Corpus iurisprudentiae Romanae

Repertorium zu den Quellen des römischen Rechts

Digesta Iustiniani Augusti

Recognovit Mommsen (1870) et retractavit Krüger (1928)
Convertit in Anglica lingua Scott (1932)
Iul.Min.
Ex Minicio lib.Iuliani Ex Minicio libri

Ex Minicio libri

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2
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7
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9
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12
13
14
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16
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18
19
20
21
22
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24
25
26
27
28
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30
31
32
33
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35
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37
38
39
40
41
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43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50

Ex libro I

Dig. 7,1,67Iu­lia­nus li­bro pri­mo ex Mi­n­icio. Cui usus fruc­tus le­ga­tus est, et­iam in­vi­to he­rede eum ex­tra­neo ven­de­re pot­est.

Julianus, On Minicius, Book I. Anyone to whom the usufruct has been bequeathed can sell the same to a stranger, even without the consent of the heir.

Dig. 30,105Idem li­bro pri­mo ex Mi­n­icio. Le­ga­tum ita erat: ‘quae Lu­cius Ti­tius mi­hi de­bet, ea he­res meus Cor­ne­lio da­re dam­nas es­to’. ni­hil am­plius ex hoc le­ga­to quam ac­tio­nes suas he­res prae­sta­re de­bet.

The Same, On Minicius, Book I. Where a legacy was bequeathed as follows: “Let my heir be charged with the payment to Cornelius of what Lucius Titius owes me,” the heir is not required to transfer anything under this legacy, but his right of action against the debtor.

Dig. 33,2,11Idem li­bro pri­mo ex Mi­n­icio. Ha­bi­ta­tio­nis le­ga­tum in sin­gu­los an­nos ab in­itio an­ni de­be­ri con­stat.

The Same, On Minicius, Book I. It is established that the legacy of an annual lodging is due from the beginning of each year.

Dig. 33,3,1Iu­lia­nus li­bro pri­mo ex Mi­n­icio. Qui duas ta­ber­nas con­iunc­tas ha­be­bat, eas sin­gu­las duo­bus le­ga­vit: quae­si­tum est, si quid ex su­pe­rio­re ta­ber­na in in­fe­rio­rem in­ae­di­fi­ca­tum es­set, num in­fe­rior one­ri fe­r­un­do in su­pe­rio­ris ta­ber­nae lo­co con­ti­ne­re­tur. re­spon­dit ser­vi­tu­tem im­po­si­tam vi­de­ri. Iu­lia­nus no­tat: vi­dea­mus, ne hoc ita ve­rum sit, si aut no­mi­na­tim haec ser­vi­tus im­po­si­ta est aut ita le­ga­tum da­tum est: ‘ta­ber­nam meam uti nunc est do le­go’.

Julianus, On Minicius, Book I. A testator who had two adjoining shops left them to different persons. If either one of the buildings projected over the other, the question might arise whether the one underneath would be obliged to pay the expense of keeping up the other. I was of the opinion that the servitude appeared to be imposed, and Julianus says with reference to this: “Let us see whether this is only true where the servitude has been expressly imposed, or where the legacy was granted as follows: “I give and bequeath my shop in the condition in which it is at present.”

Dig. 33,5,12Idem li­bro pri­mo ex Mi­n­icio. Ser­vo ge­ne­ra­li­ter le­ga­to ve­rius est om­nes he­redes, si eis elec­tio da­ta est, eun­dem da­re de­be­re: si non con­sen­tiant he­redes, ex tes­ta­men­to eos te­ne­ri.

The Same, On Minicius, Book I. Where a slave is bequeathed in general terms, the better opinion is that all the heirs, if the choice is left to them, should give the same slave, and if they do not agree, they will be liable under the terms of the will.

Dig. 35,1,30Idem li­bro pri­mo ex Mi­n­icio. Si se­pa­ra­tim mi­hi to­tus fun­dus pu­re, ti­bi sub con­di­cio­ne le­ga­tus fue­rit et tu de­ces­se­ris, an­te­quam con­di­cio ex­sti­te­rit: non ha­be­bo ne­ces­si­ta­tem im­ple­re con­di­cio­nem, ut­po­te cum, et­iam­si con­di­cio de­fe­ce­rit, pars quam vin­di­ca­tu­rus eras mi­hi ad­cres­cat.

The Same, On Minicius, Book I. If an entire estate should be bequeathed to me separately and absolutely, and to you conditionally, and you should die before the condition was complied with, I will not be required to comply with it, as even if the condition should fail, the share which you could have claimed will accrue to me.

Dig. 38,1,27Iu­lia­nus li­bro pri­mo ex Mi­n­icio. Si li­ber­tus ar­tem pan­to­mi­mi ex­er­ceat, ve­rum est de­be­re eum non so­lum ip­si pa­tro­no, sed et­iam ami­co­rum lu­dis gra­tui­tam ope­ram prae­be­re: sic­ut eum quo­que li­ber­tum, qui me­di­ci­nam ex­er­cet, ve­rum est vo­lun­ta­te pa­tro­ni cu­ra­tu­rum gra­tis ami­cos eius. ne­que enim opor­tet pa­tro­num, ut ope­ris li­ber­ti sui uta­tur, aut lu­dos sem­per fa­ce­re aut ae­gro­ta­re.

