Corpus iurisprudentiae Romanae

Repertorium zu den Quellen des römischen Rechts

Digesta Iustiniani Augusti

Recognovit Mommsen (1870) et retractavit Krüger (1928)
Convertit in Anglica lingua Scott (1932)
Mac.iud. publ.
De publicis iudiciis lib.Macri De publicis iudiciis libri

De publicis iudiciis libri

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Ex libro I

Dig. 47,12,8Ma­cer li­bro pri­mo pu­bli­co­rum. Se­pul­chri vio­la­ti cri­men pot­est di­ci ad le­gem Iu­liam de vi pu­bli­ca per­ti­ne­re ex il­la par­te, qua de eo ca­ve­tur, qui fe­ce­rit quid, quo mi­nus ali­quis fu­ne­re­tur se­pe­lia­tur­ve: quia et qui se­pul­chrum vio­lat, fa­cit, quo quis mi­nus se­pul­tus sit.

Macer, Public Prosecutions, Book I. The crime of violating a sepulchre may be considered as coming within the terms of the Julian Law relating to public violence, and that part in which it is provided that he shall be punished who prevents anyone from celebrating funeral ceremonies, or burying a corpse; because he who violates a sepulchre commits an act preventing interment.

Dig. 47,13,2Ma­cer li­bro pri­mo pu­bli­co­rum iu­di­cio­rum. Con­cus­sio­nis iu­di­cium pu­bli­cum non est: sed si id­eo pe­cu­niam quis ac­ce­pit, quod cri­men mi­na­tus sit, pot­est iu­di­cium pu­bli­cum es­se ex se­na­tus con­sul­tis, qui­bus poe­na le­gis Cor­ne­liae te­ne­ri iu­ben­tur, qui in ac­cu­sa­tio­nem in­no­cen­tium co­ie­rint qui­ve ob ac­cu­san­dum vel non ac­cu­san­dum, de­nun­tian­dum vel non de­nun­tian­dum tes­ti­mo­nium pe­cu­niam ac­ce­pe­rit.

Macer, Public Prosecutions, Book I. The prosecution of extortion is not public, but if anyone has received money because he threatened another with a criminal accusation, the prosecution may become public under the Decrees of the Senate, by which all those are ordered to be liable to the penalty of the Cornelian Law who have joined in the denunciation of innocent persons, and have received money in consideration of accusing, or not accusing others, or of giving, or not giving testimony against them.

Dig. 47,14,2Ma­cer li­bro pri­mo pu­bli­co­rum iu­di­cio­rum. Ab­igea­tus cri­men pu­bli­ci iu­di­cii non est, quia fur­tum ma­gis est. sed quia ple­rum­que ab­igei et fer­ro utun­tur, si de­pre­hen­den­tur, id­eo gra­vi­ter et pu­ni­ri eo­rum ad­mis­sum so­let.

Macer, Public Prosecutions, Book I. The crime of driving away cattle is not subject to public prosecution, because it is rather to be classed as a theft; but since most offenders of this description go armed, if they are arrested, they are usually more severely punished on this account.

Dig. 47,15,3Ma­cer li­bro pri­mo pu­bli­co­rum iu­di­cio­rum. Prae­va­ri­ca­tio­nis iu­di­cium aliud pu­bli­cum, aliud mo­ri­bus in­duc­tum est. 1Nam si reus ac­cu­sa­to­ri pu­bli­co iu­di­cio id­eo prae­scri­bat, quod di­cat se eo­dem cri­mi­ne ab alio ac­cu­sa­tum et ab­so­lu­tum, ca­ve­tur le­ge Iu­lia pu­bli­co­rum, ut non prius ac­cu­se­tur, quam de prio­ris ac­cu­sa­to­ris prae­va­ri­ca­tio­ne con­sti­te­rit et pro­nun­tia­tum fue­rit. hu­ius er­go prae­va­ri­ca­tio­nis pro­nun­tia­tio pu­bli­ci iu­di­cii in­tel­le­gi­tur. 2Quod si ad­vo­ca­to prae­va­ri­ca­tio­nis cri­men in­ten­da­tur, pu­bli­cum iu­di­cium non est: nec in­ter­est, pu­bli­co an pri­va­to iu­di­cio prae­va­ri­ca­tus di­ca­tur. 3Si id­eo quis ac­cu­se­tur, quod di­ca­tur cri­men iu­di­cii pu­bli­ci de­sti­tuis­se, iu­di­cium pu­bli­cum non est, quia ne­que le­ge ali­qua de hac re cau­tum est, ne­que per se­na­tus con­sul­tum, quo poe­na quin­que au­ri li­bra­rum in de­sis­ten­tem sta­tui­tur, pu­bli­ca ac­cu­sa­tio in­duc­ta est.

Macer, Public Prosecutions, Book I. The judgment for prevarication is either public or introduced by custom. 1If the defendant opposes the prosecutor in a criminal case, alleging that he already has been accused of the same crime by another and acquitted, it is provided by the Julian Law relating to public prosecutions that he cannot be prosecuted until the crime charged by the first accuser and the judgment rendered with reference to it have been investigated. Therefore, the decision of cases of this kind is understood to belong to the category of public prosecutions. 2Where the crime of prevarication is said to have been committed by an advocate, a public prosecution cannot be instituted; and it makes no difference whether he is said to have committed it in a public or a private proceeding. 3Therefore if anyone is accused of having abandoned a public prosecution, the case will not be public, because no provision was made for this by any law; and a public accusation is not authorized by that decree of the Senate which prescribes the penalty of five pounds of gold against anyone who abandons a case.

Dig. 48,1,1Ma­cer li­bro pri­mo de pu­bli­cis iu­di­ciis. Non om­nia iu­di­cia, in qui­bus cri­men ver­ti­tur, et pu­bli­ca sunt, sed ea tan­tum, quae ex le­gi­bus iu­di­cio­rum pu­bli­co­rum ve­niunt, ut Iu­lia ma­ies­ta­tis, Iu­lia de ad­ul­te­riis, Cor­ne­lia de si­ca­riis et ve­ne­fi­cis, Pom­peia par­ri­ci­dii, Iu­lia pe­cu­la­tus, Cor­ne­lia de tes­ta­men­tis, Iu­lia de vi pri­va­ta, Iu­lia de vi pu­bli­ca, Iu­lia amb­itus, Iu­lia re­pe­tun­da­rum, Iu­lia de an­no­na.

