Corpus iurisprudentiae Romanae

Repertorium zu den Quellen des römischen Rechts

Digesta Iustiniani Augusti

Recognovit Mommsen (1870) et retractavit Krüger (1928)
Convertit in Anglica lingua Scott (1932)
Pap.adult.
De adulteriis lib.Papiniani De adulteriis libri

De adulteriis libri

cum Notis Marciani
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Ex libro singulari

Dig. 22,5,14Idem li­bro sin­gu­la­ri de ad­ul­te­riis. Scio qui­dem trac­ta­tum es­se, an ad tes­ta­men­tum fa­cien­dum ad­hi­be­ri pos­sit ad­ul­te­rii dam­na­tus: et sa­ne ius­te tes­ti­mo­nii of­fi­cio ei in­ter­di­ce­tur. ex­is­ti­mo er­go ne­que iu­re ci­vi­li tes­ta­men­tum va­le­re, ad quod hu­ius­mo­di tes­tis pro­ces­sit, ne­que iu­re prae­to­rio, quod ius ci­vi­le sub­se­qui­tur, ut ne­que he­redi­tas ad­iri ne­que bo­no­rum pos­ses­sio da­ri pos­sit.

The Same, On Adultery. I am aware that it has also been discussed whether one who has been convicted of adultery can give evidence for the purpose of proving a will; and it is clear that he is justly forbidden from testifying in court. Therefore I think that a will which must be proved by a witness of this kind is not valid, either by the Civil Law, or by the Prætorian Law which follows it; so that neither an estate can be entered upon, nor the possession of the property of the deceased be granted on such testimony.