Julianus, On Minicius, Book I. If a freedman exercises the calling of a comic actor, it is evident that he should employ his services not only for the benefit of the patron himself, but also gratuitously at the entertainments of his friends; just as a freedman who practices medicine should, at the desire of his patron, treat the friends of the latter without compensation; for, in order that he may employ the services of his freedman it is not necessary for a patron always to give entertainments, or constantly to be ill.

Ex libro II

Dig. 8,2,22Iu­lia­nus li­bro se­cun­do ex Mi­n­icio. Qui ae­di­fi­cium ha­bet, pot­est ser­vi­tu­tem vi­ci­no im­po­ne­re, ut non so­lum de his lu­mi­ni­bus, quae in prae­sen­tia erunt, sed et­iam de his quae post­ea fue­rint, ca­veat.

Julianus, On Minicius, Book II. A man who owns a house can impose such a servitude upon his neighbor as to compel him to give security not only with reference to the lights which exist at the present time, but also with reference to any that may subsequently be made.

Dig. 8,2,34Iu­lia­nus li­bro se­cun­do ex Mi­n­icio. Et qui duas areas ha­bet, al­te­ram tra­den­do ser­vam al­te­ri ef­fi­ce­re pot­est.

Julianus, On Minicius, Book II. Where a man has two vacant lots, he can, by conveying one, subject it to a servitude in favor of the other.

Dig. 8,3,31Iu­lia­nus li­bro se­cun­do ex Mi­n­icio. Tria prae­dia con­ti­nua trium do­mi­no­rum ad­iec­ta erant: imi prae­dii do­mi­nus ex sum­mo fun­do imo fun­do ser­vi­tu­tem aquae quae­sie­rat et per me­dium fun­dum do­mi­no con­ce­den­te in suum agrum du­ce­bat: post­ea idem sum­mum fun­dum emit: de­in­de imum fun­dum, in quem aquam in­du­xe­rat, ven­di­dit. quae­si­tum est, num imus fun­dus id ius aquae amis­is­set, quia, cum utra­que prae­dia eius­dem do­mi­ni fac­ta es­sent, ip­sa si­bi ser­vi­re non po­tuis­sent. ne­ga­vit amis­sis­se ser­vi­tu­tem, quia prae­dium, per quod aqua du­ce­ba­tur, al­te­rius fuis­set et quem­ad­mo­dum ser­vi­tus sum­mo fun­do, ut in imum fun­dum aqua veniret, im­po­ni ali­ter non po­tuis­set, quam ut per me­dium quo­que fun­dum du­ce­re­tur, sic ea­dem ser­vi­tus eius­dem fun­di amit­ti ali­ter non pos­set, ni­si eo­dem tem­po­re et­iam per me­dium fun­dum aqua du­ci de­sis­set aut om­nium tria si­mul prae­dia unius do­mi­ni fac­ta es­sent.

Julianus, On Minicius, Book II. Three tracts of land which were contiguous belonged to three owners, and the owner of the lowest one had acquired for his tract from the highest one the servitude of a water-course, and this he conducted into his own land through the intervening tract with the permission of the owner of the same, and he afterwards bought the highest tract, and sold the lowest one on to which he had conducted the water. The question was asked whether the lowest tract had lost the right of conducting the water, because as both estates had become the property of the same owner no servitude could exist between them? It was denied that the lowest tract had lost the servitude because the land through which the water was conducted belonged to another, and as no servitude could be imposed in any other way upon the uppermost tract so that the water might reach the lowest one, except by being conducted through the intermediate tract; so the same servitude in favor of the same tract of land could not be lost, unless, at the same time, the watercourse should cease to be conducted through the intermediate tract, or unless all three tracts should simultaneously become the property of a single owner.

Dig. 14,2,8Iu­lia­nus li­bro se­cun­do ex Mi­n­icio. Qui le­van­dae na­vis gra­tia res ali­quas pro­iciunt, non hanc men­tem ha­bent, ut eas pro de­relic­to ha­beant, quip­pe si in­ve­ne­rint eas, ab­la­tu­ros et, si su­spi­ca­ti fue­rint, in quem lo­cum eiec­tae sunt, re­qui­si­tu­ros: ut per­in­de sint, ac si quis one­re pres­sus in viam rem ab­ie­ce­rit mox cum aliis re­ver­su­rus, ut ean­dem au­fer­ret.

Julianus, On Minicius, Book II. Those who throw any property overboard for the purpose of lightening a ship, do not intend to consider it as abandoned; since if they should find it they can carry it away, and if they have any idea of the place where it has been cast by the sea, they can claim it; so that they are in the same condition as anyone who oppressed by a burden throws it down on the road, expecting to return presently with others and remove it.

Dig. 16,3,10Iu­lia­nus li­bro se­cun­do ex Mi­n­icio. Nec ad­ver­sus co­he­redes eius, qui do­lo ca­rent, de­po­si­ti ac­tio com­pe­tit.