Macer, On Criminal Prosecutions, Book I. All cases in which crime is involved are not public, but only those which are derived from the laws relating to the prosecution of crimes, such as the Julian Law on Treason; the Julian Law on Adultery; the Cornelian Law on Assassins and Poisoners; the Pompeian Law on Parricide; the Julian Law on Peculation; the Cornelian Law on Wills; the Julian Law on Private Violence; the Julian Law on Public Violence; the Julian Law on the Bribery of Voters; the Julian Law on Extortion; and the Julian Law on Raising the Price of Food.

Dig. 48,5,19Ma­cer li­bro pri­mo de pu­bli­cis iu­di­ciis. vel an­te­quam cum eo agi coe­pit,

Macer, On Public Prosecutions, Book I. Or before the accusation was brought against him,

Dig. 48,5,25Ma­cer li­bro pri­mo pu­bli­co­rum. Ma­ri­to quo­que ad­ul­te­rum uxo­ris suae oc­ci­de­re per­mit­ti­tur, sed non quem­li­bet, ut pa­tri: nam hac le­ge ca­ve­tur, ut li­ceat vi­ro de­pre­hen­sum do­mi suae (non et­iam so­ce­ri) in ad­ul­te­rio uxo­ris oc­ci­de­re eum, qui le­no fue­rit qui­ve ar­tem lu­di­cram an­te fe­ce­rit in scae­nam sal­tan­di can­tan­di­ve cau­sa prod­ie­rit iu­di­cio­ve pu­bli­co dam­na­tus ne­que in in­te­grum re­sti­tu­tus erit, qui­ve li­ber­tus eius ma­ri­ti uxo­ris­ve, pa­tris ma­tris, fi­lii fi­liae utrius eo­rum fue­rit (nec in­ter­est, pro­prius cu­ius eo­rum an cum alio com­mu­nis fue­rit) qui­ve ser­vus erit. 1Et prae­ci­pi­tur, ut is ma­ri­tus, qui ho­rum quem oc­ci­de­rit, uxo­rem si­ne mo­ra di­mit­tat. 2Ce­te­rum sui iu­ris an fi­lius fa­mi­lias sit ma­ri­tus, ni­hil in­ter­es­se a ple­ris­que dic­tum est. 3Il­lud in utro­que ex sen­ten­tia le­gis quae­ri­tur, an pa­tri ma­gis­tra­tum oc­ci­de­re li­ceat? item si fi­lia igno­mi­nio­sa sit aut uxor con­tra le­ges nup­ta, an id ius ni­hi­lo mi­nus pa­ter ma­ri­tus­ve ha­beat? et quid, si pa­ter ma­ri­tus le­no vel ali­qua igno­mi­nia no­ta­tus est? et rec­tius di­ce­tur eos ius oc­ci­den­di ha­be­re, qui iu­re pa­tris ma­ri­ti­ve ac­cu­sa­re pos­sunt.

Macer, Public Prosecutions, Book I. A husband is also permitted to kill a man who commits adultery with his wife, but not everyone without distinction, as the father is; for it is provided by this law that the husband can kill the adulterer if he surprises him in his own house, but not if he surprises him in the house of his father-in-law; nor if he was formerly a pander; or had exercised the profession of a mountebank, by dancing or singing on the stage; or had been convicted in a criminal prosecution and not been restored to his civil rights; or is the freedman of the husband or the wife, or of the father or mother, or of the son or the daughter of any of them; nor does it make any difference whether he belonged exclusively to one of the persons above mentioned, or owed services to two patrons in common, or was a slave. 1It is also provided that a husband who has killed any one of these must dismiss his wife without delay. 2It is held by many authorities to make no difference whether the husband is his own master, or a son under paternal control. 3With reference to both parties, the question arises, in accordance with the spirit of the law, whether the father can kill a magistrate; and also where his daughter is of bad reputation, or has been illegally married, whether the father or the husband will still retain his right; and what should be done if the husband is a pander, or is branded with ignominy for some reason or other. It may properly be held that those have a right to kill who can bring an accusation as a father or a husband.

Dig. 48,5,33Ma­cer li­bro pri­mo de pu­bli­cis iu­di­ciis. Ni­hil in­ter­est, ad­ul­te­ram fi­liam prius pa­ter oc­ci­de­rit an non, dum utrum­que oc­ci­dat: nam si al­te­rum oc­ci­dit, le­ge Cor­ne­lia reus erit. quod si al­te­ro oc­ci­so al­ter vul­ne­ra­tus fue­rit, ver­bis qui­dem le­gis non li­be­ra­tur: sed di­vus Mar­cus et Com­mo­dus re­scrip­se­runt im­pu­ni­ta­tem ei con­ce­di, quia, li­cet in­ter­emp­to ad­ul­te­ro mu­lier su­per­vi­xe­rit post tam gra­via vul­ne­ra, quae ei pa­ter in­fi­xe­rat, ma­gis fa­to quam vo­lun­ta­te eius ser­va­ta est: quia lex pa­rem in eos, qui de­pre­hen­si sunt, in­dig­na­tio­nem ex­igit et se­ve­ri­ta­tem re­qui­rit. 1Cum al­te­rum ex ad­ul­te­ris ele­ge­rit ma­ri­tus, al­te­rum non an­te ac­cu­sa­re pot­est, quam prius iu­di­cium fi­nie­tur, quia duos si­mul ab eo­dem ac­cu­sa­ri non li­cet. non ta­men pro­hi­be­tur ac­cu­sa­tor si­mul cum ad­ul­te­ro vel ad­ul­te­ra eum quo­que ac­cu­sa­re, qui do­mum suam prae­buit vel con­si­lio fuit, ut cri­men red­ime­re­tur.

