Venuleius, Stipulations, Book I. The act of the stipulator and the promisor should be continuous, in such a way, however, that any short interval may be permitted to intervene, and the stipulator may be answered with very little delay. If, however, after the interrogatory has been put, something else should be done, the stipulation will be void; even though the promisor answered upon the same day. 1If I stipulate for a slave, and I have one slave in my mind, and you have another, the transaction will be void; for a stipulation is perfected by the consent of both parties. 2When I stipulate as follows, “Do you promise to pay at Ephesus?” a certain time is implied. The question arises, what time should be understood? The better opinion is to refer the entire matter to a court, that is to say to an arbiter, who will estimate how much time the diligent head of a household would require to be able to accomplish what he had promised to do; so that where anyone agreed to pay at Ephesus, he would not be compelled to travel at great speed day and night, and continue his journey regardless of every kind of weather; nor should he travel so leisurely as to appear worthy of blame; but the season, as well as the age, sex, and condition of health of the promisor, should be taken into account, in order that he may act so as to arrive promptly, that is to say, within the time that most men of his rank would ordinarily consume in making the journey. This having elapsed, even if he remained at Rome, he would not be able to pay the money at Ephesus; still he could properly be sued, either because it was his own fault that he did not make payment at Ephesus, or for the reason that he could pay it there by another, or indeed could pay it anywhere. For anything which is due at a certain time can be paid before that time, although it cannot be demanded. If, however, having used the post, or having had an unusually favorable sea voyage, he should arrive at Ephesus sooner than anyone else ordinarily could have done, he will immediately become liable, because when anything is determined by time, or by the performance of an act, there is no longer ground for conjecture. 3Again, where anyone promises to build a house, there is no need of searching for workmen everywhere, and hastening to procure the largest number possible; nor, on the other hand, should the promisor be satisfied with only one or two, but a moderate number should be obtained in accordance with the conduct of a diligent builder, the time and place also being taken into consideration. Likewise, if the work is not begun, that only will be estimated which could have been completed during the interval, and if, after the time has passed which would have been required to finish the house, it is afterwards constructed, the contractor will be released from liability, just as a person will be released who promises to give himself up, if he does so at any time afterwards. 4Ad Dig. 45,1,137,4ROHGE, Bd. 17 (1875), Nr. 83, S. 366: Liberation des Beschädigten von den übernommenen Verpflichtungen. Schadensersatz.It should be considered whether someone who has promised to pay a hundred aurei becomes liable immediately, or whether the obligation remains in abeyance until he can collect the money. But what if he has no money at home, and cannot find his creditor? These matters, however, differ from natural obstacles, and involve the ability to pay. This ability, however, is represented by the ease or difficulty of the person, and does not refer to what is promised; otherwise, if anyone should agree to deliver Stichus, we ascertain where Stichus is; or if it makes much difference when delivery is to be made at Ephesus, or where the person, being at Rome, promises to deliver something which is at Ephesus; for this also has reference to the ability to give, because there is something in common in the payment of the money, and the delivery of the slave, and that is, that the promisor cannot immediately do either. And, generally speaking, the cause of the difficulty has reference to the inconvenience of the promisor, and not to interference by the stipulator; lest it might be alleged that he who has promised to give a slave belonging to another cannot do so because his master is unwilling to sell him. 5If I stipulate with someone who cannot do what is possible for another to accomplish, Sabinus says that the obligation is legally incurred. 6Ad Dig. 45,1,137,6ROHGE, Bd. 15 (1875), Nr. 7, S. 18: Verweisung des Gläubigers seitens eines Solidarschuldners an den andern unter Sicherstellung des Gläubigers. Keine Einrede daraus für den andern Schuldner?When anyone stipulates under the following condition: “If Titius should sell a sacred or religious place, or a market, or a temple,” or anything of this kind, which has been perpetually set apart for the use of the public, and the condition cannot, under any circumstances, legally be complied with, or if the promisor cannot do what is agreed upon, the stipulation will be of no force or effect, just as if a condition which was impossible by nature had been inserted into it. Nor does it make any difference if the law can be changed, and what is now impossible may become possible hereafter, for the stipulation should be interpreted, not according to the law of the future, but according to that of the present time. 7When we stipulate for something to be done, Labeo says that it is customary, and more advisable, for a penal clause to be added, as follows: “If this is not done in this way.” But when we stipulate against something being done, we provide as follows, “If anything contrary to this should be done.” And when we stipulate conjointly, that some things shall be done, and others shall not, the following provision should be inserted, namely, “If you do not do this, or if you do anything contrary to this.” 8Ad Dig. 45,1,137,8ROHGE, Bd. 12 (1874), Nr. 106, S. 360: Verträge zu Gunsten eines Contrahenten und eines weiteren noch unbestimmten Personenkreises. Aufführungsrecht für den Theaterdirector und dessen Nachfolger.Moreover, it should be remembered that what we stipulate shall be given cannot be acquired by only one of our heirs, but must be acquired by all of them. But when we stipulate that something shall be done, only one of them can legally be included.

