Corpus iurisprudentiae Romanae

Repertorium zu den Quellen des römischen Rechts

Digesta Iustiniani Augusti

Recognovit Mommsen (1870) et retractavit Krüger (1928)
Convertit in Anglica lingua Scott (1932)
Paul.l. Iul. Pap.
Ad legem Iuliam et Papiam lib.Pauli Ad legem Iuliam et Papiam libri

Ad legem Iuliam et Papiam libri

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50

Ex libro I

Dig. 23,2,44Pau­lus li­bro pri­mo ad le­gem Iu­liam et Pa­piam. Le­ge Iu­lia ita ca­ve­tur: ‘Qui se­na­tor est qui­ve fi­lius ne­pos­ve ex fi­lio pro­ne­pos­ve ex fi­lio na­to cu­ius eo­rum est erit, ne quis eo­rum spon­sam uxo­rem­ve sciens do­lo ma­lo ha­be­to li­ber­ti­nam aut eam, quae ip­sa cu­ius­ve pa­ter ma­ter­ve ar­tem lu­di­cram fa­cit fe­ce­rit. ne­ve se­na­to­ris fi­lia nep­tis­ve ex fi­lio pro­nep­tis­ve ex ne­po­te fi­lio na­to na­ta li­ber­ti­no ei­ve qui ip­se cu­ius­ve pa­ter ma­ter­ve ar­tem lu­di­cram fa­cit fe­ce­rit, spon­sa nup­ta­ve sciens do­lo ma­lo es­to ne­ve quis eo­rum do­lo ma­lo sciens spon­sam uxo­rem­ve eam ha­be­to’. 1Hoc ca­pi­te pro­hi­be­tur se­na­tor li­ber­ti­nam du­ce­re eam­ve, cu­ius pa­ter ma­ter­ve ar­tem lu­di­cram fe­ce­rit: item li­ber­ti­nus se­na­to­ris fi­liam du­ce­re. 2Non ob­est avum et aviam ar­tem lu­di­cram fe­cis­se. 3Nec di­stin­gui­tur, pa­ter in po­tes­ta­te ha­beat fi­liam nec ne: ta­men ius­tam pa­trem in­tel­le­gen­dum Oc­ta­ve­nus ait, ma­trem et­iam si vol­go con­ce­pe­rit. 4Item ni­hil re­fert, na­tu­ra­lis sit pa­ter an ad­op­ti­vus. 5An et is no­ceat, qui an­te­quam ad­op­ta­ret ar­tem lu­di­cram fe­ce­rit? at­que si na­tu­ra­lis pa­ter an­te­quam fi­lia nas­ce­re­tur fe­ce­rit? et si hu­ius no­tae ho­mo ad­op­ta­ve­rit, de­in­de em­an­ci­pa­ve­rit, an non pos­sit du­ci? ac si ta­lis pa­ter na­tu­ra­lis de­ces­sis­set? sed de hoc ca­su con­tra­riam le­gis sen­ten­tiam es­se Pom­po­nius rec­te pu­tat, ut eis non con­nu­me­ren­tur. 6Si post­ea in­ge­nuae uxo­ris pa­ter ma­ter­ve ar­tem lu­di­cram fa­ce­re coe­pe­rit, in­iquis­si­mum est di­mit­te­re eam de­be­re, cum nup­tiae ho­nes­te con­trac­tae sint et for­tas­se iam li­be­ri pro­crea­ti sint. 7Pla­ne si ip­sa ar­tem lu­di­cram fa­ce­re coe­pe­rit, uti­que di­mit­ten­da erit. 8Eas, quas in­ge­nui ce­te­ri pro­hi­ben­tur du­ce­re uxo­res, se­na­to­res non du­cent.

Paulus, On the Lex Julia et Papia, Book I. It is provided by the Lex Julia that: “A Senator, or his son, or his grandson, or his great-grandson by his son, or grandson, shall not knowingly or with malicious intent become betrothed to, or marry a freedwoman, or a woman whose father or mother practices, or has practiced the profession of an actor. Nor shall the daughter of a Senator, or a granddaughter by his son, or a great-granddaughter by his grandson marry a freedman, or a man whose father or mother practices, or has practiced the profession of an actor, whether they do so knowingly, or with malicious intent. Nor can any one of these parties knowingly, or with malicious intent become betrothed to, or marry the daughter of a Senator.” 1Under this head a Senator is forbidden to marry a freedwoman whose father or mother has, at any time, exercised the profession of an actor. A freedman is also forbidden to marry the daughter of a Senator. 2If the grandfather or grandmother of the woman belonged to the theatrical profession, this will not be an obstacle to the marriage. 3No distinction is made whether the father has the daughter under his control or not. But Octavenus says that it must be understood that the father is legitimate, as well as the mother, even if the child is illegitimate. 4Again, it makes no difference whether the father is a natural or an adoptive one. 5Would it be an obstacle if the father had belonged to the theatrical profession before he made the adoption, or if the natural father had been connected with this profession before his daughter was born? Where a man of this degraded rank adopts a child, and afterwards emancipates her, can he not marry her, just as would be the case where a natural father dies? Pomponius very properly thinks that, in this instance, the opinion is contrary to the meaning of the law, and that children of this kind cannot be classed with the others. 6If the father or mother of a freeborn woman, after the marriage of the latter, should begin to exercise the profession of the stage, it would be most unjust for the daughter to be repudiated by her husband, as the marriage was honorably contracted, and children may already have been born. 7It is evident that if the woman herself becomes a member of the theatrical profession, she should be repudiated by her husband. 8Senators cannot marry women whom other freeborn men are forbidden to take as wives.

Dig. 50,16,129Pau­lus li­bro pri­mo ad le­gem Iu­liam et Pa­piam. Qui mor­tui nas­cun­tur, ne­que na­ti ne­que pro­crea­ti vi­den­tur, quia num­quam li­be­ri ap­pel­la­ri po­tue­runt.

Paulus, On the Lex Julia et Papia, Book I. Still-born infants are not considered either to have been born or begotten, because they have never been able to be called children.

Ex libro II

Dig. 1,9,6Pau­lus li­bro se­cun­do ad le­gem Iu­liam et Pa­piam. Se­na­to­ris fi­lius est et is, quem in ad­op­tio­nem ac­ce­pit, quam­diu ta­men in fa­mi­lia eius ma­net: em­an­ci­pa­tus ve­ro no­men fi­lii em­an­ci­pa­tio­ne amit­tit. 1A se­na­to­re in ad­op­tio­nem fi­lius da­tus ei qui in­fe­rio­ris dig­ni­ta­tis est, qua­si se­na­to­ris fi­lius vi­de­tur, quia non amit­ti­tur se­na­to­ria dig­ni­tas ad­op­tio­ne in­fe­rio­ris dig­ni­ta­tis, non ma­gis quam ut con­su­la­ris de­si­nat es­se.

Paulus, On the Lex Julia et Papia, Book II. A son adopted by a Senator continues to be such as long as he remains in his family; but when he is emancipated, then by the emancipation he loses the name of son. 1When a son is given in adoption by a Senator to a person of inferior rank he is always considered the son of a Senator; because the Senatorial dignity is not lost by an adoption arising from an inferior station, any more than anyone would cease to be of consular dignity under similar circumstances.

Dig. 22,5,4Pau­lus li­bro se­cun­do ad le­gem Iu­liam et Pa­piam. Le­ge Iu­lia iu­di­cio­rum pu­bli­co­rum ca­ve­tur, ne in­vi­to de­nun­tie­tur, ut tes­ti­mo­nium li­tis di­cat ad­ver­sus so­ce­rum ge­ne­rum, vi­tri­cum pri­vi­gnum, so­bri­num so­bri­nam, so­bri­no so­bri­na na­tum, eos­ve qui prio­re gra­du sint, item ne li­ber­to ip­sius, li­be­ro­rum eius, pa­ren­tium, vi­ri uxo­ris, item pa­tro­ni pa­tro­nae: et ut ne pa­tro­ni pa­tro­nae ad­ver­sus li­ber­tos ne­que li­ber­ti ad­ver­sus pa­tro­num co­gan­tur tes­ti­mo­nium di­ce­re.

Paulus, On the Lex Julia et Papia, Book II. It is provided by the Lex Julia having reference to public prosecutions, that a man, if unwilling, cannot be compelled to give testimony in court against his father-in-law, his son-in-law, his step-father, his stepson, his cousin, whether male or female, his cousin’s child, or any of those who are related in a nearer degree. Nor can the freedman of anyone, or of his children, his parents, his or her wife or husband, be permitted to testify against him, if he is accused. The same rule applies to a patron, and a patroness, for neither of them can be compelled to give testimony against their freedman, nor a freedman against his patron.

Dig. 23,2,47Pau­lus li­bro se­cun­do ad le­gem Iu­liam et Pa­piam. Se­na­to­ris fi­lia, quae cor­po­re quaes­tum vel ar­tem lu­di­cram fe­ce­rit aut iu­di­cio pu­bli­co dam­na­ta fue­rit, im­pu­ne li­ber­ti­no nu­bit: nec enim ho­nos ei ser­va­tur, quae se in tan­tum foe­dus de­du­xit.

