Ulpianus, On the Edict, Book LV. Where an action is brought for the services of a slave who is an artisan, payment must be made in proportion to their value; but in the case of an ordinary laborer, this will depend upon the kind of work he does, which was the opinion of Mela. 1Where a slave is under five years of age, or is weak, or is one who is unable to do any work for his owner, no estimate of the value of his services shall be made. 2Nor shall any estimate of them, based upon the pleasure or affection of the owner, be considered; for example, where the owner is greatly attached to him, or employs him in his pleasures. 3Moreover, the value of his services shall be estimated after necessary expenses have been deducted.

Ulpianus, On the Edict, Book LV. The Prætor says: “If a farmer of the public revenue, or anyone belonging to the family of a farmer of the public revenue, takes anything by force in his name, and it is not restored to the owner, I will grant an action for double its value, and if suit is brought after a year has elapsed, I will grant one for its simple value. Moreover, I will grant an action, if any damage has been sustained, or any theft is said to have been committed. If the parties concerned in the matter are not produced, I will grant an action against the masters, without the privilege of surrendering their slaves by way of reparation.” 1This Title has reference to farmers of the public revenue. Those are farmers of the revenue who handle the public funds, and they bear this name whether they pay a certain percentage to the Treasury, or collect tribute. Those, also, who lease property from the Treasury are properly called farmers of the revenue. 2Someone may ask, of what benefit is the Edict in question, just as if the Prætor had not elsewhere made provision for thefts, injuries, and robbery wifh violence. The Prætor, however, thought that, under the circumstances, it was best to issue a special Edict against farmers of the revenue. 3The penalty inflicted by this Edict is, in some respects, less severe, as damages are given for double the amount; whereas in the case of robbery with violence, they are quadrupled, as they also are in the case of manifest theft. 4Moreover, the farmer of the revenue is granted the power to restore property taken by violence, and if he does so, he will be released from all responsibility, and will not be liable to a penal action under this Section of the Edict. Hence, the question arises, if anyone desires to bring an action against a farmer of the revenue, not under this Edict, but under the general law relating to taking property by violence, unlawful damage, or theft, can he do so? It is established that he can, and Pomponius also holds the same opinion, for it would be absurd for the legal position of a farmer of the public revenue to be considered better than that of other persons. 5The term “family,” mentioned in the Edict, not only refers to the slaves of farmers of the revenue, but also to all those included in their households. Therefore, whether their own children or the slaves of others are employed in the collection of taxes, they will be included in this Edict. Hence, if the slave of a farmer of the revenue commits robbery with violence, but is not among the number of those who are employed in the collection of taxes, this Edict will not apply. 6What the Prætor says in the last place, namely, “If they are not produced, I will grant an action against their masters, without the privilege of surrendering them by way of reparation,” is a special provision of this Edict, because if the slaves are not produced, an action will be granted without the privilege of surrendering them by way of reparation, whether the masters have them in their power or not; and whether they can produce them or not.

Ulpianus, On the Edict, Book LV. If the slave should not be produced by the master, the noxal action should be brought against him. Therefore, what makes the condition of the farmers of the revenue so trying is that they must select good slaves for this employment. 1Where the Prætor says, “Against the masters,” we must understand this to mean against the associates of the collectors of taxes, although they may not be their masters. 2The plaintiff must mention beforehand the person or persons whom he may desire to be produced, so that, if this is not done, he will have a right of action. Even if he should say, “Produce all the parties, in order that I may recognize the one who is guilty,” I think that he ought to be heard. 3Where several slaves have committed the theft or the damage, the rule ought to be observed that if the farmer of the revenue pays as large a sum as if a freeman had perpetrated the offence, he should be released from liability.

The Same, On the Edict, Book LV. The right to appear in a case involving freedom is granted to an usufructuary, even if the owner (that is to say, he who alleges that he is the owner), also desires to institute proceedings respecting the status of the slave. 1Where several persons claim the ownership of the slave, alleging that he belongs to them in common, they shall be sent before the same judge. This was decreed by the Senate. But if each one of them should say that the entire slave and not merely a share in him belongs to him alone, the Decree of the Senate will not apply. For then there will be no reason to apprehend that different decisions will be rendered, as each of the alleged owners claims that the slave is his individual property. 2Where, however, one person claims the usufruct in the slave and another the ownership, or where one claims the ownership, and the other says that the slave has been pledged to him, the same judge must decide the case; and it makes little difference whether the slave was pledged to him by the same person who claims him as the owner, or by someone else.

Ulpianus, On the Edict, Book LV. What we have said with reference to the alleged slave, proving that he has been free, must be understood to mean not that he who demands his liberty must show that he was absolutely free, but that he was in possession of his freedom without any fraud on his part. But let us see what would be considered fraud on his part. Julianus says, that all those who believe that they are free are not guilty of fraud, provided they act as freemen, even though they are actually slaves. Varus, however, says that one who knows himself to be free, and takes to flight, cannot be considered to be at liberty without any fraud on his part; but at the moment when he ceases to conceal himself as a fugitive slave, and acts as if he was free, he begins to be at liberty without fraud on his part. For he holds that he who knows that he is free, and afterwards conducts himself like a fugitive slave, should be considered to act as a slave from the very fact that he has taken to flight.