Macer, On Public Prosecutions, Book I. It makes no difference whether the father kills his daughter surprised in adultery first, or not, provided he kills both guilty parties; for if he kills only one of them, he will be liable under the Cornelian Law. If, however, one of them should be killed, and the other wounded, he is not released under the terms of the law; but the Divine Marcus and Commodus stated in a Rescript that he ought to be granted impunity, for the reason that, although the adulterer was killed, and the woman survived, after having received serious wounds inflicted upon her by her father, she was saved rather by accident, than intentionally; because the law requires the same indignation and the same severity to be displayed toward all those who are taken in adultery. 1Where a husband has selected one of two culprits who have been guilty of adultery, he cannot accuse the other before the first case is terminated; because two persons cannot be accused by the same individual at the same time. Still, the prosecutor, while proceeding against the adulterer or the adulteress, is not prevented from also accusing anyone who lent his house for the purpose, or advised that the charge be suppressed by the payment of money.

Dig. 48,7,3Ma­cer li­bro pri­mo pu­bli­co­rum. nec in­ter­est, li­be­ros an ser­vos et suos an alie­nos quis ad vim fa­cien­dam con­vo­ca­ve­rit. 1Nec mi­nus hi, qui con­vo­ca­ti sunt, ea­dem le­ge te­nen­tur. 2Sed si nul­li con­vo­ca­ti nul­li­que pul­sa­ti sint, per in­iu­riam ta­men ex bo­nis alie­nis quid ab­la­tum sit, hac le­ge te­ne­ri eum qui id fe­ce­rit.

Macer, Public Prosecutions, Book I. It makes no difference whether the crowd was convoked for the purpose of employing violence against freemen, or one’s own slaves, or slaves belonging to another. 1Those who have been assembled are none the less liable under the same law. 2If, however, no persons have been assembled, and none has been beaten, but something has been unjustly taken from property belonging to others, he who did so will be liable under this law.

Dig. 48,10,10Ma­cer li­bro pri­mo pu­bli­co­rum. De eo, qui ei in cu­ius po­tes­ta­te est ei­que qui in ea­dem po­tes­ta­te est ad­scrip­se­rit, ni­hil se­na­tus con­sul­tis ca­ve­tur: sed hoc quo­que ca­su com­mit­ti­tur in le­gem, quia hu­ius rei emo­lu­men­tum ad pa­trem do­mi­num­ve per­ti­net, ad quem per­ti­ne­ret, si fi­lius ser­vus­ve si­bi ad­scrip­sis­sent. 1Il­lud con­stat, si ex­tra­neo quis ad­scrip­se­rit le­ga­tum, li­cet post­ea vi­vo tes­ta­to­re in po­tes­ta­te eum ha­be­re coe­pe­rit, se­na­tus con­sul­tis lo­cum non es­se.

Macer, Public Prosecutions, Book I. Nothing is provided by the Decrees of the Senate with reference to a person who has written something for the benefit of one who has control of him, or of another who is under the same control. But the law is violated also in this instance, because the profit derived from the act will belong to the father or the master, who would be entitled to it if the son or the slave had written the instrument for his own benefit. 1It is established that where anyone writes the bequest of a legacy for the benefit of a stranger, even though he may afterwards, during the lifetime of the testator, begin to have him under his control, there will be no ground for the application of the Decree of the Senate.

Dig. 48,11,3Ma­cer li­bro pri­mo pu­bli­co­rum. Le­ge Iu­lia re­pe­tun­da­rum te­ne­tur, qui, cum ali­quam po­tes­ta­tem ha­be­ret, pe­cu­niam ob iu­di­can­dum vel non iu­di­can­dum de­cer­nen­dum­ve ac­ce­pe­rit:

Macer, Public Prosecutions, Book I. He is liable under the Julian Law relating to Extortion who, while invested with any authority, accepts money for rendering a judgment or decree;

Dig. 48,11,5Ma­cer li­bro pri­mo pu­bli­co­rum. In com­ites quo­que iu­di­cum ex hac le­ge iu­di­cium da­tur.

Macer, Public Prosecutions, Book I. The attendants of judges can also be prosecuted under this law.

Dig. 48,11,7Ma­cer li­bro pri­mo iu­di­cio­rum pu­bli­co­rum. Lex Iu­lia de re­pe­tun­dis prae­ci­pit, ne quis ob iu­di­cem ar­bi­trum­ve dan­dum mu­tan­dum iu­ben­dum­ve ut iu­di­cet: ne­ve ob non dan­dum non mu­tan­dum non iu­ben­dum ut iu­di­cet: ne­ve ob ho­mi­nem in vin­cu­la pu­bli­ca co­icien­dum vin­cien­dum vin­ci­ri­ve iu­ben­dum ex­ve vin­cu­lis di­mit­ten­dum: ne­ve quis ob ho­mi­nem con­dem­nan­dum ab­sol­ven­dum­ve: ne­ve ob li­tem aes­ti­man­dam iu­di­cium­ve ca­pi­tis pe­cu­niae­ve fa­cien­dum vel non fa­cien­dum ali­quid ac­ce­pe­rit. 1Ap­pa­ret au­tem, quod lex ab ex­cep­tis qui­dem in in­fi­ni­tum ca­pe­re per­mit­tit, ab his au­tem, qui hoc ca­pi­te enu­me­ran­tur, a nul­lo ne­que ul­lam quan­ti­ta­tem ca­pe­re per­mit­tit. 2Il­lud quo­que ca­ve­tur, ne in ac­cep­tum fe­ra­tur opus pu­bli­cum fa­cien­dum, fru­men­tum pu­bli­ce dan­dum prae­ben­dum ad­prae­hen­den­dum, sar­ta tec­ta tuen­da, an­te­quam per­fec­ta pro­ba­ta prae­sti­ta le­ge erunt. 3Ho­die ex le­ge re­pe­tun­da­rum ex­tra or­di­nem pu­niun­tur et ple­rum­que vel ex­ilio pu­niun­tur vel et­iam du­rius, pro­ut ad­mi­se­rint. quid enim, si ob ho­mi­nem ne­can­dum pe­cu­niam ac­ce­pe­rint? vel, li­cet non ac­ce­pe­rint, ca­lo­re ta­men in­duc­ti in­ter­fe­ce­rint vel in­no­cen­tem vel quem pu­ni­re non de­bue­rant? ca­pi­te plec­ti de­bent vel cer­te in in­su­lam de­por­ta­ri, ut ple­ri­que pu­ni­ti sunt.

