Corpus iurisprudentiae Romanae

Repertorium zu den Quellen des römischen Rechts

Digesta Iustiniani Augusti

Recognovit Mommsen (1870) et retractavit Krüger (1928)
Convertit in Anglica lingua Scott (1932)
Dig. L16,
De verborum significatione
Liber quinquagesimus
XVI.

De verborum significatione

(Concerning the Signification of Terms.)

1Ul­pia­nus li­bro pri­mo ad edic­tum. Ver­bum hoc ‘si quis’ tam mas­cu­los quam fe­mi­nas com­plec­ti­tur.

1Ulpianus, On the Edict, Book I. The following words, “If anyone,” include males as well as females.

2Pau­lus li­bro pri­mo ad edic­tum. ‘Ur­bis’ ap­pel­la­tio mu­ris, ‘Ro­mae’ au­tem con­ti­nen­ti­bus ae­di­fi­ciis fi­ni­tur, quod la­tius pa­tet. 1‘Cu­ius­que diei ma­ior pars’ est ho­ra­rum sep­tem pri­ma­rum diei, non su­pre­ma­rum.

2Paulus, On the Edict, Book I. The term “city” includes all that is surrounded by its walls; but the city of Rome is terminated by its buildings, which extend still farther. 1The greater part of the day includes the first, not the last, seven hours.

3Ul­pia­nus li­bro se­cun­do ad edic­tum. ‘Iti­ne­re fa­cien­do vi­gin­ti mi­lia pas­suum in dies sin­gu­los per­agen­da’ sic sunt ac­ci­pien­da, ut, si post hanc di­nume­ra­tio­nem mi­nus quam vi­gin­ti mi­lia su­per­sint, in­te­grum diem oc­cu­pent. vel­uti vi­gin­ti unum mi­lia sunt pas­sus: bi­duum eis ad­tri­bue­tur. quae di­nume­ra­tio ita de­mum fa­cien­da erit, si de die non con­ve­niat. 1Eius, qui apud hos­tes de­ces­sit, di­ci he­redi­tas non pot­est, quia ser­vus de­ces­sit.

3Ulpianus, On the Edict, Book II. When twenty thousand paces are traversed each day in making a journey, this must be understood to mean that, if, after this enumeration, less than twenty thousand remain, they are considered an entire day of travel; as, for example, where a person travels twenty-one thousand paces, this is counted as two days’ journey. This enumeration, however, should only be made where nothing has been agreed upon as to what constitutes a day’s journey. 1Anyone who dies in the hands of the enemy is not held to have left an estate, because he dies a slave.

4Pau­lus li­bro pri­mo ad edic­tum. ‘No­mi­nis’ ap­pel­la­tio­ne rem sig­ni­fi­ca­ri Pro­cu­lus ait.

4Paulus, On the Edict, Book I. Proculus says that by the term “obligation” property is meant.

5Idem li­bro se­cun­do ad edic­tum. ‘Rei’ ap­pel­la­tio la­tior est quam ‘pe­cu­niae’, quia et­iam ea, quae ex­tra com­pu­ta­tio­nem pa­tri­mo­nii nos­tri sunt, con­ti­net, cum pe­cu­niae sig­ni­fi­ca­tio ad ea re­fe­ra­tur, quae in pa­tri­mo­nio sunt. 1‘Ope­re lo­ca­to con­duc­to’: his ver­bis La­beo sig­ni­fi­ca­ri ait id opus, quod Grae­ci ἀποτέλεσμα vo­cant, non ἔργον, id est ex ope­re fac­to cor­pus ali­quod per­fec­tum.

5The Same, On the Edict, Book II. The word “property” has a broader signification than that of “money,” because it also includes things which are not embraced in our patrimony; and the term “money” only has reference to what is included in a patrimonial estate. 1Ad Dig. 50,16,5,1ROHGE, Bd. 11 (1874), Nr. 51, S. 158: Merkmal des Werkverdingungsvertrages.Labeo says that by the terms “hiring and leasing of services” only those services are meant which are called by the Greeks apotelesma, and not ergon, that is to say, something which has been perfected by labor performed.

6Ul­pia­nus li­bro ter­tio ad edic­tum. ‘No­mi­nis’ et ‘rei’ ap­pel­la­tio ad om­nem con­trac­tum et ob­li­ga­tio­nem per­ti­net. 1Ver­bum ‘ex le­gi­bus’ sic ac­ci­pien­dum est: tam ex le­gum sen­ten­tia quam ex ver­bis.

6Ulpianus, On the Edict, Book III. The terms “claim” and “property” refer to all contracts and obligations. 1The expression, “According to the laws,” must be understood to mean the spirit as well as the letter of the law.

7Pau­lus li­bro se­cun­do ad edic­tum. ‘Spon­sio’ ap­pel­la­tur non so­lum quae per spon­sus in­ter­ro­ga­tio­nem fit, sed om­nis sti­pu­la­tio pro­mis­sio­que.

7Paulus, On the Edict, Book II. By the word “engagement” is meant not only what a person agrees to after interrogation, but every stipulation and promise.

8Idem li­bro ter­tio ad edic­tum. Ver­bum ‘opor­te­bit’ tam prae­sens quam fu­tu­rum tem­pus sig­ni­fi­cat. 1‘Ac­tio­nis’ ver­bo non con­ti­ne­tur ex­cep­tio.

8The Same, On the Edict, Book III. The clause, “It will be necessary,” applies to the present, as well as to the future time. 1Exception is not included in the term action.

9Ul­pia­nus li­bro quin­to ad edic­tum. Mar­cel­lus apud Iu­lia­num no­tat ver­bo ‘per­is­se’ et scis­sum et frac­tum con­ti­ne­ri et vi rap­tum.

9Ulpianus, On the Edict, Book V. Marcellus, in a note on Julianus, says that anything which has been torn, broken, or taken by force is included in the term “destroyed.”

10Idem li­bro sex­to ad edic­tum. ‘Cre­di­to­res’ ac­ci­pien­dos es­se con­stat eos, qui­bus de­be­tur ex qua­cum­que ac­tio­ne vel per­se­cu­tio­ne, vel iu­re ci­vi­li si­ne ul­la ex­cep­tio­nis per­pe­tuae re­mo­tio­ne vel ho­no­ra­rio vel ex­tra­or­di­na­rio, si­ve pu­re si­ve in diem vel sub con­di­cio­ne. quod si na­tu­ra de­bea­tur, non sunt lo­co cre­di­to­rum. sed si non sit mu­tua pe­cu­nia, sed con­trac­tus, cre­di­to­res ac­ci­piun­tur:

10The Same, On the Edict, Book VI. It is established that creditors should be understood to be those to whom something is due and collectible by any action or prosecution, or under the Civil Law, without the power of preventing its recovery either by pleading a perpetual exception, or by taking advantage of Prætorian Law, or of any extraordinary proceeding; whether the indebtedness is absolute, or is to be discharged within a certain time, or under some condition. When the debt is due under natural law, they do not, properly speaking, occupy the place of creditors. If, however, the claim should not be based upon money lent, but upon a contract, they are still understood to be creditors.

11Gaius li­bro pri­mo ad edic­tum pro­vin­cia­le. ‘cre­di­to­rum’ ap­pel­la­tio­ne non hi tan­tum ac­ci­piun­tur, qui pe­cu­niam cre­di­de­runt, sed om­nes, qui­bus ex qua­li­bet cau­sa de­be­tur:

11Gaius, On the Provincial Edict, Book I. By the appellation of “creditors,” not only those are understood who have loaned money, but all to whom anything is due for any reason whatsoever.

12Ul­pia­nus li­bro sex­to ad edic­tum. ut si cui ex emp­to vel ex lo­ca­to vel ex alio ul­lo de­be­tur. sed et si ex de­lic­to de­bea­tur, mi­hi vi­de­tur pos­se cre­di­to­ris lo­co ac­ci­pi. quod si ex po­pu­la­ri cau­sa, an­te li­tis con­tes­ta­tio­nem rec­te di­ce­tur cre­di­to­ris lo­co non es­se, post­ea es­se. 1Mi­nus sol­vit, qui tar­dius sol­vit: nam et tem­po­re mi­nus sol­vi­tur.

12Ulpianus, On the Edict, Book VI. For instance, where anything is due to a person on account of a purchase, a lease, or any other transaction, or even because of a crime, it seems to me that he can be held to be a creditor. When, however, the indebtedness arises from some public proceeding, he cannot be said to occupy the place of a creditor before issue has been joined, but he can afterwards. 1He who is in default pays less than he owes, for less is paid when the time of settlement is deferred.

13Idem li­bro sep­ti­mo ad edic­tum. ‘Mu­lie­ris’ ap­pel­la­tio­ne et­iam vir­go vi­ri­po­tens con­ti­ne­tur. 1Res ‘ab­es­se’ vi­den­tur (ut Sa­b­inus ait et Pe­dius pro­bat) et­iam hae, qua­rum cor­pus ma­net, for­ma mu­ta­ta est: et id­eo si cor­rup­tae red­di­tae sint vel trans­fi­gu­ra­tae, vi­de­ri ab­es­se, quon­iam ple­rum­que plus est in ma­nus pre­tio, quam in re. 2‘De­si­ne­re’ au­tem ‘ab­es­se’ res tunc vi­de­tur, cum sic red­it in po­tes­ta­tem, ne amit­te­re eius pos­ses­sio­nem pos­si­mus. 3Ob hoc, quod fur­to pri­dem sub­trac­ta est, ab­est et ea res, quae in re­bus hu­ma­nis non est.

13The Same, On the Edict, Book VII. A marriageable virgin is also included in the term “woman.” 1Property is considered to have been lost (according to the opinion of Sabinus, which Pedius adopts), even if the substance of it remains, though the form is changed. Therefore, if property is returned spoiled or altered, it is considered to have been lost; as the workmanship is generally of more value than the article itself. 2Property which has been lost is considered to cease to be in that condition when it comes under our control in such a way that we cannot again lose possession of it. 3An example of this is where anything has long since been taken from us by theft. Property is also considered lost when it is no longer in existence.

