Corpus iurisprudentiae Romanae

Repertorium zu den Quellen des römischen Rechts

Digesta Iustiniani Augusti

Recognovit Mommsen (1870) et retractavit Krüger (1928)
Convertit in Anglica lingua Scott (1932)
Call.quaest.
Quaestionum lib.Callistrati Quaestionum libri

Quaestionum libri

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Ex libro I

Dig. 1,3,38Cal­lis­tra­tus li­bro I quaes­tio­num. Nam im­pe­ra­tor nos­ter Se­ve­rus re­scrip­sit in amb­igui­ta­ti­bus quae ex le­gi­bus pro­fi­cis­cun­tur con­sue­tu­di­nem aut re­rum per­pe­tuo si­mi­li­ter iu­di­ca­ta­rum auc­to­ri­ta­tem vim le­gis op­ti­ne­re de­be­re.

The Same, Questions, Book I. For our Emperor Severus stated in a Rescript that in questions of doubt arising from statutory enactments, custom, or the authority of decisions which have always been decided in the same manner, should obtain the force of law.

Dig. 5,1,47Cal­lis­tra­tus li­bro pri­mo quaes­tio­num. Ob­ser­van­dum est, ne is iu­dex de­tur quem al­te­ra pars no­mi­na­tim pe­tat: id enim in­iqui ex­em­pli es­se di­vus Ha­d­ria­nus re­scrip­sit: ni­si hoc spe­cia­li­ter a prin­ci­pe ad ve­re­cun­diam pe­ti­ti iu­di­cis re­spi­cien­te per­mit­te­tur.

Callistratus, Questions, Book I. Care must be exercised that a person be not appointed judge, whom either side expressly petitions for; as the Divine Hadrian stated in a Rescript that this would offer a bad precedent unless it should be especially allowed by the Emperor through respect for him whose appointment was requested.

Dig. 12,3,10Cal­lis­tra­tus li­bro pri­mo quaes­tio­num. In in­stru­men­tis, quae quis non ex­hi­bet, ac­to­ri per­mit­ti­tur in li­tem iu­ra­re, quan­ti sua in­ter­est ea pro­fer­ri, ut tan­ti con­dem­ne­tur reus: id­que et­iam di­vus Com­mo­dus re­scrip­sit.

Callistratus, Questions, Book I. Where anyone does not produce documents, the plaintiff is permitted to swear to the claim, so that judgment may be rendered against the defendant for an amount of damages equal to the interest the plaintiff has in having the documents produced; and this the Divine Commodus stated in a Rescript.

Dig. 17,2,64Cal­lis­tra­tus li­bro pri­mo quaes­tio­num. Ita­que cum se­pa­ra­tim so­cii age­re coe­pe­rint et unus­quis­que eo­rum si­bi neg­otie­tur, si­ne du­bio ius so­cie­ta­tis dis­sol­vi­tur.

Callistratus, Questions, Book I. Hence, if partners begin to act separately, and each one of them transacts business on his own account, there is no doubt that the partnership is dissolved.