Julianus, On Minicius, Book II. The action on deposit does not lie against co-heirs who are not guilty of fraud.

Dig. 41,2,39Idem li­bro se­cun­do ex Mi­n­icio. In­ter­es­se pu­to, qua men­te apud se­ques­trum de­po­ni­tur res. nam si omit­ten­dae pos­ses­sio­nis cau­sa et hoc aper­te fue­rit ap­pro­ba­tum, ad usu­ca­pio­nem pos­ses­sio eius par­ti­bus non pro­ce­de­ret: at si cus­to­diae cau­sa de­po­na­tur, ad usu­ca­pio­nem eam pos­ses­sio­nem vic­to­ri pro­ce­de­re con­stat.

Ad Dig. 41,2,39Windscheid: Lehrbuch des Pandektenrechts, 7. Aufl. 1891, Bd. I, § 154, Note 6.The Same, On Minicius, Book II. I think that it makes a difference with what intention property is deposited in the hands of an arbiter; for if this is done for the purpose of relinquishing possession, and is clearly proved, the possession of the arbiter will be of no benefit to the parties for the purpose of usucaption. If, however, the property was deposited for safe-keeping, it is settled that he who gains the case can profit by the possession, in order to acquire the property by prescription.

Dig. 41,4,8Idem li­bro se­cun­do ex Mi­n­icio. Si quis, cum sci­ret ven­di­to­rem pe­cu­niam sta­tim con­sump­tu­rum, ser­vos ab eo emis­set, ple­ri­que re­spon­de­runt eum ni­hi­lo mi­nus bo­na fi­de emp­to­rem es­se, id­que ve­rius est: quo­mo­do enim ma­la fi­de emis­se vi­de­tur, qui a do­mi­no emit? ni­si for­te et is, qui a lu­xu­rio­so et pro­ti­nus scor­to da­tu­ro pe­cu­niam ser­vos emit, non usu­ca­piet.

The Same, On Minicius, Book II. Where anyone buys slaves knowing that the vendor will immediately squander the money paid for them, many authorities have held that he will, nevertheless, be a bona fide purchaser in good faith; and this is true. For, how can he be considered to have acted in bad faith, who bought the slaves from their master, unless he bought them from a man of licentious life, who will immediately give the money to a harlot, for then he cannot acquire the slaves by usucaption?

Dig. 41,4,10Idem li­bro se­cun­do ad Mi­n­i­cium. Ser­vus do­mi­no an­cil­lam, quam sub­ri­pue­rat, pro ca­pi­te suo de­dit: ea con­ce­pit: quae­si­tum est, an do­mi­nus eum par­tum usu­ca­pe­re pos­sit. re­spon­dit: hic do­mi­nus qua­si emp­tor par­tum usu­ca­pe­re pot­est, nam­que res ei ab­est pro hac mu­lie­re et ge­ne­re quo­dam­mo­do ven­di­tio in­ter ser­vum et do­mi­num con­trac­ta est.

The Same, On Minicius, Book II. A slave, in consideration of his freedom, gave to his master a female slave whom he had stolen. She conceived. The question arose whether her master could acquire her child by usucaption. The answer was that the master could, as purchaser, acquire the child by usucaption, for he gave something for the woman, and a kind of sale was made between the slave and his owner.

Dig. 41,7,7Idem li­bro se­cun­do ex Mi­n­icio. Si quis mer­ces ex na­ve iac­ta­tas in­ve­nis­set, num id­eo usu­ca­pe­re non pos­sit, quia non vi­de­ren­tur de­relic­tae, quae­ri­tur. sed ve­rius est eum pro de­relic­to usu­ca­pe­re non pos­se.

The Same, On Minicius, Book II. When anyone finds merchandise which has been thrown overboard from a ship, the question arises whether he cannot acquire it by usucaption, for the reason that it should be considered as abandoned. The better opinion is that he cannot acquire it by usucaption on the ground of abandonment.

Dig. 45,1,62Idem li­bro se­cun­do ex Mi­n­icio. Ser­vus ve­tan­te do­mi­no si pe­cu­niam ab alio sti­pu­la­tus sit, ni­hi­lo mi­nus ob­li­gat do­mi­no pro­mis­so­rem.

The Same, On Minicius, Book II. If a slave, after having been forbidden by his master, stipulates for the payment of money by another, he will still render the promisor liable to his master.

Ex libro III

Dig. 41,1,39Iu­lia­nus li­bro ter­tio ex Mi­n­icio. Et­iam fur­ti­vus ser­vus bo­nae fi­dei emp­to­ri ad­quirit, quod ex re eius sti­pu­la­tur aut per tra­di­tio­nem ac­ci­pit.

Julianus, On Minicius, Book III. Even a slave who has been stolen acquires for a purchaser in good faith, if he makes a stipulation, or receives by delivery anything obtained by means of his property.

Dig. 44,7,21Iu­lia­nus li­bro ter­tio ex Mi­n­icio. Con­tra­xis­se unus­quis­que in eo lo­co in­tel­le­gi­tur, in quo ut sol­ve­ret se ob­li­ga­vit.

