Javolenus, On the Last Works of Labeo, Book VI. I lent you a horse and while you were riding it several others were riding with you, and one of them ran against your horse and threw you off, and the legs of your horse were broken in consequence of the accident. Labeo states that no action can be brought against you, but if the accident took place through the negligence of the rider he can be sued, but suit cannot be brought against the owners of the horse; and I think this is correct.

Javolenus, On the Last Works of Labeo, Book VI. If the debtor of a woman should promise a dowry to her betrothed, the woman can bring an action for the money against her debtor before the marriage; and Labeo says that the debtor will not be liable to the husband upon this ground afterwards. This opinion is incorrect, because the promise is in suspense as long as the obligation remains in this condition.

Javolenus, On the Last Works of Labeo, Book VI. If the debtor of a woman should promise her betrothed a dowry, she cannot collect the money from her debtor before the marriage, because the promise is in suspense as long as the obligation remains in this condition.

Javolenus, On the Last Works of Labeo, Book VI. A wife gave to her husband, by way of dowry, land appraised at a hundred aurei, and then made an agreement with him to return the land to her at the same price in case of a divorce. The husband afterwards sold the said land for two hundred aurei, with the consent of his wife, and then a divorce took place. Labeo thinks that the husband should have the privilege of paying her two hundred aurei, or of returning the land, whichever he may choose; and that the obligation arising from the agreement should not be released. I think that Labeo gave this opinion because the land had been sold with the consent of the woman, otherwise it should, by all means, be returned. 1If a father promises a certain sum of money as a dowry for his daughter, and it is agreed that he shall not be compelled to pay it against his consent, I think that nothing can be collected from him; because the clause contained in the contract which stated that he could not be compelled to pay it, should be held to refer to the dowry.

Javolenus, On the Last Works of Labeo, Book VI. A husband opened marble quarries on dotal land. A divorce having taken place, the question arose to whom the marble which had been taken out but which had not yet been removed, belonged; and whether the wife or the husband should bear the expense incurred in working the quarries. Labeo said the marble belonged to the husband, but he denied that anything should be paid to him by the wife, because the expense was not necessary, and the land had been rendered less valuable. I think that not only necessary expenses but also those that are useful should be paid by the wife, and I do not believe that the land was decreased in value, if the quarries were of such a kind that the quantity of stone in them would, in time, be increased. 1If the wife should be in default, where an agreement was made that she should receive the land after paying the appraised value of part of the same to her husband; Labeo says that any profits collected in the meantime belong to the latter. I think that the better opinion is that the husband should be entitled to a proportionate share of the profits, and that the remainder should be refunded to the woman; which is the law at present.

Javolenus, On the Last Works of Labeo, Book VI. A man gave something to his wife after a divorce had taken place, to induce her to return to him; and the woman, having returned, afterwards obtained a divorce. Labeo and Trebatius gave it as their opinion in a case which arose between Terentia and Mæcenas, that if the divorce was genuine, the donation would be valid, but if it was simulated, it would be void. However, what Proculus and Cæcilius hold is true, namely, that a divorce is genuine, and a donation made on account of it is valid, where another marriage follows, or the woman remains for so long a time unmarried that there is no doubt of a dissolution of the marriage, otherwise the donation will be of no force or effect.

Javolenus, On the Last Works of Labeo, Book VI. Servius says that the husband is responsible for fraud and negligence with reference to all the property belonging to the dowry, which he has received, excepting money. This is also the opinion of Publius Mucius, for he decided in the case of Licinnia, the wife of Gracchus, whose dotal property had been lost in the sedition in which Gracchus was killed; as he held that the property should be restored to Licinnia, for the reason that Gracchus was to blame for the sedition. 1A husband gave money to his wife’s slave for the purchase of clothing, and this having been procured, a divorce took place within a year. It was held by Labeo and Trebatius that the clothing should be returned to the husband in the condition in which it was after the divorce. The rule of law would be the same if the husband had purchased the clothing and given it to the slave. If, however, the clothing should not be returned, the price of it can be set off by the husband against the dowry. 2A father ordered his daughter, who was under his control, to return her dowry to her father-in-law, a divorce having taken place; and after a part of the dowry had been paid, the father died. Labeo and Trebatius think that the remainder, if it had not been delegated or promised to be renewed to the father-in-law, should be paid to her; and this is correct. 3You received, by way of dowry, certain slaves whose value had been appraised, and an agreement was then entered into that, in case of a divorce, you should return slaves of equal value, but no mention was made of the offspring of female slaves forming part of the dowry. Labeo says that this offspring will belong to you, because it should be yours on account of the risk of losing the slaves which you are obliged to assume. 4A woman had a hundred aurei in the hands of her husband, as dowry, and a divorce having taken place, she stipulated through a mistake of her husband that he should be liable to her for two hundred. Labeo thinks that her husband will only be responsible for the dowry, whether the woman stipulated for the amount honestly or dishonestly. I adopt this opinion. 5A wife, after her divorce, received part of her dowry, and left part in the hands of her husband, and afterwards married another man, and then, having become a widow, she returned to her first husband, to whom she gave a hundred aurei, by way of dowry, without mentioning the money which remained out of the former dowry. If another divorce should occur, Labeo says that the husband will be compelled to return the remainder of the first dowry, under the same terms that he would have returned it if the first divorce had not taken place between them, as the remainder of the former dowry was transferred to the obligation of the second one. This I think to be correct. 6When a husband, without the order of his wife, during marriage, releases his father-in-law from the dowry which he had promised, Labeo says that this will be at the risk of the husband, even though it was done on account of the poverty of the father-in-law. This is true. 7Where anyone promises a dowry to a husband in behalf of his wife, and then, after having appointed the woman his heir, dies, Labeo says that the woman must assume the risk of that part of the dowry for which the husband was liable, for the reason that it would not be just for her to be enriched at the expense of her husband, and to hold him responsible for what he could not have exacted from her. I think that this is correct.