Macer, Public Prosecutions, Book I. The Julian Law on Extortion prescribes that: “No one shall receive anything as an inducement to render a judgment or a decree, or for changing his opinion; or to prevent him from rendering a decision; or to throw a person into prison, or put him in chains; or order him to be chained, or delivered from his chains; or to convict or acquit a man; or to appraise the amount of a judgment; or to sentence anyone to a capital or a pecuniary penalty, or to refrain from doing so.” 1It is, however, apparent that the law permits all those, excepting such as have been excepted, to receive money without limit; but those enumerated in this Section are not allowed to receive anything from anybody. 2It is also provided: “That no public work which is to be constructed shall be accepted as completed, nor any public provisions which are to be distributed held to be transferred or obtained, nor any buildings considered as repaired, before they have been finished, accepted, and delivered according to law.” 3Persons guilty of extortion are at present arbitrarily dealt with by the law, and they are generally punished with exile, or even more severely, according to the crime which they have committed. What, however, should be done if they accept money as a reward for killing a man? Or even if they do not accept it, but, impelled by rage, they kill an innocent person, or one whom they should not punish? They should undergo a capital penalty, or be deported to an island, as indeed most of them are.

Ex libro II

Dig. 1,18,14Ma­cer li­bro se­cun­do de iu­di­ciis pu­bli­cis. Di­vus Mar­cus et Com­mo­dus Sca­pu­lae Ter­tul­lo re­scrip­se­runt in haec ver­ba: ‘Si ti­bi li­qui­do com­per­tum est Ae­lium Pris­cum in eo fu­ro­re es­se, ut con­ti­nua men­tis alie­na­tio­ne om­ni in­tel­lec­tu ca­reat, nec sub­est ul­la su­spi­cio ma­trem ab eo si­mu­la­tio­ne demen­tiae oc­ci­sam: potes de mo­do poe­nae eius dis­si­mu­la­re, cum sa­tis fu­ro­re ip­so pu­nia­tur. et ta­men di­li­gen­tius cus­to­dien­dus erit ac, si pu­ta­bis, et­iam vin­cu­lo co­er­cen­dus, quon­iam tam ad poe­nam quam ad tu­te­lam eius et se­cu­ri­ta­tem pro­xi­mo­rum per­ti­ne­bit. si ve­ro, ut ple­rum­que ad­so­let, in­ter­val­lis qui­bus­dam sen­su sa­nio­re, non for­te eo mo­men­to sce­lus ad­mi­se­rit nec mor­bo eius dan­da est ve­nia, di­li­gen­ter ex­plo­ra­bis et si quid ta­le com­pe­re­ris, con­su­les nos, ut aes­ti­me­mus, an per im­ma­ni­ta­tem fa­ci­no­ris, si, cum pos­set vi­de­ri sen­ti­re, com­mi­se­rit, sup­pli­cio ad­fi­cien­dus sit. cum au­tem ex lit­te­ris tuis co­gno­ve­ri­mus ta­li eum lo­co at­que or­di­ne es­se, ut a suis vel et­iam in pro­pria vil­la cus­to­dia­tur: rec­te fac­tu­rus no­bis vi­de­ris, si eos, a qui­bus il­lo tem­po­re ob­ser­va­tus es­set, vo­ca­ve­ris et cau­sam tan­tae neg­le­gen­tiae ex­cus­se­ris et in unum­quem­que eo­rum, pro­ut ti­bi le­va­ri vel one­ra­ri cul­pa eius vi­de­bi­tur, con­sti­tue­ris. nam cus­to­des fu­rio­sis non ad hoc so­lum ad­hi­ben­tur, ne quid per­ni­cio­sius ip­si in se mo­lian­tur, sed ne aliis quo­que ex­itio sint: quod si com­mit­ta­tur, non im­me­ri­to cul­pae eo­rum ad­scri­ben­dum est, qui neg­le­gen­tio­res in of­fi­cio suo fue­rint.’

Macer, On Criminal Trials, Book II. The Divine Marcus and Commodus addressed a Rescript to Scapulas Tertullus in the following terms: “If it is positively ascertained by you that Ælius Perseus is to such a degree insane that, through his constant alienation of mind, he is void of all understanding, and no suspicion exists that he was pretending insanity when he killed his mother, you can disregard the manner of his punishment, since he has already been sufficiently punished by his insanity; still, he should be placed under careful restraint, and, if you think proper, even be placed in chains; as this has reference not so much to his punishment as to his own protection and the safety of his neighbors. If, however, as often happens, he has intervals of sounder mind, you must diligently inquire whether he did not commit the crime during one of these periods, so that no indulgence should be given to his affliction; and, if you find that this is the case, notify Us, that We may determine whether he should be punished in proportion to the enormity of his offence, if he committed it at a time when he seemed to know what he was doing. “But, when We are informed by your letter that his condition so far as place and treatment are concerned, is that he remains in charge of his friends, or under guard in his own house; it appears to Us that you will act properly if you summon those who had care of him at that time, and investigate the cause of such great neglect, and decide the case of each one of them, so far as you discover anything tending to excuse or increase his negligence; for keepers are appointed for insane persons, not only to prevent them from injuring themselves, but that they may not be a source of destruction to others; and where this takes place, those very properly should be held responsible who are guilty of negligence in the discharge of their duties.”

Dig. 47,2,64Ma­cer li­bro se­cun­do pu­bli­co­rum iu­di­cio­rum. Non pot­erit prae­ses pro­vin­ciae ef­fi­ce­re, ut fur­ti dam­na­tum non se­qua­tur in­fa­mia.

Macer, Public Prosecutions, Book II. The Governor of a province cannot prevent anyone who has been convicted of theft from being branded with infamy.