14Pau­lus li­bro sep­ti­mo ad edic­tum. La­beo et Sa­b­inus ex­is­ti­mant, si ves­ti­men­tum scis­sum red­da­tur vel res cor­rup­ta red­di­ta sit, vel­uti scy­phi col­li­si aut ta­bu­la ra­sa pic­tu­ra, vi­de­ri rem ‘ab­es­se’, quon­iam ea­rum re­rum pre­tium non in sub­stan­tia, sed in ar­te sit po­si­tum. item si do­mi­nus rem, quae fur­to si­bi ab­erat, igno­rans eme­rit, rec­te di­ci­tur res ab­es­se, et­iam­si post­ea id ita es­se scie­rit, quia vi­de­tur res ei ab­es­se, cui pre­tium ab­est. 1‘Rem amis­is­se’ vi­de­tur, qui ad­ver­sus nul­lum eius per­se­quen­dae ac­tio­nem ha­bet.

14Paulus, On the Edict, Book VII. Labeo and Sabinus think that if clothing is returned torn, or any article is returned spoiled, as, for instance, a cup with the edge crushed, or a tablet with a painting erased, the property is said to be lost; because the value of such articles does not consist of the materials of which they are composed, but in the skill expended upon them. Likewise, if an owner ignorantly purchases property which has been stolen from him, it is very properly said to have been lost, even if he should afterwards ascertain the fact; because where the value of anything is lost, the thing itself is considered to be lost. 1A person is considered to have lost something when he cannot bring an action against anyone to recover it.

15Ul­pia­nus li­bro de­ci­mo ad edic­tum. Bo­na ci­vi­ta­tis ab­usi­ve ‘pu­bli­ca’ dic­ta sunt: so­la enim ea pu­bli­ca sunt, quae po­pu­li Ro­ma­ni sunt.

15Ulpianus, On the Edict, Book X. Property belonging to a city is improperly styled public, for only those things are public which belong to the Roman people.

16Gaius li­bro ter­tio ad edic­tum pro­vin­cia­le. Eum qui vec­ti­gal po­pu­li Ro­ma­ni con­duc­tum ha­bet, ‘pu­bli­ca­num’ ap­pel­la­mus. nam ‘pu­bli­ca’ ap­pel­la­tio in com­plu­ri­bus cau­sis ad po­pu­lum Ro­ma­num re­spi­cit: ci­vi­ta­tes enim pri­va­to­rum lo­co ha­ben­tur.

16Gaius, On the Provincial Edict, Book III. We style him publican who leases the collection of the taxes of the Roman people. The term “public” has in many instances reference to the Roman people, for cities are in this respect considered as private individuals.

17Ul­pia­nus li­bro de­ci­mo ad edic­tum. In­ter ‘pu­bli­ca’ ha­be­mus non sa­cra nec re­li­gio­sa nec quae pu­bli­cis usi­bus de­sti­na­ta sunt: sed si qua sunt ci­vi­ta­tium vel­ut bo­na. sed pe­cu­lia ser­vo­rum ci­vi­ta­tium pro­cul du­bio pu­bli­ca ha­ben­tur. 1‘Pu­bli­ca’ vec­ti­ga­lia in­tel­le­ge­re de­be­mus, ex qui­bus vec­ti­gal fis­cus ca­pit: qua­le est vec­ti­gal por­tus vel ve­na­lium re­rum, item sa­li­na­rum et me­tal­lo­rum et pi­ca­ria­rum.

17Ulpianus, On the Edict, Book X. We include among public property not only such as is sacred and religious, and intended for the use of the people, but also that of towns, and the peculia of slaves belonging to the latter are undoubtedly considered public property. 1We must understand public taxes to mean those which the Treasury levies on certain articles, among which are the tax on merchandise in a harbor, or goods which are sold, as well as those on salt-pits, mines, and places where pitch is produced.

18Pau­lus li­bro no­no ad edic­tum. ‘Mu­nus’ tri­bus mo­dis di­ci­tur: uno do­num, et in­de mu­ne­ra di­ci da­ri mit­ti­ve: al­te­ro onus, quod cum re­mit­ta­tur, va­ca­tio­nem mi­li­tiae mu­ne­ris­que prae­stat in­de im­mu­ni­ta­tem ap­pel­la­ri. ter­tio of­fi­cium, un­de mu­ne­ra mi­li­ta­ria et quos­dam mi­li­tes mu­ni­fi­cos vo­ca­ri: igi­tur mu­ni­ci­pes di­ci, quod mu­ne­ra ci­vi­lia ca­piant.

18Paulus, On the Edict, Book IX. The word munus is defined in three different ways: first, as a donation, and hence are derived the terms to bestow, or send gifts; second, a position which, when anyone is released from it, affords exemption from military service and civil employment, whence is derived the term “immunity;” third, an office, whence are derived military occupations, and certain soldiers are designated munifices. For this reason persons who assume civil employments are called municipal officials.

19Ul­pia­nus li­bro un­de­ci­mo ad edic­tum. La­beo li­bro pri­mo prae­to­ris ur­ba­ni de­fi­nit, quod quae­dam ‘agan­tur’, quae­dam ‘ge­ran­tur’, quae­dam ‘con­tra­han­tur’: et ac­tum qui­dem ge­ne­ra­le ver­bum es­se, si­ve ver­bis si­ve re quid aga­tur, ut in sti­pu­la­tio­ne vel nu­me­ra­tio­ne: con­trac­tum au­tem ul­tro ci­tro­que ob­li­ga­tio­nem, quod Grae­ci συνάλλαγμα vo­cant, vel­uti emp­tio­nem ven­di­tio­nem, lo­ca­tio­nem con­duc­tio­nem, so­cie­ta­tem: ges­tum rem sig­ni­fi­ca­re si­ne ver­bis fac­tam.

19Ulpianus, On the Edict, Book XI. Labeo, in the First Book On the Urban Prætor, defines the terms “to act,” “to transact,” and “to contract,” as follows. He says that the word act has a general application, and refers to anything which is done verbally, or with reference to the thing itself; for example, in stipulation or enumeration. A contract, however, has a broader meaning than that of an obligation, which the Greeks style an agreement, as, for instance, purchase, sale, hiring, leasing, partnership. The term “to transact” signifies to do something without words.

20Idem li­bro duo­de­ci­mo ad edic­tum. Ver­ba ‘con­tra­xe­runt’ ‘ges­se­runt’ non per­ti­nent ad tes­tan­di ius.

20Ad Dig. 50,16,20Windscheid: Lehrbuch des Pandektenrechts, 7. Aufl. 1891, Bd. III, § 548, Note 2.The Same, On the Edict, Book XII. The expressions, “they contracted,” and “they transacted,” do not refer to the right of making a will.

21Pau­lus li­bro un­de­ci­mo ad edic­tum. Prin­ceps ‘bo­na’ con­ce­den­do vi­de­tur et­iam ob­li­ga­tio­nes con­ce­de­re.

21Paulus, On the Edict, Book XI. When the Emperor grants the possession of property, he is also considered to grant any obligations attaching to it.

22Gaius li­bro quar­to ad edic­tum pro­vin­cia­le. Plus est in re­sti­tu­tio­ne, quam in ex­hi­bitio­ne: nam ‘ex­hi­be­re’ est prae­sen­tiam cor­po­ris prae­be­re, ‘re­sti­tue­re’ est et­iam pos­ses­so­rem fa­ce­re fruc­tus­que red­de­re: ple­ra­que prae­ter­ea re­sti­tu­tio­nis ver­bo con­ti­nen­tur.

22Gaius, On the Provincial Edict, Book IV. There is more included in the term “restitution” than in that of production; for to produce means to bring forward corporeal property, and to restore is to place someone in possession, and surrender the profits. Many other things are also included in the term “restitution.”

23Ul­pia­nus li­bro quar­to de­ci­mo ad edic­tum. ‘Rei’ ap­pel­la­tio­ne et cau­sae et iu­ra con­ti­nen­tur.

23Ulpianus, On the Edict, Book XIV. Under the term “property” are also included legal action and various rights.

24Gaius li­bro sex­to ad edic­tum pro­vin­cia­le. Ni­hil est aliud ‘he­redi­tas’ quam suc­ces­sio in uni­ver­sum ius quod de­func­tus ha­buit.

24Gaius, On the Provincial Edict, Book VI. The term “inheritance” means nothing else than the right to succeed to everything which the deceased possessed.

25Pau­lus li­bro vi­cen­si­mo pri­mo ad edic­tum. Rec­te di­ci­mus eum fun­dum to­tum nos­trum es­se, et­iam cum usus fruc­tus alie­nus est, quia usus fruc­tus non do­mi­nii pars, sed ser­vi­tu­tis sit, ut via et iter: nec fal­so di­ci to­tum meum es­se, cu­ius non pot­est ul­la pars di­ci al­te­rius es­se. hoc et Iu­lia­nus, et est ve­rius. 1Quin­tus Mu­cius ait par­tis ap­pel­la­tio­ne rem pro in­di­vi­so sig­ni­fi­ca­ri: nam quod pro di­vi­so nos­trum sit, id non par­tem, sed to­tum es­se. Ser­vius non in­ele­gan­ter par­tis ap­pel­la­tio­ne utrum­que sig­ni­fi­ca­ri.

25Paulus, On the Edict, Book XXI. We very properly say that a tract of land entirely belongs to us, even when another is entitled to the usufruct of the same; for the reason that the usufruct does not constitute a part of the ownership, but of a servitude, as, for instance, a right of way, or a right of passage. Nor is it incorrect to say that something is entirely mine, when no part of it can be said to belong to another. This was the opinion of Julianus, and it is correct. 1Quintus Mucius states that by the term “part” an undivided share in something is meant; for after property has been divided not a part, but all of it is ours. Servius very properly holds that the term “part” is applicable to both the above-mentioned cases.

26Ul­pia­nus li­bro sex­to de­ci­mo ad edic­tum. Par­tum non es­se par­tem rei fur­ti­vae Scae­vo­la li­bro un­de­ci­mo quaes­tio­num scri­bit.

26Ulpianus, On the Edict, Book XVI. Scævola, in the Eleventh Book of Questions, says that the child of a slave who has been stolen is not a part of the stolen property.