Paulus, On the Lex Julia et Papia, Book II. The daughter of a Senator who has lived in prostitution, or has exercised the calling of an actress, or has been convicted of a criminal offence, can marry a freedman with impunity; for she who has been guilty of such depravity is no longer worthy of honor.

Dig. 24,3,63Pau­lus li­bro se­cun­do ad le­gem Iu­liam et Pa­piam. Et de­si­nit ser­vus in do­te es­se, quia, cui ma­nu­mit­ten­di cau­sa do­na­re li­ce­ret, ei quo­dam­mo­do do­na­ret, quod per­mit­te­ret ma­nu­mit­te­re.

Paulus, On the Lex Julia et Papia, Book II. In this instance, the slave ceases to be a part of the dowry, as where anyone is permitted to donate a slave for the purpose of manumitting him, it is the same as if the slave was donated, because permission was given to manumit him.

Dig. 35,2,63Pau­lus li­bro se­cun­do ad le­gem Iu­liam et Pa­piam. Pre­tia re­rum non ex af­fec­tu nec uti­li­ta­te sin­gu­lo­rum, sed com­mu­ni­ter fun­gun­tur. nec enim qui fi­lium na­tu­ra­lem pos­si­det tan­to lo­cu­ple­tior est, quod eum, si alius pos­si­de­ret, plu­ri­mo red­emp­tu­rus fuis­set. sed nec il­le, qui fi­lium alie­num pos­si­det, tan­tum ha­bet, quan­ti eum pa­tri ven­de­re pot­est, nec ex­spec­tan­dum est, dum ven­dat, sed in prae­sen­tia, non qua fi­lius ali­cu­ius, sed qua ho­mo aes­ti­ma­tur. ea­dem cau­sa est eius ser­vi, qui no­xam no­cuit: nec enim de­lin­quen­do quis­que pre­tio­sior fit. sed nec he­redem post mor­tem tes­ta­to­ris in­sti­tu­tum ser­vum tan­to plu­ris es­se, quo plu­ris venire pot­est, Pe­dius scri­bit: est enim ab­sur­dum ip­sum me he­redem in­sti­tu­tum non es­se lo­cu­ple­tio­rem, an­te­quam ad­eam, si au­tem ser­vus he­res in­sti­tu­tus sit, sta­tim me lo­cu­ple­tio­rem ef­fec­tum, cum mul­tis cau­sis ac­ci­de­re pos­sit, ne ius­su nos­tro ad­eat: ad­quirit no­bis cer­te cum ad­ie­rit, es­se au­tem prae­pos­te­rum an­te nos lo­cu­ple­tes di­ci, quam ad­quisie­ri­mus. 1Cu­ius de­bi­tor sol­ven­do non est, tan­tum ha­bet in bo­nis, quan­tum ex­ige­re pot­est. 2Non­nul­lam ta­men pre­tio va­rie­ta­tem lo­ca tem­po­ra­que ad­fe­runt: nec enim tan­ti­dem Ro­mae et in His­pa­nia oleum aes­ti­ma­bi­tur nec con­ti­nuis ste­ri­li­ta­ti­bus tan­ti­dem, quan­ti se­cun­dis fruc­ti­bus, dum hic quo­que non ex mo­men­tis tem­po­rum nec ex ea quae ra­ro ac­ci­dat ca­ri­ta­te pre­tia con­sti­tuan­tur.

Paulus, On the Lex Julia et Papia, Book II. The value of property should be estimated, not by affection nor according to any particular advantage attaching to it, but for what it can be disposed of at an ordinary sale. For where a father is in possession of a slave who is his natural son, he is none the more wealthy because, if the slave was in the possession of another person, he would be willing to pay a larger sum to recover him than someone else. Nor will he who has possession of the natural son of another be considered to have the value of the price for which he could sell him to his father, since the prospective time of his sale ought not to be considered, but his value at present; and not the fact that he is the son of someone else, but what he is worth as a slave. The same rule applies to a slave who has caused some damage, for no one becomes any more valuable for having committed an offence. Pedius says that a slave who has been appointed an heir after the death of his master is no more valuable for the reason that he will bring more at a sale; for it is absurd to suppose that where I have been appointed an heir, I am any the richer before I accept the estate, or where my slave is appointed an heir, that I immediately become more wealthy, as there may be many reasons why he should not accept the estate by my order. It is certain that he will acquire the estate for me when he does enter upon it, but it is preposterous to assume that we become enriched thereby before we obtain the property. 1Where a debtor of the testator is not solvent, the claim is only considered to be worth what can be collected from him. 2Places and times occasionally cause a difference in the price of property, for oil does not sell at the same price in Rome that it does in Spain, nor has it the same value in continuous bad years that it has in favorable ones; hence, under such circumstances, the value of articles should not be fixed by their scarcity at certain periods, nor on account of something which rarely occurs.

Dig. 38,1,35Pau­lus li­bro se­cun­do ad le­gem Iu­liam et Pa­piam. Li­ber­ta ma­ior quin­qua­gin­ta an­nis ope­ras prae­sta­re pa­tro­no non co­gi­tur.

Paulus, On the Lex Julia et Papia, Book II. A freedwoman, who is more than fifty years of age, is not compelled to render services to her patron.

Dig. 38,1,37Pau­lus li­bro se­cun­do ad le­gem Iu­liam et Pa­piam. ‘Qui li­ber­ti­nus duos plu­res­ve a se ge­ni­tos na­tas­ve in sua po­tes­ta­te ha­be­bit prae­ter eum, qui ar­tem lu­di­cram fe­ce­rit qui­ve ope­ras suas ut cum bes­tiis pug­na­ret lo­ca­ve­rit: ne quis eo­rum ope­ras do­ni mu­ne­ris aliud­ve quic­quam li­ber­ta­tis cau­sa pa­tro­no pa­tro­nae li­be­ris­ve eo­rum, de qui­bus iu­ra­ve­rit vel pro­mi­se­rit ob­li­ga­tus­ve erit, da­re fa­ce­re prae­sta­re de­be­to’. 1Et si non eo­dem tem­po­re duo in po­tes­ta­te ha­bue­rit vel unum quin­quen­nem, li­be­ra­bi­tur ope­ra­rum ob­li­ga­tio­ne. 1aAmis­si ant­ea li­be­ri ad eas ope­ras, quae post­ea im­po­nun­tur, pro­sunt, ut Iu­lia­nus ait. 2Sed et si uno amis­so ob­li­get se, de­in­de al­ter nas­ca­tur, mul­to ma­gis Pom­po­nius ait amis­sum huic iun­gi, uti li­be­re­tur. 3Ni­hil au­tem in­ter­est, utrum ip­si pro­mit­tat pa­tro­no an eis qui in po­tes­ta­te eius sint. 4Sed si cre­di­to­ri suo li­ber­tum pa­tro­nus dele­ga­ve­rit, non pot­est idem di­ci: so­lu­tio­nis enim vi­cem con­ti­net haec dele­ga­tio. pot­est ta­men di­ci, si in id, quod pa­tro­no pro­mi­sit, alii post­ea dele­ga­tus sit, pos­se eum li­be­ra­ri ex hac le­ge: nam ve­rum est pa­tro­no eum ex­pro­mi­sis­se, quam­vis pa­tro­no nunc non de­beat: quod si ab in­itio dele­gan­te pa­tro­no li­ber­tus pro­mi­se­rit, non li­be­ra­ri eum. 5Non so­lum fu­tu­ra­rum, sed et­iam prae­ter­ita­rum ope­ra­rum li­be­ra­tio fit. 6Iu­lia­nus et­iam si iam pe­ti­tae sunt ope­rae, li­be­ris sub­la­tis ab­so­lu­tio­nem fa­cien­dam. sed si iam ope­ra­rum no­mi­ne con­dem­na­tus est, non pot­est li­be­ra­ri, quon­iam iam pe­cu­niam de­be­re coe­pit. 7Pos­tu­mus li­ber­ti he­redes pa­tris sui non li­be­rat, quod pro­fi­cis­ci li­be­ra­tio a li­ber­to de­bet nec quis­quam post mor­tem li­be­ra­ri in­tel­le­gi pot­est. ex le­ge au­tem na­ti li­be­ri pro­sunt. 8Et­iam­si in per­so­nam li­ber­ti col­la­ta li­be­ra­tio est, fi­de­ius­so­res quo­que li­be­ra­bun­tur ex sen­ten­tia le­gis: quod si li­ber­tus ex­pro­mis­so­rem de­de­rit, ni­hil hoc ca­put ei prod­erit.

