would be dishonorable.

Gaius, On the Lex Julia et Papia, Book IV. In the laws where the exception is made that neither a son-in-law nor a father-in-law, if unwilling, can be compelled to give testimony; it is held that the betrothed of the daughter is included in the term “son-in-law,” and also that the father of the betrothed woman is included in the term “father-in-law.”

Gaius, On the Lex Julia et Papia, Book V. Where a legacy payable annually is bequeathed, it resembles an usufruct, as it is terminated by the death of the legatee. It is not, however, terminated by the loss of civil rights, as is the case of an usufruct, which can be bequeathed as follows: “I bequeath to Titius the usufruct of such-and-such a tract of land, and every time that he loses his civil rights, I bequeath to him the same usufruct.” The legacy is, in this respect, certainly more beneficial, because if the legatee should die at the beginning of any year, he leaves the legacy for that year to his heir. This does not apply to an usufruct, for if the usufructuary should die at the time that the crops are ripe, but before they have been gathered, he will not leave them to his heir.

Gaius, On the Lex Julia et Papia, Book V. Ad Dig. 34,5,23 pr.ROHGE, Bd. 11 (1874), Nr. 27, S. 69: Natur der Judicatsklage, unveränderter Charakter des Anspruchs.Where a woman perishes in a shipwreck, at the same time with her son who is under the age of puberty, the son is understood to have lost his life first.

Gaius, On the Lex Julia et Papia, Book VI. The following cities enjoy the privileges of those of Italy, namely Troy, Berytus, and Dyrrachium.

Gaius, On the Lex Julia et Papia, Book VIII. Can it be doubted whether this law will apply where a patron marries a freedwoman in whom another party jointly has rights? Javolenus denies that it does apply, because she is not properly held to be the freedwoman of one man who also is that of another. On the contrary, others hold that it cannot be denied that she is the freedwoman of one man, because she is also the freedwoman of another; and this opinion the majority of jurists have approved as correct.

Gaius, On the Lex Julia et Papia, Book VIII. (For instance, where they have relinquished their right, or have been excluded from prætorian possession by lapse of time, or have died before demanding possession):

Gaius, On the Lex Julia et Papia, Book VIII. A man who has only one son or one daughter is not without children; for the expression, “He has children,” or “he has not children,” is always used in the plural number, just as writing tablets and codicils are.

The Same, On the Lex Julia et Papia, Book IX. If I stipulate with you as follows: “Do you promise to pay me whatever I may fail to collect from Titius?” there is no doubt that if I should not collect anything from Titius you will be indebted to me for all that he owed me.

Gaius, On the Lex Julia et Papia, Book X. No woman either has proper heirs, or can cease to have them, on account of her loss of civil rights.

The Same, On the Lex Julia et Papia, Book X. For we cannot say of such a person that he is childless, and we must necessarily say that he has children.

Gaius, On the Lex Julia et Papia, Book X. There is no doubt that both males and females are included under the term “man.”

Gaius, On the Lex Julia et Papia, Book XI. Just as a codicil is considered to be part of a will, so a pupillary substitution is also held to constitute a part of the same.

Gaius, On the Lex Julia et Papia, Book XI. It is said that when, under the terms of the Silanian Decree of the Senate, the Treasury claims the entire estate, neither grants of freedom nor legacies are protected; which is plainly contrary to reason, when, in all other cases where estates are claimed by the Treasury, the rights to grants of freedom and legacies continue to exist unimpaired.

Gaius, On the Lex Julia et Papia, Book XII. Where the same property was bequeathed to Titius and myself, and the testator died on the very day that the legacy began to vest, and he appointed his heir, and I reject the legacy, either on my own account, or as the heir to the estate, I see that the opinion generally prevails that the legacy is partially extinguished. 1Ad Dig. 31,55,1Windscheid: Lehrbuch des Pandektenrechts, 7. Aufl. 1891, Bd. III, § 531, Note 11.Where a person has been appointed heir who cannot receive any of the estate, or only a portion of the same, and he leaves it to a slave belonging to the estate, in the discussion of his capacity to do this it must be determined whether the person of the heir or that of the deceased should be taken into consideration, or whether neither should be. It was settled after many conflicting decisions that, for the reason that there is no master with reference to whose person the question of capacity could arise, the legacy will be acquired by the estate without any impediment whatever; and, on this account, it will certainly belong to him who afterwards becomes the heir, in proportion to the share of the estate which he is entitled to receive, and the remaining portion shall go to those who are called by law to the succession.

