Ulpianus, On the Edict, Book LX. If a minor under twenty-five years of age appears as a defender, he is not the proper one in any case in which he is entitled to complete restitution; because a decree of this kind releases both him and his sureties. 1As to undertake a defence subjects a party to the same liability as the principal debtor, the defender of a husband should not be made liable for anything more than the husband himself can pay. 2Where a man who has undertaken the defence of another, even though he may be of large means;

Ulpianus, On the Edict, Book LX. He is not held to properly defend him unless he is ready to furnish security.

The Same, On the Edict, Book LX. When the heir is absent, he must make his defence in the place where the deceased contracted the debt, and he must be sued there if he can be found; and he cannot allege any peculiar privilege by way of exemption. 1Where anyone has been managing a guardianship or a curatorship, or some business, or banking, or anything else from which obligations arise, in any particular place, he must defend himself there, even if that is not his residence; and if he does not make a defence and has no home there, he must permit possession to be taken of his property. 2In like manner, if he sold merchandise in any particular place, or otherwise disposed of it, or purchased it; it is held that he must defend himself there, unless it had been agreed upon that he should do so elsewhere. Shall we say then that a party who has made purchases from a merchant who is a stranger, or sold goods to someone whom he knew was about to depart immediately, has no right to obtain possession of his property, but must follow the latter to the place where he resides; while if anyone makes a purchase from a person who has rented a shop, or a warehouse, in some particular place, is he in such a position that he can be sued there? This conclusion is the more reasonable one, for when a party comes to a place with the expectation of soon leaving it, you can make a purchase from him just as you could from a traveller, or from one who is making a journey either by land or sea; and it would be a great hardship that no matter where a man travelled either by sea or land he could be sued, and be compelled to defend himself. But if he remains anywhere, I do not mean by way of residence, but because he rented a small shop, or booth, or granary, or warehouse, or office, and sells merchandise there, he will then be compelled to defend himself in that place. 3The question is raised by Labeo, if a man belonging to a province has a slave acting as his agent for the purpose of selling merchandise at Rome, any contract entered into with said slave must be considered as if it was made with his master; and therefore, the party must defend himself at Rome. 4It should be remembered that a person who is bound to make payment in Italy, if his residence is in a province, can be sued in either place; and this opinion is adopted also by Julianus and many others.

Ulpianus, On the Edict, Book LX. If a slave should be appointed an heir, we cannot grant him time for deliberation, but it is granted to him to whom the slave belongs; for the reason that slaves are considered by the Prætor as of no importance. Moreover, if the slave belongs to several masters, we grant time for deliberation to all of them. 1The Prætor says, “If anyone asks time for deliberation I will grant it”. 2When the Prætor says that he will grant time, but does not say how much, he undoubtedly means that it is in the power of the court having jurisdiction to fix the term to be allowed.

Ulpianus, On the Edict, Book LX. It must be noted that sometimes one term, and sometimes several, are granted for deliberation, when the Prætor is convinced that the time that he allowed when first applied to was not sufficient.

Ulpianus, On the Edict, Book LX. The Prætor says: “If time is requested in the name of a male or female minor, for the purpose of deliberation as to whether it will profit him or her to retain the estate, and this is granted, if there seems to be good reason to diminish the assets of the estate in the meantime, I shall forbid this to be done, unless the report of a reputable citizen recommends it after thorough investigation.”

Ulpianus, On the Edict, Book LX. So long as the appointed heir is entitled to be admitted to the succession there is no place for the substitute, for he cannot succeed until the appointed heir has been excluded; the result therefore will be that the remedy of the Prætor becomes necessary, as well with reference to the refusal of actions to the heir, as to the granting of time to the substitute, because the latter cannot accept the estate, or perform any act as heir within the term granted by law to the one who was appointed. But a substitute appointed in the third degree, if the second heir dies while the first is deliberating, can himself succeed. Hence we wait for each one in order that the estate may pass to them, then, after this has taken place, we wait during the prescribed time, and if within this time the parties do not enter upon the estate, or perform any acts as heirs, we refuse them rights of action.