Venuleius, Stipulations, Book I. If a slave owned in common stipulates as follows, “Do you promise to pay on the Kalends of January ten aurei to either Titius or Mævius, whichever one of them may be living at the time?” Julianus says that the agreement is void, because a stipulation cannot remain in suspense, and it does not appear by which of the two persons the money will be acquired.

Venuleius, Stipulations, Book I. In prætorian stipulations, if the language is ambiguous, it is the duty of the Prætor to interpret it, for its intention should be determined.

Venuleius, Stipulations, Book II. Julianus states that the creditor of a son under paternal control cannot receive a surety after the death of the latter, because no civil or natural obligation with which the surety is connected survives; but it is evident that a surety can be properly received from the father on account of the action on the peculium which may be brought against him.

Venuleius, Stipulations, Book II. If, of two persons who are about to bind themselves by a promise, one answers to-day, and the other on the following day, they will not be jointly liable, and he who has answered on the next day is not even regarded as liable at all—as the stipulator, or the promisor turned aside for the transaction of other business—even though he made his reply after the said transaction had been concluded. 1If I stipulate for ten aurei with Titius and a ward without the authority of his guardian, or with a slave, and I have accepted them as two jointly liable promisors, Julianus says that Titius alone will be bound; although if a slave should promise, the same rule must be observed in an action for his peculium, as if he had been free.

The Same, Stipulations, Book III. If a promisor should become the heir of the person jointly liable with him, it must be said that he is bound by two obligations; for where there is some difference between the obligations, as in the case of a surety and the principal debtor, it is established that one obligation is annulled by the other. When, however, the obligations are of the same nature, it cannot be determined why one of them should be disposed of rather than the other. Hence, if one joint-stipulator should become the heir of the other, he will be entitled to two distinct obligations.

Venuleius, Stipulations, Book III. If I stipulate for something to be given me, and I afterwards stipulate for the same thing with the same person under a condition, with the intention of making a novation, the property must remain in existence in order for there to be ground for the novation, unless the promisor was required to give it. Therefore, if you are obliged to deliver me a slave, and you are in default in doing so, you will be liable even if the slave should die, and if, before he dies, you are already in default, and I stipulate with you for the same slave under a condition, and the slave afterwards dies, and then the condition is fulfilled, as you are already liable to me under the stipulation, novation will alscr take place. 1Ad Dig. 46,2,31,1ROHGE, Bd. 4 (1872), S. 217: Liberation eines Schuldners ohne dessen Wissen durch Zahlung bez. Angabe an Zahlungsstatt, Novation eines Dritten.ROHGE, Bd. 16 (1875), Nr. 82, S. 328: Ersatzanspruch aus der Tilgung bezw. Uebernahme der Schuld eines Andern.Windscheid: Lehrbuch des Pandektenrechts, 7. Aufl. 1891, Bd. II, § 295, Note 5; Bd. II, § 354, Note 15.Where there are two joint-stipulators, the question arises whether one of them has the right to make a novation, and what right each acquires for himself. Generally speaking, it is established that payment may properly be made to one, and that if one institutes proceedings he brings the entire matter into court, just as where one is released, the obligation of both is extinguished. From this it may be gathered that each of them acquires for himself, just as if he alone had stipulated; except that each of them, by the act of him with whom the stipulation was jointly made, can lose his debtor. According to this, if one of the joint-stipulators enters into another agreement with a third party, he can, by novation, release him from liability to the other joint-stipulator, if such was his express intention; and there is all the more reason for this, as we think that the stipulation resembles payment. Otherwise, what shall we say if one of them delegates the common debtor to his creditor, and the latter stipulates with him; or a woman orders a tract of land to be promised to her husband by way of dowry; or, if she was about to marry him, she should promise him the land as dowry? The debtor would be released, so far as both parties are concerned.

The Same, Stipulations, Book IV. When anyone stipulates for something to be given to him on certain market-days, Sabinus says that he can demand it after the first day. Proculus, however, and other authorities of the rival school, think that it can be demanded as long as the smallest part of the market day specified remains. I agree with Proculus. 1When I stipulate absolutely, as follows, “Do you promise to give this, or that?” you can change your mind with reference to what you have to give, as often as you please; because there is a difference between an intention which is expressed, and one which is implied.

Venuleius, Stipulations, Book VI. Where two or more guardians are administering a guardianship, the stipulation of the surety of each one will render him liable for the entire amount. But if the guardianship is divided among them by districts, which is generally done, and one of them attends to the business in the city, and the other to that outside of it, then the stipulation will bind, or will not bind either surety, according to the liability of either principal; for although they are all guardians, and are administering the guardianship, still, if either of them is sued with reference to property which is outside of his district, or is brought into court, the stipulation will not bind him unless the administration of the guardianship has been entirely entrusted to him. Where the administration of the entire trust has not been committed to a guardian, the effect is the same as if it had not been given to him with reference to the property which is in question.

The Same, Stipulations, Book VI. When we attempt to obtain anything by virtue of a double stipulation, the heirs of the vendor should all be sued for the entire amount, and all of them should defend the case; and if one of them fails to do so, it will be of no advantage to the others to make a defence, because the sale must be defended in its entirety, as its nature is indivisible. Where, however, one of them is in default, all are considered to be so; and therefore all of them will be liable, and each one will be required to pay in proportion to his share of the estate.