Julianus, On Minicius, Book V. Everyone is considered to have made a contract in the place where he bound himself to pay.

Dig. 47,2,60Idem li­bro ter­tio ex Mi­n­icio. Si is, qui rem com­mo­das­set, eam rem clam abs­tu­lis­set, fur­ti cum eo agi non pot­est, quia suum re­ce­pis­set et il­le com­mo­da­ti li­be­ra­tus es­set. hoc ta­men ita ac­ci­pien­dum est, si nul­las re­ti­nen­di cau­sas is cui com­mo­da­ta res erat ha­buit: nam si im­pen­sas ne­ces­sa­rias in rem com­mo­da­tam fe­ce­rat, in­ter­fuit eius po­tius per re­ten­tio­nem eas ser­va­re quam ul­tro com­mo­da­ti age­re, id­eo­que fur­ti ac­tio­nem ha­be­bit.

The Same, On Minicius, Book III. When anyone who has lent an article for use steals it, an action for theft cannot be brought against him, because he only took what was his, and the other party to the transaction will be released from any liability growing out of the loan. This, however, should only pe considered to refer to cases where he to whom the article was lent had no reason for retaining it. For if he had incurred any necessary expense on account of the article lent, it is rather to his interest to retain it than to bring an action based on the loan, and therefore he will be entitled to an action for theft.

Dig. 47,7,10Iu­lia­nus li­bro ter­tio ex Mi­n­icio. Si ge­mi­na ar­bor es­set et su­pra ter­ram iunc­tu­ra eius emi­ne­ret, una ar­bor vi­de­tur es­se. sed si id qua iun­ge­re­tur non ex­sta­ret, to­ti­dem ar­bo­res sunt, quot spe­cies ea­rum su­pra ter­ram es­sent.

Julianus, On Minicius, Book III. Where there are two parts of one tree, and they are united above the ground, they are regarded as a single tree. But if the point of union is not visible, there are as many trees as there are trunks above the surface.

Ex libro IV

Dig. 12,1,22Idem li­bro quar­to ex Mi­n­icio. Vi­num, quod mu­tuum da­tum erat, per iu­di­cem pe­ti­tum est: quae­si­tum est, cu­ius tem­po­ris aes­ti­ma­tio fie­ret, utrum cum da­tum es­set an cum li­tem con­tes­ta­tus fuis­set an cum res iu­di­ca­re­tur. Sa­b­inus re­spon­dit, si dic­tum es­set quo tem­po­re red­de­re­tur, quan­ti tunc fuis­set, si dic­tum non es­set, quan­ti tunc fuis­set, cum pe­ti­tum es­set. in­ter­ro­ga­vi, cu­ius lo­ci pre­tium se­qui opor­teat. re­spon­dit, si con­ve­nis­set, ut cer­to lo­co red­de­re­tur, quan­ti eo lo­co es­set, si dic­tum non es­set, quan­ti ubi es­set pe­ti­tum.

Ad Dig. 12,1,22Windscheid: Lehrbuch des Pandektenrechts, 7. Aufl. 1891, Bd. II, § 258, Note 7.The Same, On Minicius, Book IV. A loan of wine was made and proceedings were instituted to recover it; the question arose with reference to the time when an estimate of its value should be made, whether when it was delivered, when issue was joined in the suit, or when the case was decided? Sabinus answered that if it had been stated at what time it was to be restored, the estimate should be made of what it was worth at that date; but if not, its value should be estimated at the time when suit was brought. I asked at what place the valuation should be made? The answer was, if it had been agreed that it should be restored at a certain place, the valuation should be made there; but if this had not been mentioned, it should be appraised at the place where suit was brought.

Dig. 17,1,33Idem li­bro quar­to ex Mi­n­icio. Ro­ga­tus ut fi­de­iu­be­ret si in mi­no­rem sum­mam se ob­li­ga­vit, rec­te te­ne­tur: si in ma­io­rem, Iu­lia­nus ve­rius pu­tat quod a ple­ris­que re­spon­sum est eum, qui ma­io­rem sum­mam quam ro­ga­tus erat fi­de­ius­sis­set, hac­te­nus man­da­ti ac­tio­nem ha­be­re, qua­te­nus ro­ga­tus es­set, quia id fe­cis­set, quod man­da­tum ei est: nam us­que ad eam sum­mam, in quam ro­ga­tus erat, fi­dem eius spec­tas­se vi­de­tur qui ro­ga­vit.

The Same, On Minicius, Book IV. Where a party is asked to become a surety, and obligates himself for a smaller sum, he is legally liable; but if he becomes bound for a larger sum, Julianus very properly thinks—and this is also the opinion of many authorities—that he will not be liable to an action on mandate for a larger amount than he was asked to become surety for, but only for the sum contained in the request; because he did what he was directed to do; since it is held that the party who requested him relied upon his good faith to the extent to which he was asked to be responsible.

Dig. 19,1,29Idem li­bro quar­to ex Mi­n­icio. Cui res sub con­di­cio­ne le­ga­ta erat, is eam im­pru­dens ab he­rede emit: ac­tio­ne ex emp­to pot­erit con­se­qui emp­tor pre­tium, quia non ex cau­sa le­ga­ti rem ha­bet.

