Corpus iurisprudentiae Romanae

Repertorium zu den Quellen des römischen Rechts

Digesta Iustiniani Augusti

Recognovit Mommsen (1870) et retractavit Krüger (1928)
Convertit in Anglica lingua Scott (1932)
Paul.not. Iul. dig.
Notae ad Iuliani Digestorum librosPauli Notae ad Iuliani Digestorum libros

Notae ad Iuliani Digestorum libros

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Ex libro IV

Dig. 4,2,11Pau­lus li­bro quar­to Iu­lia­ni di­ges­to­rum no­tat. Si quis alius si­ne ma­li­tia fi­de­ius­so­ris ut fi­de­ius­so­ri ac­cep­to fie­ret vim fe­cit, non te­ne­bi­tur fi­de­ius­sor, ut rei quo­que ob­li­ga­tio­nem re­sti­tuat.

Paulus, Notes on the Digest of Julianus, Book IV. Where a third party, without fraud on the part of the surety, employs violence to obtain a release of said surety, the latter shall not also be liable to renew the obligation of the principal debtor.

Ex libro VIII

Dig. 18,5,4Li­bro oc­ta­vo di­ges­to­rum Iu­lia­ni Pau­lus no­tat. Si emp­tio con­trac­ta sit to­gae pu­ta aut lan­cis, et pac­tus sit ven­di­tor, ne al­ter­utrius emp­tio ma­neat, pu­to resol­vi ob­li­ga­tio­nem hu­ius rei no­mi­ne dum­ta­xat.

Paulus, Notes on the Digest of Julianus, Book VIII. Where a contract was for the purchase of a toga, or a dish, and the vendor agreed that one of said articles should not be sold, I think that only the obligation with reference to said article is rescinded.

Ex libro XI

Dig. 15,3,14Iu­lia­nus li­bro un­de­ci­mo di­ges­to­rum. Marcellus notat: In­ter­dum et prop­ter hoc quod in rem al­te­rius so­cii ver­sum est de in rem ver­so cum al­te­ro agi pot­est, qui con­ven­tus a so­cio pe­te­re pot­est id in quo dam­na­tus fue­rit. quid enim di­ce­mus, si pe­cu­lium ser­vo ab al­te­ro ad­emp­tum fue­rit? Paulus: er­go haec quaes­tio ita pro­ce­dit, si de pe­cu­lio agi non pot­est.

Julianus, Digest, Book XI. Note by Marcellus. Sometimes, also, the action for property employed in the affairs of another can be brought against one joint-owner; for the reason that such employment of property has taken place, and he, having been sued, can recover from his partner the amount for which judgment has been rendered against him. What shall we say, however, if the slave has been deprived of the peculium by one of the owners? Paulus says that this question only arises where an action on the peculium does not lie.