Venuleius, Stipulations, Book VI. When, through fraud, a case has not been completely defended, the stipulation will become operative under the clause relating to the payment of the judgment; for a suit is not considered to be properly defended in accordance with the opinion of a good citizen where a defence is not made for the entire amount of the property involved,

Venuleius, Stipulations, Book VII. If an heir, in an instance where a co-heir was added under a condition, or is in the hands of the enemy, should assert that he himself is the heir, and having brought an action should gain it, and afterwards the condition upon which the inheritance of the other heir depended is fulfilled, or the latter returns by postliminium; ought the other heir to share with him the advantages of his victory? He is undoubtedly entitled to an action to enforce judgment for the entire amount. In this case the co-heir should be granted his choice, that is to say, he must either be given a share of the estate or he must have the power to institute proceedings, for he is one who became an heir, or returned to the city, after his co-heir had been successful. The same rule must be observed where a posthumous child is born. These parties are not to blame on account of their silence, since they only obtained a right to the estate after their co-heir had won his case.

Venuleius, Stipulations, Book VII. The term “chains” applies to both private or public restraint of liberty; “custody,” however, only has reference to public imprisonment.

The Same, Stipulations, Book IX. The last clause of the stipulation for the payment of a judgment, “That there is no fraud, and will be none,” indicates a permanent fact for the future. Therefore, if he who was guilty of fraud should die, his heir will remain liable; for the words, “will be none,” have great latitude, and refer to all coming time, and if fraud should be committed at any time, for the reason that it is true that there was fraud, this clause will become operative. 1And where the following is added, “If any fraud should be committed in this matter, do you promise to pay the entire value of the property?” the promisor will be liable to the penalty, even on account of fraud committed by a stranger. 2The clause relating to fraud, however, as is the case with other stipulations in which the time is not expressly mentioned, refers to the beginning of the stipulation.

Venuleius, Stipulations, Book XI. If I stipulate for the purpose of making a novation on account of a legacy which was bequeathed to me under a condition, and I release my right to it before the condition is fulfilled, Nerva, the son, says that even if the condition should be fulfilled, I will not be entitled to an action under the will, because a novation took place, nor can I bring one under the stipulation, as the right to do so has been extinguished by the release.

Venuleius, Stipulations, Book XII. If the usufructuary should obtain the property, the usufruct ceases to belong to him on account of the merger of the same; but if suit is brought against him on the stipulation, it must be held either that he has not proceeded in accordance with the strict principles of law, if the doctrine governing the conduct of a good citizen is considered applicable; or that the party must make use of an exception based on what has taken place.

Venuleius, Stipulations, Book XII. Where a slave forming part of an estate stipulates and receives sureties, and after the estate has been entered upon, a doubt arises whether the time begins to run from the date when the stipulation was made, or from the time when the estate was accepted, just as where a slave whose master is in the hands of the enemy has received sureties, Cassius thinks that the time should be computed from the date when proceedings can be instituted against the parties; that is to say, after the estate has been entered upon, or the master returns from captivity under the right of postliminium.

Venuleius, Stipulations, Book XII. No one can be considered dishonest who does not know how much he ought to pay.

Venuleius, Stipulations, Book XIII. If a man should become the heir of his wife, and incur expenses for her funeral, he will not be considered to have expended the entire amount as her heir, but he should contribute in proportion to the extent that he is pecuniarily benefited, after having deducted what was due on account of the dowry.

Venuleius, Stipulations, Book XV. An attorney instituted proceedings for the production of property, and his adversary was discharged because he did not have possession of it. Then, he having subsequently obtained possession of the same property, the principal brought an action against him to compel him to produce it. Sabinus says that the sureties will not be liable, as this is a different matter; for even if the principal should bring the action in the first place, and, after his adversary had been discharged because he did not have possession of the property, he should bring another, he would not be barred by an exception on the ground of res judicata. 1If an agent has collected money from a debtor, and given him security that his principal will ratify his act, and the latter afterwards brings suit for the same sum of money, and loses the case, the stipulation will become operative; and if the agent pays the same money to his principal without an order of court, it can be recovered by a personal action. Where, however, the debtor brings suit under the stipulation, it may be said that if the principal undertakes the defence of his agent he cannot improperly make use of an exception on the ground of bad faith against the debtor, because the obligation remains a natural one. 2If anyone should permit his status to be disputed by an agent, he should take security from him that he will not continually be molested on this account, and if the principal, or his representatives, does not ratify his act, namely, that the agent attempted to reduce the party in question to slavery; or if the latter obtained a judgment against the agent in favor of his freedom, the entire value of the property must be paid to him when his right to liberty has been established, that is to say, to the extent of his interest in not having his status placed in jeopardy, as well as for the expenses incurred by the litigation. Labeo, however, thinks that a definite sum should be included, because the estimation of freedom is capable of indefinite extent; the stipulation, however, is held to become operative from the very moment when the principal refused to ratify the act of the agent. Still, an action cannot be brought under the stipulation before a judgment has been rendered with reference to the freedom of the alleged slave, because if it should be decided that he was a slave, the stipulation becomes void, and if any action can be brought he is understood to have acquired it for his master.