The Same, On Minicius, Book IV. Where property has been left to someone under a condition, and the latter, ignorant of the fact, buys it from the heir, the purchaser can recover the price by an action on purchase, because he has not possession of the property as derived from the legacy.

Dig. 19,2,32Iu­lia­nus li­bro quar­to ex Mi­n­icio. Qui fun­dum co­len­dum in plu­res an­nos lo­ca­ve­rat, de­ces­sit et eum fun­dum le­ga­vit. Cas­sius ne­ga­vit pos­se co­gi co­lo­num, ut eum fun­dum co­le­ret, quia ni­hil he­redis in­ter­es­set. quod si co­lo­nus vel­let co­le­re et ab eo, cui le­ga­tus es­set fun­dus, pro­hi­be­re­tur, cum he­rede ac­tio­nem co­lo­num ha­be­re: et hoc de­tri­men­tum ad he­redem per­ti­ne­re: sic­uti si quis rem, quam ven­di­dis­set nec dum tra­di­dis­set, alii le­gas­set, he­res eius emp­to­ri et le­ga­ta­rio es­set ob­li­ga­tus.

Ad Dig. 19,2,32Windscheid: Lehrbuch des Pandektenrechts, 7. Aufl. 1891, Bd. II, § 361, Note 3; Bd. II, § 400, Note 7.Julianus, On Minicius, Book IV. A man who leased a tract of land to be cultivated for a term of several years died, and devised the said land. Cassius denied that the tenant could be compelled to cultivate the land, because the heir had no interest in it. If, however, the tenant desired to cultivate it, and was prevented from doing so by the party to whom the land had been left, he would be entitled to an action against the heir, and the loss must be borne by the heir; just as where anyone sells something and bequeaths it to another before he delivers it; for, in this instance, the heir will be liable both to the purchaser and to the legatee.

Dig. 21,1,50Iu­lia­nus li­bro quar­to ex Mi­n­icio. Va­ri­co­sus sa­nus non est.

Julianus, On Minicius, Book IV. A slave with varicose veins is not sound.

Dig. 43,20,5Idem li­bro quar­to ex Mi­n­icio. Cum con­stet non so­lum tem­po­ri­bus, sed et­iam men­su­ris pos­se aquam di­vi­di, pot­est eo­dem tem­po­re alius cot­ti­dia­nam, alius aes­ti­vam aquam du­ce­re, ita ut aes­ta­te di­vi­da­tur in­ter eos aqua, hie­me so­lus du­cat is qui cot­ti­dia­nae ius ha­beat. 1In­ter duos, qui eo­dem ri­vo aquam cer­tis ho­ris se­pa­ra­tim du­ce­bant, con­ve­nit, ut per­mu­ta­tis in­ter se tem­po­ri­bus aqua ute­ren­tur: quae­ro, cum am­plius tem­po­re ser­vi­tu­ti­bus prae­fi­ni­to ita du­xis­sent, ut ne­uter eo­rum suo tem­po­re usus es­set, num ius uten­di amis­sis­sent. ne­ga­vit amis­sis­se.

The Same, On Minicius, Book IV. It is established that the use of water can be divided not only by seasons, but also by measurement. One person can have the right to conduct it for daily use, and another to do so during the summer; so that the water will be divided between them during the summer, and, during the winter, he alone can conduct it who has the right to its daily use. 1It was agreed between two persons who were entitled to the privilege of conducting water by the same aqueduct, at different hours, that the hours for its use should be changed. If they had conducted it for a longer period than was necessary, as prescribed by the servitude, so that neither of them used it during the specified time for which it had been granted him, I ask whether they had lost the right to its use. It was denied that they had lost it.

Dig. 46,1,19Idem li­bro quar­to ex Mi­n­icio. Ser­vus in­scio do­mi­no pro quo­dam fi­de­ius­se­rat et eo no­mi­ne pe­cu­niam sol­ve­rat: quae­re­ba­tur, do­mi­nus pos­set­ne ab eo, cui so­lu­ta es­set, re­pe­te­re. re­spon­dit: in­ter­est, quo no­mi­ne fi­de­ius­se­rit: nam si ex cau­sa pe­cu­lia­ri fi­de­ius­sit, tunc id, quod ex pe­cu­lio sol­ve­rit, re­pe­te­re do­mi­nus non pot­erit, quod ex do­mi­ni­ca cau­sa sol­ve­rit, vin­di­ca­bi­tur: si ve­ro ex­tra cau­sam pe­cu­lii fi­de­ius­se­rit, quod ex pe­cu­nia do­mi­ni­ca sol­ve­rit, ae­que vin­di­ca­bi­tur, quod ex pe­cu­lio, con­di­ci pot­erit.

The Same, On Minicius, Book IV. A slave became surety for a certain person without the knowledge of his master, and paid the money due, in his name. The question arose whether or not the master could recover the amount from the person to whom it had been paid. The answer was that it was important to ascertain in whose name the slave had become surety, for if he had done so with reference to his peculium, then his master could not recover what he had paid out of his peculium, but anything which he had paid on account of his master could be recovered by him. If, however, he became surety for an amount greater than his peculium, any money belonging to his master, which he had paid, could also be recovered, and what he paid out of his peculium could be recovered by a personal action.