The Same, On the Edict, Book LX. If anyone, when dying intestate, should bequeath freedom to a slave by a codicil, and the estate should not be entered upon, the benefit conceded by the Constitution of the Divine Marcus will be available. In a case of this kind, it directs that the slave shall be entitled to his freedom, and that the estate shall be awarded to him if he gives sufficient security to the creditors of the same to pay the full amount which is due to each one of them.

The Same, On the Edict, Book LX. Hence, as long as it remains doubtful whether there is a successor or not, the Constitution will not apply, but as soon as it is certain, it will become operative. 1Where he who can obtain complete restitution rejects the estate, shall we hold that the Constitution will not become operative as long as his right to complete restitution continues to exist, because it is uncertain whether anyone will appear as an heir at law? The better opinion is that the Constitution will apply. 2But what if, after judgment has been rendered for the purpose of procuring freedom, the heir should obtain complete restitution? It can by no means be said that freedom which has once been granted can be revoked. 3Let us see whether those who receive their freedom must be present or not. And, as property awarded on account of freedom can be granted to them, even without their consent, this can also be done in their absence. 4But what if some of them were present, and others were absent? Let us see whether those who are absent will be entitled to their freedom. It can be said, just as in the case where an estate is entered upon, that those who are absent will also become free. 5If freedom is granted on a certain day, must we wait until the day arrives? I think that we should do so; therefore, the property will not be awarded before that time. But what should be done if freedom was granted under a condition? If some grants of freedom were made absolutely, and others conditionally, the property can be awarded immediately. When, however, all the grants of freedom were conditional, what then must be said? Must we wait until the condition is fulfilled, or shall we immediately award the property so that freedom will only be granted when the condition has been complied with? The latter opinion is preferable. Hence, when the property has been awarded, and freedom directly granted, it is immediately acquired; when it is granted at a certain time, it will be acquired when the time arrives; when it is conditional, it will be acquired when the condition is fulfilled. Nor is it unreasonable to hold that, while the condition upon which the grants of freedom are dependent is in abeyance, even though all the grants of freedom were conditional, the Constitution will apply. For it must be said where there is a prospect of freedom, the property must be awarded, when there is the slightest occasion for it, if this can be done without any loss to the creditors. 6If the slave who receives the grant of freedom, under the condition of the payment of ten aurei either to the heir, to someone who is not mentioned, or to the person entitled to the estate, the question arises, can the slave obtain his freedom? The better opinion is that the money should be paid to the person to whom the estate is awarded, as the condition appears to have been transferred to him. It is, however, certain if he was directed to pay it to some other person than the heir, that it must be paid to the individual designated. 7Where slaves have received their freedom under the terms of a trust, they do not become freedmen immediately, as soon as the estate is awarded, but they can obtain their freedom left” them by the trust; that is to say, they should be manumitted by the person to whom the estate is adjudged. 8The Emperor intended that an estate should be awarded only where sufficient security is given to the creditors for the payment of the entire amount due to each of them. Proper security must, therefore, be furnished. What is meant by the term “proper”? It signifies that sureties or pledges should be given. If, however, the creditor has faith in the promisor, without his furnishing a surety, the security will be considered sufficient. 9In what way should security be furnished to creditors? Should it be given to them individually, or to one appointed by the entire number in the name of all? It is necessary and is part of the duty of the judge to call the creditors together, and appoint one of their number to whom security shall be furnished in the name of all. 10Let us see whether security should be given to the creditors before the estate is awarded, or whether this should be done under the condition that security shall be furnished? I think that it will be sufficient if everything provided by the Constitution of the Divine Marcus is included in the decree. 11We should understand the entire amount to mean both principal and interest. 12The Constitution shows whose freedmen they who are manumitted become, so that those who receive their freedom directly will be the freedmen of the deceased; unless he who claims that the estate should be awarded to him alone wishes this to be done in such a way that those who have been emancipated directly may become his own freedmen. 