Dig. 48,5,12Idem li­bro sin­gu­la­ri de ad­ul­te­ris. Mi­les, qui cum ad­ul­te­ro uxo­ris suae pac­tus est, sol­vi sa­cra­men­to de­por­ta­ri­que de­bet. 1Mi­li­tem, qui so­ro­ris fi­liam in con­tu­ber­nio ha­buit, li­cet non in ma­tri­mo­nium, ad­ul­te­rii poe­na te­ne­ri rec­tius di­ce­tur. 2Ea, quae in­ter reas ad­ul­te­rii re­cep­ta es­set, ab­sens de­fen­di non pot­est. 3So­cer cum nu­rum ad­ul­te­rii ac­cu­sa­tu­rum se li­bel­lis prae­si­di da­tis tes­ta­tus fuis­set, ma­luit ac­cu­sa­tio­ne de­sis­te­re et lu­crum ex do­te ma­gis pe­te­re. quae­ri­tur, an hu­ius­mo­di com­men­tum eius ad­mit­ti ex­is­ti­mes. re­spon­dit: tur­pis­si­mo ex­em­plo is, qui nu­rum suam ac­cu­sa­re in­sti­tuis­set, post­ea de­sis­te­re ma­luit con­ten­tus lu­crum ex do­te re­ti­ne­re tam­quam cul­pa mu­lie­ris dir­emp­to ma­tri­mo­nio: qua­re non in­ique re­pel­le­tur, qui com­mo­dum do­tis vin­dic­tae do­mus suae prae­po­ne­re non eru­buit. 4Ad­ul­te­rii reum in­tra quin­que an­nos con­ti­nuos a die cri­mi­nis ad­mis­si de­func­ta quo­que mu­lie­re pos­tu­la­ri pos­se pa­lam est. 5Qui­dam ac­cu­sa­re vo­le­bat ad­ul­te­rii mu­lie­rem et pos­tu­la­bat, ne si­bi com­pu­ta­ren­tur dies, quos in cus­to­diam fe­cis­set: me hoc ad­mit­ten­te ex­sti­tit qui mi­hi con­tra­di­ce­ret. cu­ius opi­nio­nem an tu pro­bes, ro­go ma­tu­rius mi­hi scri­bas. re­spon­dit: opi­nio­nem tuam et ver­ba le­gis et sen­ten­tia ad­iu­vant, cui pla­cuit uti­les dies ac­cu­sa­to­ri com­pu­tan­dos es­se, id est qui­bus po­tuit ac­cu­sa­tio­nis sol­lem­nia im­ple­re. qua­re si­ne du­bio dies, qui­bus quis in cus­to­dia fuit, ex­tra com­pu­ta­tio­nem uti­lium die­rum ex­is­ti­man­ti ti­bi con­sti­tu­tos con­tra­di­ci non de­buit. 6Se­xa­gin­ta dies, qui ma­ri­to ac­cu­san­ti uti­les com­pu­tan­tur, fe­ria­tis quo­que die­bus, si mo­do fa­cul­ta­tem prae­si­dis ad­eun­di ac­cu­sa­tor ha­buit, nu­me­ra­ri cer­tum est, quon­iam de pla­no quo­que li­bel­lus da­ri pot­est. quod pri­vi­le­gium si amis­it, non pro­hi­be­tur in­tra alios quat­tuor men­ses que­rel­lam suam apud iu­di­cem de­fer­re. 7Quae­re­ba­tur, an iu­re ma­ri­ti pos­sit ac­cu­sa­re vir eam fe­mi­nam, quae, cum ei de­spon­sa fuis­set, alii in ma­tri­mo­nium a pa­tre fuis­set tra­di­ta. re­spon­dit: no­vam rem in­sti­tue­re hu­ius­mo­di ac­cu­sa­to­rem ex­is­ti­mo, qui ad­ul­te­rii cri­men ob­ice­re de­si­de­rat prop­ter hoc tan­tum, quod prio­ri si­bi de­spon­sa puel­la a pa­tre in ma­tri­mo­nium alii fue­rit tra­di­ta. 8De­func­to ma­ri­to ad­ul­te­rii rea mu­lier pos­tu­la­tur, 9quae prop­ter im­pu­be­rem fi­lium vult di­la­tio­nem ab ac­cu­sa­to­re im­pe­tra­re: an de­beat au­di­ri? re­spon­di: non vi­de­tur mi­hi con­fu­ge­re ea mu­lier ad ius­tam de­fen­sio­nem, quae ae­ta­tem fi­lii prae­ten­dit ad elu­den­dam le­gi­ti­mam ac­cu­sa­tio­nem: nam non uti­que cri­men ad­ul­te­rii, quod mu­lie­ri ob­ici­tur, in­fan­ti prae­iu­di­cat, cum pos­sit et il­la ad­ul­te­ra es­se et im­pu­bes de­func­tum pa­trem ha­buis­se. 10Vo­len­ti mi­hi ream ad­ul­te­rii pos­tu­la­re eam, quae post com­mis­sum ad­ul­te­rium in eo­dem ma­tri­mo­nio per­se­ve­ra­ve­rit, con­tra­dic­tum est. quae­ro, an ius­te re­spon­sum sit. re­spon­dit: igno­ra­re non de­buis­ti du­ran­te eo ma­tri­mo­nio, in quo ad­ul­te­rium di­ci­tur es­se com­mis­sum, non pos­se mu­lie­rem ream ad­ul­te­rii fie­ri: sed nec ad­ul­te­rum in­ter­im ac­cu­sa­ri pos­se. 11Li­cet ei mu­lier, qui in su­spi­cio­nem ad­ul­te­rii in­ci­dit, nup­sis­se di­ca­tur, non an­te ac­cu­sa­ri pot­erit, quam ad­ul­ter fue­rit con­vic­tus: alio­quin ad hoc vel ma­xi­me vi­ri con­fu­gient vo­len­tes be­ne con­cor­da­tum se­quens ma­tri­mo­nium dir­ime­re, ut di­cant cum ad­ul­te­ro mu­lie­rem nup­tias con­tra­xis­se. 12Mu­lier cum ab­sen­tem vi­rum au­dis­set vi­ta func­tum es­se, alii se iun­xit: mox ma­ri­tus re­ver­sus est. quae­ro, quid ad­ver­sus eam mu­lie­rem sta­tuen­dum sit. re­spon­dit tam iu­ris quam fac­ti quaes­tio­nem mo­ve­ri: nam si lon­go tem­po­re trans­ac­to si­ne ul­lius stu­pri pro­ba­tio­ne fal­sis ru­mo­ri­bus in­duc­ta, qua­si so­lu­ta prio­re vin­cu­lo, le­gi­ti­mis nup­tiis se­cun­dis iunc­ta est, quod ve­ri­si­mi­le est de­cep­tam eam fuis­se ni­hil vin­dic­ta dig­num vi­de­ri pot­est: quod si fic­ta ma­ri­ti mors ar­gu­men­tum fa­cien­dis nup­tiis pro­ba­bi­tur prae­sti­tis­se, cum hoc fac­to pu­di­ci­tia la­bo­re­tur, vin­di­ca­ri de­bet pro ad­mis­si cri­mi­nis qua­li­ta­te. 13Ream ad­ul­te­rii uxo­rem du­xi: eam dam­na­tam mox re­pu­dia­vi. quae­ro, an cau­sam di­sci­dii prae­sti­tis­se vi­deor. re­spon­dit: cum per le­gem Iu­liam hu­ius­mo­di uxo­rem re­ti­ne­re pro­hi­bea­ris, non vi­de­ri cau­sam te di­sci­dii prae­sti­tis­se pa­lam est. qua­re ita ius trac­ta­bi­tur qua­si cul­pa mu­lie­ris fac­to di­vor­tio.