27Idem li­bro sep­ti­mo de­ci­mo ad edic­tum. ‘Ager’ est lo­cus, qui si­ne vil­la est. 1‘Sti­pen­dium’ a sti­pe ap­pel­la­tum est, quod per sti­pes, id est mo­di­ca ae­ra, col­li­ga­tur. idem hoc et­iam ‘tri­bu­tum’ ap­pel­la­ri Pom­po­nius ait. et sa­ne ap­pel­la­tur ab in­tri­bu­tio­ne tri­bu­tum vel ex eo quod mi­li­ti­bus tri­bua­tur.

27The Same, On the Edict, Book XVII. A field is land on which there is no building. 1The term “stipend” is derived from stips, that is to say, a copper coin of little value. Pomponius says that the word “tribute” is also derived from the same source; and, in fact, tribute comes from intributio; or because it is paid to soldiers.

28Pau­lus li­bro vi­cen­si­mo pri­mo ad edic­tum. ‘Alie­na­tio­nis’ ver­bum et­iam usu­ca­pio­nem con­ti­net: vix est enim, ut non vi­dea­tur alie­na­re, qui pa­ti­tur usu­ca­pi. eum quo­que alie­na­re di­ci­tur, qui non uten­do amis­it ser­vi­tu­tes. qui oc­ca­sio­ne ad­quiren­di non uti­tur, non in­tel­le­gi­tur alie­na­re: vel­uti qui he­redi­ta­tem omit­tit aut op­tio­nem in­tra cer­tum tem­pus da­tam non am­plec­ti­tur. 1Ora­tio, quae ne­que con­iunc­tio­nem ne­que dis­iunc­tio­nem ha­bet, ex men­te pro­nun­tian­tis vel dis­iunc­ta vel con­iunc­ta ac­ci­pi­tur.

28Paulus, On the Edict, Book XXI. The term “alienation” also includes usucaption, for it is difficult to understand that he who permits property to be acquired by usucaption should not be considered to have alienated it. He, also, is said to alienate who loses servitudes by failing to make use of them. Anyone who does not avail himself of the opportunity of acquiring property is not understood to alienate it; as, for instance, one who abandons an estate, or fails to make a choice within a certain prescribed time. 1A proposition which does not include either a conjunctive or a disjunctive particle should be determined according to the intention of the party making it.

29Idem li­bro se­xa­gen­si­mo sex­to ad edic­tum. Con­iunc­tio­nem enim non­num­quam pro dis­iunc­tio­ne ac­ci­pi La­beo ait: ut in il­la sti­pu­la­tio­ne ‘mi­hi he­redi­que meo te he­redem­que tuum’.

29The Same, On the Edict, Book VI. Labeo says that a conjunction should sometimes be understood as a disjunctive particle; as, for instance, in the following stipulation, “For me and my heir,” “You and your heir.”

30Gaius li­bro sep­ti­mo ad edic­tum pro­vin­cia­le. ‘Sil­va cae­dua’ est, ut qui­dam pu­tant, quae in hoc ha­be­tur, ut cae­de­re­tur. Ser­vius eam es­se, quae suc­ci­sa rur­sus ex stir­pi­bus aut ra­di­ci­bus re­nas­ci­tur. 1‘Sti­pu­la il­lec­ta’ est spi­cae in mes­se de­iec­tae nec­dum lec­tae, quas rus­ti­ci cum va­ca­ve­rint col­li­gunt. 2‘No­va­lis’ est ter­ra prae­ci­sa, quae an­no ces­sa­vit, quam Grae­ci νέασιν vo­cant. 3‘In­te­gra’ au­tem est, in quam non­dum do­mi­nus pas­cen­di gra­tia pe­cus im­mi­sit. 4‘Glans ca­du­ca’ est, quae ex ar­bo­re ce­ci­dit. 5‘Pas­cua sil­va’ est, quae pas­tui pe­cu­dum de­sti­na­ta est.

30Gaius, On the Provincial Edict, Book VII. Some authorities hold that timber fit for cutting is such as is set apart for that purpose. Servius says that this also applies to trees which have once been cut, but have grown again from sprouts or roots. 1Ungathered stalks are heads of grain thrown down during the reaping, and not afterwards gathered, which peasants collect after the harvest has been removed. 2New ground is that which, after having been cultivated, is left for a year, and which the Greeks style neasin. 3“Virgin soil” is that on which the owner has not yet placed cattle for the purpose of pasturage. 4“Fallen acorns” are such as have themselves dropped from the tree. 5“Forest pasture” is that destined for the grazing of cattle.

31Ul­pia­nus li­bro oc­ta­vo de­ci­mo ad edic­tum. ‘Pra­tum’ est, in quo ad fruc­tum per­ci­pien­dum fal­ce dum­ta­xat opus est: ex eo dic­tum, quod pa­ra­tum sit ad fruc­tum ca­pien­dum.

31Ulpianus, On the Edict, Book XVIII. A “meadow” is land for whose harvest nothing is required but a sickle; and it is so called because it is already prepared for the crop to be gathered.

32Pau­lus li­bro vi­cen­si­mo quar­to ad edic­tum. ‘Mi­nus so­lu­tum’ in­tel­le­gi­tur et­iam si ni­hil es­set so­lu­tum.

32Paulus, On the Edict, Book XXIV. Less is understood to have been paid than is due, even when nothing at all has been paid.

33Ul­pia­nus li­bro vi­cen­si­mo pri­mo ad edic­tum. ‘Pa­lam’ est co­ram plu­ri­bus.

33Ulpianus, On the Edict, Book XXI. The term “publicly” means in the presence of several persons.

34Pau­lus li­bro vi­cen­si­mo quar­to ad edic­tum. ‘Ac­tio­nis’ ver­bo et­iam per­se­cu­tio con­ti­ne­tur.

34Paulus, On the Edict, Book XXIV. The recovery of property is also included in the term “action.”

35Idem li­bro sep­ti­mo de­ci­mo ad edic­tum. ‘Re­sti­tue­re’ au­tem is in­tel­le­gi­tur, qui si­mul et cau­sam ac­to­ri red­dit, quam is ha­bi­tu­rus es­set, si sta­tim iu­di­cii ac­cep­ti tem­po­re res ei red­di­ta fuis­set, id est et usu­ca­pio­nis cau­sam et fruc­tuum.

35The Same, On the Edict, Book XVII. He is understood to make restitution who surrenders the property in dispute to the plaintiff which the latter would have obtained if it had been delivered to him at the time judgment was rendered; that is to say, both the right of usucaption, and the profits.

36Ul­pia­nus li­bro vi­cen­si­mo ter­tio ad edic­tum. ‘Li­tis’ no­men om­nem ac­tio­nem sig­ni­fi­cat, si­ve in rem si­ve in per­so­nam sit.

36Ulpianus, On the Edict, Book XXIII. The term “litigation” signifies every kind of action, whether real or personal.

37Pau­lus li­bro vi­cen­si­mo sex­to ad edic­tum. Ver­bum ‘opor­te­re’ non ad fa­cul­ta­tem iu­di­cis per­ti­net, qui pot­est vel plu­ris vel mi­no­ris con­dem­na­re, sed ad ve­ri­ta­tem re­fer­tur.

37Paulus, On the Edict, Book XXVI. The expression, “is necessary,” has no reference to the authority of the judge, who can render a decision for a larger or a smaller amount, but relates to the truth.

38Ul­pia­nus li­bro vi­cen­si­mo quin­to ad edic­tum. ‘Os­ten­tum’ La­beo de­fi­nit om­ne con­tra na­tu­ram cu­ius­que rei ge­ni­tum fac­tum­que. duo ge­ne­ra au­tem sunt os­ten­to­rum: unum, quo­tiens quid con­tra na­tu­ram nas­ci­tur, tri­bus ma­ni­bus for­te aut pe­di­bus aut qua alia par­te cor­po­ris, quae na­tu­rae con­tra­ria est: al­te­rum, cum quid prod­igio­sum vi­de­tur, quae Grae­ci φαντάσματα vo­cant.

38Ulpianus, On the Edict, Book XXV. Labeo defines the term “prodigy” to mean everything which is born or produced contrary to nature. There are, however, two kinds of prodigies; one where something is born contrary to nature, for instance with three hands or feet, or with some other part of the body deformed; another, where something is considered to be unusual, and which the Greeks designate fantasmata, that is to say, apparitions.

39Pau­lus li­bro quin­qua­gen­si­mo ter­tio ad edic­tum. ‘Sub­sig­na­tum’ di­ci­tur, quod ab ali­quo sub­scrip­tum est: nam ve­te­res sub­sig­na­tio­nis ver­bo pro ad­scrip­tio­ne uti so­le­bant. 1‘Bo­na’ in­tel­le­gun­tur cu­ius­que, quae de­duc­to ae­re alie­no su­per­sunt. 2‘De­tes­ta­ri’ est ab­sen­ti de­nun­tia­re. 3‘In­cer­tus pos­ses­sor’ est, quem igno­ra­mus.

39Paulus, On the Edict, Book LIII. The word “signed” signifies what is subscribed by anyone, for the ancients were accustomed to use this word instead of signature. 1The property of anyone is understood to be what remains after his debts are paid. 2To call someone to witness is to notify a person who is absent. 3An uncertain possessor is one of whom we have no knowledge.

40Ul­pia­nus li­bro quin­qua­gen­si­mo sex­to ad edic­tum. ‘De­tes­ta­tio’ est de­nun­tia­tio fac­ta cum tes­ta­tio­ne. 1‘Ser­vi’ ap­pel­la­tio et­iam ad an­cil­lam re­fer­tur. 2‘Fa­mi­liae’ ap­pel­la­tio­ne li­be­ri quo­que con­ti­nen­tur. 3Uni­cus ser­vus fa­mi­liae ap­pel­la­tio­ne non con­ti­ne­tur: ne duo qui­dem fa­mi­liam fa­ciunt.

40Ulpianus, Book LVI. An adjuration is the serving of notice in the presence of witnesses. 1The term “slave” likewise applies to females. 2Children are also included in the expression, “body of slaves.” 3A single slave is not included under the term “familia”; nor indeed do two slaves constitute a familia.