Paulus, On the Lex Julia et Papia, Book II. “A freedman who has two or more male or female children under his control (exclusive of any who may have adopted the profession of buffoon, or have hired themselves to fight with wild beasts), will not be required to render their patron or patroness, or the children of the latter any services, or to make them any donation or present, or to do anything else which they have agreed to furnish, bestow, or perform, in consideration of freedom, with reference to which they have sworn, promised, or bound themselves; 1and if the said freedman should not, at the same time, have two children under his control, but only one of the age of five years, he shall be released from the obligation of performing services.” 1aJulianus says that the death of children is an advantage to a freedman, as releasing him from services subsequently imposed. 2If, after having lost a child, the freedman binds himself to render services to his patron and another child is afterwards born, Pomponius says that there is all the more reason for the child who is. dead to be joined with the living one, in order to release the freedman from liability. 3It makes no difference whether the freedman promises his services to the patron himself, or to those who are under his control. 4Ad Dig. 38,1,37,4Windscheid: Lehrbuch des Pandektenrechts, 7. Aufl. 1891, Bd. II, § 355, Note 8.If the patron should assign the services of his freedman to a creditor, the same rule cannot be said to apply; for this assignment is made instead of a payment. It may, however, be said that the freedman can be released by the above-mentioned law, if the patron has assigned the services to another, after the freedman has promised them; for it is true that he promised them to his patron, although he no longer owes them to him. But if in the beginning, the freedman should promise his services on account of the assignment of his patron, he will not be released. 5The release from the rendition of services not only has reference to those to be performed in the future, but also to such as are already due. 6Julianus says that even if suit has already been brought to compel the performance of services, a release will take place if children should be born. Where, however, a decision has been rendered for services to be performed, the freedman cannot be released, as he has begun to owe a sum of money. 7A posthumous child does not discharge the heirs of his father from liability, because the release should be derived from the freedman, and no one can be considered to be discharged after death. But children born before the death of the freedman will cause a release under the above-mentioned law. 8According to the spirit of the said law, even if the release has special reference to the person of the freedman, his sureties will also be discharged. If, however, the freedman should furnish a debtor as his substitute, this will be of no advantage to him.

Dig. 50,16,134Pau­lus li­bro se­cun­do ad le­gem Iu­liam et Pa­piam. ‘An­ni­cu­lus’ non sta­tim ut na­tus est, sed tre­cen­te­si­mo se­xa­gen­si­mo quin­to die di­ci­tur, in­ci­pien­te pla­ne, non ex­ac­to die, quia an­num ci­vi­li­ter non ad mo­men­ta tem­po­rum, sed ad dies nu­me­ra­mus.

Paulus, On the Lex Julia et Papia, Book II. A child is not considered a year old as soon as it is born, but is said to be of that age after three hundred and sixty-five days have elapsed, if the last day has begun, but is not completed; because, according to the Civil Law, we reckon the year, not by moments, but by days.

Dig. 50,16,137Pau­lus li­bro se­cun­do ad le­gem Iu­liam et Pa­piam. ‘Ter eni­xa’ vi­de­tur et­iam quae tri­ge­mi­nos pe­pe­re­rit.

Paulus, On the Lex Julia et Papia, Book II. A woman who has brought forth three children at a birth is considered to have had three parturitions.

Ex libro III

Dig. 1,7,45Pau­lus li­bro ter­tio ad le­gem Iu­liam et Pa­piam. One­ra eius, qui in ad­op­tio­nem da­tus est, ad pa­trem ad­op­ti­vum trans­fe­run­tur.

Paulus, On the Lex Julia et Papia, Book III. The liabilities of him who was given in adoption are transferred to the adoptive father.

Dig. 4,6,35Pau­lus li­bro ter­tio ad le­gem Iu­liam et Pa­piam. Qui mit­tun­tur, ut mi­li­tes du­ce­rent aut re­du­ce­rent aut le­gen­di cu­ra­rent, rei pu­bli­cae cau­sa ab­sunt. 1Hi quo­que, qui mis­si sunt ad gra­tu­lan­dum prin­ci­pi. 2Item pro­cu­ra­tor Cae­sa­ris, non so­lum cui re­rum pro­vin­ciae cu­ius­que pro­cu­ra­tio man­da­ta erit, sed et is, cui re­rum quam­vis non om­nium. ita­que plu­res ibi pro­cu­ra­to­res di­ver­sa­rum re­rum rei pu­bli­cae cau­sa ab­es­se in­tel­le­gun­tur. 3Prae­fec­tus quo­que Ae­gyp­ti rei pu­bli­cae cau­sa ab­est, qui­ve aliam ob cau­sam rei pu­bli­cae gra­tia ex­tra ur­bem ab­erit. 4Sed et in ur­ba­ni­cia­nis mi­li­ti­bus idem di­vus Pius con­sti­tuit. 5Quae­si­tum est de eo, qui ad com­pes­cen­dos ma­los ho­mi­nes mis­sus est, an rei pu­bli­cae cau­sa ab­es­set: et pla­cuit rei pu­bli­cae cau­sa eum ab­es­se. 6Item pa­ga­num, qui in ex­pe­di­tio­ne con­su­la­ris ius­su trans­ie­rat ibi­que in acie ce­ci­de­rat: he­redi enim eius suc­cur­ren­dum est. 7Qui rei pu­bli­cae cau­sa Ro­mam pro­fec­tus est, ab­es­se rei pu­bli­cae cau­sa vi­de­tur. sed et si ex­tra pa­triam suam rei pu­bli­cae cau­sa pro­fec­tus sit, et­iam, si per ur­bem ei iter com­pe­tit, rei pu­bli­cae cau­sa ab­est. 8Si­mi­li­ter qui in pro­vin­cia est, ut pri­mum aut do­mo sua pro­fec­tus est aut, cum in ea­dem pro­vin­cia de­git rei pu­bli­cae ad­mi­nis­tran­dae cau­sa, si­mul age­re rem pu­bli­cam coe­pit, ad si­mi­li­tu­di­nem ab­sen­tis ha­be­tur. 9Et dum eat in cas­tra et red­eat, rei pu­bli­cae cau­sa ab­est, quod et eun­dum sit in cas­tra mi­li­ta­tu­ro et red­eun­dum. Vi­via­nus scri­bit Pro­cu­lum re­spon­dis­se mi­li­tem, qui com­mea­tu ab­sit, dum do­mum va­dit aut red­it, rei pu­bli­cae cau­sa ab­es­se, dum do­mi sit, non ab­es­se.

Paulus, On the Lex Julia et Papia. Parties who are sent to conduct soldiers, or bring them back, or have charge of recruiting, are absent in the public service. 1This is the case also, where persons are sent for the purpose of congratulating the Emperor. 2Likewise, the Imperial Procurator, and not only he to whom is entrusted the affairs of a province, but also one who is charged with the transaction of certain business pertaining thereto, but not of all of it. Therefore, where there are several Imperial Procurators charged with different matters, they are all considered to be absent in the service of the State. 3The Prefect of Egypt is also absent in the service of the State; and also whoever, for any other reason, departs from the City on a public errand. 4The Divine Pius established the same rule with reference to the garrison of a city. 5It has been asked whether a party who is dispatched for the suppression of evil-doers, is absent in the public service, and it has been determined that he is. 6The same rule applies where a civilian joined an expedition by the command of an officer of consular rank, and was killed in battle, for relief should be granted his heir. 7A person who has repaired to Rome on business for the State, is considered to be absent in the public service. Moreover, if he should leave his own country on business for the Government, even if he has a right to pass through the city, he is absent in the service of the State. 8In like manner, where a man who is in a certain province, when he has left his home, or remains in his own province for the purpose of transacting public business, as soon as he begins to discharge his duties he is treated as a party who is absent. 9A man going to camp, as well as on his return, is absent in the service of the State; as anyone who is about to serve as a soldier must go to camp and return from it. Vivianus says that it was held by Proculus, that a soldier who is on a furlough is absent in the service of the State, while he is coming home and returning to the army, but when he is at home he is not absent.

Dig. 4,6,37Pau­lus li­bro ter­tio ad le­gem Iu­liam et Pa­piam. Hi, qui in pro­vin­cia sua ul­tra tem­pus a con­sti­tu­tio­ni­bus con­ces­sum ad­si­dent, pu­bli­ca cau­sa ab­es­se non in­tel­le­gun­tur.

Paulus, On the Lex Julia et Papia, Book III. Those who serve as assessors in their own province beyond the time prescribed by the Imperial Constitutions, are not understood to be absent on public business.

Dig. 49,15,8Pau­lus li­bro ter­tio ad le­gem Iu­liam et Pa­piam. Non ut a pa­tre fi­lius, ita uxor a ma­ri­to iu­re post­li­mi­nii re­cu­pe­ra­ri pot­est, sed tunc, cum et vo­lue­rit mu­lier et ad­huc alii post con­sti­tu­tum tem­pus nup­ta non est: quod si no­lue­rit nul­la cau­sa pro­ba­bi­li in­ter­ve­nien­te, poe­nis di­sci­dii te­ne­bi­tur.

Paulus, On the Lex Julia et Papia, Book III. A wife cannot be recovered by her husband under the right of postliminium as a son can be recovered by his father, but only when the woman desires it, and provided that she has not married another after the prescribed time. If she should be willing, and there is no legal reason to prevent it, she will be liable to the penalties of separation.

Dig. 50,16,132Pau­lus li­bro ter­tio ad le­gem Iu­liam et Pa­piam. ‘An­ni­cu­lus’ amit­ti­tur, qui ex­tre­mo an­ni die mo­ri­tur. et con­sue­tu­do lo­quen­di id ita es­se de­cla­rat: ‘an­te diem de­ci­mum ka­len­da­rum’, ‘post diem de­ci­mum ka­len­da­rum’: ne­utro enim ser­mo­ne un­de­cim dies sig­ni­fi­can­tur. 1Fal­sum est eam pe­pe­ris­se, cui mor­tuae fi­lius ex­sec­tus est.

