Pomponius, Decrees of the Senate, Book I. Where a woman enters upon the estate of anyone in order to assume payment of the debts due from it, it will be difficult for her to obtain relief, unless this has been contrived by the fraud of the creditors; for a woman ought not to be considered as, in every respect, occupying the position of a minor under twenty-five years of age who has been overreached. 1When a woman wishes to recover property given in pledge by her at the time she became surety for another, she should also receive the crops and the offspring of slaves, and, if the property has been deteriorated, a larger sum should be paid on this account. Where, however, the creditor who received the pledge to secure the obligation has sold it to a third party, the true opinion is that of those who think that an action should be granted to her, even against a purchaser in good faith; because the position of a purchaser should not be better than that of the vendor. 2Ad Dig. 16,1,32,2Windscheid: Lehrbuch des Pandektenrechts, 7. Aufl. 1891, Bd. II, § 485, Note 5.Likewise, if a woman sells a tract of land to the creditor of her husband, and delivers it on condition that the purchaser will apply the money received to the payment of her husband’s debt, and she brings suit to recover said land, she can be met by an exception on the ground of property sold and delivered; but she can reply that the sale has been made against the provisions of the Decree of the Senate. This can be done whether the creditor himself purchases the property, or whether he has employed someone else to do so, in order that the woman may be deprived of it in this manner. The same rule applies where the woman has transferred her property, not in behalf of her husband, but in behalf of some other debtor. 3Where a woman, to avoid binding herself for another, directs a third party to do this for her, will the Decree of the Senate apply to this person who has acted at the request of the woman? The entire substance of the Decree of the Senate has reference to the denial of the suit against the woman herself, and I think a distinction should be made here; as, for instance, where a creditor, to whom I have bound myself at the direction of a woman, has devised this plan for the purpose of evading the Decree of the Senate, as the woman does not seem to have bound herself in violation of that Decree, but offered someone else; he should be barred by an exception based on fraud committed against the Decree of the Senate. If, however, he should be ignorant of the facts, but I should be aware of them, then, if I bring an action on mandate against the woman, I will be barred, but I will still be liable to the creditor. 4Ad Dig. 16,1,32,4Windscheid: Lehrbuch des Pandektenrechts, 7. Aufl. 1891, Bd. II, § 486, Note 6.Where a woman is ready to join issue in behalf of the party for whom she obligated herself, in order that an action may not be granted against the first debtor, as she can plead the exception based on the Decree of the Senate, she must give security that she will not avail herself of the exception, and then proceed to trial. 5A woman is also understood to bind herself for another, even when she does this for one who cannot be bound; as, for instance, where she obligates herself for a slave belonging to another, but her obligation will be extinguished if the action should be restored against the master of the slave.

Pomponius, Decrees of the Senate, Book I. Aristo stated, with reference to the Decrees of Fronto: Two daughters were the necessary heirs of their father; one of them declined to accept his estate, and the other took possession of her father’s property and was ready to discharge all its liabilities. The venerable Prætor Cassius, after hearing the case, very properly decided that prætorian actions should be granted to her who had accepted the estate of her father, but should be denied to the other daughter who had refused it.

Pomponius, Decrees of the Senate, Book II. If a son under paternal control, who is a soldier, does not make a will disposing of the property which he acquired while in the service, let us see whether it will belong to his mother. I do not think that it will, for the privilege of disposing of property of this description is, in fact, granted by military law; and, under such circumstances, sons are, by no means, regarded as the heads of households, so far as such property is concerned. 1While the right of a mother remains in suspense, for the purpose of determining whether or not certain persons can exclude her from the succession, and the result is that they cannot do so, the right to which she was entitled during the intermediate time will be unimpaired; for instance, if a son should die intestate, and a posthumous child could have been born to him, but either was not born, or died at birth; or where a son, who was in the hands of the enemy, did not return, so as to take advantage of the law of postliminium.

Pomponius, Decrees of the Senate, Book III. The Emperor Hadrian published a Rescript with reference to those who had stolen the property of the persons whom they were serving as slaves, and afterwards demanded their freedom, the words of which Rescript are as follows: “As it is not just that a slave, in expectation of his freedom, should take property belonging to the estate of his master, where freedom is to be granted him under the terms of a trust, so it is not necessary to seek for any reason to delay the grant of his freedom.” Hence, in the first place, an arbiter should be appointed, in whose presence it should be determined what can be preserved for the heir, before he can be compelled to manumit the slave.

Pomponius, Decrees of the Senate, Book IV. If, however, the child to whom I have made the assignment should die, leaving a son, and his brother, and there should also be a son of another patron, the grandson will be entitled to half of the estate, which my son, who is living, would have if I had not assigned the said freedman.

Pomponius, Decrees of the Senate, Book IV. Or the one who survives declines to accept the estate of the freedman:

The Same, Decrees of the Senate, Book IV. Anyone can, by his will, manumit a slave, and assign him to one of his children as his freedman. 1The Senate refers to children who are under the control of their father. Must it therefore be understood that no provision is made for posthumous children by this decree? I think that the better opinion is that posthumous children are also included. 2Where the Decree of the Senate says, “If anyone should lose his civil rights,” it refers to a person who has lost them forever, and not to one who has been captured by the enemy, and may return. 3An assignment can also be made to begin at a certain date, but it can hardly be made for a certain term, as the Senate itself fixed the limit of the transaction.

Ad Dig. 14,6,20Windscheid: Lehrbuch des Pandektenrechts, 7. Aufl. 1891, Bd. II, § 288, Note 11.The Same, On the Decrees of the Senate, Book V. If a person to whom money was lent while he was under the control of his father, after he himself becomes the head of the family, through ignorance makes a promise of the money in such a way that a new obligation is created, and suit is brought on the stipulation, an exception founded on the facts should be filed.

Pomponius, Decrees of the Senate, Book V. By the following words: “Their birth having been acknowledged,” the Decree of the Senate must be understood only to refer to those who would have been considered freeborn. 1By the clause, “Would have left,” it must be understood that whatever such persons have obtained from the property of him by whom they were manumitted must be restored. Let us see in what manner this must be interpreted, whether they must return whatever has been acquired by them by means of the property of their masters, or what they have abstracted from them without their knowledge, or whether this includes the property which has been granted and donated by the persons who manumitted them. The latter is the better opinion.