Responsorum libri
Ex libro XV
The Same, Opinions, Book XV. Gaius Seius purchased Pamphila under the condition that she would be manumitted within a year; and, before that time had elapsed, Seius himself was judicially decided to be a slave. I ask whether Pamphila was entitled to her freedom after a year had elapsed, in accordance with the condition of the sale. Paulus answered that the slave who had been purchased was acquired by the master of Seius, under the same condition subject to which she had been sold.
The Same, Opinions, Book XV. Lucius Titius granted freedom to his slave under the condition that he should render a faithful account of his administration to his son, Gaius Seius. When Gaius Seius had reached the age of puberty, the slave, having been sued by the curators of the former, paid in court everything that was due. A bond having been required of the curators, the slave was declared to be free. Now Gaius Seius, the son of the testator, denies that the money was legally paid to his curators, and I ask whether this was the case. Paulus answered that the balance of the account of the slave did not seem to have been paid to the curators of the youth in such a way as to comply with the condition prescribed by the will in accordance with law; but if the money had been paid in the presence of the minor, or had been entered in his accounts, the condition should be considered to have been fulfilled, just as if it had been paid to him himself.
The Same, Opinions, Book XV. Lucius Titius gave his female slave, Concordia, to his natural daughter, Septicia. Afterwards, by his will, he bequeathed the abovementioned slave along with others to his daughter, for the purpose of manumitting her. I ask whether his daughter, Septicia, can be compelled to manumit the slave. Paulus answered that, if the donation of the slave was made during the lifetime of the natural father, and the daughter did not accept other legacies left by the will of her father, she could not be compelled by the terms of the trust to manumit the said female slave, who was her own property. 1Lucius Titius bequeathed his slave Stichus to Mævius, and asked that he should never be manumitted either by him or by his heir. Paulus gave it as his opinion that the testator had the power afterwards to liberate this slave, because he did not impose any condition upon himself but upon his legatee.
Paulus, Opinions, Book XV. Paulus gave it as his opinion that if (as is stated) after a sale has been made unconditionally, the purchaser voluntarily sent a letter by which he declared that, after a certain time, he would manumit the slave whom he had bought, this letter had no reference whatever to the Constitution of the Divine Marcus. 1He also gave it as his opinion that the Constitution of the Divine Marcus applied to the cases of slaves who were sold under the condition of being manumitted after a certain time; and that a female slave, for whom her master had received money for the purpose of manumitting her, was entitled to the same favor of freedom, as he would also have authority over her as his freedwoman. 2The question arose whether a purchaser could legally grant freedom to his slave, if his price had not yet been paid. Paulus answered that if the vendor had delivered the slave to the purchaser, and had been furnished with security for his price, he would belong to the purchaser, even if the money had not been paid. 3Gaius Seius sold Stichus, his slave, under the condition that Titius would manumit Stichus at the end of three years, if he served him continually during that time. Stichus fled before the three years had elapsed, and returned in a short time after the death of Titius. I ask whether Stichus would be prevented from obtaining his freedom under the terms of the sale, by having taken to flight before the three years had expired? Paulus gave it as his opinion that, according to the facts stated, Stichus should be manumitted, and was entitled to his freedom after the term which had been prescribed.
Paulus, Opinions, Book XV. Titia, who had a son by a former husband, married Gaius Seius, who had a daughter; and, at the time of the marriage, they made an agreement that the daughter of Gaius Seius should be betrothed to the son of Titia, and an instrument was drawn up to this effect with a penalty added, if either of the parties placed any impediment in the way of the marriage. Gaius Seius afterwards died during his marriage, and his daughter refused to marry her betrothed. I ask whether the heirs of Gaius Seius are liable under the stipulation. The answer was that, in accordance with the facts stated, as in accordance with good morals, proceedings could not be instituted under the stipulation, an exception on the ground of bad faith might be pleaded against the party bringing the suit, because it is considered dishonorable for marriages which are to take place in the future, or where they already have been contracted, to be hampered by the imposition of penalties. 1Ad Dig. 45,1,134,1BOHGE, Bd. 1 (1871), S. 22: Auslegung eines Vertrages nach den übrigen zweifellosen Vertragsbestimmungen.The same authority gave it as his opinion that, in general, matters which are inserted in the preliminaries are also understood to have been repeated in the stipulation, so that the agreement does not become void on account of a repetition of this kind. 2The same authority held that Septicius, having provided for the payment of money by instruments in writing as well as for interest at six per cent, which was deposited with Sempronius, and this transaction having taken place between persons who were present, it should be understood that, even so far as Lucius Titius was concerned, the provisions of the stipulation had already been accepted. 3The same authority was of the opinion that, where several different contracts had been entered into, and a single stipulation was subsequently made with reference to all of them, even though there was but one interrogatory, and one answer, still it was the same as if each agreement constituted a separate stipulation.
The Same, Opinions, Book XV. Paulus gave it as his opinion that those who are obliged to contribute equal shares under the terms of a trust do not appear to be released, because certain of their colleagues, through mistake, have contributed more than was due. 1Paulus also held that the obligation of the debtor who pays is one thing, and the claim of a creditor who sells a pledge is another; for when a debtor pays a sum of money, it is in his power to determine on what obligation he pays it. When, however, a creditor sells a pledge, he can credit the price of the same even upon something which is only due by nature, and therefore, after deducting this natural debt, he can demand the remainder as due.