Paulus, On the Lex Julia et Papia, Book III. Ad Dig. 50,16,132 pr.Windscheid: Lehrbuch des Pandektenrechts, 7. Aufl. 1891, Bd. I, § 103, Note 12.A child dies at the age of a year who expires on the last day of the year; and the ordinary use of language shows this to be the case when it is stated “That it died before the tenth day of the kalends,” or “after the tenth day of the kalends”; for in both instances eleven days are understood. 1It is improper to say that a woman has brought forth a child, from whom, while dead, a child was removed by the Cæsarean operation.

Dig. 50,17,208Pau­lus li­bro ter­tio ad le­gem Iu­liam et Pa­piam. Non pot­est vi­de­ri de­sis­se ha­be­re, qui num­quam ha­buit.

Paulus, On the Lex Julia et Papia, Book XIII. No one can be considered to have lost something which he never had.

Ex libro IV

Dig. 32,87Pau­lus li­bro quar­to ad le­gem Iu­liam et Pa­piam. Et fi­dei­com­mis­sum et mor­tis cau­sa do­na­tio ap­pel­la­tio­ne le­ga­ti con­ti­ne­tur.

Paulus, On the Lex Julia et Papia, Book IV. A trust, and a donation mortis causa, are included in the term legacy.

Dig. 50,16,138Idem li­bro quar­to ad le­gem Iu­liam et Pa­piam. ‘He­redi­ta­tis’ ap­pel­la­tio­ne bo­no­rum quo­que pos­ses­sio con­ti­ne­tur.

The Same, On the Lex Julia et Papia, Book IV. Prætorian possession of an estate is included in the term “inheritance.”

Ex libro V

Dig. 1,3,28Pau­lus li­bro V ad le­gem Iu­liam et Pa­piam. Sed et pos­te­rio­res le­ges ad prio­res per­ti­nent, ni­si con­tra­riae sint, id­que mul­tis ar­gu­men­tis pro­ba­tur.

Paulus, On the Lex Julia et Papia, Book V. Recent laws are applicable to former ones unless they are opposed to them; and this may be established by many reasons.

Dig. 28,5,72Pau­lus li­bro quin­to ad le­gem Iu­liam et Pa­piam. Il­lae au­tem in­sti­tu­tio­nes cap­ta­to­riae non sunt, vel­uti si ita he­redem quis in­sti­tuat: ‘qua ex par­te Ti­tius me he­redem in­sti­tuit, ex ea par­te Mae­vius he­res es­to’, quia in prae­ter­itum, non in fu­tu­rum in­sti­tu­tio col­la­ta est. 1Sed il­lud quae­ri pot­est, an idem ser­van­dum sit quod se­na­tus cen­suit, et­iam­si in aliam per­so­nam cap­tio­nem di­re­xe­rit, vel­uti si ita scrip­se­rit: ‘Ti­tius, si Mae­vium ta­bu­lis tes­ta­men­ti sui he­redem a se scrip­tum os­ten­de­rit pro­ba­ve­rit­que, he­res es­to’, quod in sen­ten­tiam se­na­tus con­sul­ti in­ci­de­re non est du­bium.

Paulus, On the Lex Julia et Papia, Book V. The following appointment does not come under the head of such as are corruptly sought after; for instance, where a testator appoints an heir as follows: “Let Mævius be my heir, to the same portion to which Titius has appointed me to his heir”; for the reason that the appointment has reference to the past and not to the future. 1It may be asked, however, whether the same rule established by the Senate should be observed where the testator attempts to secure an estate for some other person; for instance, if he should say, “Let Titius be my heir, if he can show and prove that Mævius had been appointed his heir by his will”. There is no doubt that this comes within the terms of the Decree of the Senate.

Dig. 29,2,68Pau­lus li­bro quin­to ad le­gem Iu­liam et Pa­piam. Cum so­lus ser­vus he­res in­sti­tu­tus sit, sic­ut li­cet uno tem­po­re om­nium do­mi­no­rum ius­su ad­ire he­redi­ta­tem, ita et se­pa­ra­tis tem­po­ri­bus sin­gu­lo­rum ius­su rec­te ad­it: nam quia sae­pius ad­it, non ex tes­ta­men­to, sed ex iu­re do­mi­no­rum venire uti­li­ta­tis cau­sa vi­de­tur, ne al­te­rius fes­ti­na­tio­ne al­te­rius ius lae­da­tur.

Paulus, On the Lex Julia et Papia, Book V. Where a slave is appointed sole heir, just as he is permitted, at the same time, to enter upon the estate by the order of all his masters, so also he can legally enter upon it by the order of each one of them, at different times; for, because he enters upon it frequently, he is considered to do so for the sake of convenience, and on account of the right of his masters, and not by virtue of the will, in order to prevent the right of one from being prejudiced by the undue haste of another.

Dig. 29,7,20Pau­lus li­bro quin­to ad le­gem Iu­liam et Pa­piam. Si pa­lam he­res nun­cu­pa­tus sit, le­ga­ta au­tem in ta­bu­lis col­la­ta fue­rint, Iu­lia­nus ait ta­bu­las tes­ta­men­ti non in­tel­le­gi, qui­bus he­res scrip­tus non est, et ma­gis co­di­cil­li quam tes­ta­men­tum ex­is­ti­man­dae sint: et hoc pu­to rec­tius di­ci.

Paulus, On the Lex Julia et Papia, Book V. Where an heir has been orally appointed, and the bequests of the legacies have been reduced to writing; Julianus says that this instrument should not be understood to be a will in which the heir is not mentioned, but it should rather be considered a codicil, and I think this to be the more correct opinion.

Dig. 31,49Pau­lus li­bro quin­to ad le­gem Iu­liam et Pa­piam. Mor­tuo bo­ve qui le­ga­tus est ne­que co­rium ne­que ca­ro de­be­tur. 1Si Ti­tio fru­men­ta­ria tes­se­ra le­ga­ta sit et is de­ces­se­rit, qui­dam pu­tant ex­stin­gui le­ga­tum: sed hoc non est ve­rum, nam cui tes­se­ra vel mi­li­tia le­ga­tur, aes­ti­ma­tio vi­de­tur le­ga­ta. 2La­beo re­fert agrum, cu­ius com­mer­cium non ha­bes, le­ga­ri ti­bi pos­se Tre­ba­tium re­spon­dis­se, quod me­ri­to Pris­cus Ful­ci­nius fal­sum es­se aie­bat. 3Sed Pro­cu­lus ait, si quis he­redem suum eum fun­dum, cu­ius com­mer­cium is he­res non ha­beat, da­re ius­se­rat ei, qui eius com­mer­cium ha­beat, pu­tat he­redem ob­li­ga­tum es­se, quod ve­rius est, vel in ip­sam rem, si haec in bo­nis tes­ta­to­ris fue­rit, vel si non est, in eius aes­ti­ma­tio­nem. 4Si tes­ta­tor da­ri quid ius­sis­set aut opus fie­ri aut mu­nus da­ri, pro por­tio­ne sua eos prae­sta­re, qui­bus pars he­redi­ta­tis ad­cres­ce­ret, ae­que at­que ce­te­ra le­ga­ta, pla­cet.

Paulus, On the Lex Julia et Papia, Book V. Where an ox which has been bequeathed dies, neither his hide nor his flesh will be due from the heir. 1Where a ticket calling for grain is bequeathed to Titius, and he dies, certain authorities hold that the legacy is extinguished. This, however, is not correct, for anyone to whom a ticket of this kind, or an office in the army is bequeathed, is held to be entitled to the appraised value of the same. 2Labeo states that it was the opinion of Trebatius that a tract of land which is not in commerce, so far as you are concerned, can be legally bequeathed to you; but this Priscus Fulcinius says is not true. 3Proculus, however, says that, if anyone should charge a tract of land belonging to him which is not in commerce, so far as the heir is concerned, to be delivered to someone, he thinks that the heir will be bound to either give him the property itself, if it forms part of the estate of the testator, or if it does not, to pay him the value of the same; which opinion is correct. 4Ad Dig. 31,49,4Windscheid: Lehrbuch des Pandektenrechts, 7. Aufl. 1891, Bd. II, § 299, Note 7.Where a testator directs something to be paid, or some work to be done, or some service to be performed, it is held that those to whom a part of the estate has accrued must make payment, or perform the act, in proportion to their shares, and that they are also equally liable for the payment of other legacies.

Dig. 32,88Idem li­bro quin­to ad le­gem Iu­liam et Pa­piam. La­na le­ga­ta ves­tem, quae ex ea fac­ta sit, de­be­ri non pla­cet. 1Sed et ma­te­ria le­ga­ta na­vis ar­ma­rium­ve ex ea fac­tum non vin­di­ce­tur. 2Na­ve au­tem le­ga­ta dis­so­lu­ta ne­que ma­te­ria ne­que na­vis de­be­tur. 3Mas­sa au­tem le­ga­ta scy­phi ex ea fac­ti ex­igi pos­sunt.