41Gaius li­bro vi­cen­si­mo pri­mo ad edic­tum pro­vin­cia­le. ‘Ar­mo­rum’ ap­pel­la­tio non uti­que scu­ta et gla­dios et ga­leas sig­ni­fi­cat, sed et fus­tes et la­pi­des.

41Gaius, On the Provincial Edict, Book XXI. The word “arms” not only means shields, swords, and helmets, but also clubs and stones.

42Ul­pia­nus li­bro quin­qua­gen­si­mo sep­ti­mo ad edic­tum. ‘Prob­rum’ et ob­prob­ri­um idem est. prob­ra quae­dam na­tu­ra tur­pia sunt, quae­dam ci­vi­li­ter et qua­si mo­re ci­vi­ta­tis. ut pu­ta fur­tum, ad­ul­te­rium na­tu­ra tur­pe est: enim­ve­ro tu­te­lae dam­na­ri hoc non na­tu­ra prob­rum est, sed mo­re ci­vi­ta­tis: nec enim na­tu­ra prob­rum est, quod pot­est et­iam in ho­mi­nem ido­neum in­ci­de­re.

42Ulpianus, On the Edict, Book LVII. The terms “disgrace” and “infamy” have the same signification. Some things are disgraceful from their very nature, others are made so by the Civil Law, and, as it were, by national custom; for example, theft and adultery are by their nature dishonorable. To be condemned to administer a guardianship is not disgraceful by nature, but is so by the custom of the State, for that is not of itself disgraceful which may happen to a man of good repute.

43Idem li­bro quin­qua­gen­si­mo oc­ta­vo ad edic­tum. Ver­bo ‘vic­tus’ con­ti­nen­tur, quae es­ui po­tui­que cul­tui­que cor­po­ris quae­que ad vi­ven­dum ho­mi­ni ne­ces­sa­ria sunt. ves­tem quo­que vic­tus ha­be­re vi­cem La­beo ait:

43The Same, On the Edict, Book LVIII. Food, drink, the care of the body, and everything necessary to human life is embraced in the term “maintenance.” Labeo says that maintenance also includes clothing.

44Gaius li­bro vi­cen­si­mo se­cun­do ad edic­tum pro­vin­cia­le. et ce­te­ra, qui­bus tuen­di cu­ran­di­ve cor­po­ris nos­tri gra­tia uti­mur, ea ap­pel­la­tio­ne sig­ni­fi­can­tur.

44Gaius, On the Provincial Edict, Book XXII. Everything else which we make use of for the protection and care of our bodies is included in this term.

45Ul­pia­nus li­bro quin­qua­gen­si­mo oc­ta­vo ad edic­tum. In ‘stra­tu’ om­ne ves­ti­men­tum con­ti­ne­ri quod in­icia­tur La­beo ait: ne­que enim du­bium est, quin stra­gu­la ves­tis sit om­ne pal­lium, περίστρωμα. in vic­tu er­go ves­tem ac­ci­pie­mus non stra­gu­lam, in stra­tu om­nem stra­gu­lam ves­tem.

45Ulpianus, On the Edict, Book LVIII. Labeo says that under the term “covering,” all clothing which anyone puts on is included; for there is no doubt that the term applies to cloaks and every kind of garments. Therefore, when we include clothing under the term “maintenance,” we do not mean bedclothes used at night, but all articles intended for dress.

46Idem li­bro quin­qua­gen­si­mo no­no ad edic­tum. ‘Pro­nun­tia­tum’ et ‘sta­tu­tum’ idem pot­est: pro­mis­cue enim et pro­nun­tias­se et sta­tuis­se so­le­mus di­ce­re eos, qui ius ha­bent co­gnos­cen­di. 1‘Ma­trem fa­mi­lias’ ac­ci­pe­re de­be­mus eam, quae non in­ho­nes­te vi­xit: ma­trem enim fa­mi­lias a ce­te­ris fe­mi­nis mo­res dis­cer­nunt at­que se­pa­rant. pro­in­de ni­hil in­ter­erit, nup­ta sit an vi­dua, in­ge­nua sit an li­ber­ti­na: nam ne­que nup­tiae ne­que na­ta­les fa­ciunt ma­trem fa­mi­lias, sed bo­ni mo­res.

46The Same, On the Edict, Book LIX. The words “decreed” and “decided” have the same meaning, for we are accustomed to make use of them indiscriminately, when we allude to judges who have the right of jurisdiction. 1We should understand the expression, “mother of a family,” to signify one who does not live unchastely, for the morals of the mother of a family distinguish and separate her from other women. Hence, it makes no difference whether she is married or a widow, freeborn or emancipated, as neither marriage nor birth, but good morals constitute the mother of a family.

47Pau­lus li­bro quin­qua­gen­si­mo sex­to ad edic­tum. ‘Li­be­ra­tio­nis’ ver­bum ean­dem vim ha­bet quam so­lu­tio­nis.

47Paulus, On the Edict, Book LVI. The term “release” has the same force as payment.

48Gaius li­bro ..... ad edic­tum prae­to­ris ur­ba­ni ti­tu­lo qui ne­que se­quan­tur ne­que du­can­tur. ‘So­lu­tum’ non in­tel­le­gi­mus eum, qui, li­cet vin­cu­lis le­va­tus sit, ma­ni­bus ta­men te­ne­tur: ac ne eum qui­dem in­tel­le­gi­mus so­lu­tum, qui in pu­bli­co si­ne vin­cu­lis ser­va­tur.

48Gaius, On the Edict of the Urban Prætor, Title, “Those who can neither be Summoned nor Brought into Court.” We do not understand a person to be released who, although his chains have been removed, is still held by the hands; just as we do not understand anyone to be released who is retained in custody without chains.

49Ul­pia­nus li­bro quin­qua­gen­si­mo no­no ad edic­tum. ‘Bo­no­rum’ ap­pel­la­tio aut na­tu­ra­lis aut ci­vi­lis est. na­tu­ra­li­ter bo­na ex eo di­cun­tur, quod beant, hoc est bea­tos fa­ciunt: bea­re est prod­es­se. in bo­nis au­tem nos­tris com­pu­ta­ri scien­dum est non so­lum, quae do­mi­nii nos­tri sunt, sed et si bo­na fi­de a no­bis pos­si­dean­tur vel su­per­fi­cia­ria sint. ae­que bo­nis ad­nu­me­ra­bi­tur et­iam, si quid est in ac­tio­ni­bus pe­ti­tio­ni­bus per­se­cu­tio­ni­bus: nam haec om­nia in bo­nis es­se vi­den­tur.

49Ad Dig. 50,16,49Windscheid: Lehrbuch des Pandektenrechts, 7. Aufl. 1891, Bd. I, § 42, Note 3.Ulpianus, On the Edict, Book LIX. The term “property” has reference either to the natural or the Civil Law. Property naturally acquired is understood to be that which renders persons happy; for to make happy is to benefit. It must, however, be remembered that among our property should be reckoned not only that which is our own, but also any possessed by us in good faith, or which has reference to the surface and the soil. Whatever is acquired by legal actions, claims, and pursuit, is also included under the term “property,” for all these things are considered as part of our possessions.

50Idem li­bro se­xa­gen­si­mo pri­mo ad edic­tum. ‘Nu­rus’ ap­pel­la­tio et­iam ad pron­u­rum et ul­tra por­ri­gen­da est.

50The Same, On the Edict, Book LXI. The term “daughter-in-law” applies also to the wife of a grandson, and extends even farther.

51Gaius li­bro vi­cen­si­mo ter­tio ad edic­tum pro­vin­cia­le. Ap­pel­la­tio­ne ‘pa­ren­tis’ non tan­tum pa­ter, sed et­iam avus et proavus et de­in­ceps om­nes su­pe­rio­res con­ti­nen­tur: sed et ma­ter et avia et proavia.

51Gaius, On the Provincial Edict, Book XXIII. Under the term “parent” is not only included the father, but also the grandfather, the great-grandfather, and others in the male ascending line, as well as the mother, the grandmother, and the great-grandmother.

52Ul­pia­nus li­bro se­xa­gen­si­mo pri­mo ad edic­tum. ‘Pa­tro­ni’ ap­pel­la­tio­ne et pa­tro­na con­ti­ne­tur.

52Ulpianus, On the Edict, Book LXI. Patroness is also included under the term “patron.”

53Pau­lus li­bro quin­qua­gen­si­mo no­no ad edic­tum. Sae­pe ita com­pa­ra­tum est, ut con­iunc­ta pro dis­iunc­tis ac­ci­pian­tur et dis­iunc­ta pro con­iunc­tis, in­ter­dum so­lu­ta pro se­pa­ra­tis. nam cum di­ci­tur apud ve­te­res ‘ad­gna­to­rum gen­ti­lium­que’, pro se­pa­ra­tio­ne ac­ci­pi­tur. at cum di­ci­tur ‘su­per pe­cu­niae tu­te­lae­ve suae’, tu­tor se­pa­ra­tim si­ne pe­cu­nia da­ri non pot­est: et cum di­ci­mus ‘quod de­di aut do­na­vi’, utra­que con­ti­ne­mus. cum ve­ro di­ci­mus ‘quod eum da­re fa­ce­re opor­tet’, quod­vis eo­rum suf­fi­cit pro­ba­re. cum ve­ro di­cit prae­tor, ‘si do­num mu­nus ope­ras red­eme­rit’, si om­nia im­po­si­ta sunt, cer­tum est om­nia red­imen­da es­se, ex re er­go pro con­iunc­tis ha­ben­tur: 1si quae­dam im­po­si­ta sunt, ce­te­ra non de­si­de­ra­bun­tur. 2Item du­bi­ta­tum, il­la ver­ba ‘ope con­si­lio’ quem­ad­mo­dum ac­ci­pien­da sunt, sen­ten­tiae con­iun­gen­tium aut se­pa­ran­tium. sed ve­rius est, quod et La­beo ait, se­pa­ra­tim ac­ci­pien­da, quia aliud fac­tum est eius qui ope, aliud eius qui con­si­lio fur­tum fa­cit: sic enim alii con­di­ci pot­est, alii non pot­est. sa­ne post ve­te­rum auc­to­ri­ta­tem eo per­ven­tum est, ut ne­mo ope vi­dea­tur fe­cis­se, ni­si et con­si­lium ma­li­gnum ha­bue­rit, nec con­si­lium ha­buis­se no­ceat, ni­si et fac­tum se­cu­tum fue­rit.