Dig. 48,10,15Cal­lis­tra­tus li­bro pri­mo quaes­tio­num. Di­vus Clau­dius edic­to prae­ce­pit ad­icien­dum le­gi Cor­ne­liae, ut, si quis, cum al­te­rius tes­ta­men­tum vel co­di­cil­los scri­be­ret, le­ga­tum si­bi sua ma­nu scrip­se­rit, pro­in­de te­n­ea­tur ac si com­mi­sis­set in le­gem Cor­ne­liam, et ne vel is ve­nia de­tur, qui se igno­ras­se edic­ti se­ve­ri­ta­tem prae­ten­dant. scri­be­re au­tem si­bi le­ga­tum vi­de­ri non so­lum eum qui ma­nu sua id fa­cit, sed et­iam qui per ser­vum suum vel fi­lium, quem in po­tes­ta­tem ha­bet, dic­tan­te tes­ta­to­re le­ga­to ho­no­ra­tur. 1Pla­ne con­sti­tu­tio­ni­bus prin­ci­pa­li­bus ca­ve­tur, ut, si tes­ta­tor spe­cia­li­ter sub­scrip­tio­ne sua de­cla­ra­ve­rit dic­tas­se ser­vo ali­cu­ius, ut do­mi­no eius le­ga­tum ab he­redi­bus suis da­re­tur, id va­le­re, nec ge­ne­ra­lem sub­scrip­tio­nem tes­ta­to­ris va­le­re ad­ver­sus se­na­tus con­sul­ti auc­to­ri­ta­tem et id­eo le­ga­tum pro non scrip­to ha­ben­dum et ser­vo, qui et­iam si­bi le­ga­tum ad­scrip­sit, ve­niam da­ri. ego tu­tius es­se pu­to ve­niam pe­ten­dam ab im­pe­ra­to­re, sci­li­cet eo quod re­lic­tum est abs­ti­nen­ti­bus. 2Item se­na­tus cen­suit, ut, si ser­vus do­mi­ni sui ius­su tes­ta­men­to co­di­cil­lis­ve li­ber­ta­tem si­bi ad­scrip­se­rit, ob eam rem, quod ip­sius ma­nu ad­scrip­tum est, mi­nus li­ber sit: sed li­ber­tas ei ex fi­dei­com­mis­si cau­sa prae­sta­tur: si mo­do post eam scrip­tu­ram ma­nu sua tes­ta­tor tes­ta­men­to co­di­cil­lis­ve sub­scrip­se­rit. 3Et qua­te­nus de so­la spe­cie fi­dei­com­mis­sae li­ber­ta­tis hoc se­na­tus con­sul­to con­ti­ne­ba­tur, di­vus Pius re­scrip­sit sen­ten­tiam ma­gis se­quen­dam es­se hu­ius se­na­tus con­sul­ti quam scrip­tu­ram: nam ser­vos, cum do­mi­nis suis pa­rent, ne­ces­si­ta­te po­tes­ta­tis ex­cu­sa­ri, si ta­men ac­ce­dat do­mi­ni auc­to­ri­tas sub­scri­ben­tis se ea dic­tas­se et re­co­gno­vis­se: vi­de­ri enim ait ip­sius do­mi­ni ma­nu scrip­ta, cu­ius vo­lun­ta­te ea scrip­ta sunt. ‘quod ta­men’, in­quit, ‘ad li­be­ras per­so­nas, in quas nul­lum ius tes­ta­tor ha­bue­rit, ex­ten­di non de­bet: quae­ri ta­men de­bet, an ae­que sub­se­quen­di ne­ces­si­tas et ho­nes­ta ex­cu­sa­tio est non fa­cien­ti­bus, quod non sit con­ces­sum’. 4Ma­tri quo­que, cui per ser­vum suum dic­tan­te fi­lio le­ga­tum scrip­tum es­set, ve­niam tri­buen­dam le­gis Cor­ne­liae pla­cuit. 5Idem in fi­liam, quae dic­tan­te ma­tre sua per igno­ran­tiam iu­ris le­ga­tum si­bi scrip­se­rat, se­na­tus cen­suit. 6Si quis duo­bus he­redi­bus in­sti­tu­tis ad­ie­ce­rit, ut, si al­ter­uter he­res si­ne li­be­ris de­ces­sis­set, ei qui su­per­es­set et li­be­ros ha­be­ret he­redi­tas red­de­re­tur vel, si uter­que si­ne li­be­ris de­ces­sis­set, he­redi­tas (de­in­de alia ma­nu) scrip­to­ri tes­ta­men­ti re­sti­tue­re­tur: pla­cet tes­ta­men­ta­rio poe­nam le­gis Cor­ne­liae re­mit­ti. sed be­ni­gnius est, ut et­iam ea, quae su­pra scrip­ta sunt, si­mi­li mo­do con­se­qua­tur.

Callistratus, Questions, Book I. The Divine Claudius ordered by an Edict that the following should be added to the Cornelian Law: “If anyone, while writing the will or the codicil of another, should insert with his own hand the bequest of a legacy to himself, he shall be liable, just as if he had violated the Cornelian Law; and no pardon shall be granted to those who pretend to have been ignorant of the severity of the Edict.” Not only one who has drawn up the bequest of a legacy for his own benefit, with his own hand, is considered to have done so; but also he who, through the agency of his slave, or his son who is under his control, is honored by a legacy at the dictation of the testator. 1It is clearly provided by the Imperial Constitutions that if a testator specifically states, over his signature, that he has dictated to a slave belonging to anyone, that a legacy should be paid the master of the latter by his own heirs, the bequest will be valid; but the general signature of the testator will not avail against the authority of the Decree of the Senate, and therefore the bequest will be considered as not having been written, and the slave who wrote it for his own benefit should be pardoned. I think, however, that it would be safer for pardon to be asked from the Emperor, of course after the parties interested have relinquished their claim to what was left to them. 2The Senate likewise decreed that if a slave, by the order of his master, should write the bequest of his own freedom in a will or a codicil, for the very reason that it is written with his own hand he will not become free; but freedom can be granted to him under the terms of a trust, provided that, after the writing had been done, the testator signed the will or the codicil with his own hand. 3And as only the kind of freedom acquired by means of a trust was embraced in this Decree of the Senate, the Divine Pius stated in a Rescript that the spirit of the Decree, rather than the letter of the same should be followed; for when slaves obey their masters, they are excused through the necessity of the power to which they are subjected; but when the authority of the master is added, he having stated over his signature that he had dictated and read what had been written, he says that it is considered to have been written by the hand of the master himself, when this had been done by his desire. This, however, should not be extended so as to include free persons over whom the testator has no right. Still, it must be ascertained whether the same necessity for obedience did not exist, and whether those who did not comply had an honorable excuse when they failed to do what was not permitted. 4It was decided that pardon for violating the Cornelian Law should also be granted to a mother, for whose benefit the bequest of a legacy had been written by her slave at the dictation of her son. 5The Senate also made the same decision with reference to a daughter who, at the dictation of her mother, through ignorance of the law, wrote a bequest to herself. 6If anyone, after having appointed two heirs, should add that if either one of them died without leaving children, the estate should be given to the survivor, if he had children, but if both should die without any, the estate (what follows was written in another hand) should be given to the person who wrote the will: it is held that he who wrote the will should be released from the penalty of the Cornelian Law; but it would be more beneficent to permit him to acquire what has been mentioned above.