13Should those who wish to become his freedmen be manumitted by him, or in awarding the estate ought we to mention that it is awarded upon the condition that the slaves who have been granted their liberty directly shall become his freedmen? I think that this opinion should be adopted and stated in the decision, and the terms of the constitution also permit this to be done. 14When a slave, under the age of puberty, obtains his freedom, the party to whom the estate is awarded shall be entitled to his guardianship. 15If the deceased charged his heir to manumit certain slaves belonging to another, shall we say that the Constitution is applicable, or, indeed, will it not take effect? The better opinion is that there is ground for its application, because the person to whom the estate is awarded will be compelled to purchase the slaves, and have their freedom granted them by the Prætor. 16If the legatee, and not the heir, is charged to manumit the slave, will the constitution fail to apply, because, the legacies not being due, the grants of freedom cannot be due either? The better opinion is that the same advantage will be available, as the intention of the constitution, generally speaking, is to grant freedom to all who are entitled to it, if the estate has been entered upon. 17The same constitution provides that if the Treasury acquires the estate, the grants of freedom must still be made. Therefore, if the property is without an owner, on account of the Treasury having either rejected or accepted it, the constitution will still apply. If, however, the Treasury obtains it in some other way, it is evident that the constitution will cease to be applicable. Hence, if the property of a legion, which is without an owner, escheats to the Treasury, the same opinion must be adopted. 18Likewise, where a minor of twenty years of age bequeaths a grant of freedom, we say that the slave will not be entitled to it, unless the minor left it under a trust. The slave will, however, be entitled to it if the minor should manumit him during his lifetime, provided he can give a good reason for doing so. 19Where freedom is granted and creditors defrauded by a testator who was not solvent at the time of his death, will the grant be valid? If the Treasury does not obtain the estate, the grant of freedom perhaps will be valid, because all that is due to the creditors is offered to them. If, however, the estate has been entered upon, it will not be valid. It is clear that if the Treasury should obtain the estate, there will be better ground for holding that the grant of freedom will not be valid. For anyone, strictly adhering to the terms of the constitution, might say that he can only blame himself, who desired that the estate should be awarded to him under the condition that the grants of freedom should be considered valid. If anyone, however, should follow the rule applicable where an estate is accepted, a direct grant of freedom will be void if the intention of the testator was fraudulent, and the result was that the creditors were cheated; nor will grants of freedom under a trust be executed if, by doing so, the creditors of the estate will be defrauded. 20When an estate has not escheated to the Treasury, and it has been adjudged for the purpose of preserving freedom, can the Treasury afterwards acquire it? The better opinion is that it cannot do so. It is evident that, if notice had not previously been given to the officials of the Treasury, and the estate is awarded for the preservation of freedom, it should be considered whether there is ground for the application of the constitution. If the estate is in such a condition that the Treasury must accept it, the award will be of no effect; but if it is not, there will be ground for it. 21Moreover, he to whom property had been adjudged should be compared to a possessor under the Prætorian Edict; and, according to this, he will be entitled to the rights of burial enjoyed by the deceased. 22Again, let us see whether the person to whom an estate is awarded can be sued by the creditors as an heir, or only on the bond which he has furnished. The better opinion is that he can only be sued on the bond. 23Where an estate is awarded to two or more persons, they will hold the property and the freedmen in common, and will have the right to bring an action in partition against one another.

The Same, On the Edict, Book LX. If it remains uncertain for a long time whether there is any heir to an estate or not, after proper cause has been shown, permission should be granted for possession to be taken of the property for the purpose of preserving it. If the matter is urgent, or a condition must be complied with, it would, be well to obtain permission to appoint a curator.

Ulpianus, On the Edict, Book LX. A minor of twenty-five years of age, who has curators, but is not defended by them, and can find no one else to appear for him, must suffer the sale of his property, even if he does not conceal himself; although he who is not capable of protecting his own interests is not considered to have fraudulently hidden himself.