Venuleius, Stipulations, Book XVI. With reference to rural servitudes, where they tacitly follow the land, and are recovered by a third party, Quintus Mucius and Sabinus hold that the vendor cannot be held liable for eviction, for no one is liable on this ground in cases where there is a tacit accession to property; unless the land is conveyed as absolutely and entirely unincumbered, for then it should be warranted to be free from all servitudes. If, however, the purchaser demands a right of way or a driveway, the vendor cannot be held liable, unless he expressly stated that a right of way of some description was accessory to the property, for then he who made the statement will be liable. The opinion of Quintus Mucius, who stated that a party who conveys land as absolutely and entirely unincumbered warrants it to be free from every servitude, is correct; for other servitudes are not due unless it has been expressly stated by the vendor that they are accessories.

The Same, Stipulations, Book XVII. If you sell me property belonging to another, and I abandon the same, it is settled that my power to act, that is to say, my right to bring suit on account of eviction, is lost.

Venuleius, Stipulations, Book XVII. The law forbids property which has been possessed or taken by violence to be acquired by usucaption, before it again comes under the control of the owner, or his heir.

Venuleius, Interdicts, Book I. The titles to the possession and usufruct of property must not be confused, just as possession and ownership should not be intermingled. For possession is prevented if another has the use and enjoyment, nor can the usufruct of one person be computed if another is in possession of the property. 1It is clear that when anyone is forbidden to build, he is also forbidden to retain possession. 2One method of placing a person in possession of property is to prohibit any violence being manifested toward him when he enters upon it. For the judge orders the adverse party immediately to surrender and relinquish possession, which is much more decisive than to order him merely to restore it.

Venuleius, Interdicts, Book I. The ancients expressly added that violence should not be employed to prevent anyone from bringing materials suitable for repairing a road. This provision is superfluous, as anyone who does not permit materials to be brought without which a road cannot be repaired is considered to use violence to prevent the repairs from being made. 1If, however, anyone who can bring the materials necessary for the repairs by a shorter route prefers to bring them by a longer one, in order to subject him who owes the servitude to annoyance, force can be used against him with impunity, because it is he himself who interferes with the repair of the road.

Venuleius, Interdicts, Book I. The interdict is also granted where aqueducts ought to be repaired, and no inquiry is made whether a right to conduct the water exists or not. For the repair of roads is not as necessary as that of aqueducts, for if the latter are not repaired, the entire use of the water will be stopped, and persons will be exposed to death by thirst. It is evident that water cannot be obtained without repairing aqueducts; but if a road is not repaired, passage to and fro will only be rendered difficult, and this is less during the summer time.

Venuleius, Interdicts, Book I. Although the repair of existing sewers, and not the construction of new ones, is included in this interdict, Labeo says that an interdict should, nevertheless, be granted to prevent anyone from employing violence against another who builds a sewer, because the same question of public welfare is involved; as the Prætor has, by an interdict, forbidden force to be used to hinder anyone from constructing a sewer in a public place. This opinion is also adopted by Ofilius and Trebatius. Labeo also says that anyone ought, without interference, to be permitted by the interdict to clean and repair a sewer already constructed; but that the officer in charge of the public highways should grant permission to build a new one.

Venuleius, Interdicts, Book II. So that it may not be within the power of another to render my condition worse, without my being guilty of any offence.

Ad Dig. 43,24,4ROHGE, Bd. 12 (1874), Nr. 58, S. 172: Voraussetzung der Aufmerksamkeit des Geschäftsmannes bei Behandlung seiner Angelegenheiten. Seeversicherung. Kenntniß erheblicher Umstände.Venuleius, Interdicts, Book II. Servius says that he is held to have acted clandestinely, even if he thinks that no controversy will arise with reference to what he does; for it is not necessary to pay attention to every one’s inconsiderate opinion and judgment, otherwise, fools would be in a better condition than wise men.

Venuleius, Interdicts, Book II. For the origin of things of this kind is derived from the soil. Moreover, tiles are not of themselves possessed, but only with the entire edifice, nor does it make any difference whether they are attached to it, or only placed upon it.

Venuleius, Interdicts, Book II. This is because the pile of straw is not attached to the soil, but is supported by it, but buildings are attached to the soil.

Venuleius, Interdicts, Book II. Although a tenant and an usufructuary are entitled to the benefit of this interdict with reference to the crops, still, the owner will also be entitled to it if he has any additional interest.