53Paulus, On the Edict, Book LIX. It has often been stated that a conjunctive particle can be understood as a disjunctive one, and vice versa, and occasionally something which is separate from them both; for when the ancients said “agnates and cognates” this was understood to be disjunctive. When, however, it is stated, “His money or guardianship,” it is evident that a guardian cannot be appointed without control of the property; and when we say, “Which I have given or donated,” we include both. When, however, we say, “What he must either give or do,” it is sufficient to prove one of these two things. When the Prætor says: “If he redeems the gift, the present, and the services due from him,” and all these things have been prescribed, it is certain that all of them should be redeemed. Therefore, these particles are considered as conjunctive. 1Where some of these things are imposed, others cannot be exacted. 2Ad Dig. 50,16,53,2Windscheid: Lehrbuch des Pandektenrechts, 7. Aufl. 1891, Bd. II, § 453, Note 5.Likewise, it may be doubted in what way the following words, “By aid and advice,” should be understood; that is, whether they ought to be taken conjunctively or separately. The better opinion is, as Labeo says, that they should be understood separately, for the reason that it is one thing where anyone furnishes his aid in a theft, and another where he only gives his advice; and, indeed, according to the authority of the ancient jurists, the conclusion is arrived at that no one is considered to have aided in doing anything unless he gave bad advice; nor to have given bad advice, unless the illegal act was the result of it.

54Ul­pia­nus li­bro se­xa­gen­si­mo se­cun­do ad edic­tum. ‘Con­di­cio­na­les cre­di­to­res’ di­cun­tur et hi, qui­bus non­dum com­pe­tit ac­tio, est au­tem com­pe­ti­tu­ra, vel qui spem ha­bent, ut com­pe­tat.

54Ulpianus, On the Edict, Book LXII. Conditional creditors are those who are not yet entitled to an action, but who will be entitled to it; or such as expect that an action will lie in their favor.

55Pau­lus li­bro sex­to de­ci­mo bre­vis edic­ti. Cre­di­tor au­tem is est, qui ex­cep­tio­ne per­pe­tua sum­mo­ve­ri non pot­est: qui au­tem tem­po­ra­lem ex­cep­tio­nem ti­met, si­mi­lis est con­di­cio­na­le cre­di­to­ri.

55Paulus, On the Abridgment of the Edict, Book XVI. A creditor is one who cannot be barred by a perpetual exception. He, however, who has reason to apprehend the pleading of a temporary exception, resembles a conditional creditor.

56Ul­pia­nus li­bro se­xa­gen­si­mo se­cun­do ad edic­tum. ‘Co­gnos­ce­re in­stru­men­ta’ est rele­ge­re et re­co­gnos­ce­re: ‘dis­pun­ge­re’ est con­fer­re ac­cep­ta et da­ta. 1‘Li­be­ro­rum’ ap­pel­la­tio­ne con­ti­nen­tur non tan­tum qui sunt in po­tes­ta­te, sed om­nes qui sui iu­ris sunt, si­ve vi­ri­lis si­ve fe­mi­ni­ni se­xus sunt ex­ve fe­mi­ni­ni se­xus de­scen­den­tes.

56Ulpianus, On the Edict, Book LXII. To scrutinize documents is to re-read and review them; to balance accounts is to compare the receipts and disbursements. 1Under the term “children” are included not only those who are under paternal control, but also all those who are their own masters, whether they are of the male or female sex, or descendants from females.

57Pau­lus li­bro quin­qua­gen­si­mo no­no ad edic­tum. Cui prae­ci­pua cu­ra re­rum in­cum­bit et qui ma­gis quam ce­te­ri di­li­gen­tiam et sol­li­ci­tu­di­nem re­bus qui­bus prae­sunt de­bent, hi ‘ma­gis­tri’ ap­pel­lan­tur. quin et­iam ip­si ma­gis­tra­tus per de­ri­va­tio­nem a ma­gis­tris co­gno­mi­nan­tur. un­de et­iam cu­ius­li­bet dis­ci­pli­nae prae­cep­to­res ma­gis­tros ap­pel­la­ri a mo­nen­do vel mons­tran­do. 1‘Per­se­qui’ vi­de­tur et qui sa­tis ac­ce­pit.

57Paulus, On the Edict, Book LIX. Those are called managers who have particular supervision of affairs, and are, more than others, required to manifest diligence and solicitude with reference to the business of which they have charge. And, indeed, the term “magistrate” is derived from master, and also instructors in any kind of learning are so called from the fact that they admonish or explain. 1Anyone who has received security is still considered to retain the right of recovery.

58Gaius li­bro vi­cen­si­mo quar­to ad edic­tum pro­vin­cia­le. Li­cet in­ter ‘ges­ta’ et ‘fac­ta’ vi­de­tur quae­dam es­se sup­ti­lis dif­fe­ren­tia, at­ta­men καταχρηστικῶς ni­hil in­ter fac­tum et ges­tum in­ter­est. 1Pa­ter­nos li­ber­tos rec­te vi­de­mur di­ce­re nos­tros li­ber­tos: li­be­ro­rum li­ber­tos non rec­te nos­tros li­ber­tos di­ci­mus.

58Gaius, On the Provincial Edict, Book XXIV. Although there seems to be some subtle distinction between the transaction and the conduct of business, this, however, is incorrect, as no such distinction exists. 1We consider paternal freedmen to be properly called our freedmen; but we do not correctly designate the children of such freedmen our own freedmen.

59Ul­pia­nus li­bro se­xa­gen­si­mo oc­ta­vo ad edic­tum. ‘Por­tus’ ap­pel­la­tus est con­clu­sus lo­cus, quo im­por­tan­tur mer­ces et in­de ex­por­tan­tur: ea­que ni­hi­lo mi­nus sta­tio est con­clu­sa at­que mu­ni­ta. in­de ‘an­gi­por­tum’ dic­tum est.

59Ulpianus, On the Edict, Book LXVIII. An enclosed place into which merchandise is taken, and afterwards exported, is called a harbor. A place of this kind is not only enclosed, but also fortified: and therefore it is styled a by-way (angi-portus).

60Idem li­bro se­xa­gen­si­mo no­no ad edic­tum. ‘Lo­cus’ est non fun­dus, sed por­tio ali­qua fun­di: ‘fun­dus’ au­tem in­te­grum ali­quid est. et ple­rum­que si­ne vil­la ‘lo­cum’ ac­ci­pi­mus: ce­te­rum ad­eo opi­nio nos­tra et con­sti­tu­tio lo­cum a fun­do se­pa­rat, ut et mo­di­cus lo­cus pos­sit fun­dus di­ci, si fun­di ani­mo eum ha­bui­mus. non et­iam mag­ni­tu­do lo­cum a fun­do se­pa­rat, sed nos­tra af­fec­tio: et quae­li­bet por­tio fun­di pot­erit fun­dus di­ci, si iam hoc con­sti­tue­ri­mus. nec non et fun­dus lo­cus con­sti­tui pot­est: nam si eum alii ad­iun­xe­ri­mus fun­do, lo­cus fun­di ef­fi­cie­tur. 1Lo­ci ap­pel­la­tio­nem non so­lum ad rus­ti­ca, ve­rum ad ur­ba­na quo­que prae­dia per­ti­ne­re La­beo scri­bit. 2Sed fun­dus qui­dem suos ha­bet fi­nes, lo­cus ve­ro la­te­re pot­est, qua­te­nus de­ter­mi­ne­tur et de­fi­nia­tur.

60The Same, On the Edict, Book LXIX. A site is not a tract of land, but a certain part of one. A tract of land includes everything which belongs to it, and we generally understand a site to mean land on which there is no building. It is, however, only our opinion and intention which distinguishes a site from a tract, for a small site can be called a tract, if we have the intention of considering it as such. It is not the size which makes the distinction between a site and a tract, but our intention, and any portion of a tract of land can be styled a tract, if we wish to call it such, and a tract can be considered a site, for if we add it to another body of land it will become a part of the latter. 1Labeo says that the term “site” not only applies to land in the country, but also to that in a city. 2A tract of land, however, has its limits, but those of a site cannot be ascertained until they have been determined and defined.

61Pau­lus li­bro se­xa­gen­si­mo quin­to ad edic­tum. ‘Sa­tis­da­tio­nis’ ap­pel­la­tio­ne in­ter­dum et­iam re­pro­mis­sio con­ti­ne­bi­tur, qua con­ten­tus fuit is, cui sa­tis­da­tio de­be­ba­tur.

61Paulus, On the Edict, Book LXV. By the term “security” sometimes a mere promise is meant, by which the person who is entitled to protection remains satisfied.

62Gaius li­bro vi­cen­si­mo sex­to ad edic­tum pro­vin­cia­le. ‘Tig­ni’ ap­pel­la­tio­ne in le­ge duo­de­cim ta­bu­la­rum om­ne ge­nus ma­te­riae, ex qua ae­di­fi­cia con­stant, sig­ni­fi­ca­tur.

62Gaius, On the Provincial Edict, Book XXVI. By the term “beam,” according to the Law of the Twelve Tables, every kind of material of which buildings are constructed is meant.

63Ul­pia­nus li­bro sep­tua­gen­si­mo pri­mo ad edic­tum. ‘Pe­nes te’ am­plius est quam ‘apud te’: nam apud te est, quod qua­li­ter­qua­li­ter a te te­n­ea­tur, pe­nes te est, quod quo­dam mo­do pos­si­de­tur.

63Ulpianus, On the Edict, Book LXXI. “In your possession” has a broader meaning than “In your hands,” for what you have in your hands is whatever is held by you under any title whatsoever, but what is in your possession is, to a certain extent, retained by you as your own.

64Pau­lus li­bro se­xa­gen­si­mo sep­ti­mo ad edic­tum. ‘In­tes­ta­tus’ est non tan­tum qui tes­ta­men­tum non fe­cit, sed et­iam cu­ius ex tes­ta­men­to he­redi­tas ad­ita non est.