Dig. 47,10,40Ma­cer li­bro se­cun­do pu­bli­co­rum iu­di­cio­rum. Di­vus Se­ve­rus Dio­ny­sio Dio­ge­ni ita scrip­sit: ‘Atro­cis in­iu­riae dam­na­tus in or­di­ne de­cu­rio­num es­se non pot­est. nec prod­es­se ti­bi de­bet er­ror prae­si­dum aut eius, qui de te ali­quid pro­nun­tia­vit, aut eo­rum, qui con­tra for­mam iu­ris man­sis­se te in or­di­ne de­cu­rio­num pu­ta­ve­runt’.

Macer, Public Prosecutions, Book II. The Divine Severus wrote to Dionysius Diogenes, as follows: “Anyone who has been condemned for an atrocious injury cannot belong to the Order of Decurions; and the error of a Governor or of anyone else who has rendered a different decision on the point in controversy will not benefit you, nor will that of those who, in opposition to the established law, held that you still retained your membership in the Order of Decurions.”

Dig. 47,12,9Idem li­bro se­cun­do pu­bli­co­rum iu­di­cio­rum. De se­pul­chro vio­la­to ac­tio quo­que pe­cu­nia­ria da­tur.

The Same, Public Prosecutions, Book II. A pecuniary action is also granted for violating a sepulchre.

Dig. 47,15,4Idem li­bro se­cun­do pu­bli­co­rum iu­di­cio­rum. Si is, de cu­ius ca­lum­nia agi pro­hi­be­tur, prae­va­ri­ca­tor in cau­sa iu­di­cii pu­bli­ci pro­nun­tia­tus sit, in­fa­mis erit.

The Same, Public Prosecutions, Book II. If a person against whom an action for slander cannot be brought is convicted of being a prevaricator in a criminal case, he will become infamous.

Dig. 48,1,7Ma­cer li­bro se­cun­do iu­di­cio­rum pu­bli­co­rum. In­fa­mem non ex om­ni cri­mi­ne sen­ten­tia fa­cit, sed ex eo, quod iu­di­cii pu­bli­ci cau­sam ha­buit. ita­que ex eo cri­mi­ne, quod iu­di­cii pu­bli­ci non fuit, dam­na­tum in­fa­mia non se­que­tur, ni­si id cri­men ex ea ac­tio­ne fuit, quae et­iam in pri­va­to iu­di­cio in­fa­miam con­dem­na­to im­por­tat, vel­uti fur­ti, vi bo­no­rum rap­to­rum, in­iu­ria­rum.

Macer, Public Prosecutions, Book II. A sentence for every crime does not render a man infamous, but only such as have the character of public prosecutions. Hence infamy does not result from condemnation for a crime which is not the subject of public prosecution, unless the offence can be the subject of an action which, even in the case of a private judgment, brands the condemned party with infamy, as for instance, that of theft, that of robbery with violence, and that of injury.

Dig. 48,2,8Ma­cer li­bro se­cun­do de pu­bli­cis iu­di­ciis. Qui ac­cu­sa­re pos­sunt, in­tel­le­ge­mus, si scie­ri­mus, qui non pos­sunt. ita­que pro­hi­ben­tur ac­cu­sa­re alii prop­ter se­xum vel ae­ta­tem, ut mu­lier, ut pu­pil­lus: alii prop­ter sa­cra­men­tum, ut qui sti­pen­dium me­rent: alii prop­ter ma­gis­tra­tum po­tes­ta­tem­ve, in qua agen­tes si­ne frau­de in ius evo­ca­ri non pos­sunt: alii prop­ter de­lic­tum pro­prium, ut in­fa­mes: alii prop­ter tur­pem quaes­tum, ut qui duo iu­di­cia ad­ver­sus duos reos sub­scrip­ta ha­bent num­mos­ve ob ac­cu­san­dum vel non ac­cu­san­dum ac­ce­pe­rint: alii prop­ter con­di­cio­nem suam, ut li­ber­ti­ni con­tra pa­tro­nos:

Macer, On Public Prosecutions, Book II. We will more readily understand who can bring an accusation if we know who cannot do so. Hence, certain persons are forbidden to prosecute a crime on account of their sex or their age, as women, or minors. Many are disqualified because of their oath, for instance, those who are serving in the army; others cannot be brought into court on account of their magistracy, or their power, so long as they exercise this without the commission of fraud. Others, again are forbidden as the result of their own criminality, for example, infamous persons. Some are excluded on account of dishonorable gain, such as those who have filed two accusations signed by them against two different individuals; or who have received money in consideration of accusing, or not accusing others. Some are incompetent in consequence of their condition, as, for instance, freedmen cannot proceed against their patrons.

Dig. 48,2,11Ma­cer li­bro se­cun­do de pu­bli­cis iu­di­ciis. Hi ta­men om­nes, si suam in­iu­riam ex­equan­tur mor­tem­ve pro­pin­quo­rum de­fen­dent, ab ac­cu­sa­tio­ne non ex­clu­dun­tur. 1Li­be­ri li­ber­ti­que non sunt pro­hi­ben­di sua­rum re­rum de­fen­den­da­rum gra­tia de fac­to pa­ren­tium pa­tro­no­rum­ve que­ri, vel­uti si di­cant vi se a pos­ses­sio­ne ab his ex­pul­sos, sci­li­cet non ut cri­men vis eis in­ten­dant, sed ut pos­ses­sio­nem re­ci­piant. nam et fi­lius non qui­dem pro­hi­bi­tus est de fac­to ma­tris que­ri, si di­cat sup­po­si­tum ab ea par­tum, quo ma­gis co­he­redem ha­be­ret, sed ream eam le­ge Cor­ne­lia fa­ce­re per­mis­sum ei non est. 2Ab alio de­la­tum alius de­fer­re non pot­est: sed eum, qui ab­oli­tio­ne pu­bli­ca vel pri­va­ta in­ter­ve­nien­te aut de­sis­ten­te ac­cu­sa­to­re de reis ex­emp­tus est, alius de­fer­re non pro­hi­be­tur.