The Same, On Adultery. A soldier who has compromised with the seducer of his wife should be released from his oath, and be deported. 1It has very properly been decided that a soldier who lives in concubinage with his sister’s daughter, although this is not marriage, will be liable to punishment for adultery. 2A woman who is classed among those who have committed adultery cannot be defended in court while she is absent. 3A father-in-law who, in a written accusation filed with the Governor, stated that he accused his daughter-in-law of adultery, preferred to abandon the accusation and obtain her dowry. The question arises whether you think that a scheme of this kind should be permitted. The answer was, that it is a very dishonorable example for a person, after he has brought an accusation against his daughter-in-law, to desire to abandon it, and remain content with the profit obtained from her dowry, as the marriage was dissolved through the fault of the woman. Wherefore he will not be unjustly barred who was not ashamed to prefer the advantage of the dowry to avenging the honor of his house. 4It is clear that anyone guilty of adultery can be prosecuted within five years from the time when the crime was committed, even though the woman should be dead. 5A certain person desired to accuse a woman of adultery, and asked that the days which he had passed in prison should not be counted against him. I, having agreed to this, another contradicted me; and, if you approve of his opinion, I ask you to write to me after careful consideration of the question. The answer was, that both the terms and the intention of the law sustain your conclusion; for it has been decided that only available days should be counted against the accuser, that is to say, those in which he can comply with the formalities required by the accusation. Therefore, undoubtedly, when you hold that the days during which the complainant was in prison are not to be included among those available days, no reason exists for opposing your opinion. 6The sixty days that are counted as available and in which the husband can bring the accusation certainly include festivals, provided the accuser has the power of appearing before the Governor, because the information can be given to the latter even when he is not on the bench. If, however, he has lost this privilege, he is not prevented from filing his complaint with the judge during the other four months. 7The question arose whether a man could, by the right of a husband, accuse a woman who had been betrothed to him, and had afterwards been given in marriage by her father to another. The answer was, I think, that the accuser, in a case of this kind, institutes a new proceeding when he desires to bring a charge of adultery, for this reason only, that the girl who had been betrothed to him was afterwards given by her father in marriage to another. 8A woman can be prosecuted for adultery after the death of her husband. 9Should a woman who asks for delay on account of the youth of her son obtain it from the accuser, or ought she to be heard? I answered: This woman does not seem to have a just defence who offers the age of her son as a pretext for evading a legal accusation. For the charge of adultery brought against her does not prejudice the child, since she herself may be an adulteress, and the child still have the deceased for his father. 10When I desired to accuse a woman of adultery who, after having committed the offence, continued in the same marital relation, my position was disputed. I ask whether the opinion was correct. The answer was: “You should not have been ignorant that, during the marriage which existed when the adultery was said to have been committed, the woman could not have been prosecuted for adultery, and that during this time the adulterer himself could not have been accused.” 11Although a woman may be alleged to have married him with whom she is suspected of having committed adultery, she cannot be accused before the adulterer has been convicted. Otherwise, husbands desiring to have marriages, which have subsequently been contracted, annulled, would have recourse to this pretext, and say that their wives had married men with whom they had committed adultery. 12A woman, having heard that her absent husband was dead, married another, and her first husband afterwards returned. I ask, what should be decided with reference to this woman? The answer was that the question is one of law and not of fact; for if a long time had elapsed without any proof of debauchery having been made, and the woman, having been induced by false rumors, and, as it were, released from her former tie, married a second time in accordance with law, as it is probable that she was deceived, and she can be held to have done nothing deserving of punishment. If, however, it is established that the supposed death of her husband furnished an inducement for her marrying a second time, as her chastity is affected by this fact, she should be punished in proportion to the character of the offence. 13I married a woman accused of adultery, and, as soon as she was convicted, I repudiated her. I ask whether I should be considered to have furnished the cause of the separation. The answer was that, since by the Julian Law you are prohibited from keeping a wife of this kind, it is clear that you should not be considered to have furnished the cause for the separation. Therefore, the law will be applied just as if a divorce had taken place through the fault of the woman.