Ex libro XXIII

Dig. 37,6,3Iu­lia­nus li­bro vi­cen­si­mo ter­tio di­ges­to­rum. Prae­tor non sub con­di­cio­ne col­la­tio­nis bo­no­rum pos­ses­sio­nem con­tra ta­bu­las pro­mit­tit, sed de­mons­trat, quid da­ta bo­no­rum pos­ses­sio­ne fie­ri opor­tet. alio­quin mag­na cap­tio erit em­an­ci­pa­ti, si non ali­ter bo­no­rum pos­ses­sio­nem ac­ci­pe­re in­tel­le­ge­re­tur, ni­si ca­vis­set de col­la­tio­ne: nam si in­ter­im ip­se de­ces­sis­set, he­redi suo ni­hil re­lin­que­ret. item si fra­ter eius de­ces­sis­set, non ad­mit­te­re­tur ad bo­no­rum pos­ses­sio­nem. quid er­go est? in­tel­le­gen­dum est bo­no­rum pos­ses­sio­nem ac­ci­pe­re et an­te­quam ca­veat, sed si non ca­ve­rit, ita ob­ser­va­bi­tur, ut to­ta he­redi­tas apud eum, qui in po­tes­ta­te fue­rit, re­ma­neat. 1Em­an­ci­pa­tus fi­lius con­tro­ver­siam fa­cit im­pu­be­ri, qui se fi­lium et in po­tes­ta­te pa­tris fuis­se di­cit: quae­ro, si bo­na sua ei em­an­ci­pa­tus con­fer­re de­beat. Paulus notat: pu­to con­fe­ren­dum es­se ex­ac­ta cau­tio­ne, ut vic­tus sic­ut he­redi­ta­tem, ita et quae col­la­ta sunt prae­stet. 2Iulianus. Quo­tiens con­tra ta­bu­las bo­no­rum pos­ses­sio da­tur, em­an­ci­pa­ti bo­na sua con­fer­re de­bent his so­lis, qui in po­tes­ta­te pa­tris fue­rint. hoc quem­ad­mo­dum ex­pe­di­ri opor­teat, quae­ri so­let: nam si bo­na a pa­tre re­lic­ta et em­an­ci­pa­to­rum in me­dium con­fe­ran­tur et ita vi­ri­les par­tes su­man­tur, eve­niet, ut et em­an­ci­pa­tis quo­que col­la­tio ab ip­sis fac­ta pro­sit. vi­dea­mus er­go, ne com­mo­dis­si­mum sit em­an­ci­pa­tos quar­tam par­tem ex bo­nis pa­ter­nis fer­re, ex suis ter­tiam: quod di­co, ex­em­plo ma­ni­fes­tius fiet. po­na­mus pa­trem qua­drin­gen­ta re­li­quis­se et duos in po­tes­ta­te fi­lios, duos em­an­ci­pa­tos, ex qui­bus al­te­rum cen­tum, al­te­rum se­xa­gin­ta in bo­nis ha­be­re: is qui cen­tum ha­be­bit cen­tum tri­gin­ta tria et trien­tem fe­ret, is ve­ro qui se­xa­gin­ta con­tu­le­rit cen­tum vi­gin­ti, at­que ita eve­niet, ut col­la­tio­nis emo­lu­men­tum ad so­los, qui in po­tes­ta­te re­man­se­rint, per­ve­niat. 3Em­an­ci­pa­ti bo­na sua con­fer­re cum his, qui in po­tes­ta­te fue­runt, iu­ben­tur. 4Qua­re sic­ut is, qui in po­tes­ta­te est, do­tem uxo­ris prae­ci­pit, ita em­an­ci­pa­tus quo­que, qua­si prae­ci­piat, re­ti­ne­re de­bet. 5Em­an­ci­pa­tus prae­ter­itus si, dum de­li­be­rat, ca­ve­rit de bo­no­rum col­la­tio­ne nec bo­no­rum pos­ses­sio­nem pe­tie­rit, agen­te fra­tre ex sti­pu­la­tu ip­so iu­re tu­tus erit. sed et si pe­cu­niam con­tu­le­rit, con­dic­tio­ne eam re­pe­tit: omis­sa enim bo­no­rum pos­ses­sio­ne in­ci­pit pe­cu­nia si­ne cau­sa es­se apud he­redem. 6Qui duos fi­lios in po­tes­ta­te ha­be­bat et ex uno eo­rum ne­po­tem, em­an­ci­pa­vit fi­lium, ex quo ne­po­tem ha­be­bat: de­in­de em­an­ci­pa­tus fac­tus pro­crea­vit fi­lium, quem avus in lo­cum fi­lii ad­op­ta­vit et vel in­tes­ta­tus, vel tes­ta­men­to fac­to prae­terito em­an­ci­pa­to fi­lio, de­ces­sit: quae­si­tum est, quid de bo­no­rum pos­ses­sio­ne, quid de col­la­tio­ne iu­ris es­set. re­spon­di bo­no­rum, de qui­bus quae­ri­tur, tres par­tes fie­ri de­bent, ex qui­bus una per­ti­net ad fi­lium qui in po­tes­ta­te re­man­sit, al­te­ra ad ne­po­tem, qui in lo­cum fi­lii ad­op­ta­tus est, ter­tia ad em­an­ci­pa­tum fi­lium et ne­po­tem, qui in po­tes­ta­te re­man­se­rit, ita ut pa­ter so­li ei con­fe­rat, cum quo bo­no­rum pos­ses­sio­nem ac­ci­piat.