Macer, On Public Prosecutions, Book II. Still, all these persons, if they are prosecuting injuries sustained by them, or the death of near relatives, are not excluded from bringing accusations. 1When children and freedmen desire to protect their interests they should not be prevented from complaining of the acts of their parents and patrons; for instance, where they state that they have been forcibly expelled from possession, and do not do so for the purpose of bringing an accusation of the crime of violence, but in order that they may recover possession of the property. For, indeed, a son is not forbidden to complain of the act of his mother, if he alleges that a child has been falsely substituted by her in order that he might have a co-heir, but he will not be permitted to accuse his mother under the Cornelian Law. 2One person cannot accuse another who has been already accused by a third party; but anyone who has been publicly or privately acquitted, or whose accuser has desisted from prosecution, and has been removed from a number of defendants, may be accused by another.

Dig. 48,16,9Ma­cer li­bro se­cun­do pu­bli­co­rum. vel ob rem pro­spe­re ges­tam

Macer, Public Prosecutions, Book II. Or by reason of the fortunate result of some transaction,

Dig. 48,16,15Ma­cer li­bro se­cun­do pu­bli­co­rum. In se­na­tus con­sul­tum Tur­pil­lia­num in­ci­dunt, qui sub­ie­cis­sent ac­cu­sa­to­res, aut sub­iec­ti pos­tu­las­sent nec per­egis­sent reos, aut ali­ter quam ab­oli­tio­ne fac­ta de­sti­tis­sent: qui­que chi­ro­gra­phum ob ac­cu­san­dum de­dis­sent pac­tio­nem­ve ali­quam in­ter­po­suis­sent. hoc au­tem ver­bum ‘nec per­egis­sent’ ad uni­ver­sos su­pra scrip­tos per­ti­ne­re di­cen­dum est. 1An ad eos, qui ho­die de iu­di­ciis pu­bli­cis ex­tra or­di­nem co­gnos­cunt, se­na­tus con­sul­tum per­ti­neat, quae­ri­tur: sed iam hoc iu­re ex sa­cris con­sti­tu­tio­ni­bus uti­mur, ut per­ti­neat ita ex sin­gu­lis cau­sis sin­gu­lae poe­nae ir­ro­gen­tur. 2Eos, de quo­rum ca­lum­nia agi non per­mit­ti­tur, si de­sti­te­rint, non in­ci­de­re in poe­nam hu­ius se­na­tus con­sul­ti con­sti­tu­tio­ni­bus ca­ve­tur. 3Si prop­ter mor­tem rei ac­cu­sa­tor de­sti­te­rit, non pot­est hoc se­na­tus con­sul­to te­ne­ri, quia mor­te rei iu­di­cium sol­vi­tur, ni­si ta­le cri­men fuit, cu­ius ac­tio et ad­ver­sus he­redes du­rat, vel­uti ma­ies­ta­tis. idem in ac­cu­sa­tio­ne re­pe­tun­da­rum est, quia haec quo­que mor­te non sol­vi­tur. 4Ce­te­rum si, post­ea quam ac­cu­sa­tor de­sti­tit, reus de­ces­se­rit, non id­eo ma­gis de­lic­tum ac­cu­sa­to­ris rele­va­tur. nam eum qui se­mel de­sti­tit, si post­ea ac­cu­sa­re pa­ra­tus sit, non es­se au­dien­dum Se­ve­rus et An­to­ni­nus sta­tue­runt. 5Qui post in­scrip­tio­nem an­te li­tem con­tes­ta­tam an­no vel bi­en­nio age­re non po­tue­rint va­riis prae­si­dum oc­cu­pa­tio­ni­bus vel et­iam ci­vi­lium of­fi­cio­rum ne­ces­si­ta­ti­bus di­stric­ti, in se­na­tus con­sul­tum non in­ci­dent. 6Quam­quam prius reum quis de­tu­le­rat, et si post ab­oli­tio­nem, an­te­quam reus re­pe­te­re­tur, alia ab­oli­tio su­per­ve­ne­rit: non ex su­pe­rio­re, sed ex se­cun­da ab­oli­tio­ne dies tri­gin­ta com­pu­tan­tur.

Macer, Public Prosecutions, Book II. Those come within the scope of the Turpillian Decree of the Senate who substitute accusers in their places; or who, having done so, bring the accusation without prosecuting the defendants; or desist from the prosecution in some other manner than by the dismissal of the case, as well as such as have filed some written document, or have entered into some agreement for the purpose of accusing another. It must be said that these words, “Bring the accusation without prosecuting the defendants,” are applicable to all the persons above mentioned. 1The question arises whether the Decree of the Senate applies to those who, at present, have extraordinary jurisdiction of public offences. The present law, based upon the Imperial Constitutions, is that it does apply; hence each penalty will be imposed in each individual case. 2If those who are not permitted to bring an accusation for calumny desist, they will not be liable to the penalty of this Decree of the Senate. This has been provided by the Constitutions. 3If, on account of the death of the defendant, the accuser should desist, he cannot be held liable under this Decree of the Senate; because the prosecution is extinguished by the death of the accused, unless the crime is such that its prosecution can be continued against the heirs, as, for instance, that of high treason. The same rule applies where an accusation is brought for extortion, because this also is not extinguished by death. 4Moreover, if the defendant should die after the accuser has desisted from the prosecution, the offence of the accuser will not, for this reason, be lessened. For if he who has once desisted should afterwards be ready to renew the accusation, Severus and Antoninus have decreed that he shall not be heard. 5Those who, after having filed a written accusation, have permitted one or two years to elapse, for the reason that they could not prosecute on account of their various occupations as Governors, or because they were prevented by the requirements of civil office, do not come within the terms of the Decree of the Senate. 6If anyone has accused a person in the first place, and, after the case has been dismissed, but before the defendant is again accused, a second dismissal should occur, the thirty days should be computed, not from the first, but from the second dismissal of the case.

Dig. 48,17,2Ma­cer li­bro se­cun­do pu­bli­co­rum. An­ni spa­tium ad oc­cu­pan­da bo­na eius, qui re­qui­ren­dus ad­no­ta­tus est, per­ti­net. 1Sed si per vi­gin­ti an­nos fis­cus bo­na non oc­cu­pa­ve­rit, post­ea prae­scrip­tio­ne vel ab ip­so reo vel ab he­redi­bus eius sub­mo­ve­bi­tur:

Macer, On Public Prosecutions, Book II. The term of a year is fixed for the purpose of seizing the property of anyone who is sought for and noted as being present. 1If, however, the Treasury does not seize his property for twenty years, it will be barred from doing so subsequently, if prescription should be pleaded either by the defendant himself, or by his heirs.