Dig. 48,19,35Cal­lis­tra­tus li­bro pri­mo quaes­tio­num. Man­da­tis prin­ci­pa­li­bus, quae prae­si­di­bus dan­tur, ca­ve­tur, ne quis per­pe­tuis vin­cu­lis dam­ne­tur: id­que et­iam di­vus Ha­d­ria­nus re­scrip­sit.

Callistratus, Questions, Book I. It is provided by the Imperial Mandates, which are communicated to Governors, that no one shall be sentenced to chains for life; and this was also stated by the Divine Hadrian in a Rescript.

Ex libro II

Dig. 14,2,4Cal­lis­tra­tus li­bro se­cun­do quaes­tio­num. Na­vis on­us­tae le­van­dae cau­sa, quia in­tra­re flu­men vel por­tum non po­tue­rat cum one­re, si quae­dam mer­ces in sca­pham tra­iec­tae sunt, ne aut ex­tra flu­men pe­ri­cli­te­tur aut in ip­so os­tio vel por­tu, ea­que sca­pha sum­mer­sa est, ra­tio ha­be­ri de­bet in­ter eos, qui in na­ve mer­ces sal­vas ha­bent, cum his qui in sca­pha per­di­de­runt, pro­in­de tam­quam si iac­tu­ra fac­ta es­set: id­que Sa­b­inus quo­que li­bro se­cun­do re­spon­so­rum pro­bat. con­tra si sca­pha cum par­te mer­cium sal­va est, na­vis per­iit, ra­tio ha­be­ri non de­bet eo­rum, qui in na­ve per­di­de­runt, quia iac­tus in tri­bu­tum na­ve sal­va venit. 1Sed si na­vis, quae in tem­pes­ta­te iac­tu mer­cium unius mer­ca­to­ris le­va­ta est, in alio lo­co sum­mer­sa est et ali­quo­rum mer­ca­to­rum mer­ces per uri­na­to­res ex­trac­tae sunt da­ta mer­ce­de, ra­tio­nem ha­be­ri de­be­re eius, cu­ius mer­ces in na­vi­ga­tio­ne le­van­dae na­vis cau­sa iac­tae sunt, ab his, qui post­ea sua per uri­na­to­res ser­va­ve­runt, Sa­b­inus ae­que re­spon­dit. eo­rum ve­ro, qui ita ser­va­ve­runt, in­vi­cem ra­tio­nem ha­be­ri non de­be­re ab eo, qui in na­vi­ga­tio­ne iac­tum fe­cit, si quae­dam ex his mer­ci­bus per uri­na­to­res ex­trac­tae sunt: eo­rum enim mer­ces non pos­sunt vi­de­ri ser­van­dae na­vis cau­sa iac­tae es­se, quae per­it. 2Cum au­tem iac­tus de na­ve fac­tus est et ali­cu­ius res, quae in na­vi re­man­se­runt, de­te­rio­res fac­tae sunt, vi­den­dum, an con­fer­re co­gen­dus sit, quia non de­bet du­pli­ci dam­no one­ra­ri et col­la­tio­nis et quod res de­te­rio­res fac­tae sunt. sed de­fen­den­dum est hunc con­fer­re de­be­re pre­tio prae­sen­te re­rum: ita­que ver­bi gra­tia si vi­ce­num mer­ces duo­rum fue­runt et al­te­rius aspar­gi­ne de­cem es­se coe­pe­runt, il­le cu­ius res in­te­grae sunt pro vi­gin­ti con­fe­rat, hic pro de­cem. pot­est ta­men di­ci et­iam il­la sen­ten­tia di­stin­guen­ti­bus no­bis, de­te­rio­res ex qua cau­sa fac­tae sunt, id est utrum prop­ter iac­ta nu­da­tis re­bus dam­num se­cu­tum est an ve­ro alia ex cau­sa, vel­uti quod ali­cu­bi ia­ce­bant mer­ces in an­gu­lo ali­quo et un­da pe­ne­tra­vit. tunc enim con­fer­re de­be­bit: an ex prio­re cau­sa col­la­tio­nis onus pa­ti non de­bet, quia iac­tus et­iam hunc lae­sit? ad­huc num­quid et si aspar­gi­ne prop­ter iac­tum res de­te­rio­res fac­tae sunt? sed di­stinc­tio sup­ti­lior ad­hi­ben­da est, quid plus sit, in dam­no an in col­la­tio­ne: si ver­bi gra­tia hae res vi­gin­ti fue­runt et col­la­tio qui­dem fa­cit de­cem, dam­num au­tem duo, de­duc­to hoc, quod dam­num pas­sus est, re­li­quum con­fer­re de­beat. quid er­go, si plus in dam­no erit quam in col­la­tio­ne? ut pu­ta de­cem au­reis res de­te­rio­res fac­tae sunt, duo au­tem col­la­tio­nis sunt. in­du­bi­ta­te utrum­que onus pa­ti non de­bet: sed hic vi­dea­mus, num et ip­si con­fer­re opor­teat. quid enim in­ter­est iac­ta­tas res meas amis­e­rim an nu­da­tas de­te­rio­res ha­be­re coe­pe­rim: nam sic­ut ei qui per­di­de­rit sub­ve­ni­tur, ita et ei sub­ve­ni­ri opor­tet, qui de­te­rio­res prop­ter iac­tum res ha­be­re coe­pe­rit. haec ita Pa­pi­rius Fron­to re­spon­dit.

