Macer, On Appeals, Book I. It must be remembered that the possessors of real property are not compelled to give security. 1Ad Dig. 2,8,15,1Windscheid: Lehrbuch des Pandektenrechts, 7. Aufl. 1891, Bd. I, § 154, Note 7.By such a possessor is to be understood one who possesses land either in the country or in the city, either wholly, or in part. He also is understood to be a possessor who holds land subject to the payment of rent to the State, that is, an emphyteutic estate; and he also who has the mere ownership is considered to be a possessor. Ulpianus, however, stated that he who has only the usufruct, is not a possessor. 2A creditor who has accepted a pledge is not a possessor, even though he may have possession of the article, or whether it has been delivered to him, or is held by the debtor at the will of the creditor. 3Where real property is given by way of dowry, both the wife and the husband are understood to be possessors on account of their possession of said property. 4The case is different with a party who has the right of personal action for the recovery of land. 5Guardians, whether their wards or they themselves are in possession, are considered possessors; and the same rule applies where only one of several guardians is in possession. 6If you bring suit against me for land of which I am in possession; and judgment is rendered in your favor, and I take an appeal; am I still to be considered the possessor of said land? It may be very properly stated that I am the possessor of the same, because I still hold it; nor does it make any difference that I can subsequently be deprived of my possession. 7To ascertain whether a party is, or is not a possessor, the time when a bond was required must be considered; for just as the party is none the worse who has sold his possession after giving a bond, so he who takes possession after a bond has been executed obtains no advantage.

Macer, On Appeals, Book I. When anyone appeals at the time when the judgment is rendered, it will be sufficient for him to say, “I appeal.”

Macer, On Appeals, Book I. It is not permitted to appeal from the execution of a judgment. 1It is, however, permitted to appeal from the decision of one who is alleged to have placed a wrong interpretation upon a judgment, if he had the authority to interpret it, as, for instance, the Governor of a province, or the Imperial Procurator; provided that, in discussing the causes for granting the appeal the question alone is raised whether the interpretation was according to law. This was also stated by the Divine Antoninus in a Rescript. 2Where another person has been convicted, he who has an interest in the case can appeal; for instance, one who, having appointed an attorney, has been defeated, and the attorney did not appeal in his name. 3Likewise, if the purchaser is evicted of the property sold, and neglects to appeal, the vendor can appeal. Or, if he brings suit and is defeated, the vendor should not be denied the right to appeal. But what if the vendor who refused to appeal is not solvent? And even if he should appeal, and appears to be liable to suspicion when conducting the case, the defence for this reason can be entrusted to the purchaser, just as if he himself had appealed. 4This has been decided with reference to the creditor, when the debtor is defeated and appeals, for he did not faithfully defend his case. This constitution should be understood to mean that the creditor having intervened, the debtor lost his case involving a pledge and took an appeal. For it has been decided that the debtor, in case of the absence of his creditor, does not prejudice him in any way. 5Where an attorney who is conducting a case loses it, let us see whether he himself can appeal through another attorney, because it is established that one attorney cannot appoint another. It must, however, be remembered that an attorney, by the joinder of issue, becomes the master of the case, and therefore can appeal by the agency of another attorney.

Macer, Appeals, Book I. If you have conducted a case as an attorney, and, having been defeated, appeal, and your appeal has been decided to be ill founded, it may be doubted whether you should appeal on the second day, for as judgment has been rendered against your appeal, you appear to be the party in interest. It is, however, better to hold that you can appeal on the third day, because you have, nevertheless, defended the case of another. 1If, however, another than a party litigant should appeal, for example, one who has an interest, let us see whether he can appeal on the third day. It must, however, be said that he ought to appeal on the second day, because it is true that he is defending his own case. It would be opposing himself if he should allege that he has a right to appeal within three days, because it is held that if he takes an appeal in the name of another, when if he wishes his own case to appear to be that of another, he excludes himself, for the reason that he who was not a party in the beginning has no right to appeal in another’s case. 2If, however, one who is alleged to be a freedman should defend himself on the ground that he is freeborn, and, having been beaten, neglects to appeal, the question arises whether his father can do so, especially if he states that he is under his control. But if he can appeal, it is better to hold that he should do so on the second day, as conducting his own case. 3Where a near relative appeals in behalf of a person who has been sentenced to death, Paulus doubts whether he should be heard on the third day. It must, however, be said that a person of this kind should appeal upon the second day, as representing himself; because he who alleges that he is interested is defending his own case.

