Fideicommissorum libri
Ex libro I
Paulus, Trusts, Book I. Even if I should charge my heir with a trust as follows, “I ask you, Lucius Titius, to charge your heir to pay ten aurei to Mævius,” the trust will be valid; provided that, after the death of Titius, its execution can be demanded from his heir. This opinion was also held by Julianus. 1A trust cannot, however, be created as follows, “If Stichus should become the property of Seius, and should enter upon my estate by his order, I ask Seius to pay such-and-such a sum,” since anyone who obtains an estate through chance, and not by the will of the testator, or acquires a legacy under such circumstances, ought not to be burdened with the obligation of a trust; and the principle should not be adopted that you can bind anyone by a request of this kind when you give him nothing.
Paulus, Trusts, Book I. If a legatee, who has been charged with a trust, claims the legacy, he can only be compelled to pay to the beneficiary of the trust as much as will be required by the judge; or, if the judge does not compel him to pay anything, he must assign him his right of action; for it is unjust that he should sustain the risk attending a lawsuit, if the case should be lost through no fault of the legatee. 1A slave of the heir cannot be charged with a trust, unless the latter is requested to manumit the slave. 2Where a testator provided that any of his estate which might come into his father’s hands should be given to his daughter, so that, in this way, she would have more than she would otherwise obtain from her father’s estate, the Divine Pius stated in a Rescript that it was evident that the testator intended that the delivery of the property should be made after the death of the father.
Ex libro II
Paulus, Trusts, Book II. When I am charged with a trust or a legacy for your benefit, and you are requested after a certain time to deliver the same to me, I do not think that this should be subject to the operation of the Falcidian Law, because I shall begin to receive the property subsequently as the beneficiary of a trust.
Paulus, Trusts, Book II. Where anyone is appointed an heir under the condition that his coheir will enter upon the estate, he can avail himself of the benefit of the Falcidian Law, even if his co-heir should enter upon the estate under compulsion; provided that he himself is not compelled to do so. 1Julianus says that under this Decree of the Senate an estate can be transferred to the agent of an absent beneficiary of the trust, if he should desire this to be done; provided, however, that he gives security to ratify the act, if the wishes of the absent party were not known. But it must be said that, if the heir alleges that he suspects the estate of being insolvent, he should not be compelled to accept it, if it is uncertain whether the beneficiary directed this to be done; even though a bond should be furnished, on account of the weakness of the security. If, however, he should enter upon the estate voluntarily, no great injury can result, but, if the beneficiary did not authorize it, the rights of action will not pass to him until he has ratified the transfer of the estate. 2If some wrong has been committed against a slave belonging to the estate, although an action will lie in favor of the heir on account of the said slave, still, the right of action under the Aquilian Law will not pass to the beneficiary of the trust, for only those rights pass which were included in the property of the deceased. 3If a Deputy is compelled to enter upon and transfer an estate at Rome, the beneficiary of the trust will be compelled to defend actions at Rome, although the heir is not compelled to do so. 4It is well to consider whether the beneficiary of the trust should be sued in the same place where the deceased ought to have been sued, and if the heir entered upon the estate voluntarily and transferred it, whether the beneficiary of the trust can make his defence in any one of three different places, namely, where the deceased was domiciled, or where the heir, or he himself, resides. Therefore, it must be held that the beneficiary of the trust should be sued either where he has his domicile, or where the greater part of the estate which was transferred is situated.