Venuleius, Interdicts, Book II. If you have drawn over, and planted a sprout of one of my vines on your land, and it takes root, I will be entitled to the interdict Quod vi aut clam for the term of a year. If, however, the year should elapse, I shall no longer have a right of action; for even the roots which remain on my land become yours, because they are accessory. 1If anyone cultivates land with violence, or clandestinely, I think that he will be liable under this interdict, just as if he had dug a ditch; for the application of this interdict is not based upon the kind of work, but upon every description of labor which is performed upon the soil. 2If you attach a tablet to my door, and before serving notice upon you I remove it, and we then institute proceedings against one another under the interdict Quod vi aut clam, and you do not desist to enable me to be released, you should have judgment rendered against you for not restoring the property to its former condition, to the extent of my interest; or I can plead an exception based upon the fact that you have acted with violence, or clandestinely, or under a precarious title. 3If you throw manure upon my premises, after I have forbidden you to do so, Trebatius says that you will be liable under the interdict Quod vi aut clam, even though you cause me no damage, and do not change the appearance of my land. Labeo is of the opposite opinion, for he holds that anyone will not be liable under this interdict who merely makes a road through my land, or releases a bird of prey there, or hunts upon it, without constructing any new work. 4If anyone extends his roof or gutter above a tomb, even if it does not touch the monument itself, proceedings can, nevertheless, lawfully be instituted against him by means of the interdict Quod vi aut clam, because a sepulchre is not only a place intended for interment, but is entitled to all the air above it, and, on this account, the action for violation of a tomb can be brought. 5If he who served notice that he was about to undertake a new work should begin it immediately, he will not be understood to have done so clandestinely; but he will be considered to have acted clandestinely if he undertakes it after the designated time has expired.

Venuleius, Interdicts, Book III. But if I am entitled to retain possession of property by means of the interdict Uti possidetis, although the question relating to the ownership of the same may not have been decided, and I grant you possession of it under a precarious tenure, you will be liable under this interdict.

The Same, Interdicts, Book III. If anyone who is in possession merely as possessor should request the owner of the property to grant him permission to retain it under a precarious tenure, or if he who purchased property belonging to another should make this request to the owner of the same, it is evident that they will hold possession under a precarious tenure; and they should not be considered to have themselves changed their title to possession, as possession under a precarious tenure has been granted them by the owner of the land. For if you should ask another for property in your possession to be granted you under a precarious tenure, you will be considered to have ceased to possess it under the first title, and to begin to hold it under a precarious one. On the other hand, if a person who has the right to take the property away from the possessor should ask him to grant it to him by a precarious tenure, he will be liable under the interdict in question; as an advantage has been obtained by this request, that is to say, the possession which belongs to another. 1If a ward, without the authority of his guardian, should ask that property be granted him under a precarious tenure, Labeo says that he will hold precarious possession of it, and will be liable under this interdict; for where anyone has possession naturally, there is no ground for the exertion of the authority of a guardian. The words, “which you hold under a precarious tenure,” are perfectly applicable, because what he possesses he holds by the title under which he asked for the grant of the property. There is nothing new to be determined by the Prætor in this case; for if the ward holds the property, he will be required by the judge to surrender it, and if he does not hold it, he will not be liable.

Venuleius, Interdicts, Book IV. For there is not much difference between slaves and persons who have not the power to depart at their pleasure.

Venuleius, Interdicts, Book IV. If anyone restrains of his liberty a freeman who is not aware of his own condition, he will still be required to reproduce him, if he fraudulently retains him under his control. 1Trebatius, also, says that anyone who in good faith purchases a freeman as a slave, and retains him under his control, is not liable. 2A man who is free should, at no time, be fraudulently restrained of his liberty, and this is so far true that some authorities hold that not even the least delay should be allowed the person required to produce him, as he is liable to the penalty for an act which has been committed. 3This interdict does not lie in favor of a creditor, for the purpose of producing his debtor in court; for no one is obliged to produce a debtor who conceals himself, but under the Edict of the Prætor his property may be taken in execution.

Venuleius, Interdicts, Book IV. If a son is in the possession of another with his own consent, this interdict cannot be employed, because he is rather in his own possession than in that of him against whom proceedings may be instituted under the interdict, as he has free power to depart or remain; unless there is a dispute between two persons, each of whom alleges that he is his father, and one of whom demands that the child shall be produced by the other.

The Same, Interdicts, Book V. Possession which is defective is usually only advantageous as against strangers.

Venuleius, Interdicts, Book V. In the case of usucaption, the rule is observed that if the property is in possession only for a moment during the last day, the usucaption is, nevertheless, completed; for the entire day is not required for the completion of the prescribed time. 1The addition of time of possession not only includes that during which the property remained in the hands of the vendor but also the time that the purchaser held it, where the latter also disposed of it. If, however, one of the vendors was not a bona fide possessor, the possession of those who preceded him will be of no advantage, because the possession is not continuous, just as the possession of a vendor cannot be added to that of someone who is not in possession. 2It must also be added that, if you purchased the property yourself, or ordered someone else to do so, and he also directed it to be sold to a third party, continuity of possession is necessary. If, however, he who is directed to sell the property, should direct another to sell it, Labeo says that the addition of possession of him who gave the second mandate should not be allowed, unless the owner consents for this to be done. 3But if I purchase property from a son under paternal control, or from a slave, the addition of the time during which it was in possession of the father, or the master, should be granted me, if the property was sold either with the consent of the father or the master, or as part of the peculium of the slave who was entrusted with its administration. 4The time of possession by a ward is also added to that of a person who purchased the property from his guardian. The same rule should be observed in the case of anyone who buys property from the curator of a minor or an insane person. If the sale has been made in behalf of an unborn child, or because possession of the property has been obtained for the purpose of its preservation, or it is diminished on account of a dowry, this addition of the time of possession will also be permitted. 5These rules relating to additions of the time of possession are not understood to be as comprehensive as their language indicates; for, even if the property remains in the hands of the vendor after its sale and delivery, the purchaser will only be entitled to the benefit of the time which preceded the sale, even though the vendor did not have the property in his possession when it was sold. 6Where an heir sells to anyone property belonging to the estate, the latter will be entitled to the benefit of the time it remained in the hands of the heir, as well as to that during which it was in the possession of the deceased.