Dig. 48,17,4Ma­cer li­bro se­cun­do de pu­bli­cis iu­di­ciis. An­nus ex­in­de com­pu­tan­dus est, ex quo ea ad­no­ta­tio quae vel edic­to vel lit­te­ris ad ma­gis­tra­tus fac­tis pu­bli­ce in­no­tuit. 1Er­go et vi­gin­ti an­no­rum tem­pus ex­in­de fis­co nu­me­ra­tur, ex quo ad­no­ta­tio pu­bli­ce in­no­tuit. 2In sum­ma scien­dum est nul­la tem­po­ris prae­scrip­tio­ne cau­sae de­fen­sio­ne sum­mo­ve­ri eum, qui re­qui­ren­dus ad­no­ta­tus est.

Macer, On Public Prosecutions, Book II. The year is computed from the time when the notification was publicly made, either by means of an Edict or by letters sent to the magistrate. 1Therefore, the term of twenty years is reckoned for the Treasury, from the moment when the notice was published. 2In a word, it should be remembered that he who is sought for and notified is not barred from undertaking his defence by any prescription of time.

Dig. 48,19,10Ma­cer li­bro se­cun­do de pu­bli­cis iu­di­ciis. In ser­vo­rum per­so­na ita ob­ser­va­tur, ut ex­em­plo hu­mi­lio­rum pu­nian­tur. et ex qui­bus cau­sis li­ber fus­ti­bus cae­di­tur, ex his ser­vus fla­gel­lis cae­di et do­mi­no red­di iu­be­tur: et ex qui­bus li­ber fus­ti­bus cae­sus in opus pu­bli­cum da­tur, ex his ser­vus, sub poe­na vin­cu­lo­rum ad eius tem­po­ris spa­tium, fla­gel­lis cae­sus do­mi­no red­di iu­be­tur. si sub poe­na vin­cu­lo­rum do­mi­no red­di ius­sus non re­ci­pia­tur, ve­num­da­ri et, si emp­to­rem non in­ve­ne­rit, in opus pu­bli­cum et qui­dem per­pe­tuum tra­di iu­be­tur. 1Qui ex cau­sa in me­tal­lum da­ti sunt et post hoc de­li­que­runt, in eos tam­quam me­tal­li­cos con­sti­tui de­bet, quam­vis non­dum in eum lo­cum per­duc­ti fue­rint, in quo ope­ra­ri ha­bent: nam sta­tim ut de is sen­ten­tia dic­ta est, con­di­cio­nem suam per­mu­tant. 2In per­so­nis tam ple­be­io­rum quam de­cu­rio­num il­lud con­sti­tu­tum est, ut qui ma­io­ri poe­na ad­fi­ci­tur, quam le­gi­bus sta­tu­ta est, in­fa­mis non fiat. er­go et si ope­re tem­po­ra­rio quis mul­ta­tus sit vel tan­tum fus­ti­bus cae­sus, li­cet in ac­tio­ne fa­mo­sa, vel­uti fur­ti, di­cen­dum erit in­fa­mem non es­se, quia et so­lus fus­tium ic­tus gra­vior est quam pe­cu­nia­ris dam­na­tio.

Macer, On Public Prosecutions, Book II. The rule is observed with reference to slaves, that they shall be punished as persons of the lowest rank, and in cases where a freeman is whipped, a slave should be scourged, and ordered to be restored to his master; and where a freeman, after having been whipped, is sentenced to labor upon the public works, a slave, under the same circumstances, after having been kept in chains for a certain period of time, and scourged, is ordered to be restored to his master. Where a slave, after having undergone the punishment of chains, is ordered to be restored to his master, but is not received by him, he shall be sold; and if he does not find a purchaser, he shall be sentenced to labor on the public works for life. 1Those who, for some cause, have been sentenced to the mines and afterwards commit some offence, ought to be judged as having been condemned to the mines, although they may not yet have been taken to the place where they will be compelled to work; for they change their condition just as soon as sentence has been passed upon them. 2It has been decided with reference to plebeians as well as decurions, that where a more severe penalty than is authorized by law has been inflicted upon anyone, he does not become infamous. Therefore, if a man has been sentenced to labor for a specified term, or only beaten with rods, although this may have been done in an action which implied infamy, as, for instance, one of theft, it must be said that the accused does not become infamous, because blows with a rod constitute a more severe penalty than a pecuniary fine.

Dig. 48,21,2Ma­cer li­bro se­cun­do pu­bli­co­rum. ‘Im­pe­ra­to­res Se­ve­rus et An­to­ni­nus Iu­lio Iu­lia­no. Eos, qui a la­tro­ni­bus no­mi­na­ti cor­rup­tis ac­cu­sa­to­ri­bus diem suum ob­ie­rint, ut con­fes­sos de cri­mi­ne non re­lin­que­re de­fen­sio­nem he­redi­bus ra­tio­nis est’. 1Si is, de cu­ius poe­na im­pe­ra­to­ri scrip­tum est (vel­uti quod de­cu­rio fue­rit vel quod in in­su­lam de­por­ta­ri de­bue­rit), an­te­quam re­scri­be­re­tur de­ces­se­rit: pot­est quae­ri, num an­te sen­ten­tiam de­ces­sis­se vi­dea­tur. ar­gu­men­to est se­na­tus con­sul­tum, quod fac­tum est de his, qui Ro­mam trans­mis­si an­te sen­ten­tiam de­ces­sis­sent. cu­ius ver­ba haec sunt: ‘Cum dam­na­tus ne­mo vi­de­ri pos­sit in hunc an­num, an­te­quam de eo for­te iu­di­cium Ro­mae red­di­tum et pro­nun­tia­tum es­set: ne­que cu­ius­quam mor­tui bo­na, an­te­quam de eo Ro­mae pro­nun­tia­tum sit, pu­bli­ca­ta sunt, ea­que bo­na he­redes pos­si­de­re de­bent’.