The Same, On the Lex Julia et Papia, Book V. It has been decided that where wool is bequeathed, a garment made out of it is not included in the legacy. 1Likewise, where material such as wood is bequeathed, a ship or a chest of drawers made out of it cannot be claimed as part of the legacy. 2Where a ship, which has been bequeathed, is broken up, neither the ship itself, nor the materials of which it is composed, will be due. 3Where, however, a mass of metal is bequeathed, any cup made out of it can be demanded.

Dig. 34,4,6Pau­lus li­bro quin­to ad le­gem Iu­liam et Pa­piam. Trans­la­tio le­ga­ti fit quat­tuor mo­dis: aut enim a per­so­na in per­so­nam trans­fer­tur: aut ab eo qui da­re ius­sus est trans­fer­tur, ut alius det: aut cum res pro re da­tur, ut pro fun­do de­cem au­rei: aut quod pu­re da­tum est, trans­fer­tur sub con­di­cio­ne. 1Sed si id, quod a Ti­tio de­di, a Mae­vio dem, quam­vis so­leant es­se duo eius­dem rei de­bi­to­res, ta­men ve­rius est hoc ca­su ad­emp­tum es­se le­ga­tum: nam cum di­co: ‘quod Ti­tium da­re dam­na­vi, Se­ius dam­nas es­to da­re’, vi­deor di­ce­re, ne Ti­tius det. 2Item si pro fun­do de­cem le­gen­tur, qui­dam pu­tant non es­se ad­emp­tum prius le­ga­tum: sed ve­rius est ad­emp­tum es­se: no­vis­si­ma enim vo­lun­tas ser­va­tur.

Paulus, On the Lex Julia et Papia, Book V. The transfer of a legacy is made in four ways. It can either be transferred by substituting one person for another; or this may be done by the party who directed it to be bestowed, so that another may give it; or where one kind of property is left instead of another, as ten aurei instead of a tract of land; or where the legacy was absolute, and it is transferred under a condition. 1If, however, I should give to Mævius what I have already given to Titius, although it is customary to hold that they are both charged with the delivery of the same property, still, the better opinion is that, in this case, the first legatee is deprived of the bequest, for where I say, “Let Seius be charged with giving what I have charged Titius to give,” I shall be considered to have said that Titius shall not deliver the property. 2Likewise, where ten aurei are bequeathed instead of a tract of land, certain authorities think that the first bequest is not revoked; but, as a matter of fact it is, for the last will is the one to be carried into effect.

Dig. 41,5,4Pau­lus li­bro quin­to ad le­gem Iu­liam et Pa­piam. Con­stat eum, qui tes­ta­men­ti fac­tio­nem ha­bet, pro he­rede usu­ca­pe­re pos­se.

Paulus, On the Lex Julia et Papia, Book V. It is established that he who has a right to make a will can, in the capacity of heir, acquire property by usucaption.

Dig. 42,5,29Pau­lus li­bro quin­to ad le­gem Iu­liam et Pa­piam. Fu­fi­dius re­fert sta­tuas in pu­bli­co po­si­tas bo­nis dis­trac­tis eius, cu­ius in ho­no­rem po­si­tae sunt, non es­se emp­to­ris bo­no­rum eius, sed aut pu­bli­cas, si or­nan­di mu­ni­ci­pii cau­sa po­si­tae sint, aut eius, cu­ius in ho­no­rem po­si­tae sint: et nul­lo mo­do eas de­tra­hi pos­se.

Paulus, On the Lex Julia, et Papia, Book V. Aufidius says that statues erected in public places for the purpose of honoring anyone whose property has been sold by his creditors cannot be acquired by a purchaser, but are public, whether they have been donated for the purpose of ornamenting the city, or remain the property of him in whose honor they have been raised, and that, under no circumstances, can they be removed.

Ex libro VI

Dig. 12,4,12Pau­lus li­bro sex­to ad le­gem Iu­liam et Pa­piam. Cum quis mor­tis cau­sa do­na­tio­nem, cum con­va­luis­set do­na­tor, con­di­cit, fruc­tus quo­que do­na­ta­rum re­rum et par­tus et quod ad­cre­vit rei do­na­tae re­pe­te­re pot­est.

Paulus, On the Lex Julia et Papia, Book VI. Where anyone brings an action for a donatio mortis causa on the recovery of the party from sickness, he can claim also the produce of the property donated, the children of female slaves, and anything else which may have accrued to the property donated.

Dig. 30,29Pau­lus li­bro sex­to ad le­gem Iu­liam et Pa­piam. sin au­tem ne­que mo­do ne­que tem­po­re ne­que con­di­cio­ne ne­que lo­co de­bi­tum dif­fe­ra­tur, in­uti­le est le­ga­tum.

Ulpianus, On the Lex Julia et Papia, Book VI. If, however, the claim is not rendered more advantageous to the creditor, either by modification, time, condition, or place, the bequest is void.

Dig. 32,89Idem li­bro sex­to ad le­gem Iu­liam et Pa­piam. Re con­iunc­ti vi­den­tur, non et­iam ver­bis, cum duo­bus se­pa­ra­tim ea­dem res le­ga­tur. item ver­bis, non et­iam re: ‘Ti­tio et Se­io fun­dum ae­quis par­ti­bus do le­go’, quon­iam sem­per par­tes ha­bent le­ga­ta­rii. prae­fer­tur igi­tur om­ni­mo­do ce­te­ris, qui et re et ver­bis con­iunc­tus est. quod si re tan­tum con­iunc­tus sit, con­stat non es­se po­tio­rem. si ve­ro ver­bis qui­dem con­iunc­tus sit, re au­tem non, quaes­tio­nis est, an con­iunc­tus po­tior sit: et ma­gis est, ut et ip­se prae­fe­ra­tur.

Ad Dig. 32,89Windscheid: Lehrbuch des Pandektenrechts, 7. Aufl. 1891, Bd. III, § 644, Note 13.The Same, On the Lex Julia et Papia, Book VI. Parties are considered joint legatees where the same article is bequeathed to them separately, by reason of the property itself, and not on account of the words employed by the testator. They are considered joint legatees on account of the words used, and not by reason of the property bequeathed, where the testator says, “I give and devise such-and-such a tract of land to Titius and Seius, share and share alike,” as both legatees have their shares from the beginning. Therefore a legatee is certainly preferred to others, where he is joined with his co-legatee both by the property left and by the terms of the bequest. If he should only be joined with him by the legacy of the property, it is established that he is not entitled to any preference. But where he is joined with him by words and not by his interest in the property, the question arises whether the other will be entitled to the preference. The better opinion is that he will be preferred.

Dig. 34,3,29Pau­lus li­bro sex­to ad le­gem Iu­liam et Pa­piam. Si is, qui duos reos pro­mit­ten­di ha­bet, dam­na­ve­rit he­redem, ut utros­que li­be­ret, si al­ter ex his ca­pe­re non pos­sit nec so­cii sint, dele­ga­ri de­be­bit is qui ni­hil ca­pit ei cui hoc com­mo­dum le­ge com­pe­tit: cu­ius pe­ti­tio­ne utrum­que ac­ci­dit, ut et hoc com­mo­dum ad eum per­ve­niat et is qui ca­pit li­be­re­tur. quod si so­cii sint, prop­ter eum qui ca­pax est et il­le ca­pit per con­se­quen­tias li­be­ra­to il­lo per ac­cep­ti­la­tio­nem: id enim eve­ni­ret, et­iam­si so­lum ca­pa­cem li­be­ra­re ius­sus es­set.

Paulus, On the Lex Julia et Papia, Book VI. Where a testator has two principal debtors, and charges his heir to release both of them, and one of them is not capable of receiving a legacy, and they are not partners; the heir should transfer his right of action from the debtor who cannot take the legacy to the one upon whom the law does confer this benefit, and by this proceeding two things will happen, that is, the one who cannot receive the legacy will participate in the benefit, and the one who can receive it, will be released. If, however, the debtors are partners, the one who is incapacitated will necessarily profit through the other who can receive the legacy, and he will be released by means of a receipt; for the same thing will happen even if the testator had directed that the only one entitled to take under the will should be released.

Dig. 35,2,65Pau­lus li­bro sex­to ad le­gem Iu­liam et Pa­piam. Si fun­dus le­ga­tus sit quin­qua­gin­ta dig­nus sub hac con­di­cio­ne, si quin­qua­gin­ta he­redi de­dis­set, ple­ri­que pu­tant uti­le es­se le­ga­tum, quia con­di­cio­nis im­plen­dae cau­sa da­tur: nam con­stat et­iam Fal­ci­diam eum pa­ti pos­se. sed si quin­qua­gin­ta au­rei le­ga­ti sint, si quin­qua­gin­ta de­dis­set, di­cen­dum in­uti­le es­se le­ga­tum et ma­gis rid­icu­lum es­se.

Paulus, On the Lex Julia et Papia, Book VI. Where a tract of land, worth fifty aurei, is devised under the condition that the party to whom it is left shall pay fifty aurei to the heir, many authorities think that the devise is valid, because the reason for complying with the condition is stated. It is established that the devise is subject to the Falcidian Law. Where, however, fifty aurei are bequeathed on condition that the legatee pays fifty to the heir, the legacy is not only void, but also ridiculous.

