The Same, Digest, Book XXII. A husband appointed his wife and a son whom he had by her, his heirs, and charged his wife with a trust as follows: “I ask you, my wife, not to claim any share in the Titian Estate, as you know that I myself bought all of said property, but on account of the affection and respect which I owe you, I have let it be understood that we had equal shares in this purchase which I made with my own money.” The question arose whether he intended the said land to belong entirely to his son. The answer, with reference to the clause in question, was that the testator intended the said land to be included in his estate, as constituting a portion of all of it, so that his wife and son should each be entitled to half of the land as constituting part of the same. 1Where the following provision was inserted in a will, “I wish my house, with the garden adjoining it, to be given to my freedmen,” and under another head was written, “I wish my heir to transfer to my freedman Fortunius, in the house which I have given to my freedmen, the room in which I was accustomed to live, and the storeroom connected with the same,” the question arose whether the heir of the testator was obliged to pay the legacy to Fortunius, although the entire house had been previously devised to all the freedmen. The answer was that he was not required to do so. 2A testator made the following provision in a codicil, which he confirmed by his will: “I bequeath to all my freedmen, including those whom I have manumitted during my lifetime, who are manumitted by this codicil, or whom I may hereafter manumit, and their wives, sons and daughters, except such as I have specifically bequeathed, to my wife by the terms of my will.” He afterwards charged his heirs as follows: “I desire my heirs to give to my wife, their co-heir, my lands in Umbria, Etruria, and Picenum, together with all their appurtenances, including the country or city slaves, and those who transact my business, with the exception of such as have been manumitted.” The question arose whether Eros and Stichus, his slaves who had transacted the business of the testator in Umbria and Picenum until the death of the latter, and who were the natural sons of Damas whom the testator had manumitted during his lifetime, should be delivered by the heirs to Damas, in compliance with the terms of the codicil, or whether they belonged to Seia, his wife, according to the terms of his letter. The answer was that, under the codicil, they belonged to their natural father, in conformity with the dictates of natural affection. 3A testatrix left to Felicissimus and Felicissima, to whom she had granted freedom, the Gargilian Estate, including the house, and, in another part of her will, she bequeathed to her son Titius, whom she appointed heir to a fourth of her estate, a legacy, as follows: “My son, Titius, in addition to your share of my estate, take the legacies which your father, Præsens, and Cælius Justus, your father’s brother, left me.” The question arose, as the Gargilian Estate had been devised to the testatrix by her husband, that is to say, by the father of her son Titius to whom the land was due under the terms of the trust, whether the said land should belong only to Titius, the son, or to Felicissima, or to all three of them. The answer was that it was not probable that the testatrix, who left nothing to Felicissimus and Felicissima except what was contained in a special bequest, intended that the legacy should, by a general statement, be transferred to her son to whom she had also left a portion of her estate. 4A man left certain slaves, who were children, by will as follows: “I wish five of my young slaves to be given by my heirs to my little lord Publius Mævius, the said slaves to be under the age of seven years.” The testator died many years after he executed the will. The question arose of what age the slaves that were due to Mævius should be, whether they were those who, at the time when the will was made, were under seven, or whether those should be given who were ascertained to be under that age at the time of the death of the testator. The answer was that those seemed to be designated who were of that age when they were bequeathed by the testator. 5A testator made a bequest to his concubine of the following legacy, among other things: “I wish the tract of land which I have on the Appian Way to be given to her, with the steward in charge of the same, and his wife and his children.” The question arose whether the testator intended that the grandchildren of the steward and his wife should belong to the concubine. The answer was that there was nothing in the case stated which would prevent them being given to her. 6A certain man left a legacy in trust to Mævius as follows: “I bequeath whatever I possess in the city of Gades.” The question arose whether, if he had any property in the suburb adjoining the city, this also would be due to Mævius under the terms of the trust. The answer was that the meaning of the words will also permit this extension. It was also asked, in the same case, certain notes having been found in the account-book of the testator, he being in the habit of loaning money in his native city of Gades, or in the environs thereof, and having left the property which he had in said city, whether Mævius would be entitled to the said notes on account of a trust having been created by the words above mentioned. I answered that he would not be entitled to them. The question also arose whether money found in a chest in his house at Gades, or which had been obtained by the collection of different notes and deposited there, would be due under the terms of the trust. The reply was that this question had already been answered. 