The Same, On Adultery. I am aware that it has also been discussed whether one who has been convicted of adultery can give evidence for the purpose of proving a will; and it is clear that he is justly forbidden from testifying in court. Therefore I think that a will which must be proved by a witness of this kind is not valid, either by the Civil Law, or by the Prætorian Law which follows it; so that neither an estate can be entered upon, nor the possession of the property of the deceased be granted on such testimony.

The Same, On Adultery. A soldier who has compromised with the seducer of his wife should be released from his oath, and be deported. 1It has very properly been decided that a soldier who lives in concubinage with his sister’s daughter, although this is not marriage, will be liable to punishment for adultery. 2A woman who is classed among those who have committed adultery cannot be defended in court while she is absent. 3A father-in-law who, in a written accusation filed with the Governor, stated that he accused his daughter-in-law of adultery, preferred to abandon the accusation and obtain her dowry. The question arises whether you think that a scheme of this kind should be permitted. The answer was, that it is a very dishonorable example for a person, after he has brought an accusation against his daughter-in-law, to desire to abandon it, and remain content with the profit obtained from her dowry, as the marriage was dissolved through the fault of the woman. Wherefore he will not be unjustly barred who was not ashamed to prefer the advantage of the dowry to avenging the honor of his house. 4It is clear that anyone guilty of adultery can be prosecuted within five years from the time when the crime was committed, even though the woman should be dead. 5A certain person desired to accuse a woman of adultery, and asked that the days which he had passed in prison should not be counted against him. I, having agreed to this, another contradicted me; and, if you approve of his opinion, I ask you to write to me after careful consideration of the question. The answer was, that both the terms and the intention of the law sustain your conclusion; for it has been decided that only available days should be counted against the accuser, that is to say, those in which he can comply with the formalities required by the accusation. Therefore, undoubtedly, when you hold that the days during which the complainant was in prison are not to be included among those available days, no reason exists for opposing your opinion. 6The sixty days that are counted as available and in which the husband can bring the accusation certainly include festivals, provided the accuser has the power of appearing before the Governor, because the information can be given to the latter even when he is not on the bench. If, however, he has lost this privilege, he is not prevented from filing his complaint with the judge during the other four months. 7The question arose whether a man could, by the right of a husband, accuse a woman who had been betrothed to him, and had afterwards been given in marriage by her father to another. The answer was, I think, that the accuser, in a case of this kind, institutes a new proceeding when he desires to bring a charge of adultery, for this reason only, that the girl who had been betrothed to him was afterwards given by her father in marriage to another. 8A woman can be prosecuted for adultery after the death of her husband. 9Should a woman who asks for delay on account of the youth of her son obtain it from the accuser, or ought she to be heard? I answered: This woman does not seem to have a just defence who offers the age of her son as a pretext for evading a legal accusation. For the charge of adultery brought against her does not prejudice the child, since she herself may be an adulteress, and the child still have the deceased for his father. 10When I desired to accuse a woman of adultery who, after having committed the offence, continued in the same marital relation, my position was disputed. I ask whether the opinion was correct. The answer was: “You should not have been ignorant that, during the marriage which existed when the adultery was said to have been committed, the woman could not have been prosecuted for adultery, and that during this time the adulterer himself could not have been accused.” 11Although a woman may be alleged to have married him with whom she is suspected of having committed adultery, she cannot be accused before the adulterer has been convicted. Otherwise, husbands desiring to have marriages, which have subsequently been contracted, annulled, would have recourse to this pretext, and say that their wives had married men with whom they had committed adultery. 12A woman, having heard that her absent husband was dead, married another, and her first husband afterwards returned. I ask, what should be decided with reference to this woman? The answer was that the question is one of law and not of fact; for if a long time had elapsed without any proof of debauchery having been made, and the woman, having been induced by false rumors, and, as it were, released from her former tie, married a second time in accordance with law, as it is probable that she was deceived, and she can be held to have done nothing deserving of punishment. If, however, it is established that the supposed death of her husband furnished an inducement for her marrying a second time, as her chastity is affected by this fact, she should be punished in proportion to the character of the offence. 13I married a woman accused of adultery, and, as soon as she was convicted, I repudiated her. I ask whether I should be considered to have furnished the cause of the separation. The answer was that, since by the Julian Law you are prohibited from keeping a wife of this kind, it is clear that you should not be considered to have furnished the cause for the separation. Therefore, the law will be applied just as if a divorce had taken place through the fault of the woman.

The Same, On Adultery. The question was asked whether those who had been excluded from bringing an accusation by lapse of time come within the scope of the Turpillian Decree of the Senate. The answer was that there is no doubt that persons who are prevented by prescription from bringing a charge of adultery can be punished for calumny.