Venuleius, Interdicts, Book VI. When a pregnant woman is bequeathed, acquired by usucaption, or alienated in any other way, and brings forth a child, it will become the property of him who purchased her, and not of him to whom she belonged when she conceived.

Venuleius Saturninus, Interdicts, Book VI. From this it may be gathered that not even a part of the price paid by the purchaser should be returned to him. It can, however, be said that the matter ought to be investigated by an arbiter, to the end that he may order the money to be refunded, if it still is among the effects of the debtor; because, in this way, no one will be defrauded.

Venuleius Saturninus, Interdicts, Book VI. Cassius introduced an action having reference to property which comes into the hands of an heir.

Venuleius, Interdicts, Book VI. When a fraudulent debtor gives a release to someone who owes him, with the knowledge of the surety of the latter, and the principal debtor was not ignorant of the fact, both parties will be liable, or at least the one who was familiar with the circumstances. Where, however, he who was released was not solvent, let us see whether the action should be granted against the principal debtor, even if he was ignorant of the facts, because he received the debt as a donation. On the other hand, if the release was given to the principal debtor and he was aware of the fraud, his surety will also be liable, if he also was aware of it; but if he did not know of it, why should not an action also be granted against him, as he does not sustain any more damage than he obtains benefit? Where there are two principal debtors, the case of both is the same. 1Where a son-in-law accepts a dowry from his father-in-law, knowing that he intends to defraud his creditors, he will be liable under this action. If he returns the property, he will cease to have the dowry, and Labeo says that nothing should be returned to an emancipated daughter, after a divorce has taken place, because this action is granted for the purpose of recoyering the property and not to inflict a penalty; and hence the defendant, by making restitution, is discharged from liability. If, however, before the creditors have brought suit against the father-in-law, the son-in-law should return the dowry to the daughter, he can be sued in an action on dowry; and Labeo holds that he will still be liable under this action, without having any recourse against the woman. But let us see whether he will have a right to claim anything without instituting judicial proceedings. If he was ignorant of the fraudulent intent of the father-in-law, but the daughter knew it, she will be liable; and if both of them knew it, they will both be liable. If neither of them knew it, some authorities hold that an action against the daughter ought, nevertheless, to be granted, because it is understood that something in the form of a donation has come into her hands; or, at all events, she should give security to return whatever she may obtain. An action, however, should not be granted against the husband, if he was ignorant of the intended fraud, as he would not have married a wife who had no dowry; any more than it should be granted against a creditor who receives what is due to him from a debtor intending to commit a fraudulent act. 2Likewise, if a stranger, for the purpose of defrauding his creditors, gives a dowry to a girl under paternal control, her husband will be liable if he was aware of his intent, and the woman also, as well as her father, if he was not ignorant of it; so that the husband must give security to return the dowry if it should come into his hands. 3If an agent, without the knowledge of his principal, orders a slave to receive property from a debtor who has the intention of defrauding his creditors, and he is aware of this, he himself, and not his principal, will be liable to this action. 4Ad Dig. 42,8,25,4Windscheid: Lehrbuch des Pandektenrechts, 7. Aufl. 1891, Bd. II, § 463, Note 17.Not only must the property which has been alienated be returned, but also any crops which have taken root in the earth at the time of the alienation, because they constitute part of the property of the fraudulent debtor, as well as those which were gathered after the suit was begun. Any crops gathered in the meantime will not, however, be included in the restitution. In like manner, the offspring of a female slave who has been fraudulently alienated, which was born in the meantime, will not be included in the restitution, because it did not form part of the property of the debtor. 5Ad Dig. 42,8,25,5Windscheid: Lehrbuch des Pandektenrechts, 7. Aufl. 1891, Bd. II, § 463, Note 17.Proculus says that, if a female slave conceives after the alienation took place, and has a child before suit is brought, there is no doubt that the child should not be returned. If, however, she was pregnant at the time she was sold, it may be said that the child must also be returned. 6Ad Dig. 42,8,25,6Windscheid: Lehrbuch des Pandektenrechts, 7. Aufl. 1891, Bd. II, § 463, Note 17.With reference to crops attached to the soil, Labeo says that by this expression it is not clear whether the Prætor meant the crops which were ripe, or also those which had not yet matured. Moreover, if he referred to those which were ripe, possession need not be restored on that account, for when a tract of land is alienated, the land and everything attached to it are held to constitute but one thing, that is to say, the crops are included in an alienation of any kind; nor should he be understood to have two different things, who, during the winter, has a tract of land which is worth a hundred aurei, and at the time of harvest or vintage, can sell the crops for ten aurei, that is to say, the land is worth a hundred aurei, and the crops are worth ten; but as he has but one thing, that is, the tract of land worth a hundred aurei, so also he has but one thing who can sell his house separate from the land. 7Ad Dig. 42,8,25,7ROHGE, Bd. 13 (1874), Nr. 122, S. 381: Besitz als Voraussetzung der actio Pauliana.Windscheid: Lehrbuch des Pandektenrechts, 7. Aufl. 1891, Bd. II, § 463, Note 25.This action is also granted against a fraudulent debtor, although Mela does not think that it ought to be done, because none is granted against him for anything which took place before the sale of his property, and it would be unjust for an action to be granted against one who had been deprived of all his possessions. If, however, he should lose some of them and they cannot be recovered in any way, an action will, nevertheless, be granted against him. The Prætor is not considered to take into account the benefit of this proceeding in the case of one who had been deprived of his property by way of penalty.