Callistratus, Questions, Book II. If, for the purpose of lightening an overloaded ship because she could not enter a river or reach a harbor with her cargo, a certain portion of the merchandise is placed in a boat to prevent the vessel from being in danger outside the river, or at the entrance of the harbor, or in the latter, and the boat is sunk, an account should be taken between those who have their merchandise preserved on the ship and those who lost theirs in the boat, just as if the latter had been thrown overboard. Sabinus also adopts this view in the Second Book of Opinions. On the other hand, if the boat is saved with part of the merchandise, and the ship is lost, no account should be taken with reference to those who lost their property in the ship, because jettison necessitates contribution only where the ship is saved. 1But where a ship, which has been lightened in a storm by throwing overboard the goods of a merchant, is sunk in some other place, and the goods of certain merchants are recovered by divers for compensation; Sabinus also says an account must be taken between the party whose goods were thrown overboard during the voyage for the purpose of lightening the ship, and those who subsequently recovered their goods by means of divers. But, on the other hand, no account must be presented by the party whose merchandise was thrown overboard during the voyage to those whose merchandise was not thereby preserved, if any of it was recovered by divers; for it cannot be held to have been thrown overboard for the purpose of saving the ship which was lost. 2But where jetsam is made from the ship, and the merchandise of anyone which remained on board, is damaged; it is a matter for consideration whether he should be compelled to contribute, since he ought not to be oppressed by the double loss of contribution and deterioration of his property. The point, however, may be maintained that he should contribute in proportion to the present value of his property. Thus, for example, where the merchandise of two persons was each worth twenty aurei, and that of one of them became only worth ten, on account of having been wet; the party whose property was not damaged should contribute in the proportion of twenty and the other in the proportion of ten. An opinion can, however, be given in this instance, if we make a distinction as to the cause of the deterioration; that is to say, whether the damage resulted on account of the exposure resulting from throwing the merchandise overboard, or for some other cause; for example, where the merchandise lay somewhere in a corner, and the waves reached it. In this instance the owner will be compelled to contribute, but in the former one, ought he not to be released from the burden of contribution because the jetsam also injured him? Or ought he to be liable even if his goods were deteriorated by the splashing of water on account of the jetsam? A still finer distinction should be made, namely, as to whether the greater loss is sustained through the damage, or through the contribution; for example, if the merchandise is worth twenty aurei, and the contribution is assessed at ten, the damage, however, amounts to two, and this having been deducted because of the loss, must the owner contribute the remainder? How then if the damage amounted to more than the contribution? For example, if the property was damaged to the amount of ten aurei, and the contribution amounted to two, there is no doubt that the party should not bear both burdens. But here let us see whether a contribution should not be made to him; for what difference does it make whether I lose my property by its being thrown overboard, or have it deteriorated by being exposed? For just as relief is granted to a party for the loss of his property, so, also, it should be granted to him whose property has become deteriorated on account of the jetsam. Papirius Fronto also stated this in an opinion.