Macer, Appeals, Book I. He should not be heard who attempts to cause delay in a suit in which he alleges in reply that he has presented a petition to the Emperor, and is waiting for the issue of the Rescript, and, if he takes an appeal on this ground, the Imperial Constitutions forbid it to be received.

Macer, On Appeals, Book III. This difference exists between the case of minors under twenty-live years of age and parties who are absent on public business, namely: minors, even where they are defended by their guardians and curators, may still obtain complete restitution against the State, that is, where proper cause is shown; but where anyone is absent on public business, or where others who enjoy the same privilege, if they are defended by their agents, are usually only relieved by complete restitution to the extent of being permitted to appeal.

Ad Dig. 42,1,63Windscheid: Lehrbuch des Pandektenrechts, 7. Aufl. 1891, Bd. I, § 132, Note 2.Macer, On Appeals, Book II. It has often been stated in the Imperial Constitutions that judgments obtained by certain persons do not prejudice the rights of others. This, however, admits of a certain distinction, for in some instances a judgment rendered against certain persons does prejudice others who have knowledge of it, but, in other cases, does not injure even those against whom it was rendered. A judgment is of no disadvantage to those who have knowledge of it, as where one of two heirs of a debtor has judgment rendered against him; for the right of the other to defend himself remains unimpaired, even if he knew that he was sued with his co-heir. Moreover, where one of two plaintiffs, having lost his case, acquiesces in the decision, the claim of the other is not prejudiced. This has been stated in a rescript. A decision rendered against certain parties injures others who are aware of it, when anyone who has a right to bring or defend an action before another suffers someone else to do so; as, for instance, where a creditor permits his debtor to bring suit involving the right to a pledge; or a husband allows his father-in-law, or his wife to institute proceedings to determine the ownership of property received by way of dowry; or a possessor permits the vendor to bring an action to establish the title to property which he has purchased. These points are understood to have been settled by many constitutions. For why should knowledge injure these parties, when it does not injure those previously mentioned? The reason for this is, that when anyone knows that his co-heir brings suit, he cannot prevent him from using any means which he may be able to employ in bringing or defending an action in which he is interested. He, however, who suffers a former owner of the property in dispute to defend an action is, on account of his knowledge, barred by an exception, even though the suit was decided with reference to others; because the decision was rendered with his consent, so far as any right derived from the party appearing in the case was concerned. For if, through my intervention, my freedman is decided to be the slave or the freedman of another, my rights will be prejudiced. A distinction, however, arises where Titius brings suit against you to recover a tract of land, which I allege belongs to me directly, and not through Titius; for even though judgment has been rendered against Titius with my knowledge, I still do not suffer any prejudice to my rights, as I do not claim the land by the same title under which Titius was defeated; and I cannot interfere to prevent him from availing himself of his alleged right, just as was the case with the co-heir above mentioned.

Macer, On Appeals, Book II. It must be remembered that neither a ward, nor the State, can obtain complete restitution in a case where freedom is involved, but an appeal is necessary. This has been stated in various rescripts.

The Same, Appeals, Book II. When a letter is written to the Emperor, and a copy of the same is shown to one of the litigants, who did not appeal, and afterwards the Emperor decides against him in a Rescript, let us see whether he can appeal from the letter which was previously shown to him, since as he did not do so at the time, he seems to have admitted its contents were true. He should not be heard, if he should state that he was waiting for the issue of the Imperial Rescript.

Macer, On Appeals, Book II. It must be remembered that, when an appeal is rejected, it has been decided by the Imperial Constitutions that everything must remain in the same condition, and nothing new be done, even if the appeal is taken against the Treasury; and he who refuses to receive the appeal must immediately make a report giving his opinion, and the reason for its rejection; and it is provided by the Imperial Mandates that he shall furnish the litigant with a copy of his report.