Julianus, Digest, Book XXIII. The Prætor does not promise possession of the property of an estate in opposition to the terms of the will, under the condition that collation shall be made, but he shows what must be done after possession has been given. Otherwise, great advantage would be taken of an emancipated son, if he was not understood to have obtained prætorian possession of the estate, unless he had given security to make collation; for if, in the meantime, he himself should die, he would leave nothing to his heir. Moreover, if his brother should die, he will not be permitted to obtain prætorian possession of the estate. What should be done under such circumstances? It must then be held that he obtained legal possession of the estate, even before he gave security; but if he should not give security, the result will be that the entire estate will go to the son under paternal control. 1An emancipated son entered into a controversy with a minor under the age of puberty, who declared that he was his brother, and was under the control of his father. I ask whether the emancipated son should make collation of his property with him. Paulus remarks on this point: “I think that collation should be made, after a bond has been required that, if the minor loses the case, he will transfer the estate as well as the property of which collation was made.” 2Julianus: Whenever prætorian possession is given contrary to the provisions of the will, the emancipated sons should make collation of their property only with those who remain under the control of their father. The question arises how this can be done. For, if the property left by the father, as well as that belonging to the emancipated sons, is placed in one mass, and full shares of the same are taken, the result will be that the emancipated sons will profit by the collation made by themselves. Therefore, let us see whether it will not be more convenient for the emancipated sons to receive a fourth of their father’s estate, and a third of their own property. What I mean will become more plain by an example. Let us suppose that a father left four hundred aurei, and two sons under his control, and two have been emancipated. Of these one will have a hundred and the other sixty aurei out of his estate; the one who will be entitled to a hundred will obtain in all a hundred and thirty-three and a third; and he who contributed sixty will obtain a hundred and twenty, so that the result will be that those only who remained under the control of their father will obtain the benefit of the collation. 3Emancipated sons are ordered to place their property in collation with those who are under the control of their father. 4Wherefore, as he who is under the control of his father receives the dowry of his wife as a preferred legacy, so, also, can an emancipated son retain that of his wife as a preferred legacy. 5Where an emancipated son, who was passed over in a will, gives security with reference to the collation of his property, while he is deliberating whether he will demand prætorian possession of the estate or not, and he does not do so, and his brother brings suit against him on the stipulation, he will be secure under the will. If, however, he has deposited money by way of collation, he can recover it by an action; for, after he has declined to apply for prætorian possession, there will be no reason for the money to remain in the hands of the heir. 6A man who had two sons under his control, and also a grandson who was the son of one of them, emancipated the one by whom he had the grandson; and, after having been emancipated, the son had another son whom his grandfather adopted in his stead; and then the grandfather died, either intestate, or after making a will in which his emancipated son was passed over. The question arose, what would the rule be with reference to prætorian possession, and what ought to be done with respect to collation? The answer was that, so far as the property was concerned, three parts should be made of it, one of which would belong to the son who remained under paternal control, the second to the grandson who was adopted instead of the son, and the third to the emancipated son and the grandson who remained under paternal control; so that the father would be liable to collation only with the one who had obtained prætorian possession of the estate.

Ex libro XXVII

Dig. 39,6,15Idem li­bro vi­cen­si­mo sep­ti­mo di­ges­to­rum. Marcellus notat: cum tes­ta­men­to re­lin­quen­di, cui ve­lint, ad­ep­ti sint fi­lii fa­mi­lias mi­li­tes li­be­ram fa­cul­ta­tem, cre­di pot­est ea et­iam re­mis­sa, quae do­na­tio­nes mor­tis cau­sa fie­ri pro­hi­bent. Paulus notat: hoc et con­sti­tu­tum est et ad ex­em­plum le­ga­to­rum mor­tis cau­sa do­na­tio­nes re­vo­ca­tae sunt.

The Same, Digest, Book XXVII. Marcellus says that where sons under paternal control, who are serving in the army, have obtained the unrestricted right to dispose of their property by will to anyone whom they may select, it may be held that they are also released from the observance of the ordinary formalities required in the case of donations mortis causa. Paulus says, with reference to this, that it is established by the Imperial Constitutions that donations mortis causa can be revoked in the same way as legacies.

Ex libro XXXVI

Dig. 5,1,75Idem li­bro tri­gen­si­mo sex­to di­ges­to­rum. Si prae­tor ius­se­rit eum a quo de­bi­tum pe­te­ba­tur ad­es­se et or­di­ne edic­to­rum per­ac­to pro­nun­tia­ve­rit ab­sen­tem de­be­re, non uti­que iu­dex, qui de iu­di­ca­to co­gnos­cit, de­bet de prae­to­ris sen­ten­tia co­gnos­ce­re: alio­quin lu­so­ria erunt hu­ius­mo­di edic­ta et de­cre­ta prae­to­rum. Marcellus notat: si per do­lum sciens fal­so ali­quid al­le­ga­vit et hoc mo­do con­se­cu­tum eum sen­ten­tiam prae­to­ris li­qui­do fue­rit ad­pro­ba­tum, ex­is­ti­mo de­be­re iu­di­cem que­rel­lam rei ad­mit­te­re. Paulus notat: si au­tem mor­bo im­pe­di­tus aut rei pu­bli­cae cau­sa avo­ca­tus ad­es­se non po­tuit reus, pu­to vel ac­tio­nem iu­di­ca­ti eo ca­su in eum de­ne­gan­dam vel ex­se­qui prae­to­rem ita iu­di­ca­tum non de­be­re.

