Fideicommissorum libri
Ex libro V
The Same, Trusts, Book V. Ad Dig. 36,1,67 pr.Windscheid: Lehrbuch des Pandektenrechts, 7. Aufl. 1891, Bd. III, § 596, Note 11.An estate cannot legally be transferred to a slave, if his master is unwilling or not informed of the fact, but if he afterwards ratifies the transfer, it will be confirmed, and the rights of action will be acquired by the master himself, not for the reason that this transfer resembles the acquisition of the estate, and that the order of the master must precede it, but, as has already been stated, the subsequent ratification can be made just as in the case of the possession of property under the Prætorian Law. Nor does it make any difference, in the present instance, whether the master himself or his slave is charged to transfer his estate, nor is the consent nor the agency of the slave required but his consent is necessary where prætorian possession of the property is demanded, or an estate is to be accepted. Therefore, where heirs allege that they think an estate is insolvent, on the application of the master they can be compelled to enter upon and transfer it. 1Where a testator charges his heir to transfer his estate to a woman, if she does not marry, it must be held that if the heir alleges that he suspects the estate of being insolvent, he can be compelled to accept and transfer it to the woman, even if she should marry. Our Julianus adopts this view with reference to other conditions which, in like manner, cannot be fulfilled except at the termination of life. In accordance with this opinion, a bond should be furnished by those to whom the heir has been charged to transfer the estate under similar conditions, to deliver it to the persons to whom it will belong if the condition should not be complied with. 2If the Prætor, after proper investigation, should, either through mistake or partiality, order an estate to be transferred as due under a trust, it is to the interest of the community that it should be transferred, on account of the authority which invests judicial decisions. 3Where anyone is charged to transfer an estate to a ward who is not old enough to talk, and he voluntarily enters upon said estate, it can be transferred either to the slave of the ward, or to the ward himself, with the authority of his guardian; and the incapacity of the child to speak is no more an impediment to the transaction than exists in the case where a mute, who has reached the age of puberty, desires an estate to be delivered to him. If, however, the heir refuses to enter upon the estate, it is difficult to decide how the matter can be settled, because there will be no ground for the application of the Trebellian Decree of the Senate if the guardian should ask that the estate be accepted at the risk of his ward; nor can the ward ask that this be done, as he does not possess the faculty of speech. This question may be more easily solved in the case of persons who are dumb, for if they are interrogated and can hear, they can indicate by a nod that they are willing to accept the estate at their own risk, just as persons who are absent can give their consent by a messenger. However, I have no doubt that relief ought to be granted the child, and that this rule should be established on account of the resemblance between the Civil and the Prætorian Law. But if the said ward should be appointed heir, there is no doubt that he can act as such under the authority of his guardian; or, where a question arises with reference to obtaining possession of an estate under the Prætorian Law, he can claim it by his guardian; hence if appointed heir, he can be compelled by his guardian to enter upon and transfer the estate. In the same manner, a person who is dumb and destitute of understanding can be assisted by his curator. 4Where property is delivered by the heir, on my order, to the person to whom I have sold it, there is no doubt that the transfer should be considered to have been made to me as the beneficiary of the trust. The same rule will apply if, by my order, the property is delivered to anyone to whom I would be obliged to deliver it under the terms of a trust, or for any other reason; or to one to whom I intended to lend it, or give it.