Ex libro V

Dig. 3,3,76Idem li­bro quin­to ad Mi­n­i­cium. Ti­tius cum ab­sen­tem de­fen­de­ret, sa­tis­de­dit et prius quam iu­di­cium ac­ci­pe­ret de­siit reus sol­ven­do es­se: quam ob cau­sam de­fen­sor re­cu­sa­bat iu­di­cium in se red­di opor­te­re. quae­ro, an id ei con­ce­di opor­teat. Iu­lia­nus re­spon­dit: de­fen­sor cum sa­tis­de­dit, do­mi­ni lo­co ha­ben­dus est. nec mul­tum ei prae­sta­tu­rus est prae­tor, si eum non co­ege­rit iu­di­cium ac­ci­pe­re, cum ad fi­de­ius­so­res eius iri pos­sit et hi quid­quid prae­sti­te­rint a de­fen­so­re con­se­cu­tu­ri sint.

The Same, On Minicius, Book V. Titius, while he was defending a case for an absent party, gave security, and before issue was joined, the debtor became insolvent; for which reason the defender refused to permit issue to be joined as against himself. I ask whether he should be permitted to do this? Julianus answers that the defender should be held to occupy the place of the principal, when he gave security; and if the Prætor did not compel him to accept joinder of issue, it would not be of much benefit to him, as recourse could be had to the sureties, and whatever these paid could be recovered from the defender.

Dig. 23,3,49Idem li­bro quin­to ex Mi­n­icio. Vir ab eo, qui uxo­ri eius do­tem fa­ce­re vo­le­bat, cer­tam pe­cu­niam eo no­mi­ne sti­pu­la­tus est, de­in­de ac­cep­tam eam fe­cit: quae­re­ba­tur, es­set­ne ea pe­cu­nia in do­tem. re­spon­dit, si ac­cep­tam non fe­cis­set et pro­mis­sor sol­ven­do es­se de­sis­set, quae­re­re­mus, an cul­pa ma­ri­ti ea pe­cu­nia ex­ac­ta non es­set: cum ve­ro ac­cep­tam fe­cit, om­ni­mo­do pe­ri­cu­lum ad eum per­ti­ne­bit: per­in­de enim est, ac si ac­ce­pe­rit pe­cu­niam et ean­dem pro­mis­so­ri do­na­ve­rit.

The Same, On Minicius, Book V. A certain man entered into a stipulation with a party concerning a sum of money which the latter wished to give as a dowry to his wife, and he then released him from liability for the same. The question arose whether or not this money constituted part of the dowry. The answer was that, if the husband had not released the promisor and he had become insolvent, we should inquire whether the money was not collected on account of the negligence of the husband, but as the husband released the debtor, he must, by all means, assume the entire responsibility; for the case is the same as if he had received the money, and then presented it to the promisor.

Dig. 24,1,39Iu­lia­nus li­bro quin­to ex Mi­n­icio. Vir uxo­ri pe­cu­niam cum do­na­re vel­let, per­mi­sit ei, ut a de­bi­to­re suo sti­pu­le­tur: il­la cum id fe­cis­set, prius­quam pe­cu­niam au­fer­ret, di­vor­tium fe­cit: quae­ro, utrum vir eam sum­mam pe­te­re de­beat an ea pro­mis­sio­ne prop­ter do­na­tio­nis cau­sam ac­tio nul­la es­set. re­spon­di in­anem fuis­se eam sti­pu­la­tio­nem. sed si pro­mis­sor mu­lie­ri igno­rans sol­vis­set, si qui­dem pe­cu­nia ex­stat, vin­di­ca­re eam de­bi­tor pot­est: sed si ac­tio­nes suas ma­ri­to prae­sta­re pa­ra­tus est, do­li ma­li ex­cep­tio­ne se tue­bi­tur id­eo­que ma­ri­tus hanc pe­cu­niam de­bi­to­ris no­mi­ne vin­di­can­do con­se­que­tur. sed si pe­cu­nia non ex­stat et mu­lier lo­cu­ple­tior fac­ta est, ma­ri­tus eam pe­tet: in­tel­le­gi­tur enim ex re ma­ri­ti lo­cu­ple­tior fac­ta es­se mu­lier, quon­iam de­bi­tor do­li ma­li ex­cep­tio­ne se tue­ri pot­est.

Julianus, On Minicius, Book V. A husband who wished to give a sum of money to his wife, permitted her to make a stipulation with his debtor. She did so, but before having received the money, she divorced herself from her husband. I ask whether the latter can recover the entire amount, or whether an action based on the promise will be void on account of the donation. I answered that the stipulation will be of no effect. If, however, the promisor, not being aware of the facts, should pay the woman, and the money has not been expended, the debtor can recover it. But where he is ready to assign his rights of action to the husband, he will be protected by an exception on the ground of fraud, and therefore the husband can recover this money by an action in the name of the debtor. If, however, the money is not in existence, and the woman has become more wealthy on account of it, the husband can claim it; for it is understood that the woman has become more wealthy through having received property belonging to her husband, since the debtor can protect himself by an exception on the ground of fraud.