Dig. 48,16,11Idem li­bro sin­gu­la­ri de ad­ul­te­ris. Quae­re­ba­tur, an hi, qui ab ac­cu­sa­tio­ne tem­po­re ex­clu­si es­sent, in se­na­tus con­sul­tum Tur­pil­lia­num in­ci­de­runt. re­spon­dit non opor­te­re du­bi­ta­ri ca­lum­nia non pu­ni­ri eos, qui prae­scrip­tio­ne tem­po­ris ex­clu­si cau­sam ad­ul­te­rii per­fer­re non po­tue­runt.

The Same, On Adultery. The question was asked whether those who had been excluded from bringing an accusation by lapse of time come within the scope of the Turpillian Decree of the Senate. The answer was that there is no doubt that persons who are prevented by prescription from bringing a charge of adultery can be punished for calumny.

Ex libro I

Dig. 22,5,13Pa­pi­nia­nus li­bro pri­mo de ad­ul­te­riis. Quae­si­tum scio, an in pu­bli­cis iu­di­ciis ca­lum­niae dam­na­ti tes­ti­mo­nium iu­di­cio pu­bli­co per­hi­be­re pos­sunt. sed ne­que le­ge rem­mia pro­hi­ben­tur et Iu­lia lex de vi et re­pe­ten­da­rum et pe­cu­la­tus eos ho­mi­nes tes­ti­mo­nium di­ce­re non ve­tue­runt. ve­rum­ta­men quod le­gi­bus omis­sum est, non omit­te­tur re­li­gio­ne iu­di­can­tium ad quo­rum of­fi­cium per­ti­net eius quo­que tes­ti­mo­nii fi­dem, quod in­te­grae fron­tis ho­mo di­xe­rit, per­pen­de­re.

Papinianus, On Adultery, Book I. I know that the question has arisen whether those who have been convicted of calumny in public trials can testify in a public prosecution. They are not, however, forbidden to do so by the Lex Remmia; and the Lex Julia relating to violence, extortion, and peculation, does not prohibit such persons from giving evidence, nevertheless, what is omitted by the laws should not be omitted by the conscientious judge, whose duty it is to carefully weigh the credibility of the witness and determine whether he gives his testimony as a man of integrity should do.

Dig. 23,5,12Pa­pi­nia­nus li­bro pri­mo de ad­ul­te­riis. Et­iam si dir­emp­to ma­tri­mo­nio do­ta­le prae­dium es­se in­tel­le­gi­tur. 1So­ce­ri vo­lun­tas in dis­tra­hen­do do­ta­li prae­dio nul­la est.

Papinianus, On Adultery, Book I. Even though the marriage should be dissolved, the land is still understood to be dotal. 1The consent of a father-in-law to the sale of land belonging to a dowry is of no force or effect.

Dig. 24,2,7Pa­pi­nia­nus li­bro pri­mo de ad­ul­te­riis. Si pae­ni­tuit eum, qui li­bel­lum tra­den­dum di­vor­tii de­dit, is­que per igno­ran­tiam mu­ta­tae vo­lun­ta­tis ob­la­tus est, du­ra­re ma­tri­mo­nium di­cen­dum, ni­si pae­ni­ten­tia co­gni­ta is qui ac­ce­pit ip­se vo­luit ma­tri­mo­nium dis­sol­ve­re: tunc enim per eum qui ac­ce­pit sol­vi­tur ma­tri­mo­nium.

Papinianus, On Adultery, Book I. Where one party who has given the other notice of divorce repents, and the other is ignorant of the change of mind, the marriage must be held to continue to exist; unless the one who received the notice and is aware of the change of mind, himself or herself desires to dissolve the marriage, for then it will be dissolved by the one who received the notice.

Dig. 46,3,41Pa­pi­nia­nus li­bro pri­mo de ad­ul­te­riis. Reo cri­mi­nis pos­tu­la­to in­ter­im ni­hil pro­hi­bet rec­te pe­cu­niam a de­bi­to­ri­bus sol­vi: alio­quin ple­ri­que in­no­cen­tium ne­ces­sa­rio sump­tu ege­bunt.

Papinianus, On Adultery, Book I. Where a creditor is accused of a crime, there is nothing to prevent the payment of money by his debtors; otherwise, many innocent persons would be deprived of the necessary means of defence.