Dig. 21,2,72Cal­lis­tra­tus li­bro se­cun­do quaes­tio­num. Cum plu­res fun­di spe­cia­li­ter no­mi­na­tim uno in­stru­men­to emp­tio­nis in­ter­po­si­to ven­ie­rint, non uti­que al­ter al­te­rius fun­dus pars vi­de­tur es­se, sed mul­ti fun­di una emp­tio­ne con­ti­nen­tur. et quem­ad­mo­dum, si quis com­plu­ra man­ci­pia uno in­stru­men­to emp­tio­nis in­ter­po­si­to ven­di­de­rit, evic­tio­nis ac­tio in sin­gu­la ca­pi­ta man­ci­pio­rum spec­ta­tur, et sic­ut alia­rum quo­que re­rum com­plu­rium una emp­tio fac­ta sit, in­stru­men­tum qui­dem emp­tio­nis in­ter­po­si­tum unum est, evic­tio­nem au­tem tot ac­tio­nes sunt, quot et spe­cies re­rum sunt quae emp­tio­ne com­pre­hen­sae sunt: ita et in pro­pos­i­to non uti­que pro­hi­be­bi­tur emp­tor evic­to ex his uno fun­do ven­di­to­rem con­ve­ni­re, quod una cau­tio­ne emp­tio­nis com­plu­res fun­dos mer­ca­tus com­pre­hen­de­rit.

Callistratus, Questions, Book II. Where several tracts of land are sold and expressly and specifically described in one and the same instrument of sale, each of these is not held to be a part of any other, but all the tracts are included in a single purchase. And, just as if anyone should sell several slaves by a single bill of sale, the action for eviction will include each head of said slaves individually; and just as also where a single purchase is made of several other articles, and only one bill of sale is drawn up, there are, however, as many actions for eviction as there are different kinds of property included in the purchase; so, in the case stated, the purchaser certainly will not be prohibited from bringing suit against the vendor if one of said tracts is evicted, because the transaction included several pieces of land conveyed by one instrument of sale.

Dig. 22,4,5Cal­lis­tra­tus li­bro se­cun­do quaes­tio­num. Si res ges­ta si­ne lit­te­ra­rum quo­que con­sig­na­tio­ne ve­ri­ta­te fac­tum suum prae­beat, non id­eo mi­nus va­le­bit, quod in­stru­men­tum nul­lum de ea in­ter­ces­sit.

Callistratus, Questions, Book II. Where a transaction shows that it has actually been concluded without any documentary evidence, it will be none the less valid because no written instrument with reference to it exists.

Dig. 23,2,64Cal­lis­tra­tus li­bro se­cun­do quaes­tio­num. Li­ber­tum eun­dem­que tu­to­rem pu­pil­lae eo, quod in ma­tri­mo­nium col­lo­ca­ta ip­si tu­to­ri suo vel fi­lio eius est, se­na­tus rele­gan­dum cen­suit. 1Se­na­tus con­sul­ti, quo pro­hi­ben­tur tu­to­res et fi­lii eo­rum pu­pil­las suas du­ce­re, pu­to he­redem quo­que tu­to­ris ex­tra­neum sen­ten­tia ad­pre­hen­di, cum id­eo pro­hi­bue­rit hu­ius­mo­di nup­tias, ne pu­pil­lae in re fa­mi­lia­ri cir­cum­scri­ban­tur ab his, qui ra­tio­nes eis ges­tae tu­te­lae red­de­re com­pel­lun­tur. 2Tu­tor au­tem pu­pil­li non pro­hi­be­tur fi­liam suam col­lo­ca­re pu­pil­lo suo in ma­tri­mo­nium.

Callistratus, Questions, Book II. The Senate decreed that a freedman, who was also the guardian of his patron’s daughter, should be banished because she married him, or his son. 1I think that the foreign heir of a guardian should be included in the terms of the Decree of the Senate by which guardians and their sons are forbidden to marry their female wards; since marriages of this kind are prohibited to prevent wards from being cheated by those who are compelled to account to them for the administration of their guardianship. 2A guardian is not forbidden to give his daughter in marriage to his ward.

Dig. 23,3,8Cal­lis­tra­tus li­bro se­cun­do quaes­tio­num. Sed ni­si hoc evi­den­ter ac­tum fue­rit, cre­den­dum est hoc agi, ut sta­tim res spon­si fiant et, ni­si nup­tiae se­cu­tae fue­rint, red­dan­tur.

Callistratus, Questions, Book II. Where, however, it is evident that such action has not been taken, it must be held to be understood that the property immediately passes to the betrothed, and unless the marriage is solemnized it must be returned.

