The Same, On Plautius, Book VII. When anyone transacts my business, there are not several different matters but only one contract; unless, in the beginning, the party undertook to do only one thing, and to retire when it was finished; for in this case if he undertook to do anything else after having changed his mind, there is a new contract.

Ad Dig. 5,1,23Windscheid: Lehrbuch des Pandektenrechts, 7. Aufl. 1891, Bd. I, § 128, Note 5.The Same, On Plautius, Book VII. Anything which comes up after issue has been joined cannot be considered as before the court; and therefore it will be necessary to make a new application.

Paulus, On Plautius, Book VII. Where the Prætor says, “When a number of slaves commit a theft an action will only be granted to enable the plaintiff to obtain as much as he would have done if a freeman had committed the crime,” the question arises whether this has reference to the payment of money as damages, or to the surrender of the slave by way of reparation; as, for instance, where double damages are collected out of the value of the slaves that have been surrendered, whether other actions will be prohibited? Sabinus and Cassius both think that the defendant should be credited with the value of the slaves surrendered. This Pomponius approves, and it is true; for if a slave is taken away because no defence was offered, the owner must receive credit for what he was worth. Julianus thinks that it is certain that an account must be taken, not only of the double damages, but also of what might be recovered by a personal action; and where theft has been committed by a number of slaves, the time when this was done must be investigated, in order to determine whether they belonged to the same band; for the Edict is not applicable where those slaves who belong to different owners afterwards becomes the property of one alone.

Paulus, On Plautius, Book VII. The vendor of a house should enter into a stipulation relative to threatened injury before he conveys it, for the reason that he is obliged to exercise proper care and diligence before he delivers the possession of the property, and it is a part of said care and diligence to make such a stipulation, and therefore if he neglects to do so he will be liable to the purchaser.

The Same, On Plautius, Book VII. A guardian who is administering his trust should be considered as occupying the place of an owner, with reference to whatever concerns the interests of his ward.

Paulus, On Plautius, Book VII. A pledge given by the curator of an insane person is valid, if this was done because the benefit of the latter required it.

The Same, On Plautius, Book VII. Where anyone, not acting as heir, but as the son of his patron, being in want, asks for support from the freedman of his patron, there is no doubt that he does not, by so doing, interfere with the management of his father’s estate. Labeo also very properly holds this opinion.

Paulus, On Plautius, Book VII. A stipulation was entered into by a patron as follows, namely, “If you do not give me your services for ten days, do you promise to pay me twenty sesterces?” It must be considered whether an action for the twenty sesterces should not be granted, as having been promised for the purpose of rendering freedom burdensome; or whether services which have not been promised can be given; or whether this ought only to be assumed to have been promised, in order that the patron may not be entirely excluded? The Prætor decides that services have only been promised. 1Hence the following point arises, namely, whether the freedman can prevent a judgment for a larger sum than twenty sesterces from being rendered against him, because the patron seems to have valued his services at that amount, and therefore he himself should not desire to increase it. It would, however, be unjust to do this, nor is it necessary to show such indulgence to the freedman, for he should not, on the one hand, agree to the stipulation, and on the other complain of it as being unjust.

The Same, On Plautius, Book VII. I manumitted a slave by will as follows, “Let him be free if he will swear to pay to my son, Cornelius, ten aurei in lieu of his services.” The question arises, what is the law in this case? It must be acknowledged that the slave will comply with the condition by taking the oath, but he will not be bound to pay the money in lieu of his services, because he will not be bound unless he takes the oath after his manumission.

The Same, On Plautius, Book VII. Ad Dig. 41,1,48 pr.Windscheid: Lehrbuch des Pandektenrechts, 7. Aufl. 1891, Bd. I, § 182, Note 11.A bona fide purchaser undoubtedly obtains as his own any profits acquired by means of the property of another in the interim, and this not only refers to such as are acquired by his diligence and labor, but to all others, because, as far as the profits are concerned, he practically occupies the position of the owner; for, even before he obtains the crops, and immediately after they are separated from the soil, they become the property of a bona fide purchaser. Nor does it make any difference whether what I buy in good faith can be acquired by prescription or not; as, for instance, if it belongs to a ward, or has been obtained by violence, or has been given to the Governor of a province contrary to the law against extortion, and has afterwards been transferred by him to a bona fide purchaser. 1On the other hand, if at the time when the property was delivered to me I thought that it belonged to the vendor, and I afterwards ascertained that it belonged to someone else, the question arises whether I am entitled to the profits, because possession had lasted for a long time. Pomponius says that it must be apprehended that a purchaser of this kind is not one in good faith, although he may hold the property, for prescription has reference to the law, and whether he possesses the property either in good or bad faith is a question of fact. Nor can this be controverted by alleging that a long time has elapsed; as, on the other hand, he who can not acquire property by prescription on account of a defect in the title to the same has still a right to the profits thereof. 2The increase of sheep is a profit, and therefore it belongs to a bona fide possessor, even if they should have been sold while pregnant, or had been stolen while in that condition. And, indeed, it cannot be doubted that a possessor in good faith is entitled to the milk, even though the animals may have been sold ready to be milked. The same rule applies to wool.

The Same, On Plautius, Book VII. An insane person and a ward are liable without the authority of their curator or guardian, where the obligation arises from the property itself; as, for instance, if I hold a tract of land in common with one of them, and have incurred some expense with reference to it, or the ward has damaged it in some way, he will be liable to an action in partition.

Paulus, On Plautius, Book VII. Where anyone who has given an article in pledge sells it, although he is the owner, he commits a theft, whether he delivered it to the creditor or merely bound himself by a special agreement. Julianus holds the same opinion. 1If anyone from whom property has been stolen should bequeath it to me, while it is in the hands of the thief, and the latter should afterwards appropriate it, will I be entitled to an action for theft? According to the opinion of Octavenus, such an action will only lie in my favor when the heir is not entitled to one in his name; because it is established that, no matter in what way the ownership of property may be changed, the owner will be entitled to bring the action for theft. 2The ancient authorities gave it as their opinion that where anyone brings a muleteer into court for fraud, and his mules die in the meantime, he will be liable to theft. 3Julianus says that where a slave is appointed for the collection of money, and collects it after he has been manumitted, he will be liable for theft. The same rule applies to the case of a guardian to whom money is paid after puberty. 4If you have recommended Titius to me as being solvent, and as being one to whom I can lend money, and I make inquiries about him, and you afterwards introduce to me someone else as Titius, you will be guilty of theft; because I believe that he is Titius, and by all means if he who was brought to me knew of the fraud. If you were not aware of it, you will not be guilty of theft, and he who introduced him does not appear to have given his assistance, as no theft was committed; but an action in factum will be granted against the person who brought him. 5If I stipulate with you not to do anything to prevent the slave Eros from being given to me before such-and-such kalends, although it is to my interest that he should not be stolen, still, if he is stolen, you will not be liable under the stipulation; provided nothing was done by you to prevent him from being given to me, and I will not be entitled to an action for theft.