Dig. 48,2,2Pa­pi­nia­nus li­bro pri­mo de ad­ul­te­riis. Cer­tis ex cau­sis con­ces­sa est mu­lie­ri­bus pu­bli­ca ac­cu­sa­tio, vel­uti si mor­tem ex­equan­tur eo­rum ea­rum­que, in quos ex le­ge tes­ti­mo­nium pu­bli­co­rum in­vi­tae non di­cunt. idem et in le­ge Cor­ne­lia tes­ta­men­ta­ria se­na­tus sta­tuit: sed et de tes­ta­men­to pa­ter­ni li­ber­ti vel ma­ter­ni mu­lie­ri­bus pu­bli­co iu­di­cio di­ce­re per­mis­sum est. 1Pu­pil­lis ex con­si­lio tu­to­rum pa­tris mor­tem, item pu­pil­lae avi sui mor­tem ex­equi con­ces­sum est. le­ge au­tem tes­ta­men­ta­ria nam de pa­tris qui­dem tes­ta­men­to pu­pil­lis age­re di­vus Ves­pa­sia­nus per­mi­sit: sed qua­si non ex­hi­bean­tur ta­bu­lae, per in­ter­dic­tum pos­sunt ex­per­i­ri.

Papinianus, On Adultery, Book I. Women are permitted to bring a public accusation for certain causes, for instance, if they do so on account of the death of any of those persons of either sex against whom they, if unwilling, can not be compelled to appear as witnesses, under the provisions of the law relating to public testimony. The Senate arrived at the same conclusion with reference to the Cornelian Law on Evidence. Women, however, are allowed to testify publicly in a criminal prosecution concerning the will of a freedman of their father or their mother. 1By the law relating to testaments, the right was conceded to wards, with the advice of their guardians, to institute a prosecution for the death of their father, just as a female ward is allowed to institute one for the death of her grandfather, since the Divine Vespasian permitted wards to bring suit with reference to the will of their father; but they could proceed by means of the interdict just as if the will had not been produced.

Dig. 48,3,2Pa­pi­nia­nus li­bro pri­mo de ad­ul­te­riis. Si ser­vus ca­pi­ta­li cri­mi­ne pos­tu­le­tur, le­ge pu­bli­co­rum ca­ve­tur, ut sis­ten­dum vel a do­mi­no vel ab ex­te­ro sa­tis­da­to pro­mit­ta­tur: quod si non de­fen­da­tur, in vin­cu­la pu­bli­ca co­ici iu­be­tur, ut ex vin­cu­lis cau­sam di­cat. 1So­let ita­que trac­ta­ri, an post­ea do­mi­no per­mit­ten­dum sit ob­la­ta sa­tis­da­tio­ne ser­vum suum vin­cu­lis li­be­ra­re. du­bi­ta­tio­nem au­get edic­tum Do­mi­ti­a­ni, quo cau­tum est ab­oli­tio­nes ex se­na­tus con­sul­to fac­tas ad hu­ius­mo­di ser­vos non per­ti­ne­re. nam et lex ip­sa pro­hi­bet eum ab­sol­vi, prius­quam de eo iu­di­ce­tur. sed haec in­ter­pre­ta­tio per­du­ra, per­ni­mium se­ve­ra est in eo, cu­ius do­mi­nus ab­sens fuit vel quod per in­opiam il­lo mo­men­to tem­po­ris sa­tis­da­tio­nem im­ple­re non po­tuit: ne­que enim pro in­de­fen­so de­relic­tus rec­te di­ci pot­est, qui do­mi­num prae­sen­tem non ha­buit vel ha­buit pa­ra­tum de­fen­de­re, pau­pe­rem ta­men. quod uti­que fa­ci­lius ad­mit­ti pot­erit, si non post lon­gum tem­po­ris spa­tium hoc de­si­de­re­tur. 2Qui ex­hi­ben­di pos­tu­la­ti sunt prop­ter aliam cau­sam, al­te­rius cri­mi­nis, quod an­te ad­mis­sum est, rei non re­ci­piun­tur ex se­na­tus con­sul­to. quod in pri­va­tis quo­que cau­sis et ho­mi­ni­bus sub fi­de­ius­so­re fac­tis ob­ser­va­tur, ni­si ex hoc tem­po­ra­lis ac­tio in pe­ri­cu­lum ca­dat.