The Same, Digest, Book XXXVI. Where the Prætor has ordered a party against whom an action is brought for a debt, to appear; and the number of citations is exhausted; and he decides that the absent party owes the debt, and suit is brought to enforce the judgment; the judge who hears the case cannot examine the decree of the Prætor, otherwise citations of this kind and the decrees of the Prætors would be illusory. Marcellus says in a note: “Where the plaintiff knowingly and falsely states anything with malicious intent, and it is clearly established that in this way he obtained a judgment in his favor from the Prætor; I think that the judge should admit the complaint of the defendant.” Paulus says in a note, that if the defendant was unable to be present because he was prevented by illness, or was employed in some business for the State, it is his opinion that in this case an action to enforce the judgment against him should be refused, or the Prætor ought not to permit execution to be issued.

Ex libro XLII

Dig. 40,2,4Iu­lia­nus li­bro qua­dra­gen­si­mo se­cun­do di­ges­to­rum. Si pa­ter fi­lio per­mi­se­rit ser­vum ma­nu­mit­te­re et in­ter­im de­ces­se­rit in­tes­ta­to, de­in­de fi­lius igno­rans pa­trem suum mor­tuum li­ber­ta­tem im­po­sue­rit, li­ber­tas ser­vo fa­vo­re li­ber­ta­tis con­tin­git, cum non ap­pa­reat mu­ta­ta es­se do­mi­ni vo­lun­tas. sin au­tem igno­ran­te fi­lio ve­tuis­set pa­ter per nun­tium et an­te­quam fi­lius cer­tior fie­ret, ser­vum ma­nu­mis­sis­set, li­ber non fit. nam ut fi­lio ma­nu­mit­ten­te ser­vus ad li­ber­ta­tem per­ve­niat, du­ra­re opor­tet pa­tris vo­lun­ta­tem: nam si mu­ta­ta fue­rit, non erit ve­rum vo­len­te pa­tre fi­lium ma­nu­mis­sis­se. 1Quo­tiens do­mi­nus ser­vum ma­nu­mit­tat, quam­vis ex­is­ti­met alie­num es­se eum, ni­hi­lo mi­nus ve­rum est vo­lun­ta­te do­mi­ni ser­vum ma­nu­mis­sum et id­eo li­ber erit. et ex con­tra­rio si se Sti­chus non pu­ta­ret ma­nu­mit­ten­tis es­se, ni­hi­lo mi­nus li­ber­ta­tem con­tin­ge­re. plus enim in re est, quam in ex­is­ti­ma­tio­ne et utro­que ca­su ve­rum est Sti­chum vo­lun­ta­te do­mi­ni ma­nu­mis­sum es­se. idem­que iu­ris est et si do­mi­nus et ser­vus in eo er­ro­re es­sent, ut ne­que il­le se do­mi­num nec hic se ser­vum eius pu­ta­ret. 2Mi­nor vi­gin­ti an­nis do­mi­nus nec com­mu­nem qui­dem ser­vum si­ne con­si­lio rec­te ma­nu­mit­tit. Paulus notat: sed si pig­no­ri ob­li­ga­tum si­bi mi­nor vi­gin­ti an­nis ma­nu­mit­ti pa­tia­tur, rec­te ma­nu­mit­ti­tur, quia non tam ma­nu­mit­te­re is quam non im­pe­di­re ma­nu­mit­ten­tem in­tel­le­gi­tur.

Julianus, Digest, Book XLII. If a father should permit his son to manumit his slave, and, in the meantime, should die intestate, and his son, not being aware that his father was dead, should grant the slave his freedom, the slave will become free through the favor conceded to liberty, as it does not appear that the master changed his mind. If, however, the father had, by means of a messenger, forbidden his son to liberate the slave, and the son did not know this, and, before ascertaining it, he should manumit the slave, the latter will not become free; for in order that a slave may obtain his freedom through the manumission of a son, the intention of the father must continue to exist; since, if he should change his mind, it would not be true that the son had manumitted the slave with his father’s consent. 1Whenever a master manumits his slave, even though he may think he belongs to another, it is, nevertheless, true that the slave is manumitted with the consent of his master, and therefore he will become free. And, on the other hand, if Stichus does not think that he belongs to the person who manumits him, he will, nevertheless, obtain his freedom, for there is more in the fact itself than in opinion; and, in both cases, it is true that Stichus was manumitted with the consent of his master. The same rule of law will apply where both the master and the slave are mistaken, and one of them thinks that he is not the master, and the other believes that he is not his slave. 2A minor of twenty years of age, who is a master, cannot legally manumit without appearing before the proper authority. Paulus says that if a minor of twenty years of age permits a slave over whom he has the right of pledge to be manumitted, the manumission is legal; because he is not understood to have actually liberated him, but only not to have interfered with his manumission.