The Same, On the Edict, Book LIX. The Prætor says, “The decision with reference to the property was rendered by the magistrate having jurisdiction.” It would be better if he had said, “By him who had cognizance of the matter,” for the word “cognizance” also has reference to judges who have no jurisdiction of these questions, but who have the right to examine certain other cases. 1If a judge should decide against anyone as follows, “Let So-and-So deliver to Titius what he has received under the will or codicil of Mævius,” we must understand this to mean the same as if he had expressly mentioned the amount which had been left by the will or the codicil. The same rule will apply if he had decided that a verbal trust should be executed.

The Same, On the Edict, Book LIX. If he who makes an assignment afterwards acquires any property, he can be sued to the extent of his ability to pay. 1Sabinus and Cassius think that he who has made an assignment cannot any longer be annoyed, even by others to whom he is indebted.

The Same, On the Edict, Book LIX. The following question is raised by Julianus. If the father of a minor holds property in joint ownership with Titius, and an action in partition is brought against the minor, but is not defended, there will be no reason, on this account, for judgment to be rendered against the father; but must the property of the father be sold, or can it be taken possession of for its preservation, in behalf of the plaintiff? Julianus says that if the father has collected any of the crops, or caused the property in question to deteriorate, his own property can be sold. If, however, there is no reason why the property of the father should be sold, possession of that of the minor can be taken. Marcellus, however, observes that it would be unjust for him who had not made any contract with the minor to be compelled to wait till he arrives at puberty; which opinion is reasonable. Therefore, as the contract is derived from the father, it must be held that it is not necessary to wait until the minor reaches the age of puberty. 1It can be said that there is a contract with a minor, where one has been entered into with a slave, for, in this case an action De peculio will lie against him; hence the rule should be adopted that an action must be granted in every case where one can be brought against the ward; and there is much more reason for doing this in the case of a slave, who was acting for the benefit of his master, or by his order, or has been appointed to represent him in some transaction. 2I think that where a contract has been made with his guardian, on account of which an action is granted against the ward, the better opinion is that there will be ground for the application of the Edict, just as if the contract had been made directly with the ward. 3If a minor becomes the heir of anyone, and, for this reason, is charged with the payment of a legacy, let us see whether there is ground for the application of this Edict. The better opinion is, as Marcellus says, that possession can be taken of the property of a minor, and that the creditors of the estate have the right to choose what course they prefer to adopt; for a minor under the age of puberty is held to make a contract when he accepts an estate.

Ulpianus, On the Edict, Book LIX. These things also occur whenever a minor is not defended by anyone, nor by a guardian or a curator, whether he has a guardian or not. If, however, someone appears who is ready to defend him, possession for the purpose of preserving the property will not take place. 1It should be known that the minor is not defended, and the Prætor must ascertain this fact, in order to permit possession to be taken of the property. This can be effected in the following manner. The guardians of the ward should be summoned before the Prætor, in order to undertake his defence. If he has no guardian, his relatives, or those connected with him by affijiity, or any other whom it is probable will not fail to conduct the defence of the male or female minor, either on account of their near relationship, or because of the affection they may entertain towards him, or her, or for any other reason, shall be called upon for this purpose. Even freedmen, if they “are qualified, can be summoned and required to conduct the defence. Where, however, they refuse to do so, or while not absolutely refusing, keep silent, the Prætor shall then grant possession, so long as the minor is not defended. As soon, however, as the defence of the minor is undertaken, the property will cease to be possessed under the order of the Prætor. The same rule applies in the case of insane persons. 2The Prætor says: “If the male or female minor should reach the age of puberty and is properly defended, I shall order those who are in the possession of his or her property to relinquish it.” 3Let us see what the words, “Properly defended,” mean: whether it is sufficient for the party to appear and be ready to comply with the judgment, or whether security must be given under all circumstances. The terms of the Edict do not merely refer to the persons of the parties desiring to defend themselves, but it also has reference to the property itself. And the words, “Properly defended,” mean to be defended by themselves, or by any other person whomsoever. If the defence is undertaken by another, security must be furnished, but if the minor defends himself, I do not think that this is requisite; therefore, if a defence is offered, the Prætor can eject the party in possession by means of an interdict.