Macer, On Appeals, Book II. We must remember that when an inquiry is made whether a case has been decided or not, and the judge of this question declares that it has not been decided, even though it may have been, it is rescinded, even if no appeal has been taken. 1Ad Dig. 49,8,1,1ROHGE, Bd. 7 (1873), S. 59: Berichtigung von Rechnungsfehlern in einem Erkenntnisse.Likewise, if an error in the calculation is alleged to exist in the decision, it is not necessary to appeal, for instance, if the judge decides as follows: “As it is proved that Titius owes Seius fifty sesterces for such-and-such an article, and also twenty-five for another; therefore I hold that Lucius Titius shall pay Seius a hundred sesterces;” because, as the mistake is one of computation, it is not necessary to appeal, and it can be corrected without doing so. If, however, the judge of this question should render a decision for a hundred sesterces, for the reason that he thought that fifty and twenty-five made a hundred, still, the same mistake is one of computation, and it is not necessary to appeal. But when the judge decides that there is another sum of twenty-five sesterces due, there will be ground for appeal. 2Likewise, when the decision is contrary to the Imperial Constitutions, the necessity for appeal does not exist. A decision is rendered against the constitutions when it is pronounced in compliance with the law as laid down by them, and not with reference to the rights of the litigant; for if the judge, in the case of a person desiring to be excused from the charge of a public office, or of a guardianship, on account of having children, or through age, or by reason of some privilege, should hold that neither children, nor age, nor any privilege will avail to excuse anyone from office, or from guardianship, he is understood to have decided with reference to the law as set forth in the constitutions. If, however, he should permit a person to establish his right, and then renders a decision against him because he did not prove his age, or the number of his children; he is understood to have decided with reference to the rights of the litigant, in which case an appeal will be necessary. 3Likewise when, under a peremptory Edict which has not been published, and of which the party has not been notified, he is convicted while absent, the constitutions declare that a decision of this kind is of no effect. 4If you and I both apply to the same judge, and neither of our petitions asks for interest, and the judge renders a decision against me before doing so against you, in order that you may be the first to have a judgment in your favor; it is not necessary for me to appeal on this ground, as, according to the Sacred Constitutions, you cannot ask for an execution against me before judgment has been rendered with reference to my claim; but the better opinion is that an appeal should be taken.

Macer, Appeals, Book II. When the attorney of an absent party appeals, and afterwards gives his reasons for doing so, he will, nevertheless, be obliged to answer. If, however, he fails to do so, can the party to the suit answer, as in the case of a minor? is a question which we should consider. We rather incline to the opinion that he ought to be heard in giving the reasons for the appeal, who, as the attorney of the absent party, applied for it.

Macer, On Appeals, Book II. Where the appellant dies without leaving an heir, an appeal of this kind is extinguished. If, however, an heir of the appellant should appear, and no one else has any interest in stating the ground for the appeal, the heir cannot be forced to prosecute it. But when the Treasury, or any other party against whom the appeal was taken, is interested in the case, the heir will be required to state the grounds for the appeal. No one has any interest, where, for example, the party has been relegated without having been deprived of his property. In case he should be relegated after having been deprived of his property, or be deported to an island, or sentenced to the mines, or should die after the appeal was taken, our Emperor Alexander made the following statement in a Rescript addressed to Pletorius, a soldier, as being applicable: “Although, while the appeal is pending, the accusation of the defendant is annulled by death, still, as it is alleged that a part of his property has been confiscated under the judgment, be who is entitled to the benefit of the succession can only obtain it if he gives good reasons for the appeal, and establishes the injustice of the decision.” 1If a guardian, after having taken an appeal pertaining to the business of his ward, should die, his heir will be compelled to state the grounds for the appeal, even if he has already rendered his account of the guardianship, for the reason that it is sufficient that he would have been obliged to state the grounds for it at the time of his death. The Divine Severus and Antoninus, however, stated in a Rescript that a guardian, after having rendered his accounts, should not be compelled to set forth the grounds of the appeal.