Ex libro III
Paulus, Trusts, Book III. Where the slave himself has not been bequeathed, but a sum of money has, and the legatee is asked to manumit his slave, he will be subject to the operation of the Falcidian Law, and will, nevertheless, be compelled to manumit him; because his slave is considered to be worth as much as the sum bequeathed. 1But what if the slave should belong to another? In this instance he cannot be compelled to pay more for him than he received. 2If, however, the heir is charged to manumit the slave, it has been decided that the value of the latter should be deducted as a debt of the estate. 3Where a slave alone is bequeathed, and presented with his freedom, under a trust, although the Falcidian Law will apply, the legatee can claim or recover the entire slave, and even if the legatee should have received something in addition to the slave, the entire slave can still be demanded, but the fourth part of each legacy shall be retained, in order that the grant of freedom may take effect. 4Where it is uncertain whether freedom should be granted or not, for instance, because it was bequeathed under some condition, or to take effect after a certain time, and while the uncertainty exists whether it should be bestowed or not, should the application of the Falcidian Law be permitted, as, in the meantime, the slave may either die, or the condition fail of fulfilment? When the slave is entitled to his freedom, or it is due, can the legatee claim that portion which was deducted on account of the Falcidian Law? It was held by Cæcilius that if the heir, during the intervening time, had gained anything through the services of the slave, he should include it in the value of the latter in deducting the Falcidian portion.
Paulus, Trusts, Book III. If the heir who sold the slave should die without leaving an heir, and the purchaser should be living, and the slave should desire to become the freedman of the deceased, and not that of the purchaser, Valens decided that he ought not to be heard, for fear that the purchaser might lose both the price which he had paid and his rights over the freedman as well.
Paulus, Trusts, Book III. Where a slave is alienated after he has been placed in such a position that he ought to be liberated under the terms of a trust, the person to whom he belongs in the meantime will be compelled to manumit him. In this case, however, no distinction is made as to whether there is a good cause for his absence or not, for, in any event, he will be entitled to his freedom.
Paulus, Trusts, Book III. Freedom can be granted under a trust to a slave belonging to another, provided he has testamentary capacity with reference to his master. 1Where a person about to die intestate charged his son to manumit a certain slave, and a posthumous child was afterwards born to him, the Divine Fathers stated in a Rescript that, because the slave could not be divided, he should be manumitted by both the heir at law and the posthumous child. 2A person who is charged with a grant of freedom under a trust can manumit a slave, even at the time when he is forbidden to alienate him. 3If a patron acquires prætorian possession contrary to the provisions of the will, because his freedman has passed him over, he cannot be compelled to sell his own slave whom he was requested by his freedmen to manumit. 4Where the person to whom a slave belongs is unwilling to sell him in order that he may be manumitted, the Prætor has no cause to interfere. The same rule applies when he wishes to sell him for more than a just price. If, however, the master is ready to sell his slave for a certain sum which, at the first glance, does not appear to be unjust, and he who was asked to manumit him contends that the price is unreasonable, the Prætor should interpose his authority, so that a just price having been paid with the consent of the master freedom may be granted to the slave by the purchaser. If, however, the master is willing to sell the slave, and the latter desires to be manumitted, the heir should be compelled to purchase and manumit him; unless the master wished to manumit the slave in order that an action might be granted him against the heir to recover the price. The same should be done if the heir conceals himself. The Emperor Antoninus, also, stated this in a Rescript.
Paulus, Trusts, Book III. Where the son of the deceased is asked to manumit a slave belonging to his father, it must be said that he can have him as his freedman under the Prætorian Edict, and impose services upon him; for he can do this as the son of the patron, even if the slave should obtain his freedom directly. 1There will be ground for the application of the Rubrian Decree of the Senate even when freedom is granted under a condition, provided compliance with the condition is not imposed upon the slave himself. Nor does it make any difference whether the condition consists of giving or doing something, or is dependent upon the occurrence of any other event, for the heir will lose his freedom as the son of the deceased if he places any obstacle in the way of the fulfillment of the condition, even though he can acquire his right over the freedman in another way. Sometimes he suffers a penalty, for if he demands that the slave shall remain in servitude, or accuses him of a capital crime, he will lose prætorian possession contrary to the provisions of the will. 2Where a slave is bequeathed to anyone who is charged to manumit him, but refuses to accept him, he can be compelled to do so, or to assign his rights of action to whomever the slave may select, in order that the grant of freedom may not be annulled.