The Same, On Public Prosecutions, Book I. A witness cannot be produced against a defendant who has already given evidence against him.

Venuleius, On Public Prosecutions, Book II. An accuser should not call as a witness one who has been convicted of a crime, or who is under twenty years of age.

Venuleius Saturninus, On Public Prosecutions, Book II. During the Consulate of Taurus and Lepidus, the term of five years was established by a Decree of the Senate for the institution of criminal proceedings, where the will of a man who was said to have been killed by his slaves had been opened contrary to the Decree of the Senate, which provision, however, only applies to strangers; for, by the same Decree of the Senate, those who are liable to punishment for parricide can always be accused without reference to lapse of time.

Venuleius, Public Prosecutions, Book II. No one is permitted to wear filthy clothing or long hair in public under the name of an accused person, unless he is so closely connected with him by affinity that he cannot be compelled to testify against him in opposition to his will.

Venuleius Saturninus, Public Prosecutions, Book II. An accuser convicted of prevarication cannot afterwards bring an accusation under the law.

Venuleius Saturninus, On Public Prosecutions, Book II. It is not lawful to accuse the following persons, namely: the Deputy of the Emperor, that is to say, the Governor of a province; according to the decision of Lentulus, rendered during the Consulate of Sylla and Trio; nor the Deputy of a Governor, for a crime which he committed before he obtained his office; nor a magistrate of the Roman people; nor anyone who is absent on business for the State; provided he did not depart for the purpose of evading the law. 1Persons who are classed as offenders can make use of this privilege, if, having been discharged, they contend that they should not again be accused, which is in accordance with the Epistle of the Divine Hadrian addressed to Glabrio, Consul. 2It is provided by the Julian Law relating to criminal proceedings that no one can prosecute two persons at the same time, unless on account of an injury which he himself has sustained. 3When an accusation is brought against a slave, the same rule should be observed as if he were free, according to a Decree of the Senate promulgated when Cotta and Messala were consuls. 4Slaves can be accused under all laws, with the exception of the Julian Law relating to private violence; because those who are condemned under it are punished by the confiscation of the third part of their property, which penalty cannot be imposed upon a slave. The same must be said with reference to other laws, by which either a pecuniary or a capital penalty is inflicted, which does not apply to slaves, as for instance, relegation. The Pompeian Law relating to parricide is placed in this category, because the First Section includes those who have killed their parents, their blood-relatives, or their patrons; which does not apply to slaves, so far as the provisions of the law are concerned. But as their nature is similar, they are punished in the same way. Again Cornelius Sylla was the author of the decision that a slave is not included in the Cornelian Law which has reference to injuries; but he is punished arbitrarily by a more severe penalty.

Venuleius Saturninus, On Public Prosecutions, Book II. If the defendant has confessed, he should be thrown into prison until sentence is passed upon him.

Venuleius Saturninus, On Public Prosecutions, Book II. Those who melt down the statues of the Emperor which have already been consecrated, or commit any other act of this kind, are liable under the Julian Law relating to lese majesty.

Venuleius Saturninus, Public Prosecutions, Book II. The crime of peculation cannot be prosecuted after the lapse of five years.

Venuleius Saturninus, Public Prosecutions, Book III. Or for doing more or less than he was obliged to do in the performance of his official duty.

Venuleius Saturninus, Public Prosecutions, Book I. Those are liable under the same law who receive money either for testifying, or for not testifying. 1He who is convicted under this law is forbidden to testify in public, or to be a judge, or to prosecute a crime. 2It is provided by the Julian Law relating to Extortion that: “No one shall take money for the purpose of enlisting or discharging a soldier, nor shall anyone accept money for giving his opinion in the Senate or in a public council, or to accuse, or not to accuse anyone; and city magistrates must abstain from all kinds of corruption, and not receive in gifts or presents more than a hundred aurei during the entire year.”

The Same, Public Prosecutions, Book III. Anyone who removes the brazen tablet of the law containing the boundaries of fields or anything else, or changes it in any way, is liable under the Julian Law relating to Peculation. 1He who erases anything from the public registers, or inserts anything therein, is liable under this law.