Macer, Public Prosecutions, Book II. The Emperors Severus and Antoninus to Julius Julianus: Those who are said by robbers to have corrupted their accuser, and are dead, are considered to have confessed their crime, and hence to have left no defence to their heirs. 1Where anyone, concerning whose punishment a communication has been sent to the Emperor, for instance, because he was a decurion, or should have been deported to an island, and he dies before the Emperor has sent his reply, it may be asked whether he should be considered to have died before judgment. This question may be said to have been settled by a Decree of the Senate, which was enacted with reference to persons who were transferred to Rome, and died before judgment was rendered. The terms of this decree are as follows: “As no one can be considered to have been condemned during this year, before judgment in his case has been rendered and made public at Rome; no property belonging to a deceased person shall be confiscated before judgment in his case has been made public at Rome; and his heirs can take possession of his estate.”

Dig. 49,14,34Ma­cer li­bro se­cun­do pu­bli­co­rum. Im­pe­ra­to­res Se­ve­rus et An­to­ni­nus As­cle­pia­di ita re­scrip­se­runt: ‘Tu, qui de­fen­sio­ne omis­sa red­ime­re sen­ten­tiam ma­luis­ti, cum ti­bi cri­men ob­ice­re­tur, non im­me­ri­to quin­gen­tos so­li­dos in­fer­re fis­co ius­sus es: omis­sa enim ip­sius cau­sae in­qui­si­tio­ne ip­se te huic poe­nae sub­di­dis­ti. op­ti­nen­dum est enim, ut hi, qui­bus neg­otia fis­ca­lia mo­ven­tur, ad de­fen­sio­nes cau­sae bo­na fi­de ve­niant, non ad­ver­sa­rios aut iu­di­ces red­ime­re temp­tent’.

Macer, Public Prosecutions, Book II. The Emperors Severus and Antoninus stated in a Rescript to Asclepiades: “You who, having failed to make a defence, preferred to purchase the judgment when you were accused of crime, are with reason ordered to pay fifty solidi to the Treasury, since, leaving out of consideration the examination of your case, you have rendered yourself liable to this penalty; for it must be maintained that those who are involved in matters in which the Treasury is interested, should undertake the defence of their cases in good faith, and not attempt to buy their adversaries, or their judges.”

Fragmenta incerta

Dig. 48,20,8Ma­cer li­bro ..... de pu­bli­cis iu­di­ciis. Li­be­ris quo­que pa­tro­no­rum in­te­grum ius pa­tro­na­tus ser­va­tur in bo­nis pa­ter­ni li­ber­ti pu­bli­ca­tis. si eius li­ber­ti ex­tat pa­tro­ni fi­lius, fis­co lo­cus non est in par­te fi­lii pa­tro­ni. 1Si pa­tro­ni fi­lius ex­clu­di­tur prop­ter li­be­ros quos ha­bet li­ber­tus, sa­tius est di­ce­re fis­co lo­cum non es­se, quon­iam pa­tro­ni fi­lium ex­clu­dunt li­be­ri li­ber­ti, ip­se au­tem fis­cum re­pel­lit. 2Pa­tro­ni fi­lius et­iam­si bo­no­rum pos­ses­sio­nem non pe­tat, haud du­bie ex­clu­dit fis­cum in par­te si­bi de­bi­ta ex bo­nis li­ber­ti pa­ter­ni. 3Rele­ga­ti bo­na per sen­ten­tiam spe­cia­lem pu­bli­ca­ri pot­erunt, nec ta­men iu­ra ad­ver­sus li­ber­tos ei au­fe­run­tur ni­si prin­ci­pis ius­su. 4Si con­dem­na­tur pa­ter, qui do­tem pro fi­lia de­dit, fis­co in eam do­tem ius non est, et­iam­si post­ea in ma­tri­mo­nio fi­lia mo­ria­tur,

Marcianus, Book. The right of patrons is preserved unimpaired for their children, so far as the property of a freedman of their father, whose property has been confiscated, is concerned. If the son of the patron appears, the Treasury can claim nothing of the share to which he is entitled. 1Where, however, there is a son of the patron, and a son of the freedman as well, the former will be excluded; and there will still be more reason for us to hold that there will be no ground for forfeiture to the Treasury, as children of the freedman exclude those of the patron, and those of the patron exclude the Treasury. 2But even if the son of the patron does not desire to demand prætorian possession of the estate, it is established that the Treasury will be excluded from that portion of the property of the freedman of his father to which he is entitled. 3The property of a person who has been relegated is not confiscated, unless this is expressly done by the terms of the sentence; but the rights of freedmen cannot be taken away by a special sentence, because the Emperor alone can deprive a relegated person of them. 4When a father, who has given a dowry for his daughter, is convicted, nothing is forfeited to the Treasury, even if the daughter should die afterwards during marriage, in which case the profecticial dowry will revert to the father. Therefore it will remain in the hands of her husband.

Dig. 48,20,10Ma­cer li­bro ..... de pu­bli­cis iu­di­ciis. Et­iam si pa­ter, cum pro fi­lia do­tem pro­mi­sis­set, con­dem­na­tur, vir eam ex bo­nis eius a fis­co pe­tit. 1Si post so­lu­tum ma­tri­mo­nium fi­liae pa­ter con­dem­na­tur, si qui­dem post­quam fi­lia ei con­sen­sit de do­te re­pe­ten­da, fis­cus a ma­ri­to eam re­pe­tit: si an­te­quam con­sen­ti­ret ei, con­dem­na­tus est, ip­sa re­pe­ti­tio­nem ha­bet.

Marcianus, Book. Even if the father has promised a dowry for his daughter, and has been convicted, an action to recover the dowry from the estate of the father will be granted to the husband against the Treasury. 1Where a father has been convicted, after the dissolution of the marriage of the daughter, and, indeed, after the daughter has given her consent for him to have the dowry, the Treasury can recover it from the husband; but, before she gives her consent, the daughter herself will have a right to recover her dowry.