Dig. 36,2,24Pau­lus li­bro sex­to ad le­gem Iu­liam et Pa­piam. Si pe­num he­res da­re dam­na­tus sit vel fun­dum et, si non de­dis­set, de­cem, ego ac­ce­pi et pe­num le­ga­tam et trans­la­tam es­se in de­cem, si no­lue­rit pe­num he­res da­re, et tunc pe­cu­niam de­be­ri, cum in­ter­pel­la­tus fun­dum non de­dis­set, et, si in­ter­ea de­ces­se­rit le­ga­ta­rius, tunc he­redi eius non ni­si fun­dum de­be­ri. nam­que cum dic­tum est: ‘at Pu­bli­cius fun­dum da­to’, per­fec­tum est le­ga­tum et cum di­cit: ‘si non de­de­rit, cen­tum da­to’, sub con­di­cio­ne fun­di le­ga­tum ad­emp­tum vi­de­ri eo ca­su, quo cen­tum de­be­ri coe­pe­rint. quo­rum quia con­di­cio vi­vo le­ga­ta­rio non ex­sti­te­rit, for­te quia in­ter­pel­la­tus he­res non sit, eve­nit, ut ad­emp­tio ni­hil ege­rit fun­di­que le­ga­tum du­ra­ve­rit. 1Pla­ne si sic le­ga­tum sit: ‘si pe­num non de­de­rit, de­cem da­to’, di­ci­mus non es­se pe­num le­ga­tum.

Paulus, On the Lex Julia et Papia, Book VI. Ad Dig. 36,2,24 pr.Windscheid: Lehrbuch des Pandektenrechts, 7. Aufl. 1891, Bd. II, § 285, Note 3.Where an heir is charged with the delivery of provisions or land, and, if he should not deliver them, is required to pay ten aurei; and I have ascertained that the provisions which were the subject of the legacy have been changed into the sum of ten aurei, and if the heir refuses to deliver the provisions, the money will then be payable; and if, when notified to deliver the land, the heir does not do so, and, in the meantime he should die, his heir will not be entitled to anything but the land. For when anyone says, “Let my heir Publicius transfer such-and-such a tract of land,” the legacy is complete, and if he should add, “If he does not transfer it, let him pay a hundred aurei,” the legatee seems to have been deprived of the devise of the land on condition that the hundred aurei will begin to be due; and if the condition should not be fulfilled during the lifetime of the legatee, for instance, because no demand was made upon the heir, the result will be that the deprivation of the legacy will be of no force or effect, and the devise of the land will remain. 1When a bequest is made as follows, “If my heir should not furnish the provisions, let him pay ten aurei,” we hold that it is clear that no provisions have been bequeathed.

Dig. 39,6,35Pau­lus li­bro sex­to ad le­gem Iu­liam et Pa­piam. Se­na­tus cen­suit pla­ce­re mor­tis cau­sa do­na­tio­nes fac­tas in eos, quos lex pro­hi­bet ca­pe­re, in ea­dem cau­sa ha­be­ri, in qua es­sent, quae tes­ta­men­to his le­ga­ta es­sent, qui­bus ca­pe­re per le­gem non li­ce­ret. ex hoc se­na­tus con­sul­to mul­tae va­riae­que quaes­tio­nes agi­tan­tur, de qui­bus pau­ca re­fe­ra­mus. 1Do­na­tio dic­ta est a do­no qua­si do­no da­tum, rap­ta a Grae­co: nam hi di­cunt δῶρον καὶ δωρεῖσθαι. 2Sed mor­tis cau­sa do­na­tio lon­ge dif­fert ab il­la ve­ra et ab­so­lu­ta do­na­tio­ne, quae ita pro­fi­cis­ci­tur, ut nul­lo ca­su re­vo­ce­tur. et ibi qui do­nat il­lum po­tius quam se ha­be­re ma­vult: at is, qui mor­tis cau­sa do­nat, se co­gi­tat at­que amo­re vi­tae re­ce­pis­se po­tius quam de­dis­se ma­vult: et hoc est, qua­re vul­go di­ca­tur: ‘se po­tius ha­be­re vult, quam eum cui do­nat, il­lum de­in­de po­tius quam he­redem suum’. 3Er­go qui mor­tis cau­sa do­nat, qua par­te se co­gi­tat, neg­otium ge­rit, sci­li­cet ut, cum con­va­lue­rit, red­da­tur si­bi: nec du­bi­ta­ve­runt Cas­sia­ni, quin con­dic­tio­ne re­pe­ti pos­sit qua­si re non se­cu­ta prop­ter hanc ra­tio­nem, quod ea quae dan­tur aut ita dan­tur, ut ali­quid fa­cias, aut ut ego ali­quid fa­ciam, aut ut Lu­cius Ti­tius, aut ut ali­quid op­tin­gat, et in is­tis con­dic­tio se­qui­tur. 4Mor­tis cau­sa do­na­tio fit mul­tis mo­dis: alias ex­tra su­spi­cio­nem ul­lius pe­ri­cu­li a sa­no et in bo­na va­le­tu­di­ne po­si­to et cui ex hu­ma­na sor­te mor­tis co­gi­ta­tio est: alias ex me­tu mor­tis aut ex prae­sen­ti pe­ri­cu­lo aut ex fu­tu­ro, si qui­dem ter­ra ma­ri­que, tam in pa­ce quam in bel­lo et tam do­mi quam mi­li­tiae mul­tis ge­ne­ri­bus mor­tis pe­ri­cu­lum me­tui pot­est. nam et sic pot­est do­na­ri, ut om­ni­mo­do ex ea va­le­tu­di­ne do­na­to­re mor­tuo res non red­da­tur, et ut red­da­tur, et­iam­si prior ex ea­dem va­le­tu­di­ne de­ces­se­rit, si ta­men mu­ta­ta vo­lun­ta­te re­sti­tui si­bi vo­lue­rit. et sic do­na­ri pot­est, ut non ali­ter red­da­tur, quam si prior il­le qui ac­ce­pit de­ces­se­rit. sic quo­que pot­est do­na­ri mor­tis cau­sa, ut nul­lo ca­su sit re­pe­ti­tio, id est ne si con­va­lue­rit qui­dem do­na­tor. 5Si quis so­cie­ta­tem per do­na­tio­nem mor­tis cau­sa in­ie­rit, di­cen­dum est nul­lam so­cie­ta­tem es­se. 6Si duo­bus de­bi­to­ri­bus mor­tis cau­sa do­na­tu­rus cre­di­tor uni ac­cep­tum tu­lit et con­va­lue­rit, eli­ge­re pot­est, utri eo­rum con­di­cat. 7Sed qui mor­tis cau­sa in an­nos sin­gu­los pe­cu­niam sti­pu­la­tus est, non est si­mi­lis ei, cui in an­nos sin­gu­los le­ga­tum est: nam li­cet mul­ta es­sent le­ga­ta, sti­pu­la­tio ta­men una est et con­di­cio eius cui ex­pro­mis­sum est se­mel in­tuen­da est.

Paulus, On the Lex Julia et Papia, Book VI. The Senate decreed that where donations mortis causa were made to those whom the law forbade to receive them, they are in the same position as persons to whom legacies are bequeathed by will, and who are not permitted by law to accept them. A great variety of questions have arisen under this Decree of the Senate, a few of which we shall mention. 1The word “donation” is derived from donum, meaning “presented with a gift.” It is taken from the Greek, for the Greeks say dwron kai dwreisvai, that is to say, “a gift and to give.” 2A donation mortis causa, however, differs greatly from a genuine and absolute gift, which is made in such a way that it can, under no circumstances, be revoked; and where he who makes it would rather that the donee should have the property than he himself. On the other hand, he who makes a donation mortis causa thinks of himself and, through his love of life, prefers to keep the property, rather than to give it away. This is the reason why it is commonly said that the donor would rather have the property than allow him to whom he gives it to have it, but that he would rather that he should have it, than that it should pass to his heir. 3Therefore, he who makes a donation mortis causa, so far as his thoughts of himself are concerned, concludes a business transaction; that is to say, he imposes the condition that the property shall be returned to him if he is restored to health. The followers of Cassius entertained no doubt that the property could be recovered, as in the case of an unfinished transaction; for the reason that, where anything is given, it is done either that you may perform some act, or that I may perform one, or that Lucius Titius may do so, or in case some event takes place; and in all these instances, the property may be recovered by an action. 4A donation mortis causa is made in several different ways. Sometimes it is made by a man who is well and has no anticipation of immediate death, who enjoys excellent health, but who reflects that man is liable to die. Sometimes it is made through the fear of death, either on account of present or future danger. For the danger of death may be apprehended on land and sea, in peace and in war, at home as well as in the army. A donation may also be made under the condition that if the donor should die of his illness, the property shall not, under any circumstances, be returned; or that it shall be returned if he should change his mind, and desire it to be restored to him, even before he died of the same illness. A donation can also be made under the condition that it shall not be returned unless the person entitled to it dies before the donor. A donation mortis causa can also be made in such a way that it cannot be recovered in any event, that is, not even if the donor should recover his health. 5If anyone should form a partnership with another for the purpose of making a donation mortis causa, it must be said that the partnership is void. 6When a creditor wishes to make a donation mortis causa to two of his debtors, of what they owe him, and releases one of them from liability, and regains his health, he can sue either one of them that he may select. 7He who stipulates for the payment of a sum of money annually as a donation mortis causa does not resemble the person to whom a legacy, payable annually, has been bequeathed; for although there are many legacies, still there is only one stipulation, and the status of him to whom the promise was made must always be considered.