Dig. 24,3,48Cal­lis­tra­tus li­bro se­cun­do quaes­tio­num. Si do­ta­li in­stru­men­to ita sti­pu­la­tio in­ter­po­si­ta sit, ut li­be­ro­rum no­mi­ne dos apud ma­ri­tum re­si­deat, ne­po­tum quo­que no­mi­ne dos re­ti­ne­bi­tur.

Callistratus, Questions, Book II. If it was stipulated in the dotal instrument that the dowry should remain in the hands of the husband for the benefit of the children, it can also be retained by him for the benefit of the grandchildren.

Dig. 35,1,82Cal­lis­tra­tus li­bro se­cun­do quaes­tio­num. Cum ser­vus ita li­ber es­se ius­sus sit ‘si ra­tio­nes red­di­de­rit’ ei­que fun­dum he­res da­re dam­nas sit, vi­dea­mus, utrum con­di­cio li­ber­ta­ti prae­po­si­ta sit an ve­ro et le­ga­to. et qui­dem si li­ber­ta­ti so­li ac­ci­pia­mus prae­po­si­tam, nul­lus trac­ta­tus am­plius su­per­est: nam le­ga­tum pu­rum in­ve­ni­tur et id­eo in­uti­le fit: quod si con­di­cio et­iam le­ga­to in­si­ta sit, quod qui­dam rec­te pu­tant, si­mul cum li­ber­ta­te dies quo­que le­ga­ti uti­li­ter ce­dit. quid er­go con­ti­ne­tur his ver­bis ‘si ra­tio­nes red­di­de­rit?’ qui­dam hoc aiunt ‘si re­li­qua red­di­de­rit’, qua­si ni­hil in­ter­sit, utrum sub hac con­di­cio­ne ‘si re­li­qua’ vel hac ‘si ra­tio­nes red­di­de­rit’. sed nos ne­que con­di­cio­nem me­ram pu­ta­mus es­se, quae in da­tio­ne ex­sis­tit, ne­que me­ram con­di­cio­nem, quae in fac­to sit, sed eam con­di­cio­nem, quae ex mix­tu­ra qua­dam con­sis­tit. nam non uti­que si il­le in fol­le re­li­qua op­tu­le­rit, li­ber erit: non enim tes­ta­tor hoc sen­sit, sed il­lud, ut ra­tio­nes red­dat, quo­mo­do ser­vus red­de­re so­let, id est le­gen­das of­fer­re ra­tio­nes pri­mum, de­in­de com­pu­tan­das, ut ex­plo­ra­ri pos­sit, im­pu­ta­tio­nes pro­be an im­pro­be re­fe­ran­tur, ac­cep­ta rec­te re­la­ta an non rec­te: ita enim in­ci­pit qui­dem res a fac­to, per­ve­nit au­tem ad pe­cu­niam. in­est his ver­bis et­iam he­redes no­ti­tia in­strui ra­tio­num, ut sciant, quid in qua­que ra­tio­ne scrip­tum sit. nam quod ip­se vi­vus fac­tu­rus erat, ab he­redi­bus suis fie­ri ius­sis­se in­tel­le­gi­tur: il­le au­tem uti­que non sic so­le­bat ser­vo suo os­ten­den­ti re­li­qua ra­tio­nes sub­scri­be­re, sed ita, ut le­ge­ret exa­mi­na­ret ex­ci­pe­ret. ita­que cum ser­vo sub hac con­di­cio­ne tes­ta­men­to li­ber­tas da­tur ‘si ra­tio­nes red­di­de­rit’, non hanc so­lam ha­bet sig­ni­fi­ca­tio­nem, si cau­tio­nes in­stru­men­ta­que om­nia ac­tus sui ex­hi­bue­rit he­redi, sed et si re­li­qua sol­ve­rit.

