Digestorum libri
Ex libro V
Celsus, Digest, Book V. If a right of way through the property of another is merely granted or bequeathed to anyone he will have the right to walk or drive over it, but only in a proper manner, that is to say over any portion of the same; for certain things are tacitly understood to be excepted in ordinary conversation. He will not, however, be permitted to go through the house, or to walk or drive through the vineyards, when he might have done so just as conveniently elsewhere, and with less injury to the land subject to the servitude. For it is settled that in whatever direction he first directs his course, he must afterwards use the same in walking and driving; and that he has no power subsequently to change it. This view was also held by Sabinus, who stated in an argument that it was lawful for a party to direct a water-course wherever he pleased, but after this was done he could not change it; and it is true that this rule should also be observed in the case of a right of way.
Celsus, Digest, Book V. For it is sufficient that there should be a right of access on account of the land. 1Where you and I have a right of way through the land of a neighbor, and I use it, but you cease to do so for the period prescribed by law, will you lose your right? And, on the other hand, if a neighbor who has a right of way through our land, walks or drives through my portion of the same, but does not enter yours, will this free yours? Celsus answered that if the estate is divided by metes and bounds between the joint-owners, then, so far as the servitude to which the land is entitled is concerned, it is the same as if it had been attached to both estates from the beginning, and either one of the owners can make use of his own servitude, and each can lose his own by want of use, and the interests of the two estates are no further involved; no injury is done to the party whose land is subject to the servitude, but in fact, his condition is improved, since one of the owners by making use of the right benefits himself and not the entire estate. 1aBut where the estate subject to the servitude is divided in this way, the matter is involved in a little more doubt; for if the location of the right of way is certain and well defined, then, if the estate is divided in the line of the right of way, everything must be observed just as if there had been two distinct estates in the beginning, when the servitude was established; but if the land is divided across the line of the right of way, (and it does not make much difference if this is done equally or unequally) then the right of servitude remains just as it was when the land was undivided, and nothing less than the entire right of way can be retained by using it, or lost by failure to do so; and if it should happen that the owner uses only as much of the way as crosses one of the tracts of land, the other will not become free for that reason, since a right of way is one, and hence is indivisible. 1bThe parties can, however, liberate either of the estates from the servitude, provided they expressly agree to do so; and, at all events, if the party who is entitled to the servitude should purchase one estate, after the division, will the servitude to which the other tract of land is subject remain operative? I do not see how anything absurd can result from this opinion, while one of the estates remains subject to the servitude; provided that, from the beginning, a narrower right of way was created than was mentioned in the contract, and that space enough still remains in the estate, with reference to which the servitude was not released, for the right of way to be made use of; but if insufficient space remains for this purpose, then, both estates should be freed; one on account of the purchase, the other because a right of way cannot be created over the space which remains. 1cIf, however, the right of way was so established that the party was at liberty to walk or drive over any portion of the estate that he chose; and there was nothing to prevent his changing his direction from time to time, and afterwards the estate was divided; if he could walk and drive equally over any portion that he chose, then we must consider the case just as if, in the beginning, two servitudes had been imposed on both estates in such a way that one could be retained and the other lost by want of use. 1dI know perfectly well that, under these circumstances, the right of one of the parties would be impaired by the act of the other, since, formerly it would have been sufficient if the party had walked or driven over part of the land to enable him to retain the same right over the rest of it; but the party entitled to the right of way secured the advantage of being able to walk or drive over two roads equally; that is, over two roads each eight feet wide where straight and sixteen feet where curved.
Ad Dig. 12,1,32Windscheid: Lehrbuch des Pandektenrechts, 7. Aufl. 1891, Bd. II, § 270, Noten 10, 13, 15.Celsus, Digest, Book V. If you request Titius and myself to lend you money and I order a debtor of mine to promise to furnish it to you, and you make a stipulation believing that he is the debtor of Titius, will you be liable to me? I am in doubt on this point, if you did not enter into any contract with me, but I think it is probable that you are liable; not because I lent you money (for this cannot be unless the parties consent); but because my money came into your hands, and therefore it is proper and just that you should repay it to me.
Ad Dig. 42,1,11Windscheid: Lehrbuch des Pandektenrechts, 7. Aufl. 1891, Bd. II, § 258, Note 7.Celsus, Digest, Book V. If I have stipulated for something to be done on the Kalends of a certain month, and judgment has been rendered some time after the Kalends of that month, the amount of damages must be estimated in proportion to my interest in having the work done on the date above mentioned; for if the estimate is made from that time, I would have no further interest than in what could be paid later.