Digestorum libri
Ex libro XIII
The Same, Digest, Book XIII. Where an oath is required from a debtor it effects a release of a pledge; for this resembles the discharge from liability for a debt, and certainly gives rise to a perpetual exception. Therefore, a creditor who brings suit for a penalty will be barred by an exception, and if the money has been paid it can be recovered; just as where an oath is interposed all controversy is at an end.
Julianus, Digest, Book III. He who allows his own property to be deposited with him or requests permission to use it, is not liable to an action on deposit or on one of loan for use, just as in the case of a party who rents his own property, or asks to hold it by sufferance, for he is not liable in either instance.
Julianus, Digest, Book XIII. If I give you a slave with the understanding that you will manumit him, and afterwards my agent should forbid you to manumit him, can I bring an action on mandate, if you grant him his freedom? I answered that, if the agent had good reason for preventing the manumission of the slave whom I had received for the sole purpose of manumitting him; for instance, if he should have subsequently ascertained that he had forged accounts, or that he had plotted against the life of his former master, I will be liable, if I do not pay attention to the notice of the agent. But, if the notice was given by the agent without any good reason, but merely in order to prevent the manumission of the slave, an action cannot be brought against me, even though I should give him his freedom.
Julianus, Digest, Book XIII. Where, however, a pledge has been sold by a creditor in the case of a conditional sale, he cannot be held to have acted in good faith, if he does not accept the increased price. But what if the new purchaser was poor, and had intervened only for the purpose of preventing the sale? The creditor can adjudge the property to the first purchaser without incurring any risk.
The Same, Digest, Book XIII. If anyone should manumit a slave, after he had sold him together with his peculium, he will be liable not only for the peculium which the slave had at the time when he was manumitted, but also for what he acquired afterwards; and he must, in addition, furnish security to restore anything which might come into his hands from the estate of the freedman. Marcellus says in a note that the vendor is compelled, in an action on sale, to deliver whatever the purchaser would have obtained if the slave had not been manumitted. Therefore, nothing is included which he would have acquired if the slave had not been manumitted.
The Same, Digest, Book XIII. A case sometimes occurs in which the heir is entitled to an action, although the testator could not have availed himself of it; as, for instance, where a guardian, at the time when he paid the legacies with which his ward was charged, did not enter into a stipulation with the legatees, binding them to refund anything which they might receive above the amount allowed by the Falcidian Law. The ward, indeed, cannot bring suit against his guardian on this account, but the latter will be liable to the heir of the minor.
Julianus, Digest, Book XIII. When we agree as to property which has been delivered, but dissent as to the causes for its transfer, I do not understand why the delivery should not be valid; for example, if I think that I am obliged to transfer a tract of land to you in compliance with the terms of a will, and I transfer it, and you are under the impression that I should do so by virtue of a stipulation. For if I pay you a sum of money for the purpose of making a donation of the same, and you think I intend to lend it to you, it is settled that the ownership will pass to you, and the fact that we differed with respect to the cause of giving and receiving it will be no impediment to its legal transfer.
Julianus, Digest, Book XIII. He who transfers a tract of land to a creditor, by way of pledge, is understood to retain possession of the same. But even if he should claim it by a precarious title, he can also acquire a good one by lapse of time; for, as possession by the creditor does not interfere with prescription, there is less reason that the claim of the debtor under a precarious title should present no obstacle, since he has much better right who claims property by a precarious title and is in possession, than he who has no possession at all.
The Same, Digest, Book XIII. A man borrowed a sum of money from a slave forming part of an estate, and gave him by way of pledge a tract of land or a slave, and having requested that the land or the slave be retained by him under a precarious title, he kept possession of it under such a title. He did this because a slave belonging to an estate acquired property for it by accepting delivery of the same; and by granting property under a precarious title, the result is that it cannot be acquired by usucaption. For if he had lent the property for use, or deposited it, and it had formed part of his peculium, he would have the right to bring an action on loan or deposit for the benefit of the estate. This occurs where the contract was made with reference to his peculium, for it should be understood that possession of property is acquired under such circumstances.
Julianus, Digest, Book XIII. If a slave lends money out of his peculium, and his debtor, not knowing that his master was dead, pays the slave before the estate has been entered upon, he will be released. The same rule of law will apply even if the debtor pays the money after the slave has been manumitted, provided he is ignorant of the fact that his peculium was not bequeathed to him; nor does it make any difference whether the money was delivered to him during the lifetime or after the death of his master, since, even in the latter instance, the debtor will be released, just as if the debtor had been ordered by his creditor to pay a sum of money to Titius; for although the creditor may be dead, still he does not pay it any the less properly to Titius, provided he was not aware that he was dead.