Ulpianus, On the Edict, Book LIX. Fulcinius thinks that creditors placed in possession of property for its preservation should not be supported by means of the said property. 1The Prætor says: “I will order the property of anyone who fraudulently conceals himself to be taken possession of and sold, if he is not defended in such a way as to be approved by a good citizen.” 2For this Edict to become applicable, it will not be sufficient for the party to conceal himself, but this must be done with fraudulent intent. Nor in order to authorize possession and sale of the property, will it be sufficient for him to be guilty of fraud without concealment, but he must conceal himself for the purpose of committing fraud. This is the most frequent cause for granting possession, as it is customary for the property of debtors who conceal themselves to be seized. 3If anyone should obtain possession of the property of another on the ground that he is concealing himself, when in fact he has not done so, and sells it, the result will be that the sale will be held to be of no force or effect. 4But let us see what is understood by concealment. Concealment is not (as Cicero defines it) a dishonorable seclusion of one’s self, for anyone can conceal himself for some reason which is not dishonorable; as for instance, if he fears the cruelty of a tyrant, the violence of enemies, or domestic sedition. 5He, however, who conceals himself fraudulently, but not on account of his creditors (although concealment of this kind defrauds his creditors), is still not in such a position that possession can be taken of his property on this ground, because he does not conceal himself with a view to defraud his creditors. Hence, the intention of the person in concealing himself must be ascertained, whether it is for the purpose of defrauding his creditors, or for some other reason. 6But what if he had two or more motives for concealment, and among them that of defrauding his creditors; could the sale of his property legally take place? I think the opinion should be adopted that, if there were several reasons for his concealment, and the intent to defraud his creditors was one of them, this would be prejudicial, and his property could be sold on this account. 7If, however, he intended to conceal himself from some of his creditors, and not from others; what shall we say in this instance? Pomponius very properly holds that it is not necessary to require that the debtor should conceal himself from all his creditors, but that, if he only conceals himself from one of them, with the intention of deceiving and defrauding him by means of his seclusion, this will be sufficient. Then will all his creditors have a right to take and sell his property, because he remains concealed, that is to say, even those from whom he does not hide, merely because it is a fact that he is concealed; or can only that creditor whom he is avoiding do so? And indeed, it is a fact that he is hidden for the sake of committing fraud, even though he may not hide himself from me. If he is only concealing himself from me, Pomponius thinks that it should be considered whether I alone will have the right to sell his property for this reason. 8The term “conceal himself” refers to concealment during a considerable time; just as the word factitare signifies to do anything frequently. 9Moreover, to such an extent does concealment demand the existence of fraudulent intent and desire of the party secluding himself, that it has been very properly held that an insane person cannot render himself liable to have his property sold on this ground, because a man who is not of sound mind cannot conceal himself. 10If it is evident that an insane person is not defended, a curator should be appointed for him, or permission to take possession of his property should expressly be granted. Moreover, Labeo says that if no curator or defender can be found for an insane person, or if the curator who has been appointed does not undertake his defence, he should then be removed, and the Prætor must appoint another curator, in order that no more property of the said insane person may be sold than is necessary. Labeo holds that the same formalities should be observed as where an unborn child is placed in possession. 11It is clear that sometimes his property should be sold, after proper cause is shown, if the payment of his debts is urgent, and delay may injure his creditors. The sale, however, should be made in such a way that any surplus may be returned to the insane person; because the condition of a man of this kind does not differ greatly from that of a minor. This opinion is not unreasonable. 12The same rule must be said to apply to the case of a spendthrift, and to others who require the services of a guardian, but no one can properly say that they are trying to conceal themselves. 13It should be noted that anyone can stay in the same city and remain concealed, or in another city, and not be concealed. For, let us see whether one who is in another city, and shows himself in public, and appears everywhere, can be considered as lying concealed. Our practice at present is, that a person is held to conceal himself if he avoids meeting his creditors in any place where he may be, whether in the same town where they are, or in another, or in a distant country. In short, the ancient authorities were of the opinion that a person was to be considered as concealing himself, even if he was in the Public Forum, and hid behind columns of buildings, for the purpose of avoiding his creditors. Anyone can conceal himself from one creditor and not from another. Moreover, it was established that the creditor from whom the debtor conceals himself is the one who can sell his property. 14If a man who owes a debt payable after a certain time, or under some condition, conceals himself, his property cannot be sold before the time arrives, or the condition is complied with. For what difference is there between a person who is not a debtor, and one who cannot yet be sued? The same rule must be adopted if there is no debtor; and it also applies where a creditor is entitled to an action which can be barred by an exception. 15If anyone who is liable to an action De peculia, on account of his son or his slave, conceals himself, it is our practice to permit his property to be seized and sold, even though nothing may be found in the peculium, because something might eventually be found there; and, at the time that the judgment is rendered, we ascertain whether there is anything in the peculium or not, for the reason that the action will lie even when there is nothing in the peculium. 16Let us see whether the property of a man who conceals himself to avoid appearing in a real action can be taken in execution and sold. An opinion of Neratius is extant in which he says that his property can be sold. This is also stated in a Rescript of Hadrian, and is our practice at present. 17Celsus, in reply to Sextus, gave it as his opinion that, if Titius is in possession of a tract of land which I intend to bring suit to recover and he, being absent, is not defended, it would be better for me to be placed in possession of the said land than to levy on all his property. It must, however, be noted that Celsus was consulted with reference to a person who was absent, and not with reference to one who purposely concealed himself. 18Celsus also thinks that if a person from whom I intend to claim an estate conceals himself, the best plan would be to place me in possession of the property, which is held in the capacity of either heir or possessor. If, however, he was guilty of fraud in order to avoid remaining in possession, all his property should be levied on and sold. 19The Divine Pius stated in a Rescript, with reference to a man who, being in possession of an estate, secluded himself, that his adversary should be placed in possession of the property of the estate. In the same Rescript he also directed that he who is placed in possession of the property of an estate on account of the contumacy of a former possessor of the same shall be entitled to the income from said property.

Ulpianus, On the Edict, Book LIX. Or has provided men for this purpose.

The Same, On the Edict, Book LIX. The words “decreed” and “decided” have the same meaning, for we are accustomed to make use of them indiscriminately, when we allude to judges who have the right of jurisdiction. 1We should understand the expression, “mother of a family,” to signify one who does not live unchastely, for the morals of the mother of a family distinguish and separate her from other women. Hence, it makes no difference whether she is married or a widow, freeborn or emancipated, as neither marriage nor birth, but good morals constitute the mother of a family.

Ad Dig. 50,16,49Windscheid: Lehrbuch des Pandektenrechts, 7. Aufl. 1891, Bd. I, § 42, Note 3.Ulpianus, On the Edict, Book LIX. The term “property” has reference either to the natural or the Civil Law. Property naturally acquired is understood to be that which renders persons happy; for to make happy is to benefit. It must, however, be remembered that among our property should be reckoned not only that which is our own, but also any possessed by us in good faith, or which has reference to the surface and the soil. Whatever is acquired by legal actions, claims, and pursuit, is also included under the term “property,” for all these things are considered as part of our possessions.