Callistratus, Questions, Book II. Where a slave is directed to be free as follows, “Let my heir be charged with the delivery of such-and-such a tract of land to my slave, if he renders his accounts,” let us see whether the condition has reference to the grant of freedom, or to the legacy. And, indeed, if we decide that it only refers to the grant of freedom, no further consideration is necessary, for the legacy is absolute, and therefore void. If, however, the condition was imposed on the legacy, as some authorities very properly hold, it becomes legally payable at the very moment when the slave obtains his freedom. What then is the meaning of the words, “If he renders his accounts”? Certain jurists say that it signifies if he should give a statement of the balance in his hands, just as if there was no difference between the two conditions, “If he renders an account of the balance remaining in his hands,” or, “If he renders his accounts.” We, however, do not think that the condition only has reference to payment, or to some act which is to be performed, but that it includes both of these things, since if the slave should tender the balance of the money in a bag, he will not be released from liability, as this was not the intention of the testator, but he wished him to render his accounts in the way in which a slave usually does so; that is to say, that if he should first show the accounts to the heir, and then the calculations, in order that it may be ascertained whether they are correctly or incorrectly made out, and whether the receipts which have been taken correspond with the statement, or not. In this way the investigation begins with an act, and finishes with the payment of money. These words also mean that the heirs can ascertain from the examination of each item what is contained in the several accounts, for the heir is understood to have ordered the same thing to be done by his heirs which he himself would have done if he had been living. For he was certainly not accustomed to sign accounts, where his slave merely showed him the balance which was due, but he was accustomed to read them, scrutinize them, and take exception to them; therefore, where freedom is left to a slave under the condition, “If he renders his accounts,” it has not merely the signification that he will deliver to his heir all the bonds and documents relating to his administration, but that he will also pay him any balance remaining in his hands.

Dig. 40,12,37Cal­lis­tra­tus li­bro se­cun­do quaes­tio­num. Con­ven­tio pri­va­ta ne­que ser­vum quem­quam ne­que li­ber­tum ali­cu­ius fa­ce­re pot­est.

Callistratus, Questions, Book II. A private agreement cannot make anyone either the slave or the freedman of another.

Dig. 41,1,59Cal­lis­tra­tus li­bro se­cun­do quaes­tio­num. Res ex man­da­tu meo emp­ta non prius mea fiet, quam si mi­hi tra­di­de­rit qui emit.

Ad Dig. 41,1,59Windscheid: Lehrbuch des Pandektenrechts, 7. Aufl. 1891, Bd. I, § 155, Note 6.Callistratus, Questions, Book II. Property purchased by my order does not become mine until the person who bought it has delivered it to me.

Dig. 42,8,20Cal­lis­tra­tus li­bro se­cun­do quaes­tio­num. De­bi­to­rem, qui ex se­na­tus con­sul­to Tre­bel­lia­no to­tam he­redi­ta­tem re­sti­tuit, pla­cet non vi­de­ri in frau­dem cre­di­to­rum alie­nas­se por­tio­nem, quam re­ti­ne­re po­tuis­set, sed ma­gis fi­de­li­ter fa­ce­re.

Callistratus, Questions, Book II. It is settled that a debtor who has transferred an entire estate, in accordance with the Trebellian Decree of the Senate, is not considered to have defrauded his creditors, if he also transfers the portion which he was entitled to retain by law, but that he has, with the greatest fidelity, complied with the wishes of the deceased.

Dig. 47,9,7Idem li­bro se­cun­do quaes­tio­num. Ne quid ex nau­fra­giis di­ri­pia­tur vel quis ex­tra­neus in­ter­ve­niat col­li­gen­dis eis, mul­ti­fa­riam pro­spec­tum est. nam et di­vus Ha­d­ria­nus edic­to prae­ce­pit, ut hi, qui iux­ta li­to­ra ma­ris pos­si­dent, sci­rent, si quan­do na­vis vel in­fic­ta vel frac­ta in­tra fi­nes agri cu­ius­que fue­rit, ne nau­fra­gia di­ri­piant, in ip­sos iu­di­cia prae­si­des his, qui res suas di­rep­tas que­run­tur, red­di­tu­ros, ut quid­quid pro­ba­ve­rint ad­emp­tum si­bi nau­fra­gio, id a pos­ses­so­ri­bus re­ci­piant. de his au­tem, quos di­ri­puis­se pro­ba­tum sit, prae­si­dem ut de la­tro­ni­bus gra­vem sen­ten­tiam di­ce­re. ut fa­ci­lior sit pro­ba­tio hu­ius­mo­di ad­mis­si, per­mi­sit his et quid­quid pas­sos se hu­ius­mo­di que­run­tur, ad­ire prae­fec­tos et ad eum tes­ta­ri reos­que pe­te­re, ut pro mo­do cul­pae vel vinc­ti vel sub fi­de­ius­so­ri­bus ad prae­si­dem re­mit­tan­tur. a do­mi­no quo­que pos­ses­sio­nis, in qua id ad­mis­sum di­ca­tur, sa­tis ac­ci­pi, ne co­gni­tio­ni de­sit, prae­ci­pi­tur. sed nec in­ter­ve­ni­re nau­fra­giis col­li­gen­dis aut mi­li­tem aut pri­va­tum aut li­ber­tum ser­vum­ve prin­ci­pis pla­ce­re si­bi ait se­na­tus.