Papinianus, On Adultery, Book I. Where a slave is accused of a capital offence, it is provided by the law of criminal prosecutions that he must furnish security for his appearance in court, even though his surety be a stranger. If he is not defended in this way, he should be thrown into the public prison, so that he may defend himself while under restraint. 1Therefore, the question is usually discussed whether the master should afterwards, by giving security, be permitted to release his slave from confinement. The Edict of Domitian, by which it is provided that releases obtained under the Decree of the Senate are not applicable to slaves of this kind, increases the already existing doubt, for the law itself forbids him to be discharged before his case has been disposed of. This interpretation, which is somewhat hard, is too severe when applied to a slave whose master is absent, or who, through poverty, was at that time unable to furnish security. For it cannot be said that a slave is left without defence whose master is present, or is ready to defend him, but is too poor to do so. This can the more readily be admitted, if too long a time to find security has not been taken. 2Those who are required to appear in court on account of some other crime previously committed are not included in the number of accused persons, according to a Decree of the Senate. This rule is also observed in private cases, where the parties have given sureties, unless on this account a temporary action is in danger of being extinguished through lapse of time.

Dig. 48,5,6Pa­pi­nia­nus li­bro pri­mo de ad­ul­te­riis. In­ter li­be­ras tan­tum per­so­nas ad­ul­te­rium stu­prum­ve pas­sas lex Iu­lia lo­cum ha­bet. quod au­tem ad ser­vas per­ti­net, et le­gis Aqui­liae ac­tio fa­ci­le te­ne­bit et in­iu­ria­rum quo­que com­pe­tit nec erit de­ne­gan­da prae­to­ria quo­que ac­tio de ser­vo cor­rup­to: nec prop­ter plu­res ac­tio­nes par­cen­dum erit in hu­ius­mo­di cri­mi­ne reo. 1Lex stu­prum et ad­ul­te­rium pro­mis­cui et καταχρηστικώτερον ap­pel­lat. sed pro­prie ad­ul­te­rium in nup­ta com­mit­ti­tur, prop­ter par­tum ex al­te­ro con­cep­tum com­po­si­to no­mi­ne: stu­prum ve­ro in vir­gi­nem vi­duam­ve com­mit­ti­tur, quod Grae­ci φθορὰν ap­pel­lant. 2Fi­lius fa­mi­liae ma­ri­tus ab eo, qui sui iu­ris est, in ea le­ge non se­pa­ra­tur. di­vus quo­que Ha­d­ria­nus ro­sia­no ge­mi­no re­scrip­sit et in­vi­to pa­tre fi­lium hac le­ge reum fa­ce­re. 3Ma­ri­tus et­si duo reos ex alio cri­mi­ne ha­beat, pot­erit iu­re vi­ri ter­tium ac­cu­sa­re, quon­iam ea cau­sa non ce­dit in nu­me­rum ce­te­ra­rum.

Papinianus, On Adultery, Book I. The Julian Law only applies to free persons who have been the victims of adultery or debauchery. With reference to female slaves, recourse can easily be had to the action authorized by the Aquilian Law, and that for injury will also lie, and the Prætorian action for the corruption of a slave will not be refused; so that the person guilty of this crime will not escape on account of the multiplicity of actions. 1The law promiscuously and incorrectly designates the same crime by the terms debauchery and adultery. Properly speaking, adultery is only committed with a married woman; this name having been adopted on account of the child being begotten by another than the husband. Debauchery, which the Greeks call “corruption,” is committed with a virgin, or a widow. 2A son under paternal control, who is a husband, is not, by this law, distinguished from one who is his own master. The Divine Hadrian stated in a Rescript addressed to Rosianus Geminus, that even without the consent of his father, a son under paternal control could bring an accusation under this law. 3The husband, although he may be already prosecuting two persons for another crime, can, by his marital right, accuse a third party, because this case is not included among the others.

Dig. 48,5,21Pa­pi­nia­nus li­bro pri­mo de ad­ul­te­riis. Pa­tri da­tur ius oc­ci­den­di ad­ul­te­rum cum fi­lia quam in po­tes­ta­te ha­bet: ita­que ne­mo alius ex pa­tri­bus idem iu­re fa­ciet: sed nec fi­lius fa­mi­lias pa­ter:

Papinianus, On Adultery, Book I. The right is granted to the father to kill a man who commits adultery with his daughter while she is under his control. Therefore no other relative can legally do this, nor can a son under paternal control, who is a father, do so with impunity.

