Paulus, On the Edict, Book LXIII. If I owe you Stichus under the terms of a stipulation, and I do not deliver him, and you obtain possession of him in some other way, you are a depredator. Likewise, if I should sell you any property and do not deliver it, and you obtain possession of the same without my consent, you will not do so as a purchaser, but as a depredator.

Paulus, On the Edict, Book LXIII. There are double and single interdicts. The interdict Uti possidetis is an instance of a double one. Exhibitory and restitutory interdicts are single, and there are also prohibitory interdicts, as for instance, those De arboribus cædendis and De itinere actuque. 1Moreover, interdicts will lie in favor either of persons, or for the purpose of upholding the Divine Law, and protecting places which are religious; for example, to prevent any act being committed in a sacred place, or to compel matters to be restored to their former condition, where anything has been done; which includes the interdict having reference to burials and the construction of tombs. Those which have been established in favor of persons either have reference to the common welfare, the maintenance of the rights of individuals, the discharge of official duty, or the preservation of private property. The interdict granting the use of public highways and public rivers, and prohibiting any obstruction from being placed upon a highway is an instance of one instituted for the common welfare; the interdicts to compel the production of children and freedmen in court are examples of those established for the protection of private rights. The interdict requiring the production of a freeman in court is an example of one to compel the performance of an official duty. Other interdicts are granted for the protection of property. 2Some interdicts include the pursuit of property, as, for instance, the one which has reference to private rights of way, for by proceedings under this interdict the title to property is involved. Interdicts which refer to sacred and religious places also embrace, to a certain extent, the title to property. That which has reference to the production of children in court, and which we have stated has for its object the maintenance of private rights, is also of this description, so that it is not strange that interdicts relating to private property include the title to it and not the right to its mere possession. 3Those interdicts which have reference to private property are instituted either for the purpose of acquiring, recovering, or retaining possession. Interdicts to obtain possession are such as are available by parties who have not hitherto acquired it; and an example of these is the interdict Quorum bonorum. The Salvian Edict which relates to pledges is one of this kind, and is as follows: “I forbid violence to be employed to prevent the purchaser from using a right of way which was used by the vendor.” Interdicts for the recovery of possession are mentioned under the title, “Unde vi,” for there are certain interdicts which are classed under this head. The interdict, “Uti possidetis,” is an instance of one of those issued for the purpose of retaining possession. As we have previously stated there are also interdicts which are double; these are for the purpose of both recovering and retaining possession.

Paulus, On the Edict, Book LXIII. The case is different if anything has afterwards been added to the legacy, for, in this case, the sureties will be liable for the entire amount. 1Where the Prætor says, “if the prætorian possessor of the estate is not required to give security,” we must understand this to mean, if he is ready to give it. Hence, he should not offer to furnish security, but should not delay to do so if the legatee demands it. 2When anyone does not make restitution, judgment to the amount of his interest should be rendered against him under this interdict. 3If the legatee is satisfied with a mere promise, the interdict should be granted. The same must be said, if the legatee refused to be secured by pledges. 4If the legatee was to blame for security not having been given, even though none was furnished, he will be liable under the interdict. If, however, he was to blame for security not having been given, but, at the time that the interdict was issued, he was ready to accept security, the interdict will not lie, unless security was given. But if the possessor under the Prætorian Edict was responsible for security not having been given, but was afterwards ready to furnish it, the interdict will lie; for the time when it was issued is taken into consideration.