Ulpianus, On the Edict, Book II. The Prefect of the City has no jurisdiction beyond the limits of the city, but he can appoint judges outside of it.

Ulpianus, On the Edict, Book II. As soon as the Proconsul enters the gate of Rome, he loses his authority.

The Same, On the Edict, Book II. It is also customary to dispense justice during the season of harvest and vintage in cases where the property is liable to be lost either by time or by death, as for example, in actions for theft, ordinary injury, atrocious injury, and where parties are said to have been guilty of robbery during a fire, the destruction of a house, shipwreck, or the seizure of a boat or a ship and other cases of this kind. The same rule applies where the property may be lost through the lapse of time, or the term within which suit can be brought is about to expire. 1Proceedings relating to freedom can be concluded at all times. 2Justice can also be dispensed at all times in the case of a person who accepts something contrary to the public welfare under pretence of the right of holding a market.

Ad Dig. 5,1,1ROHGE, Bd. 10 (1874), S. 328: Voraussetzung der stillschweigenden Prorogation des Gerichtsstandes.Ulpianus, On the Edict, Book II. Where persons voluntarily agree to submit to the jurisdiction of some court, then this case can be heard by any judge who presides over said court, or has jurisdiction therein, so far as the consenting parties are concerned.

Ulpianus, On the Edict, Book II. Where an action for the partition of an estate, or for the division of property held in common is brought, and it seems almost impossible to make the division; the judge can render a decision in favor of one party, and adjudge the entire property to him.

The Same, On the Edict, Book II. If, however, when I deposited the money with you in the beginning, I permitted you to make use of it, if you wished to do so; it is held that the loan does not exist before the money is removed, since it is not certain that anything is owing.

Ulpianus, On the Edict, Book II. For, if I promise to give something when I die, and I give it before that time, Celsus says that I am not entitled to an action for its recovery; and this opinion is correct.

Ulpianus, On the Edict, Book II. For no one, by lending anything, makes it the property of the party to whom he lends it.

The Same, On the Edict, Book II. For when a partnership is formed by express agreement, an action on partnership will lie; but where there is no agreement, an action can be brought with reference to the property itself, and the business is held to have been transacted in common.

Ulpianus, On the Edict, Book II. A lease does not usually change the ownership of property.

Ulpianus, On the Edict, Book II. A man who is not a resident of the town can be appointed a guardian, provided the ward for whom he is appointed is a citizen of the place.

The Same, On the Edict, Book II. Where papers are bequeathed, no one can say that this refers to such as have been written upon, and that books already made up are included in the legacy. This also applies to tablets.

Ulpianus, On the Edict, Book II. As judgments rendered between litigants cannot prejudice others who are not parties to the suit, proceedings can be instituted under a will by which freedom is granted, or a legacy is bequeathed, although the will may have been broken, or may have been declared void, or may have been held not to have been drawn in accordance with the prescribed legal formalities; but, still, if the legatee should lose his case, the testamentary grant of freedom will not be affected.

Ulpianus, On the Edict, Book II. In personal suits for the recovery of property, a judgment does not always imply disgrace, even though it may be rendered in cases involving infamy.

Ulpianus, On the Edict, Book II. The following stipulation, “Do you promise to guarantee the payment of ten thousand sesterces?” is valid. 1A person who stipulates that someone shall see that he is paid ten aurei cannot bring suit to recover that sum, as the promisor may be released by giving a solvent surety, as Labeo says, and Celsus also states in the Sixth Book of the Digest.

Ulpianus, On the Edict, Book II. Although a curator is appointed for certain specific purposes, a stipulation for the preservation of the property may be interposed.

Ulpianus, On the Edict of the Prætor, Book II. The action for violating a sepulchre brands a person with infamy.

Ulpianus, On the Edict, Book II. Either birth, manumission, or adoption, creates a citizen of a municipality. 1Properly speaking, indeed, those only are designated citizens of a municipal town who have the right of citizenship, and share the municipal duties with us. Now, however, we improperly call those citizens of a municipal town who are the residents of any town, as, for instance, those who live in Campania, or in Puteola. 2Therefore, anyone born of parents dwelling in Campania is styled a citizen of Campania. If, however, his father came from Campania, and his mother from Puteola, he is likewise considered a citizen of Campania, unless his mother enjoys some special privilege of birth; for then he will be a citizen of the town where his mother was born. Thus, for instance, it is conceded as a privilege to the people of Troy that when the mother was born at Troy, her son will become a citizen of that city. This same privilege is also granted to the people of Delphi. Celsus states that the inheritants of Pontus also enjoy this advantage, through the favor of the Great Pompey, that is to say, that anyone whose mother was born in Pontus will be a citizen of that country. Certain authorities, however, hold that this privilege was only granted to children born in lawful marriage, but Celsus does not adopt this opinion. For it would not have been provided that a child born out of wedlock should follow the condition of its mother (as it has the same origin that she has), but the rule could only apply to children born of parents whose birthplaces were in different cities.

Ulpianus, On the Edict, Book II. Anyone who is manumitted becomes a citizen of the town to which the person who manumitted him belongs; still, he does not follow his domicile, but his country; and if his patron is a citizen of two different towns, by his manumission he will become the citizen of the same towns. 1Where anyone always conducts his business, not in a colony, but in a town, and sells, purchases, and makes contracts there, or uses the markets, or the baths, or attends exhibitions, and celebrates festivals there, and, in short, enjoys all the advantages of the town, and none of those of the colony, he is understood to have his domicile in the said town rather than where he sojourns for the purpose of cultivating land. 2Celsus, in the First Book of the Digest, discusses the point that, if anyone should furnish two houses alike, which are situated in two different places, and does not live in one any less than in the other, he must be considered to have his domicile where he himself thinks that it is. I doubt whether by changing his mind from one place to another anyone can be considerd to have his domicile in two places. Still, this may be true, although it is a difficult thing to decide, just as it is difficult to decide that anyone can be without a domicile. I think, however (and this can be maintained as correct), that if a man having left his domicile, takes a sea voyage, or travels by land, seeking some place to sojourn for a time, he will be without any domicile. 3He who has been relegated can have his domicile, as Marcellus says, in the place to which he has been restricted.

Ulpianus, On the Edict, Book II. When twenty thousand paces are traversed each day in making a journey, this must be understood to mean that, if, after this enumeration, less than twenty thousand remain, they are considered an entire day of travel; as, for example, where a person travels twenty-one thousand paces, this is counted as two days’ journey. This enumeration, however, should only be made where nothing has been agreed upon as to what constitutes a day’s journey. 1Anyone who dies in the hands of the enemy is not held to have left an estate, because he dies a slave.

Ulpianus, On the Edict, Book II. Where two actions are brought, in one of which a large sum is claimed as damages, and in the other an infamous charge is made, the one which affects the party’s reputation is entitled to the preference. But where both actions are such that the sentences will brand the defendant with infamy, they should both be considered to be of the same importance, even though the amounts involved are unequal.