64Paulus, On the Edict, Book LXVII. A person who is intestate is not only one who did not make any will, but also one whose estate was not entered upon under the will.

65Ul­pia­nus li­bro sep­tua­gen­si­mo se­cun­do ad edic­tum. ‘He­redis’ ap­pel­la­tio non so­lum ad pro­xi­mum he­redem, sed et ad ul­te­rio­res re­fer­tur; nam et he­redis he­res et de­in­ceps he­redis ap­pel­la­tio­ne con­ti­ne­tur.

65Ulpianus, On the Edict, Book LXXVI. The term “heir” not only has reference to the next heir, but to all others; for the heir of an heir, and so on in succession, is included in this appellation.

66Idem li­bro sep­tua­gen­si­mo quar­to ad edic­tum. ‘Mer­cis’ ap­pel­la­tio ad res mo­bi­les tan­tum per­ti­net.

66The Same, On the Edict, Book LXXIV. The word “merchandise” only applies to movable property.

67Idem li­bro sep­tua­gen­si­mo sex­to ad edic­tum. ‘Alie­na­tum’ non pro­prie di­ci­tur, quod ad­huc in do­mi­nio ven­di­to­ris ma­net: ‘ven­di­tum’ ta­men rec­te di­ce­tur. 1‘Do­na­tio­nis’ ver­bum sim­pli­ci­ter lo­quen­do om­nem do­na­tio­nem com­pre­hen­dis­se vi­de­tur, si­ve mor­tis cau­sa si­ve non mor­tis cau­sa fue­rit.

67The Same, On the Edict, Book LXXVI. Anything which still remains under the control of the vendor is not correctly held to have been alienated, but it still may properly be said to have been sold. 1The term “donation,” generally speaking, is understood to include every kind of a gift, whether it was made mortis causa or not.

68Idem li­bro sep­tua­gen­si­mo sep­ti­mo ad edic­tum. Il­la ver­ba ‘ar­bi­tra­tu Lu­cii Ti­tii fie­ri’ ius sig­ni­fi­cant et in ser­vum non ca­dunt.

68The Same, On the Edict, Book LXXVII. The following clause, “To be done according to the judgment of Lucius Titius,” refers to a person who has a right to act, and does not apply to a slave.

69Idem li­bro sep­tua­gen­si­mo oc­ta­vo ad edic­tum. Haec ver­ba ‘cui rei do­lus ma­lus ab­erit afue­rit’ ge­ne­ra­li­ter com­pre­hen­dunt om­nem do­lum, qui­cum­que in hanc rem ad­mis­sus est, de qua sti­pu­la­tio est in­ter­po­si­ta.

69The Same, On the Edict, Book LXXVIII. The following words, “There is not, and shall not be any fraud in this transaction,” generally include every species of fraud which can be committed in the matter with reference to which the stipulation was entered into.

70Pau­lus li­bro sep­tua­gen­si­mo ter­tio ad edic­tum. Scien­dum est he­redem et­iam per mul­tas suc­ces­sio­nes ac­ci­pi. nam pau­cis spe­cie­bus ‘he­redis’ ap­pel­la­tio pro­xi­mum con­ti­net, vel­uti in sub­sti­tu­tio­ne im­pu­be­ris ‘quis­quis mi­hi he­res erit, idem fi­lio he­res es­to’, ubi he­redis he­res non con­ti­ne­tur, quia in­cer­tus est. item in le­ge Ae­lia Sen­tia fi­lius he­res pro­xi­mus pot­est li­ber­tum pa­ter­num ut in­gra­tum ac­cu­sa­re, non et­iam si he­redi he­res ex­sti­te­rit. idem di­ci­tur in ope­ra­rum ex­ac­tio­ne, ut fi­lius he­res ex­ige­re pos­sit, non ex suc­ces­sio­ne ef­fec­tus. ver­ba haec ‘is ad quem ea res per­ti­net’ sic in­tel­le­gun­tur, ut qui in uni­ver­sum do­mi­nium vel iu­re ci­vi­li vel iu­re prae­to­rio suc­ce­dit, con­ti­nea­tur.

70Paulus, On the Edict, Book LXXIII. It must be remembered that, by the term “heir,” several successors are understood. For the term “heir” only refers to the next heir in very few instances, for example, in a pupillary substitution made as follows, “Whoever shall be my heir, let him also be my son’s heir,” for in this case, the heir of the heir is not included, because he is uncertain. Likewise, according to the Lex Ælia Sentia, the son who is the next heir can accuse a paternal freedman of being ungrateful, but he could not do so if he was the heir of the heir. The same rule applies to the right to exact services from a freedman, as a son who is the heir can demand them, but not if he has been removed from the succession. The following words, “The person to whom the property belongs,” are understood to refer to an heir who has succeeded to the entire ownership of the estate, either under the Civil or the Prætorian Law.

71Ul­pia­nus li­bro sep­tua­gen­si­mo no­no ad edic­tum. Aliud est ‘ca­pe­re’, aliud ‘ac­ci­pe­re’. ca­pe­re cum ef­fec­tu ac­ci­pi­tur: ac­ci­pe­re, et si quis non sic ac­ce­pit, ut ha­beat. id­eo­que non vi­de­tur quis ca­pe­re, quod erit re­sti­tu­tu­rus: sic­ut per­ve­nis­se pro­prie il­lud di­ci­tur, quod est re­man­su­rum. 1Haec ver­ba ‘his re­bus rec­te prae­sta­ri’ hoc sig­ni­fi­cant, ne quid pe­ri­cu­lum vel dam­num ex ea re sti­pu­la­tor sen­ti­ret.

71Ulpianus, On the Edict, Book LXX. It is one thing to take property, and another to receive it. Anything is taken when it is acquired as the result of some act which has been performed. To receive something is for a person to obtain it, but not in order to hold it; and, therefore, no one is considered to take an article which he must surrender; as the expression “comes into his hands” is correctly said of property which will remain in his possession. 1The following words, “To legally indemnify me with reference to these matters,” mean that the stipulator shall not be liable for any risk or damage resulting from the transaction.

72Pau­lus li­bro sep­tua­gen­si­mo sex­to ad edic­tum. Ap­pel­la­tio­ne ‘rei’ pars et­iam con­ti­ne­tur.

72Paulus, On the Edict, Book LXXVI. A part is also included in the term “property.”

73Ul­pia­nus li­bro oc­to­gen­si­mo ad edic­tum. Haec ver­ba in sti­pu­la­tio­ne po­si­ta ‘eam rem rec­te re­sti­tui’ fruc­tus con­ti­nent: ‘rec­te’ enim ver­bum pro vi­ri bo­ni ar­bi­trio est.

73Ulpianus, On the Edict, Book LXXX. The following clause, “Do you promise to restore the property in good condition?” when inserted in a stipulation, includes the crops. The words, “in good condition,” mean according to the judgment of reliable citizens.

74Pau­lus li­bro se­cun­do ad edic­tum ae­di­lium cu­ru­lium. Sig­na­to­rius anu­lus ‘or­na­men­ti’ ap­pel­la­tio­ne non con­ti­ne­tur.

74Paulus, On the Edict of the Curule Ædiles, Book II. A signet ring is not embraced in the term “ornament.”

75Idem li­bro quin­qua­gen­si­mo ad edic­tum. ‘Re­sti­tue­re’ is vi­de­tur, qui id re­sti­tuit, quod ha­bi­tu­rus es­set ac­tor, si con­tro­ver­sia ei fac­ta non es­set.

75The Same, On the Edict, Book L. He is held to make restitution who restores that which the plaintiff would have had if no controversy had arisen with reference to it.

76Idem li­bro quin­qua­gen­si­mo pri­mo ad edic­tum. ‘De­dis­se’ in­tel­le­gen­dus est et­iam is, qui per­mu­ta­vit vel com­pen­sa­vit.

76The Same, On the Edict, Book LI. He is understood to have paid who has made an exchange or a set-off instead of giving the purchase money.

77Idem li­bro qua­dra­gen­si­mo no­no ad edic­tum. ‘Fru­gem’ pro red­itu ap­pel­la­ri, non so­lum fru­men­tis aut le­gu­mi­ni­bus, ve­rum et ex vi­no, sil­vis cae­duis, cre­ti­fo­di­nis, la­pi­di­ci­nis ca­pi­tur, Iu­lia­nus scri­bit. ‘fru­ges’ om­nes es­se, qui­bus ho­mo ves­ca­tur, fal­sum es­se: non enim car­nem aut aves fe­ras­ve aut po­ma fru­ges di­ci. ‘fru­men­tum’ au­tem id es­se, quod aris­ta se te­n­eat, rec­te Gal­lum de­fi­nis­se: lu­pi­num ve­ro et fa­bam fru­ges po­tius di­ci, quia non aris­ta, sed si­li­qua con­ti­nen­tur. quae Ser­vius apud Al­fe­num in fru­men­to con­ti­ne­ri pu­tat.

77The Same, On the Edict, Book XLIX. By the term “income” is understood not only the crop of grain and vegetables, but also whatever is obtained from vines, timber, chalk-pits, and quarries. Julianus says it is not true that by the term “income” is meant whatever a man uses for food; as the flesh of animals, birds or wild beasts, and the fruits of trees cannot be so-called income. Grain includes everything which is contained in ears, as Gallus has properly defined it. Beans, and other pulse, can more properly be called income, for the reason that they are not contained in ears, but in pods, which Servius, in his Treatise on Alfenus, thinks should be classed under the head of grain.

78Pau­lus li­bro ter­tio ad Plau­tium. In­ter­dum pro­prie­ta­tem quo­que ver­bum ‘pos­ses­sio­nis’ sig­ni­fi­cat: sic­ut in eo, qui pos­ses­sio­nes suas le­gas­set, re­spon­sum est.

78Paulus, On Plautius, Book III. The term “possession” sometimes means property, as has been held in the case of one who bequeathed his possession.