Dig. 48,5,23Pa­pi­nia­nus li­bro pri­mo de ad­ul­te­ris. Nec in ea le­ge na­tu­ra­lis ab ad­op­ti­vo pa­ter se­pa­ra­tur. 1In ac­cu­sa­tio­nem vi­duae fi­liae non ha­bet pa­ter ius prae­ci­puum. 2Ius oc­ci­den­di pa­tri con­ce­di­tur do­mi suae, li­cet ibi fi­lia non ha­bi­tat, vel in do­mo ge­ne­ri: sed do­mus et pro do­mi­ci­lio ac­ci­pien­da est, ut in le­ge Cor­ne­lia de in­iu­riis. 3Sed qui oc­ci­de­re pot­est ad­ul­te­rum, mul­to ma­gis con­tu­me­lia pot­erit iu­re ad­fi­ce­re. 4Id­eo au­tem pa­tri, non ma­ri­to mu­lie­rem et om­nem ad­ul­te­rum re­mis­sum est oc­ci­de­re, quod ple­rum­que pie­tas pa­ter­ni no­mi­nis con­si­lium pro li­be­ris ca­pit: ce­te­rum ma­ri­ti ca­lor et im­pe­tus fa­ci­le de­cer­nen­tis fuit re­fre­nan­dus.

Papinianus, On Adultery, Book I. In this law, the natural father is not distinguished from the adoptive father. 1In the accusation of his daughter, who is a widow, the father is not entitled to the preference. 2The right to kill the adulterer is granted to the father in his own house, even though his daughter does not live there, or in the house of his son-in-law. The house should be understood to mean the residence, as in the Cornelian Law relating to injuries. 3He, however, who can kill an adulterer, has a much greater right to treat him with contumely. 4Hence the father, and not the husband, has the right to kill the woman and every adulterer; for the reason that, in general, paternal affection is solicitous for the interests of the children, but the heat and impetuosity of the husband, who decides too quickly, should be restrained.

Ex libro II

Dig. 3,6,9Pa­pi­nia­nus li­bro se­cun­do de ad­ul­te­riis. De ser­vo qui ac­cu­sa­tur, si pos­tu­le­tur, quaes­tio ha­be­tur: quo ab­so­lu­to in du­plum pre­tium ac­cu­sa­tor do­mi­no dam­na­tur: sed et ci­tra pre­tii aes­ti­ma­tio­nem quae­ri­tur de ca­lum­nia eius. se­pa­ra­tum est et­enim ca­lum­niae cri­men a dam­no quod in ser­vo prop­ter quaes­tio­nem do­mi­no da­tum est.

Papinianus, On Adultery, Book II. Where a slave is accused he shall be put to torture, if this is demanded; and if he is acquitted, the accuser shall be condemned to pay his master double his value; and, in addition to double his value, an inquiry shall be made as to whether the prosecution was instituted for the purpose of annoyance, as the crime of illegal prosecution is separate from any loss which has been sustained by the master through the torture of the slave.

Dig. 24,2,8Idem li­bro se­cun­do de ad­ul­te­riis. Di­vus Ha­d­ria­nus eum, qui alie­nam uxo­rem ex iti­ne­re do­mum suam du­xis­set et in­de ma­ri­to eius re­pu­dium mis­sis­set, in tri­en­nium rele­ga­vit.

The Same, On Adultery, Book II. The Divine Hadrian exiled for the term of three years a man who, while on a journey, took the wife of another man to his house, from which she sent to her husband a notice of repudiation.

Dig. 48,5,9Idem li­bro se­cun­do de ad­ul­te­ris. Qui do­mum suam, ut stu­prum ad­ul­te­rium­ve cum alie­na ma­tre fa­mi­lias vel cum mas­cu­lo fie­ret, sciens prae­bue­rit vel quaes­tum ex ad­ul­te­rio uxo­ris suae fe­ce­rit: cu­ius­cum­que sit con­di­cio­nis, qua­si ad­ul­ter pu­ni­tur. 1Ap­pel­la­tio­ne do­mus ha­bi­ta­tio­nem quo­que sig­ni­fi­ca­ri pa­lam est.

Papinianus, On Adultery, Book II. Anyone who knowingly lends his house to enable debauchery or adultery to be committed there with a matron who is not his wife, or with a male, or who pecuniarily profits by the adultery of his wife, no matter what may be his status, is punished as an adulterer. 1It is clear that by the term “house” every kind of habitation is meant.