Dig. 50,16,140Pau­lus li­bro sex­to ad le­gem Iu­liam et Pa­piam. ‘Ce­pis­se’ quis in­tel­le­gi­tur, quam­vis alii ad­quisiit.

Paulus, On the Lex Julia et Papia, Book VI. A man is understood to have acquired something, even though he may have acquired it for another.

Dig. 50,16,142Pau­lus li­bro sex­to ad le­gem Iu­liam et Pa­piam. Tri­pli­ci mo­do con­iunc­tio in­tel­le­gi­tur: aut enim re per se con­iunc­tio con­tin­git, aut re et ver­bis, aut ver­bis tan­tum. nec du­bium est, quin con­iunc­ti sint, quos et no­mi­num et rei com­ple­xus iun­git, vel­uti ‘Ti­tius et Mae­vius ex par­te di­mi­dia he­redes sun­to’, vel ita ‘Ti­tius Mae­vius­que he­redes sun­to’, vel ‘Ti­tius cum Mae­vio ex par­te di­mi­dia he­redes sun­to’. vi­dea­mus au­tem, ne et­iam si hos ar­ti­cu­los de­tra­has ‘et’ ‘que’ ‘cum’, in­ter­dum ta­men con­iunc­tos ac­ci­pi opor­teat, vel­uti ‘Lu­cius Ti­tius, Pu­blius Mae­vius ex par­te di­mi­dia he­redes sun­to’, vel ita ‘Pu­blius Mae­vius, Lu­cius Ti­tius he­redes sun­to. Sem­pro­nius ex par­te di­mi­dia he­res es­to’, ut Ti­tius et Mae­vius ve­niant in par­tem di­mi­diam et re et ver­bis con­iunc­ti vi­dean­tur. ‘Lu­cius Ti­tius ex par­te di­mi­dia he­res es­to. Se­ius ex par­te, qua Lu­cium Ti­tium he­redem in­sti­tui, he­res es­to. Sem­pro­nius ex par­te di­mi­dia he­res es­to’. Iu­lia­nus du­bi­ta­ri pos­se, tres sem­is­ses fac­ti sint an Ti­tius in eun­dem sem­is­sem cum Gaio Se­io in­sti­tu­tus sit. sed eo, quod Sem­pro­nius quo­que ex par­te di­mi­dia scrip­tus est, ve­ri­si­mi­lius es­se in eun­dem sem­is­sem duos co­ac­tos et con­iunc­tim he­redes scrip­tos es­se.

Paulus, On the Lex Julia et Papia, Book VI. A joinder of heirs can take place in three different ways, for it can either be made by means of the property itself; or by means of the property and words contained in the will; or by the words alone. There is no doubt that those are joined who are connected by both their names and by the property; for example, “Let Titius and Mævius be heirs to half my estate;” or “Let Titius and Mævius be my heirs;” or “Let Titius, with Mævius, be heirs to half of my estate.” Let us see, however, if we omit the particles “and” “and with,” whether the parties can be considered to be joined, for instance: “Let Lucius Titius, Publius Mævius be heirs to half of my estate,” or, “Let Publius Mævius, Lucius Titius, be my heirs; let Sempronius be the heir to half my estate.” As Titius and Mævius are entitled to half of the estate, they are understood to be joined with reference to the property, and the terms of the will. “Let Lucius Titius be heir to half of my estate; let Seius be the heir to the same share to which I have appointed Lucius Titius; let Sempronius be the heir to half of my estate.” Julianus says that a doubt may arise as to whether the estate was divided into three parts, or whether Titius was appointed heir to the same share as Gaius Seius. But, for the reason that Sempronius was also appointed an heir to half the estate, it is more probable that the two others were to share the same half and were made heirs conjointly.

Ex libro VII

Dig. 32,90Idem li­bro sep­ti­mo ad le­gem Iu­liam et Pa­piam. No­mi­na­tim le­ga­tum ac­ci­pien­dum est, quod a quo le­ga­tum sit in­tel­le­gi­tur, li­cet no­men pro­nun­tia­tum non sit.

The Same, On the Lex Julia et Papia, Book VII. A legacy is understood to have been specifically bequeathed where the party who is charged with it is known, even though his name may not be stated.

Dig. 33,2,21Pau­lus li­bro sep­ti­mo ad le­gem Iu­liam et Pa­piam. Ti­tio usus fruc­tus Sti­chi aut, si na­vis ex Asia ve­ne­rit, de­cem le­ga­ta sunt. non pe­tet usum fruc­tum, an­te­quam con­di­cio de­cem ex­is­tat vel de­fi­ciat, ne po­tes­tas he­redi utrum ve­lit dan­di au­fe­ra­tur.

Paulus, On the Lex Julia et Papia, Book VII. “I bequeath to Titius the usufruct of Stichus,” or, “if a ship should come from Asia, I bequeath the sum of ten aurei.” The legatee cannot demand the usufruct before the condition relating to the ten aurei is fulfilled, or has failed, in order that the heir may not be deprived of the power of giving whichever he chooses.

Dig. 35,1,60Pau­lus li­bro sep­ti­mo ad le­gem Iu­liam et Pa­piam. In fac­to con­sis­ten­tes con­di­cio­nes va­rie­ta­tem ha­bent et qua­si tri­per­ti­tam re­ci­piunt di­vi­sio­nem, ut quid de­tur, ut quid fiat, ut quid op­tin­gat, vel re­tro ne de­tur, ne fiat, ne op­tin­gat. ex his dan­di fa­cien­di­que con­di­cio­nes in per­so­nas col­lo­can­tur aut ip­so­rum, qui­bus quid re­lin­qui­tur, aut alio­rum: ter­tia spe­cies in even­tu po­ne­tur. 1Fis­cus iis­dem con­di­cio­ni­bus pa­re­re de­bet, qui­bus per­so­na, a qua ad ip­sum quod re­lic­tum est per­ve­nit, sic­ut et­iam cum suo one­re hoc ip­sum vin­di­cat.

Paulus, On the Lex Julia et Papia, Book VII. Conditions relating to acts are of different kinds, and are susceptible, as it were, of a threefold division, that is to say where something must be given, or something must be done, or something must occur; or, on the other hand, where something must not be given, or not be done, or not occur. The conditions of giving something or of performing some act have reference either to those to whom a bequest was made, or to others; the third class depends upon some event taking place. 1The Treasury is obliged to comply witli the same conditions by which the person from whom the Treasury obtained possession of the property was bound; just as it can also claim the property which is the subject of the legacy, with any burdens attaching to the same.

Dig. 35,3,7Pau­lus li­bro sep­ti­mo ad le­gem Iu­liam et Pa­piam. Di­vus Pius ab eo, qui an­nua le­ga­ta prae­ci­pe­re ad dis­tri­buen­dum ius­sus erat, ve­tuit cau­tio­nem ex­igi ces­san­tium par­tes red­di, ni­si aper­te ca­ve­re ius­sus es­set.

Paulus, On the Lex Julia et Papia, Book VII. The Divine Pius forbade security from being exacted from a person who was directed to oversee the distribution of certain annual legacies, requiring him to return to the heir the shares of those who failed to accept them, unless he was expressly ordered to do so by the testator.