79Idem li­bro sex­to ad Plau­tium. ‘Im­pen­sae ne­ces­sa­riae’ sunt, quae si fac­tae non sint, res aut peritu­ra aut de­te­rior fu­tu­ra sit. 1‘Uti­les im­pen­sas’ es­se Ful­ci­nius ait, quae me­lio­rem do­tem fa­ciant, non de­te­rio­rem es­se non si­nant, ex qui­bus red­itus mu­lie­ri ad­quira­tur: sic­uti ar­bus­ti pas­ti­na­tio­nem ul­tra quam ne­ces­se fue­rat, item doc­tri­nam pue­ro­rum. quo­rum no­mi­ne one­ra­ri mu­lie­rem igno­ran­tem vel in­vi­tam non opor­tet, ne co­ga­tur fun­do aut man­ci­piis ca­re­re. in his im­pen­sis et pis­tri­num et hor­reum in­su­lae do­ta­li ad­iec­tum ple­rum­que di­ce­mus. 2‘Vo­lup­ta­riae’ sunt, quae spe­ciem dum­ta­xat or­nant, non et­iam fruc­tum au­gent: ut sint vi­ri­dia et aquae sa­lien­tes, in­crus­ta­tio­nes, lo­ri­ca­tio­nes, pic­tu­rae.

79The Same, On Plautius, Book VI. Necessary expenses are those which must be incurred to prevent the destruction or deterioration of property. 1Fulcinius says that useful expenses are any that improve the condition of a dowry, and do not permit the deterioration of anything from which an income is obtained by the wife; as, for instance, by making a larger plantation of trees than was necessary. Likewise, a husband cannot provide for the instruction of slaves if, by so doing, the woman, being ignorant of the fact, or unwilling, may be put to expense, and be forced to lose either her land or her slaves. We generally include in expenses of this kind those incurred by a husband for the construction of a mill or a warehouse, to be added to the dotal property. 2Expenses incurred for pleasure are such as only adorn property, and do not increase its income; for example shrubbery, fountains, ornamented stucco-work, hangings, and paintings.

80Idem li­bro no­no ad Plau­tium. In ge­ne­ra­li re­pe­ti­tio­ne le­ga­to­rum et­iam da­tae li­ber­ta­tes con­ti­nen­tur ex men­te le­gis duo­de­cim ta­bu­la­rum.

80The Same, On Plautius, Book IX. Generally speaking, according to the spirit of the Law of the Twelve Tables, in the repetition of legacies by a testator in a substitution, the grants of freedom are also included.

81Idem li­bro de­ci­mo ad Plau­tium. Cum prae­tor di­cat ‘ut opus fac­tum re­sti­tua­tur’, et­iam dam­num da­tum ac­tor con­se­qui de­bet: nam ver­bo ‘re­sti­tu­tio­nis’ om­nis uti­li­tas ac­to­ris con­ti­ne­tur.

81The Same, On Plautius, Book X. When the Prætor says, “The work must be restored to its former condition,” this means that the plaintiff can also recover any damages which he may have sustained; for under the term “restitution” all the interest of the plaintiff is included.

82Idem li­bro quar­to de­ci­mo ad Plau­tium. Ver­bum ‘am­plius’ ad eum quo­que per­ti­net, cui ni­hil de­be­tur: sic­uti ex con­tra­rio ‘mi­nus’ so­lu­tum vi­de­tur et­iam, si ni­hil es­set ex­ac­tum.

82The Same, On Plautius, Book XIV. The expression, “In addition,” has even reference to one to whom nothing is due; as, on the other hand, is the case where anyone is considered to have paid less than he owed, when he has not paid anything, even if nothing could be collected from him.

83Ia­vo­le­nus li­bro quin­to ex Plau­tio. Pro­prie ‘bo­na’ di­ci non pos­sunt, quae plus in­com­mo­di quam com­mo­di ha­bent.

83Javolenus, On Plautius, Book V. That can not correctly be called “property” which is productive of more inconvenience than benefit.

84Pau­lus li­bro se­cun­do ad Vi­tel­lium. ‘Fi­lii’ ap­pel­la­tio­ne om­nes li­be­ros in­tel­le­gi­mus.

84Paulus, On Vitellius, Book II. By the term “sons” we understand all children to be meant.

85Mar­cel­lus li­bro pri­mo di­ges­to­rum. Ne­ra­tius Pris­cus tres fa­ce­re ex­is­ti­mat ‘col­le­gium’, et hoc ma­gis se­quen­dum est.

85Marcellus, Digest, Book I. Neratius Priscus held that three constituted a corporate body; and this rule should be followed.

86Cel­sus li­bro quin­to di­ges­to­rum. Quid aliud sunt ‘iu­ra prae­dio­rum’ quam prae­dia qua­li­ter se ha­ben­tia: ut bo­ni­tas, sal­u­bri­tas, am­pli­tu­do?

86Celsus, Digest, Book V. What else is meant by the rights attaching to land and its nature than the enjoyment of its fertility, its salubrity, and its extent?

87Mar­cel­lus li­bro duo­de­ci­mo di­ges­to­rum. Ut Al­fe­nus ait, ‘urbs’ est ‘Ro­ma’, quae mu­ro cin­ge­re­tur, ‘Ro­ma’ est et­iam, qua con­ti­nen­tia ae­di­fi­cia es­sent: nam Ro­mam non mu­ro te­nus ex­is­ti­ma­ri ex con­sue­tu­di­ne co­ti­dia­na pos­se in­tel­le­gi, cum di­ce­re­mus Ro­mam nos ire, et­iam­si ex­tra ur­bem ha­bi­ta­re­mus.

87Marcellus, Digest, Book XII. Alfenus says the City of Rome includes all that is encircled by its walls; but Rome also consists of all the buildings which adjoin it, for it should not be considered to be merely bounded by its walls, for when we say that we are going to Rome, we do so according to the ordinary acceptation of these words, even if we live outside of the city itself.

88Cel­sus li­bro oc­ta­vo de­ci­mo di­ges­to­rum. Prope­mo­dum tan­tum quis­que pe­cu­niae re­lin­quit, quan­tum ex bo­nis eius re­fi­ci pot­est: sic di­ci­mus cen­ties au­reo­rum ha­be­re, qui tan­tum in prae­diis ce­te­ris­que si­mi­li­bus re­bus ha­beat. non idem est in fun­do alie­no le­ga­to, quam­quam is he­redi­ta­ria pe­cu­nia pa­ra­ri pot­est. ne­que quis­quam eum, qui pe­cu­niam nu­me­ra­tam ha­bet, ha­be­re di­cit quid­quid ex ea pa­ra­ri pot­est.

88Celsus, Digest, Book XVIII. A man leaves only as much money as his estate is worth. Hence we say that the estate of anyone is worth a hundred aurei if he had that amount in land, or other property. The same rule does not apply to the devise of land belonging to another, although it may be bought with the money of the estate; for anyone who has only money is not considered to have what can be purchased with it.

89Pom­po­nius li­bro sex­to ad Sa­binum. ‘Bo­ves’ ma­gis ‘ar­men­to­rum’ quam ‘iu­men­to­rum’ ge­ne­ris ap­pel­lan­tur. 1Hoc ser­mo­ne ‘dum nup­ta erit’ pri­mae nup­tiae sig­ni­fi­can­tur. 2In­ter ‘ede­re’ et ‘red­di ra­tio­nes’ mul­tum in­ter­est: nec is, qui ede­re ius­sus sit, re­li­quum red­de­re de­bet: nam et ar­gen­ta­rius ede­re ra­tio­nem vi­de­tur, et­iam­si quod re­li­quum sit apud eum, non sol­vat.

89Pomponius, On Sabinus, Book VI. Oxen are rather classed as cattle than as beasts of burden. 1By the expression, “When she shall be married,” the first nuptials are meant. 2There is a great deal of difference between paying a balance and rendering an account; as he who has been ordered to render an account is not obliged to pay the balance in his hands. A banker is considered to render his account, even if he does not pay any balance remaining in his hands.

90Ul­pia­nus li­bro vi­cen­si­mo sep­ti­mo ad Sa­binum. Qui ‘uti op­ti­mae ma­xi­mae­que sunt’ ae­des tra­dit, non hoc di­cit ser­vi­tu­tem il­lis de­be­re, sed il­lud so­lum ip­sas ae­des li­be­ras es­se, hoc est nul­li ser­vi­re.

90Ulpianus, On Sabinus, Book XXVII. He who delivers a house in the best condition possible does not mention that a servitude is due to it; but only that the house is free, and that no servitude is imposed upon it.

91Pau­lus li­bro se­cun­do fi­dei­com­mis­so­rum. ‘Meo­rum’ et ‘tuo­rum’ ap­pel­la­tio­ne ac­tio­nes quo­que con­ti­ne­ri di­cen­dum est.

91Paulus, Trusts, Book II. In the terms, “My property,” and “Your property,” it must be said that rights of action are also included.

92Idem li­bro sep­ti­mo quaes­tio­num. ‘Pro­xi­mus’ est, quem ne­mo an­te­ce­dit: ‘su­pre­mus’ est, quem ne­mo se­qui­tur.

92The Same, Questions, Book VII. The “next of kin” is one whom no one precedes, and the most remote relative is one whom no one follows.

93Cel­sus li­bro no­no de­ci­mo di­ges­to­rum. ‘Mo­ven­tium’, item ‘mo­bi­lium’ ap­pel­la­tio­ne idem sig­ni­fi­ca­mus: si ta­men ap­pa­ret de­func­tum ani­ma­lia dum­ta­xat, quia se ip­sa mo­ve­rent, mo­ven­tia vo­cas­se. quod ve­rum est.

93Celsus, Digest, Book XIX. By the words “movable property” and “personal property” are meant the same thing, unless it appears that the deceased, by using the expression “movable” property, only intended to refer to animals because they moved themselves. This is correct.

94Idem li­bro vi­cen­si­mo di­ges­to­rum. Ver­bum ‘red­den­di’ quam­quam sig­ni­fi­ca­tum ha­bet re­tro dan­di, re­ci­pit ta­men et per se dan­di sig­ni­fi­ca­tio­nem.

94The Same, Digest, Book XX. The verb “to restore,” although it means to return, has, nevertheless, itself the signification of “to give.”