The Same, Questions, Book II. Many precautions have been taken to hinder property from being stolen during a shipwreck, or to prevent strangers from coming in and taking possession of it. For the Divine Hadrian provided by an Edict that those who owned land on the shore of the sea should, when a ship either badly damaged or broken up within the boundaries of any of them, see that nothing was stolen from the wreck; and that the Governors of provinces should grant actions against them in favor of those who were searching for the property of which they had been deprived, to enable them to recover anything which they could prove had been taken from them during the shipwreck, by those who had possession of the same. With reference to such as are proved to have taken the property, the Governor should impose a severe sentence upon them, as upon robbers. And in order to render proof of the commission of crimes of this kind more easy, he permitted those who complained of having suffered any loss to go before the Prefect and give their evidence, and search for the guilty parties, in order that they might be sent before the Governor either in chains, or under bond, in proportion to the gravity of their offences. He also directed that security be taken from the owner of the property alleged to have been stolen not to desist from the prosecution. The Senate also decreed that neither a soldier, nor any private individual, nor a freedman, nor a slave of the Emperor, should interfere in the collection of articles dispersed by shipwreck.

Dig. 50,16,220Cal­lis­tra­tus li­bro se­cun­do quaes­tio­num. ‘Li­be­ro­rum’ ap­pel­la­tio­ne ne­po­tes et pro­ne­po­tes ce­te­ri­que qui ex his de­scen­dunt con­ti­nen­tur: hos enim om­nes suo­rum ap­pel­la­tio­ne lex duo­de­cim ta­bu­la­rum com­pre­hen­dit. to­tiens enim le­ges ne­ces­sa­riam du­cunt co­gna­tio­nem sin­gu­lo­rum no­mi­ni­bus uti (vel­uti fi­lii, ne­po­tes, pro­ne­po­tis ce­te­ro­rum­ve qui ex his de­scen­dunt), quo­tiens non om­ni­bus, qui post eos sunt, prae­sti­tum vo­lue­rint, sed so­lis his suc­cur­rent, quos no­mi­na­tim enu­me­rent. at ubi non per­so­nis cer­tis, non qui­bus­dam gra­di­bus prae­sta­tur, sed om­ni­bus, qui ex eo­dem ge­ne­re or­ti sunt, li­be­ro­rum ap­pel­la­tio­ne com­pre­hen­dun­tur. 1Sed et Pa­pi­rius Fron­to li­bro ter­tio re­spon­so­rum ait prae­dio cum vi­li­co et con­tu­ber­na­li eius et fi­liis le­ga­to ne­po­tes quo­que ex fi­liis con­ti­ne­ri, ni­si vo­lun­tas tes­ta­to­ris ali­ter ha­beat: fi­lii enim ap­pel­la­tio­ne sae­pe et ne­po­tes ac­ci­pi mul­ti­fa­riam pla­ce­re. 2Di­vus quo­que Mar­cus re­scrip­sit non vi­de­ri si­ne li­be­ris de­func­tum, qui ne­po­tem suum he­redem re­li­quit. 3Prae­ter haec om­nia na­tu­ra nos quo­que do­cet pa­ren­tes pios, qui li­be­ro­rum pro­crean­do­rum ani­mo et vo­to uxo­res du­cunt, fi­lio­rum ap­pel­la­tio­ne om­nes qui ex no­bis de­scen­dunt con­ti­ne­re: nec enim dul­cio­re no­mi­ne pos­su­mus ne­po­tes nos­tros quam fi­lii ap­pel­la­re. et­enim id­cir­co fi­lios fi­lias­ve con­ci­pi­mus at­que edi­mus, ut ex prole eo­rum ea­rum­ve diu­tur­ni­ta­tis no­bis me­mo­riam in ae­vum re­lin­qua­mus.

Callistratus, Questions, Book II. By the term “children,” grandchildren and great-grandchildren, and all their descendants are understood, for the Law of the Twelve Tables includes all these under the term “proper heirs.” When the laws consider it necessary to use separate names for different relatives, for instance, sons, grandsons, great-grandsons, and their descendants, they do not mean that this shall extend to all who come after them. But when certain persons or degrees are not specified, but only those are mentioned who are descended from the same stock, they are included under the term “children.” 1Papirius Fronto, however, in the Third Book of Opinions, says that where land, with a farmer and his wife and children, is devised, the grandchildren descended from the sons are also included, unless the intention of the testator was otherwise; for it has been frequently decided that in the term “children,” grandchildren are also included. 2The Divine Marcus stated in a Rescript that anyone who left a grandson his heir was not considered to have died without issue. 3In addition to all this, Nature teaches us that affectionate fathers, who marry with the intention and desire to have children, inelude under the term all who are descended from them. For we cannot designate our grandchildren by a more loving name than that of children, since we have, and rear sons and daughters for the purpose of perpetuating our memory, for all time, by means of their offspring.