Dig. 39,3,25Iu­lia­nus li­bro quin­to ex Mi­n­icio. Is, cu­ius fun­do via de­be­tur, aquae plu­viae ar­cen­dae age­re pot­est fun­di sui no­mi­ne, quon­iam de­te­rio­re via fac­ta fun­do no­ce­tur.

Julianus, On Minicius, Book V. Where a right of way is imposed upon the land of anyone, the person entitled to it can bring an action to compel care to be taken of rain-water for the benefit of the land, because by damaging the right of way the land also will be injured.

Dig. 40,12,30Iu­lia­nus li­bro quin­to ex Mi­n­icio. Duo­bus pe­ten­ti­bus ho­mi­nem in ser­vi­tu­tem pro par­te di­mi­dia se­pa­ra­tim, si uno iu­di­cio li­ber, al­te­ro ser­vus iu­di­ca­tus est, com­mo­dis­si­mum est eo us­que co­gi iu­di­ces, do­nec con­sen­tiant: si id non con­tin­get, Sa­binum re­fer­tur ex­is­ti­mas­se du­ci ser­vum de­be­re ab eo qui vi­cis­set: cu­ius sen­ten­tiae Cas­sius quo­que est et ego sum. et sa­ne rid­icu­lum est ar­bi­tra­ri eum pro par­te di­mi­dia du­ci, pro par­te li­ber­ta­tem eius tue­ri. com­mo­dius au­tem est fa­vo­re li­ber­ta­tis li­be­rum qui­dem eum es­se, com­pel­li au­tem pre­tii sui par­tem vi­ri bo­ni ar­bi­tra­tu vic­to­ri suo prae­sta­re.

Julianus, On Minicius, Book V. Where two persons separately claim a man as their slave, and each of them alleges that he owns half of him, and, by one judgment, he is declared to “be free, and by another, he is pronounced to be a slave, the most convenient course will be for the judges to be compelled to agree. If this cannot be done, Sabinus states that it has been held that the man should be taken as a slave by the party who gained the case. Cassius (as well as myself), adopts this opinion, and, indeed, it is ridiculous for the man to be considered half slave, and also to be protected in the enjoyment of half his freedom. It is, however, convenient to decide that he was free, on account of the favor conceded to liberty, and to compel him to pay to the party who gained the case half of his value, as appraised by a reliable citizen.

Dig. 46,8,23Idem li­bro quin­to ex Mi­n­icio. Pro­cu­ra­tor cum pe­te­ret pe­cu­niam, sa­tis­de­dit am­plius non pe­ti: post iu­di­cium ac­cep­tum ex­ti­tit, qui et ip­se pro­cu­ra­to­rio no­mi­ne ean­dem pe­cu­niam pe­te­ret: quae­si­tum est, cum is, qui post­ea pe­te­ret, pro­cu­ra­tor non es­set et prop­ter hoc ex­cep­tio­ni­bus pro­cu­ra­to­riis ex­clu­di pos­set, num fi­de­ius­so­res prio­ris pro­cu­ra­to­ris te­ne­ren­tur. Iu­lia­nus re­spon­dit: ve­rius est non ob­li­ga­ri fi­de­ius­so­res: nam in sti­pu­la­tio­ne ca­ve­tur non pe­ti­tu­rum eum, cu­ius de ea re ac­tio pe­ti­tio per­se­cu­tio sit, et ra­tum ha­bi­tu­ros om­nes, ad quos ea res per­ti­ne­bit: hic au­tem, qui pro­cu­ra­tor non est, nec ac­tio­nem nec pe­ti­tio­nem ha­be­re in­tel­le­gen­dus est.

The Same, On Minicius, Book V. An agent, when bringing an action to collect a sum of money, gave security that no more would be demanded. If, after judgment has been rendered, another person should appear, who claimed the same money in the capacity of agent, as he who made the second demand was not really an agent, and for this reason could be excluded by an exception on the ground that he had no authority, the question arises whether the sureties of the first agent are liable. Julianus is of the opinion that they are not liable. For it was provided in the stipulation that he who has the right to bring an action to demand or to collect the debt will not do so; and that all those having an interest in the matter will ratify the transaction. He, however, who is not an agent, is not understood to have any right of action, or to be entitled to make any claim whatever.

Ex libro VI

Dig. 2,14,56Idem li­bro sex­to ad Mi­n­i­cium. Si con­ve­ne­rit, ne do­mi­nus a co­lo­no quid pe­te­ret, et ius­ta cau­sa con­ven­tio­nis fue­rit: ni­hi­lo mi­nus co­lo­nus a do­mi­no pe­te­re pot­est.

The Same, On Minicius, Book VI. Where for some reason an agreement is made that a landlord shall not sue his tenant, and there is good cause for such an agreement, the tenant, nevertheless, can bring an action against his landlord.