Saturninus, On the Duties of Proconsul, Book I. The Divine Hadrian decided that anyone who was of age, and permitted himself to be sold in order that he might receive a portion of the price, should be forbidden to bring an action to obtain his freedom; but that he could do so under certain circumstances, if he returned his share of the price which had been paid. 1Those who are freedmen, and assert their claim to freedom by birth, shall not be heard after the lapse of five years from the date of their manumission. 2Those who, after the lapse of five years, allege that they have discovered documents establishing their rights to be considered freeborn, must have recourse to the Emperor, who will examine their claims.

Venuleius Saturninus, On the Duties of Proconsul, Book I. It is the rule that if soldiers commit a crime, they must be sent back to the officer under whom they served. The general in chief has a right to punish all soldiers under his command.

Venuleius Saturninus, On the Duties of Proconsul, Book I. He who delivers a slave to be castrated shall be punished by a fine of half his property, under a decree of the Senate enacted during the Consulate of Neratius Priscus and Annius Verus.

Venuleius Saturninus, On the Duties of Proconsul, Book I. The Divine Hadrian forbade those included in the order of decurions to be punished capitally, unless they had killed one of their parents. It is, however, very clearly provided by the Imperial Mandates, that they should suffer the penalty of the Cornelian Law.

Venuleius Saturninus, On the Duties of Proconsul, Book II. If there is anything that demands severe punishment, the Deputy should send the case to the Proconsul; for he himself has not the right to execute, to imprison, or to scourge with great severity.

Venuleius, On the Office of Proconsul, Book II. The magistrates of every district should be careful to afford facilities to all who wish to make wills, and themselves be witnesses and sign wills with others, by means of which matters may be more easily explained, and the proof of facts be secure.

The Same, On the Duties of Proconsul, Book II. To prevent anyone from dismissing prisoners without sufficient reason, it is provided as follows by the Imperial Mandates: “If you know that imprisoned persons have been released too soon, and without good cause by the magistrates, you will order them to be placed in custody, and you will fine those who released them; for when the magistrates know that they themselves will be punished if they discharge prisoners too readily, they will not do so again without proper investigation.”

Venuleius Saturninus, On the Duties of Proconsul, Book II. One can appeal from the Governor to the Proconsul, and if he has imposed a fine, the Proconsul can take cognizance of his injustice, and decide whatever he thinks best.

Venuleius, Actions, Book IV. When anyone obtains permission to reside upon land under a precarious tenure, it is superfluous for the words, “For him and his household” to be added; for it is understood that permission is granted through him for his family to make use of the property.

Venuleius, Actions, Book V. It is a mental rather than a physical defect, for a slave to wish to constantly be present at exhibitions, or to carefully examine paintings, or even to be untruthful, or to have similar faults. 1Whenever a chronic disease is mentioned, Cassius says this means one which is harmful. The word, however, should be understood to signify an affection which is constant, and not ended by time. A chronic disease is held to be one which attacks a man after his birth, for the word chronic means continuous. 2A slave can be styled experienced, or a novice. Cælius says that an experienced slave should be valued, not on account of the time he has been in servitude, but because of his ability and qualifications; for where anyone, at a sale, purchases a slave who is a novice and employs him in some service, he is immediately included in the number of those who are experienced, since inexperience is understood to be dependent, not upon the undeveloped state of the mind, but upon the condition of servitude. It makes no difference whether he understands Latin or not, for a slave is not held to be experienced merely because he happens to be learned in the liberal arts and sciences.

Venuleius, Actions, Book VII. Although it was formerly doubtful whether only a slave or a freedman could be obliged by his patron to swear to observe the conditions which were imposed upon him in consideration of his liberty, it is, however, better to hold that he cannot be bound to a greater extent than a freeman. Hence it is customary to exact this oath from slaves, in order that they may be restrained by religion, and be required to again be sworn after they become their own masters; provided they take the oath, or make the promise at the very time when they are manumitted. 1Moreover, it is lawful to insert the name of the wife with reference to any donation, present, or daily labor to be given or performed by the manumitted slave. 2A prætorian action on account of labor to be performed should be granted against one who, before reaching the age of puberty, took the oath, that is to say if he was legally capable of doing so; as a boy under the age of puberty can render services if he is either a nomenclator or an actor.

Venuleius, Actions, Book VIII. In stipulations which include a promise of as much as the property is worth, it is more convenient to mention a definite sum, for the reason that it is frequently difficult to prove the amount of the interest of each of the persons in question and this is reduced to a very small sum.

Venuleius, Actions, Book X. It makes no difference whether the testator bequeaths the usufruct of the third part of property, or the usufruct of the third part of certain property, for where the usufruct of property in general is left, the debts are deducted from it, and any accounts which may be due are credited. Where the usufruct of certain property is bequeathed, the same rule is not observed.

Venuleius, Actions, Book X. It is easy to take anything from, or add anything to a legacy, where only a sum of money was bequeathed, but where certain corporeal property is concerned, it is more difficult to express this in writing, and the division is likely to be unintelligible. 1Where the freedom bequeathed to slaves is taken away from them, nothing is gained by specifically depriving them of their legacies.

The Same, Disputations, Book VII. A good citizen does not consider a case to be undefended in which the Prætor does not compel this to be done.