Gaius, On the Lex Julia et Papia, Book XII. The vendor can manumit a slave whom he has agreed to sell, and the promisor one whom he has contracted to deliver.

Gaius, On the Lex Julia et Papia, Book XIII. Where an heir is appointed under a condition, and we substitute another for him, unless, when doing so, we repeat the same condition, the substitution of the heir will be understood to be absolute.

Gaius, On the Lex Julia et Papia, Book XIII. If the testator expressed himself as follows, “I give and bequeath to Titius such-and-such property, if he is willing,” Proculus, on Labeo, remarks that the legacy will not belong to the heir of the legatee, unless the legatee himself desired him to have it, because the condition appears to be attached to the person.

The Same, On the Lex Julia et Papia, Book XIII. Formal acceptance is not necessary for proper heirs, because they immediately become heirs by operation of law.

Gaius, On tine Lex Julia et Papia, Book XIII. If a legacy is bequeathed to a slave on the condition of his rendering his accounts, there is no doubt that, under the condition by which he is directed to receive the legacy, he must pay over any balance remaining in his hands. 1Therefore, when inquiry was made with reference to the following clause, “Let Stichus, together with his female companion, be free, after he has rendered his accounts,” and Stichus should die before the condition is complied with, will his companion be free? Julianus says that there is a point in this case which also arises with respect to legacies, as where a testator says, “I give to So-and-So together with So-and-So,” and one of the parties is lacking, the other is permitted to take the legacy; because the better opinion is that the case is just as if the testator had said, “I give to So-and-So and So-and-So.” It is also said that there is another question, namely, whether the condition is also imposed upon the female companion. It is held that this is the case; hence, if Stichus has no balance in his hands, the woman will immediately become free; but if a balance remained in his hands, she must pay the money, nor will it be lawful for her to take it out of the peculium, because this is only permitted to those who are directed to make payment in their own names, in consideration of the freedom which is granted them.

Gaius, On the Lex Julia et Papia, Book XIV. Ad Dig. 29,2,53 pr.Windscheid: Lehrbuch des Pandektenrechts, 7. Aufl. 1891, Bd. III, § 601, Note 5.Where an heir has been appointed to two shares of an estate, to one absolutely, and to the other conditionally, and accepts the share left to him absolutely, and then dies, and the condition is subsequently fulfilled, that share of the estate dependent upon it will also belong to his heir. 1Where anyone becomes the heir to one share of an estate, he will also even without his consent, acquire the shares of his co-heirs who refuse to accept them; that is to say, their shares will tacitly accrue to him, even contrary to his will.

The Same, On the Lex Julia et Papia, Book XIV. Where a legacy is bequeathed to the Emperor, and he dies before the day when it becomes due, it will belong to his successor, according to a Constitution of the Divine Antoninus.

Gaius, On the Lex Julia et Papia, Book XIV. When a party to whom a legacy was bequeathed wishes only to obtain a portion of it, he will acquire it all.

Gaius, On the Lex Julia et Papia, Book XV. He is guilty of a fraud against the law who tacitly agrees to deliver what is left to him, or anything else, to a person who is legally prohibited from taking under the will, whether he gives a written instrument to this effect, or undertakes to do so by a mere promise. 1Where anyone was charged to deliver certain property to someone who can take under a will, and who, at the time of death, has been forbidden to do so, I have no doubt that although the trust is extinguished, it should still remain with him who was asked to deliver the property, because no fraud is held to have been committed by him, unless he bound himself with reference to what he knew would occur; that is to say, that he would deliver the property to the beneficiary even though he might be legally incapacitated from receiving it. 2It has very properly been held that if the father of a son who is under his control makes a tacit agreement, this should not prejudice the son, because he is obliged to obey his father.