Dig. 6,1,59Iu­lia­nus li­bro sex­to ex Mi­n­icio. Ha­bi­ta­tor in alie­na ae­di­fi­cia fe­nes­tras et os­tia im­po­suit, ea­dem post an­num do­mi­nus ae­di­fi­cio­rum demp­sit: quae­ro, is qui im­po­sue­rat pos­set­ne ea vin­di­ca­re. re­spon­dit pos­se: nam quae alie­nis ae­di­fi­ciis co­ne­xa es­sent, ea quam­diu iunc­ta ma­ne­rent, eo­run­dem ae­di­fi­cio­rum es­se, si­mul at­que in­de demp­ta es­sent, con­ti­nuo in pris­ti­nam cau­sam re­ver­ti.

Ad Dig. 6,1,59Windscheid: Lehrbuch des Pandektenrechts, 7. Aufl. 1891, Bd. I, § 188, Note 21.Julianus, On Minicius, Book VI. A man living in a house belonging to another placed windows and doors therein, and these the owner of the building removed after a year had elapsed. I ask whether the party who put them there can bring an action for the recovery of those doors and windows? The answer was that he can, for whatever is attached to the building of another forms a part of the same as long as it continues so, but as soon as it is removed, it immediately reverts to its former condition.

Dig. 6,1,61Iu­lia­nus li­bro sex­to ex Mi­n­icio. Mi­n­icius in­ter­ro­ga­tus, si quis na­vem suam alie­na ma­te­ria re­fe­cis­set, num ni­hi­lo mi­nus eius­dem na­vis ma­ne­ret, re­spon­dit ma­ne­re. sed si in ae­di­fi­can­da ea idem fe­cis­set, non pos­se. Iu­lia­nus no­tat: nam pro­prie­tas to­tius na­vis ca­ri­nae cau­sam se­qui­tur.

Julianus, On Minicius, Book VI. Minicius, where a man had used materials belonging to another to repair his own ship, having been asked whether the ship would still remain the property of the same man, answered that it would; but if he did this while building the ship, it would not be the case. Julianus states in a note that the property in the entire ship follows the position of the keel.

Dig. 8,5,18Iu­lia­nus li­bro sex­to ex Mi­n­icio. Is, cu­ius fa­mi­lia vi­ci­num pro­hi­be­bat aquam du­ce­re, sui po­tes­ta­tem non fa­cie­bat, ne se­cum agi pos­set: quae­rit ac­tor, quid si­bi fa­cien­dum es­set. re­spon­di opor­te­re prae­to­rem cau­sa co­gni­ta iu­be­re bo­na ad­ver­sa­rii pos­si­de­ri et non an­te in­de dis­ce­de­re, quam is ac­to­ri ius aquae du­cen­dae con­sti­tuis­set et si quid, quia aquam du­ce­re pro­hi­bi­tus es­set, sic­ci­ta­ti­bus de­tri­men­ti ce­pis­set, vel­uti si pra­ta ar­bo­res­ve exa­ruis­set.

Julianus, On Minicius, Book VI. The slaves of a certain man had prevented a neighbor from conducting water, and the responsible party having concealed himself to avoid suit being brought against him, the complainant asked what he can do? I answered that the Prætor, after having heard the case, must order the property of the defendant to be taken into possession and not surrendered until he had established a right of conducting water for the benefit of the plaintiff, if he had suffered any damage from drought, because he had been prevented from conducting water; as for instance, if his meadows or his trees had been dried up.

Dig. 22,1,26Idem li­bro sex­to ex Mi­n­icio. Ve­na­tio­nem fruc­tus fun­di ne­ga­vit es­se, ni­si fruc­tus fun­di ex ve­na­tio­ne con­stet.

Ad Dig. 22,1,26Windscheid: Lehrbuch des Pandektenrechts, 7. Aufl. 1891, Bd. I, § 184, Note 5; Bd. I, § 203, Note 6.The Same, On Minicius, Book VI. Julianus denies that game constitutes the profit of land, unless the profit of the land consists of game.

Dig. 50,16,206Iu­lia­nus li­bro sex­to ex Mi­n­icio. ‘Vi­na­ria’ va­sa pro­prie va­sa tor­cu­la­ria es­se pla­cet: do­lia au­tem et se­rias tam­diu in ea cau­sa es­se, quam­diu vi­num ha­be­rent, cum si­ne vi­no es­se de­si­ne­rent, in eo nu­me­ro non es­se, quon­iam ad alium usum trans­fer­ri pos­sent, vel­uti si fru­men­tum in his ad­da­tur. ean­dem cau­sam am­pho­ra­rum es­se, ut, cum vi­num ha­beant, tum in va­sis vi­na­riis, cum in­anes sint, tum ex­tra nu­me­rum vi­na­rio­rum sint, quia aliud in his ad­di pos­sit.

Julianus, On Minicius, Book VI. It is held that the expression “wine-jars” is properly applied to jars used at the wine press; for casks and other vessels are only classed as such while they contain wine; for, when they cease to do so, they have not this appellation, as they can be put to other uses; for instance, where grain is placed in them. The same rule applies to other earthen jars, when they are used for wine, just as it does to the former, for when they are empty, they are not included in the number of receptacles for wine, because other things can be kept in them.