Dig. 48,5,11Pa­pi­nia­nus li­bro se­cun­do de ad­ul­te­riis. Ma­ter au­tem fa­mi­lias sig­ni­fi­ca­tur non tan­tum nup­ta, sed et­iam vi­dua. 1Mu­lie­res quo­que hoc ca­pi­te le­gis, quod do­mum prae­bue­runt vel pro com­per­to stu­pro ali­quid ac­ce­pe­runt, te­nen­tur. 2Mu­lier, quae evi­tan­dae poe­nae ad­ul­te­rii gra­tia le­no­ci­nium fe­ce­rit aut ope­ras suas in scae­nam lo­ca­vit, ad­ul­te­rii ac­cu­sa­ri dam­na­ri­que ex se­na­tus con­sul­to pot­est.

Papinianus, On Adultery, Book II. A matron means not only a married woman, but also a widow. 1Women who lend their houses, or have received any compensation for debauchery which they have committed, are also liable under this Section of the law. 2A woman who gratuitously acts as a bawd for the purpose of avoiding the penalty for adultery, or hires her services to appear in the theatre, can be accused and convicted of adultery under the Decree of the Senate.

Dig. 48,16,8Pa­pi­nia­nus li­bro se­cun­do de ad­ul­te­riis. Ab­oli­tio aut pu­bli­ce fit ob diem in­sig­nem aut pu­bli­cam gra­tu­la­tio­nem

Papinianus, On Adultery, Book II. The dismissal of a criminal case is either made publicly on account of some memorable occasion, or because of some public rejoicing,

Dig. 48,16,10Pa­pi­nia­nus li­bro se­cun­do de ad­ul­te­riis. aut pri­va­tim ac­to­re pos­tu­lan­te. ter­tio ge­ne­re fit ex le­ge ab­oli­tio ac­cu­sa­to­re mor­tuo vel ex ius­ta cau­sa im­pe­di­to, quo mi­nus ac­cu­sa­re pos­sit. 1Ab­oli­tio­ne au­tem pu­bli­ce fac­ta non re­trac­ta­bi­tur in iu­di­cio re­pe­ten­do de ma­ri­ti iu­re. 2Tri­gin­ta dies re­pe­ten­di rei di­vus Tra­ia­nus uti­les es­se in­ter­pre­ta­tus est, ex die sci­li­cet, quo fe­riae fi­ni­tae sunt. et se­na­tus cen­suit eas dies ce­de­re, qui­bus quis­que reum suum re­pe­te­re pos­sit. hoc au­tem re­pe­ten­di rei tem­pus non ali­ter ce­dit, quam si ac­cu­sa­tor quo­que po­tuit ad­ire.

Papinianus, On Adultery, Book II. Or privately, at the request of the accuser. There is a third kind of dismissal made in accordance with law, that is, when the accuser dies, or is prevented by some good reason from bringing the accusation. 1When a dismissal is made in accordance with a public decree, the husband, in bringing the charge a second time, will not forfeit any of his rights. 2The Divine Hadrian stated that the thirty days prescribed for reviving an accusation should be understood to be available days, that is to say they should be computed from the date on which the festivals terminated. The Senate decreed that these days began at the time when anyone could resume the prosecution of the defendant. This time to revive the case does not begin to run except where the accuser can institute proceedings.

Dig. 48,18,6Pa­pi­nia­nus li­bro se­cun­do de ad­ul­te­riis. Pa­tre vel ma­ri­to de ad­ul­te­rio agen­te et pos­tu­lan­ti­bus de ser­vis rei ut quaes­tio ha­bea­tur, si ve­re cau­sa per­ora­ta tes­ti­bus pro­la­tis ab­so­lu­tio se­cu­ta fue­rit, man­ci­pio­rum, quae mor­tua sunt, aes­ti­ma­tio ha­be­tur: se­cu­ta ve­ro dam­na­tio­ne quae su­per­sunt pu­bli­can­tur. 1Cum de fal­so tes­ta­men­to quae­ri­tur, he­redi­ta­rii ser­vi pos­sunt tor­que­ri.

Papinianus, On Adultery, Book II. When a father or a husband brings an accusation of adultery, and a demand is made that the slaves of the party accused be put to the question, if an acquittal should result, after the case has been argued, and the witnesses produced, an estimate must be made of the value of the slaves who have died; but if a conviction should be obtained, the surviving slaves shall be confiscated. 1When the case is one involving a forged will, the slaves belonging to the estate can be tortured.

Dig. 48,20,4Pa­pi­nia­nus li­bro se­cun­do de ad­ul­te­ris. et om­nes om­ni­no ma­ri­tus sal­vas ac­tio­nes con­tra fis­cum ha­bet.

Papinianus, On Adultery, Book II. Every husband is always entitled to actions against the Treasury.