Ulpianus, On the Edict, Book LV. Hence, it should be noted that a person who is free can be fraudulently at liberty, and that a slave can be at liberty without being guilty of fraud. 1A child who is stolen in infancy served as a slave in good faith, although he was free; and afterwards, while ignorant of his condition, left his master and secretly began to live in freedom. He does not remain at liberty without being guilty of fraud. 2A slave can also be at liberty without committing fraud, as, for instance, where he receives his freedom by a will and is not aware that the will is void; or where he obtains it before a magistrate from someone whom he believed to be his owner, when he was not; or where he has been brought up as free, when, in fact, he was a slave. 3Generally speaking, whenever anyone thinks that he is free, without being guilty of deceit, whether he is induced to do so by good or bad motives, and he remains at liberty, it must be held that he is in the same condition as if he was free without being guilty of fraud, and therefore he can enjoy all the advantages of a possessor of freedom. 4The proof of good faith, however, is referred to the time when he was at liberty without being guilty of fraud, which is when legal proceedings with reference to him were first instituted. 5Where the services of a slave are due to anyone, he can also avail himself of the action relating to freedom. 6If a person who claims his freedom has caused me any damage during the time when he was serving me as a slave in good faith (as, for example, if I really, believing myself to be his owner, was sued in a noxal action, and judgment was rendered against me, and I paid the appraised damages, instead of surrendering the alleged slave by way of reparation), judgment will be rendered against him in my favor.

Ulpianus, On the Edict, Book LV. The Prætor very properly opposes the deceitful conduct of those who, knowing that they are free, fraudulently permit themselves to be sold as slaves; for he grants an action against them. 1This action will lie whenever he who permitted himself to be sold as a slave is in such a position that he cannot be refused permission to demand his freedom. 2We do not consider that he has acted in bad faith who did not voluntarily inform the purchaser of the fraud, but only when he himself deceived him.

Ulpianus, On the Edict, Book LV. The same rule applies to one who pretends to be a slave, and is sold as such, with the intention of deceiving the purchaser. 1If, however, he, who was sold was under the influence of either force or fear, we say that he was not guilty of fraud. 2The purchaser is entitled to this action when he was not aware that the alleged slave was free, for if he knew that he was free, and then bought him, he cheated himself. 3Therefore, if a son under paternal control makes a purchase of this kind, and he himself was aware of the facts, but his father was ignorant of them, he will not be entitled to an action for the benefit of his father, if he made the purchase with reference to his peculium. But, in this instance, the question arises whether, if the father directed him to make the purchase, he will be prejudiced by the knowledge of his son. I think that it will prejudice him just as it would prejudice an agent. 4If the son was not aware that the man who was sold was free, and his father knew it, I think that it is clear that the father will be barred from bringing an action, even if the son made the purchase with reference to his peculium; provided the father was present and could have prevented his son from doing so.

Ulpianus, On the Edict, Book LV. He, therefore, will be liable for as much as he has paid, or for the amount for which he bound himself, that is to say, for double the price. 1Let us see, however, whether merely the purchase money or also whatever may have been added to it should be doubled. I think that either all that was paid on account of the sale ought, by all means, to be doubled,

Ulpianus, On the Edict, Book LV. And what he bound himself to pay should be doubled. 1Hence, if the purchaser has lawfully paid something to anyone in order to obtain this action, it must be said that it comes within the terms of this Edict, and will be doubled. 2Where anyone is said to have bound himself, we must understand this to have been done either to the vendor or to someone else; for whatever he, either himself, or through another, gave to the vendor himself, or to some other person by his order, is equally included. 3We should consider the purchaser to be bound where he cannot protect himself by an exception, but if he can do so, he is not held to be bound. 4It sometimes happens that he who makes the purchase will be entitled to an action for quadruple the value of the property. For a suit for double damages will lie in his favor against the alleged slave himself, who, being free, knowingly permitted himself to be sold; and, in addition to this, he will be entitled to an action for double damages against the vendor, or against him who promised him double damages.

Ulpianus, On the Edict, Book LV. Not only the purchaser himself, but also his heirs, can institute proceedings by means of this action in factum. 1We understand anyone to make a purchase, even where he does so by another, as, for instance, through an agent. 2Where, however, several persons make a purchase, while all of them will be entitled to this action, still, if they have bought different shares, they can bring suit in proportion to the respective amounts of the price which they have paid; or if each one bought the entire interest in the slave, each will be entitled to an action to recover in full; nor will the knowledge or the ignorance of any one of them benefit or prejudice the others. 3If the purchaser was not aware that the man who was sold was free, and he afterwards learned this, his rights will not be prejudiced, because he was ignorant of the fact at the time. But if he knew it when the sale took place, and afterwards doubted its truth, this will be of no advantage to him. 4Knowledge does not prejudice, nor ignorance benefit the heir and other successors of the purchaser in any way. 5If, however, anyone should make the purchase by an agent, who knows that the man is free, it will prejudice him; and Labeo thinks that the knowledge of a guardian will, under these circumstances, prejudice his ward. 6This action is not granted after a year, as it is an equitable as well as a penal one.

Ulpianus, On the Edict, Book LV. When a person has a right to give anything, he also has the right to sell and alienate it.