Dig. 49,14,13Pau­lus li­bro sep­ti­mo ad le­gem Iu­liam et Pa­piam. Edic­to di­vi Tra­ia­ni, quod pro­pos­ui, sig­ni­fi­ca­tur, ut, si quis, an­te­quam cau­sa eius ad ae­ra­rium de­fe­ra­tur, pro­fes­sus es­set eam rem quam pos­si­de­ret ca­pe­re si­bi non li­ce­re, ex ea par­tem fis­co in­fer­ret, par­tem ip­se re­ti­ne­ret. 1Idem post­ea edic­to sig­ni­fi­ca­vit, ut, quae­cum­que pro­fes­sa es­set vel pa­lam vel ta­ci­te re­lic­tum si­bi quod ca­pe­re non pos­set et pro­bas­set iam id ad fis­cum per­ti­ne­re: et­iam­si id non pos­si­de­ret, ex eo, quod red­ac­tum es­set a prae­fec­tis ae­ra­rio, par­tem di­mi­diam fe­rat. 2Ni­hil au­tem in­ter­est, quae cau­sa im­pe­diat ius ca­pien­di. 3Id au­tem de­fer­ri de­bet, quod la­tet, non id quod fis­ci est. 4Ad he­redes eius, qui se de­tu­le­rat, non vi­de­ba­tur prae­mium trans­ire: sed di­vus Ha­d­ria­nus re­scrip­sit, ut, li­cet an­te de­ces­sis­set is qui se de­tu­le­rat, an­te­quam id quod de­tu­le­rat fis­co ad­di­ce­re­tur, he­redi eius prae­mium da­re­tur. 5Ex­stat eius­dem Ha­d­ria­ni epis­tu­la, ut, si is qui se de­fer­re pot­erat mor­te prae­ven­tus fue­rit, he­res eius, si de­tu­le­rit, prae­mium con­se­qua­tur: ‘si ta­men’, in­quit, ‘li­que­bit de­func­tum eius ani­mi fuis­se, ut se vel­let de­fer­re’: si ve­ro id­cir­co dis­si­mu­la­ve­rit, dum rem oc­cul­ta­ri spe­rat, he­redem eius ul­tra vul­ga­re prae­mium ni­hil con­se­cu­tu­rum. 6Item di­vi fra­tres re­scrip­se­runt he­redes eo­rum, qui­bus ta­ci­tum fi­dei­com­mis­sum re­lic­tum est, ita de­mum ex be­ne­fi­cio Tra­ia­ni de­fer­re se pos­se, si is, cui da­tum fue­rat, mor­te prae­ven­tus es­set et id­eo per an­gus­tias tem­po­ris de­fer­re se non po­tue­rit. 7Cum an­te aper­tum tes­ta­men­tum ta­ci­tum fi­dei­com­mis­sum nun­tia­tum es­set ab his, qui fi­dem ta­ci­tam sus­ce­pe­runt, de­in­de post aper­tas a fi­dei­com­mis­sa­rio de­la­tum es­set, di­vus An­to­ni­nus re­ci­pi pro­fes­sio­nem eius ius­sit: ne­que enim dig­nam es­se prae­mio tam prae­ci­pi­tem fes­ti­na­tio­nem prio­ris, et cum quis se nun­tiet non ca­pe­re, po­tius con­fi­te­ri de suo iu­re quam aliud de­fer­re vi­de­tur. 8Ad eos be­ne­fi­cium Tra­ia­ni per­ti­net, qui ex de­func­ti vo­lun­ta­te re­lic­tum si­bi ca­pe­re non pos­sunt. er­go nec il­lud, quod ser­vo meo re­lic­tum est, de­fer­re pot­ero. 9Eos, qui qua­si in­dig­ni re­pel­lun­tur, sum­mo­ven­dos es­se ab eius­mo­di prae­mio: id est eos, qui de in­of­fi­cio­so ege­runt vel fal­sum di­xe­runt tes­ta­men­tum, qui us­que ad fi­nem li­tis ob­pug­na­ve­runt tes­ta­men­tum. 10Ei, qui per er­ro­rem se de­tu­lit, cum ca­pe­re so­li­dum pos­set, non no­ce­re hoc di­vus Ha­d­ria­nus et di­vus Pius et fra­tres re­scrip­se­runt.

Paulus, On the Lex Julia et Papia, Book VII. By the Edict of the Divine Trajan, which I have cited, it is decided that if anyone, before information of his case was given to the Treasury, should declare that he had no right to retain the property in his possession, he could surrender half of it to the Treasury, and retain the other half for himself. 1The same Emperor afterwards determined by an Edict that where any woman stated, either publicly or privately, that a legacy had been bequeathed to her which she had no right to receive, and proved that it belonged to the Treasury, even if she did not have possession of the property, she would be entitled to half of what could be recovered by the Prefect of the Treasury. 2It makes no difference what the reason was which interfered with the right of receiving the legacy. 3Property which is concealed should be denounced, and not that which is in possession of the Treasury. 4The reward of a person who has denounced himself is not considered to pass to his heirs; but the Divine Hadrian stated in a Rescript that even if he who denounced himself should die before the property of which he gave notice was seized by the Treasury, the reward should be given to his heir. 5A letter of the same Hadrian is extant which says that if he who could have denounced himself was prevented from doing so by death, and his heir gives the information, he will obtain the reward; provided that it is clear that the deceased had the intention of denouncing himself, but if he dissimulated because he expected to conceal the property, his heir will be entitled to nothing but the ordinary reward. 6The Divine Brothers also stated in a Rescript that the heirs of those to whom an implied trust had been left could denounce themselves by the privilege of Trajan, if he to whom it had been granted was surprised by death, and was not able to denounce himself for want of time. 7When an implied trust was denounced before a will was opened by those who had undertaken to execute it, and then, after the will had been opened, it was again denounced by the beneficiary of the trust, the Divine Antoninus ordered the statement of the latter to be received, on the ground that the exceeding haste of the first informers was unworthy of reward; and as the beneficiary declared that he could not receive it, he appeared rather to make a disclosure with reference to his own right than to denounce another. 8The privilege of Trajan has reference to those who cannot take what is left to them by the will of the deceased. Therefore I cannot denounce what has been left to me by my slave. 9Those who are rejected as unworthy should be barred from claiming a reward of this kind; for instance, those who have proceeded against a will on the ground of its being inofficious, or have alleged that a will is forged, and have attacked its validity until the case was terminated. 10The Divine Hadrian and the Divine Pius stated in Rescripts that anyone who denounced himself by mistake, when he was entitled to receive the entire amount bequeathed to him, was not prejudiced by doing so.

Ex libro VIII

Dig. 37,14,15Pau­lus li­bro oc­ta­vo ad le­gem Iu­liam et Pa­piam. Qui con­tra le­gem Ae­liam Sen­tiam ad iu­ran­dum li­ber­tum ad­egit, ni­hil iu­ris ha­bet nec ip­se nec li­be­ri eius.

Paulus, On the Lex Julia et Papia, Book VIII. Anyone who compels his freedman to be sworn contrary to the Lex Ælia Sentia will neither himself nor his children have any rights over the freedman.

Ex libro IX

Dig. 40,10,5Pau­lus li­bro no­no ad le­gem Iu­liam et Pa­piam. Is, qui ius anu­lo­rum im­pe­tra­vit, ut in­ge­nuus ha­be­tur, quam­vis in he­redi­ta­te eius pa­tro­nus non ex­clu­da­tur.

Paulus, On the Lex Julia et Papia, Book IX. He who has obtained the right to wear a gold ring is considered as having been freeborn; even though his patron may not have been excluded from his succession.

Ex libro X

Dig. 38,5,13Pau­lus li­bro de­ci­mo ad le­gem Iu­liam et Pa­piam. Con­sti­tu­tio­ne di­vi Pii ca­ve­tur de im­pu­be­re ad­op­tan­do, ut ex bo­nis, quae mor­tis tem­po­re il­lius qui ad­op­ta­vit fue­runt, pars quar­ta ad eum per­ti­neat, qui ad­op­ta­tus est: sed et bo­na ei, quae ad­quisiit pa­tri, re­sti­tui ius­sit: si cau­sa co­gni­ta em­an­ci­pa­tus fue­rit, quar­tam per­dit. si quid ita­que in frau­dem eius alie­na­tum fue­rit, qua­si per Cal­vi­sia­nam vel Fa­via­nam ac­tio­nem re­vo­can­dum est.

Paulus, On the Lex Julia et Papia, Book X. It is provided by a Constitution of the Divine Pius, which has reference to the adoption of minors under the age of puberty, that, out of the property which the adoptive father possessed at the time of his death, a fourth shall belong to the child who was adopted. The Emperor also ordered any property which he had obtained from his adoptive father to be given him, and if he should be emancipated after proper cause was shown, he will lose his fourth. Therefore, where property has been alienated for the purpose of defrauding the child, it can be recovered by an action resembling the Calvisian or Favian Action.

Dig. 50,16,144Pau­lus li­bro de­ci­mo ad le­gem Iu­liam et Pa­piam. Li­bro me­mo­ria­lium Mas­su­rius scri­bit ‘pel­li­cem’ apud an­ti­quos eam ha­bi­tam, quae, cum uxor non es­set, cum ali­quo ta­men vi­ve­bat: quam nunc ve­ro no­mi­ne ami­cam, pau­lo ho­nes­tio­re con­cu­bi­nam ap­pel­la­ri. gra­nius Flac­cus in li­bro de iu­re Pa­pi­ria­no scri­bit pel­li­cem nunc vol­go vo­ca­ri, quae cum eo, cui uxor sit, cor­pus mis­ceat: quos­dam eam, quae uxo­ris lo­co si­ne nup­tiis in do­mo sit, quam παλλακὴν Grae­ci vo­cant.

Paulus, On the Lex Julia et Papia, Book X. Massurius stated in his Book on Memorials that a mistress was considered by the ancients to be a woman who lived with a man without being his wife, and who is now known by the name of friend, or by the slightly more honorable appellation, concubine. Granius Flaccus, in his Book on the Papirian Law, says that the word “mistress” means a woman who cohabits with a man who has a wife; and others hold one is meant who lives in his house, as his wife, without being married to him, and whom the Greeks call pallakyn.

Ex libro XII

Dig. 25,7,2Pau­lus li­bro duo­de­ci­mo ad le­gem Iu­liam et Pa­piam. Si pa­tro­nus li­ber­tam con­cu­bi­nam ha­bens fu­re­re coe­pe­rit, in con­cu­bi­na­tu eam es­se hu­ma­nius di­ci­tur.

Paulus, On the Lex Julia et Papia, Book XII. Where a patron, who has a freedwoman as his concubine, becomes insane, it is more equitable to hold that she remains in concubinage.