7A testator, by his will, in which he appointed his wife and his son his heirs, left a hundred aurei to his daughter in trust, to be paid when she married in the family, and he added the following provision: “I charge you, my daughter, when you marry in the family, and as often as you may marry, to permit your brother, and your mother Seia, each to stipulate for the return of half of the dowry which will be bestowed, if you should die during your marriage without leaving either a son or a daughter, or a divorce should take place before your dowry is returned, or satisfaction is otherwise given you with reference to it.” The father gave his daughter, who was a virgin, in marriage, and presented her with a dowry. A divorce having taken place, he received the dowry, and gave her with it in marriage to another man, stipulating that the said dowry should be returned either to himself or to his daughter. The testator died during her second marriage, leaving the same will, and his son and wife became his heirs. The husband of the girl having subsequently died, she obtained her dowry, and married a third time in the presence, and with the consent of her brother and mother, who even increased her dowry, and neither of them made any stipulation with reference to it. The son and the daughter afterwards became the heirs of their mother, and then the daughter died, leaving her husband her heir. The question arose, as the girl had not received the money composing her dowry as a legacy from the heirs of her father, but, being the mother of a family, had recovered it after the death of her second husband, whether her heir could be held liable to the brother of the deceased, under the terms of the trust, for the money which he could have received if he had made a stipulation with reference to the dowry. The answer was that, according to the case stated, he would not be liable. 8Where the heir or legatee of a testator is requested to adopt someone, and the following words are added, “If he should do otherwise, let him be disinherited,” or, “Let him lose his legacy,” the question arose, if he should not adopt the person mentioned, whether an action would lie by virtue of the trust in favor of the person who was not adopted. The answer was that a trust by which a party is requested to adopt anyone is not valid. 9“I wish the tract of land which is situated in such-and-such a district to be transferred to Mævius, Publius, and Gaius for a price fixed by an arbiter, and, the purchase-money having been added to my estate, that my remaining heirs shall promise, under the penalty of a hundred aurei, to be liable for double the amount in case of eviction, in order that the said land may not either wholly, or in part, ever pass into the hands of Seia, or her descendants, in any way whatsoever.” The question arose whether the legacy was valid, because Publius wished to purchase it, and Gaius refused to consent. The answer was that he who wished to profit by the trust could claim half of the land which was devised, even though the other declined to avail himself of his right. Inquiry was also made as to what security ought to be furnished, in accordance with the will of the testator, for the amount to be paid to each of the heirs. The answer was that security should be given in proportion to the share to which they were entitled under the terms of the trust. 10A testator bequeathed to his sister certain slaves whom he designated in his will, and charged her to deliver the same slaves to his children when she died. The question arose whether the children born of said slaves should be delivered to the children who were the heirs of the deceased, after the death of the legatee, or whether they would belong to her heirs. The answer was that those which were born afterwards were not included in the terms of the trust. 11A father owed his daughter a certain sum of money under a trust created by the will of her husband, and, when the girl married again, her father gave a dowry to her husband without having been directed to do so by her, and stipulated for the return of the dowry to himself, if his daughter should die without issue. The woman had a daughter, and the question arose whether the father could be required to execute the trust. The answer was that if the daughter had not ratified the dowry which was given her, the right to demand the execution of the trust would survive. Inquiry was also made, if the father should be willing to release the obligation arising out of the stipulation, whether the right to demand the execution of the trust would be denied to the woman. I replied that this had already been answered, and if the father had given the dowry in order that the woman might sanction it, and she did not do so, he could bring suit to recover the dowry in question. 12A woman appointed her husband Seius, her heir, and substituted her foster-child, Apia, for him; and charged her heir to transfer her estate to her said foster-child after his death, and if anything should happen to her foster-child before that time, she directed him to deliver her said estate to Valerian, her nephew. The question arose, if Seius, during his lifetime, should deliver to the foster-child whatever he had obtained from the estate, whether he would be held to have done this in accordance with the will of the deceased; especially when the said foster-child had been substituted for him. The answer was that, if Apia should die during the lifetime of Seius, the latter would not be released from the execution of the trust which had been left for the benefit of Valerian. 13Scævola held that when an appointed heir is asked to deliver an estate to another person, when he wishes to do so, he will not be compelled, in the meantime, to execute the trust. Claudius: For a trust of this kind is considered to have been created after his death. 14A testator requested his appointed heir to deliver his entire estate to his wife, Seia, and charged her as follows: “I ask you, Seia, to deliver to Mævia, our dear child, everything which may come into your hands from my estate, except what I have bequeathed to you as above mentioned; and I forbid any security to be taken from Seia, as I know that she will rather increase, than diminish my estate.” The question arose whether Mævia could immediately demand the execution of the trust by Seia. The answer was that there was nothing in the case stated which would prevent her from doing so.