95Mar­cel­lus li­bro quar­to de­ci­mo di­ges­to­rum. Pot­est ‘re­li­quo­rum’ ap­pel­la­tio et uni­ver­sos sig­ni­fi­ca­re.

95Marcellus, Digest, Book XIV. The term “balance” means everything that remains due.

96Cel­sus li­bro vi­cen­si­mo quin­to di­ges­to­rum. Li­tus est, quo­us­que ma­xi­mus fluc­tus a ma­ri per­ve­nit: id­que Mar­cum Tul­lium aiunt, cum ar­bi­ter es­set, pri­mum con­sti­tuis­se. 1Prae­dia di­ci­mus ali­quo­rum es­se non uti­que com­mu­ni­ter ha­ben­tium ea, sed vel alio aliud ha­ben­te.

96Celsus, Digest, Book XXV. The shore of the sea is reckoned from the point reached by the greatest flow. It is said that Marcus Tullius was the first to establish this rule, when he served as arbiter in a certain case. 1When we say that land belongs to several persons, this does not merely mean that they hold it in common, but that part of it may be separately held by each one of them.

97Idem li­bro tri­gen­si­mo se­cun­do di­ges­to­rum. Cum sti­pu­la­mur ‘quan­ta pe­cu­nia ex he­redi­ta­te Ti­tii ad te per­ve­ne­rit’, res ip­sas quae per­ve­ne­runt, non pre­tia ea­rum spec­ta­re vi­de­mur.

97The Same, Digest, Book XXXII. When we stipulate for “As much money as may come into your hands from the estate of Titius,” we mean that the property itself which comes into your hands, and not its value, should be taken into consideration.

98Idem li­bro tri­gen­si­mo no­no di­ges­to­rum. Cum bi­sex­tum ka­len­dis est, ni­hil re­fert, utrum prio­re an pos­te­rio­re die quis na­tus sit, et de­in­ceps sex­tum ka­len­das eius na­ta­lis dies est: nam id bi­duum pro uno die ha­be­tur. sed pos­te­rior dies in­ter­ca­la­tur, non prior: id­eo quo an­no in­ter­ca­la­tum non est sex­to ka­len­das na­tus, cum bi­sex­tum ka­len­dis est, prio­rem diem na­ta­lem ha­bet. 1Ca­to pu­tat men­sem in­ter­ca­la­rem ad­di­ti­cium es­se: om­nes­que eius dies pro mo­men­to tem­po­ris ob­ser­vat ex­tre­mo­que diei men­sis Fe­brua­rii ad­tri­buit Quin­tus Mu­cius. 2Men­sis au­tem in­ter­ca­la­ris con­stat ex die­bus vi­gin­ti oc­to.

98The Same, Digest, Book XXXIX. When anyone is born on the kalends of a bissextile year, it makes no difference whether his birth takes place on the preceding or succeeding day, and his birthday is said to be the sixth of the kalends; for these two days are only considered as one, and it is the last day, and not the first, which is intercalated. Therefore, if he should be born on the sixth of the kalends, in a year which is not intercalated, and when the intercalary day falls on the kalends, the preceding day will be that of his birth. 1Cato held that an intercalary, month was an addition to the others; and Quintus Mucius added all its days from the time when it was computed to the last day of the month of February. 2It is, however, established that there are twenty-eight days in the intercalary month.

99Ul­pia­nus li­bro pri­mo de of­fi­cio con­su­lis. ‘No­tio­nem’ ac­ci­pe­re pos­su­mus et co­gni­tio­nem et iu­ris­dic­tio­nem. 1‘Con­ti­nen­tes pro­vin­cias’ ac­ci­pe­re de­be­mus eas, quae Ita­liae iunc­tae sunt, ut pu­ta Gal­liam: sed et pro­vin­ciam Si­ci­liam ma­gis in­ter con­ti­nen­tes ac­ci­pe­re nos opor­tet, quae mo­di­co fre­to Ita­lia di­vi­di­tur. 2‘In­stru­men­to­rum’ ap­pel­la­tio­ne quae com­prae­hen­dan­tur, per­quam dif­fi­ci­le erit se­pa­ra­re: quae enim pro­prie sint in­stru­men­ta, prop­ter quae di­la­tio dan­da sit, in­de di­nos­ce­mus. 3Si in prae­sen­tiam per­so­nae, quae in­strue­re pos­sit, di­la­tio pe­ta­tur (pu­ta qui ac­tum ges­sit, li­cet in ser­vi­tu­te, vel qui ac­tor fuit con­sti­tu­tus), pu­tem vi­de­ri in­stru­men­to­rum cau­sa pe­ti di­la­tio­nem.

99Ulpianus, On the Duties of Consul, Book I. We understand the word “investigation” to signify the right of judicial inquiry and jurisdiction. 1We should understand the neighboring, contiguous provinces to mean those which are joined to Italy, as for instance, Gaul. We should, however, include the Province of Sicily among them, as it is only separated from Italy by a narrow arm of the sea. 2It would be extremely difficult to define everything included under the term “instrument.” Instruments, properly speaking, are documents for whose production a delay should be granted; 3just as when time is asked for the production of someone who can conduct a case, for instance, a steward, although he may be in slavery, or of someone who has been appointed an agent, I think it may be held that a delay can be requested on account of the papers, in order to enable him to appear for the above-mentioned purpose.

100Idem li­bro se­cun­do de of­fi­cio con­su­lis. ‘Spe­cio­sas per­so­nas’ ac­ci­pe­re de­be­mus cla­ris­si­mas per­so­nas utrius­que se­xus, item eo­rum, quae or­na­men­tis se­na­to­riis utun­tur.

100The Same, On the Duties of Consul, Book II. We should understand distinguished persons to mean those of both sexes who are illustrious, as well as those who are entitled to Senatorial honors.

101Mo­des­ti­nus li­bro no­no dif­fe­ren­tia­rum. In­ter ‘stu­prum’ et ‘ad­ul­te­rium’ hoc in­ter­es­se qui­dam pu­tant, quod ad­ul­te­rium in nup­tam, stu­prum in vi­duam com­mit­ti­tur. sed lex Iu­lia de ad­ul­te­riis hoc ver­bo in­dif­fe­ren­ter uti­tur. 1‘Di­vor­tium’ in­ter vi­rum et uxo­rem fie­ri di­ci­tur, ‘re­pu­dium’ ve­ro spon­sae re­mit­ti vi­de­tur. quod et in uxo­ris per­so­nam non ab­sur­de ca­dit. 2Ve­rum est ‘mor­bum’ es­se tem­po­ra­lem cor­po­ris in­be­cil­li­ta­tem, ‘vi­tium’ ve­ro per­pe­tuum cor­po­ris im­pe­d­imen­tum, vel­uti si ta­lum ex­cus­sit: nam et lus­cus uti­que vi­tio­sus est. 3Ser­vis le­ga­tis et­iam an­cil­las de­be­ri qui­dam pu­tant, qua­si com­mu­ne no­men utrum­que se­xum con­ti­neat.

101Modestinus, Differences, Book VI. Some authorities think that a distinction exists between fornication and adultery, because adultery is committed with a married woman, and fornication with a widow. The Julian Law on Adultery, however, uses this term indiscriminately. 1A divorce is said to take place between husband and wife, but repudiation is considered to apply only to the wife, because it not improperly has reference to her personally. 2It is true that a disease means a temporary weakness of the body, but a defect is a perpetual corporeal hindrance; as, for instance, where one is purblind, and therefore a one-eyed man is defective. 3Some legal authorities hold that when slaves are bequeathed, female slaves are also included, as the term is common to both sexes.

102Idem li­bro sep­ti­mo re­gu­la­rum. ‘De­ro­ga­tur’ le­gi aut ‘ab­ro­ga­tur’. de­ro­ga­tur le­gi, cum pars de­tra­hi­tur: ab­ro­ga­tur le­gi, cum pror­sus tol­li­tur.

102The Same, Rules, Book VII. A law is either derogated or abrogated. It is derogated when a part of it is stricken out; it is abrogated when it is entirely repealed.

103Idem li­bro oc­ta­vo re­gu­la­rum. Li­cet ‘ca­pi­ta­lis’ La­ti­ne lo­quen­ti­bus om­nis cau­sa ex­is­ti­ma­tio­nis vi­dea­tur, ta­men ap­pel­la­tio ca­pi­ta­lis mor­tis vel amis­sio­nis ci­vi­ta­tis in­tel­le­gen­da est.

103The Same, Rules, Book VIII. Although the word “capital” may appear to all those who speak Latin to have reference to reputation; still, this term should be understood to apply only to death, or loss of citizenship.

104Idem li­bro se­cun­do ex­cu­sa­tio­num. Ἡ τῶν τέκνων προσηγορία καὶ ἐπὶ τοὺς ἐγγόνους ἐκτείνεται.

104The Same, Excuses, Book II. The term “children” also extends to grandchildren.

105Idem li­bro un­de­ci­mo re­spon­so­rum. Mo­des­ti­nus re­spon­dit his ver­bis ‘li­ber­tis li­ber­ta­bus­que meis’ li­ber­tum li­ber­tae tes­ta­to­ris non con­ti­ne­ri.

105The Same, Opinions, Book XI. Modestinus is of the opinion that the freedmen of a freedwoman of the testator are not included in the words, “My freedmen and freedwomen.”

106Idem li­bro sin­gu­la­ri de prae­scrip­tio­ni­bus. ‘Di­mis­so­riae lit­te­rae’ di­cun­tur, quae vol­go apos­to­li di­cun­tur. di­mis­so­riae au­tem dic­tae, quod cau­sa ad eum qui ap­pel­la­tus est di­mit­ti­tur.

106The Same, On Prescriptions. Letters of dismissal are those which are ordinarily styled letters of appeal. They are so called because by their means a case is sent to the court to which an appeal is made.

107Idem li­bro ter­tio pan­dec­ta­rum. ‘Ad­sig­na­re li­ber­tum’ hoc est tes­ti­fi­ca­ri, cu­ius ex li­be­ris li­ber­tum eum es­se vo­luit.

107The Same, Pandects, Book III. To “assign” a freedman is for a patron to declare to which of his children he desires his freedman to belong.

108Idem li­bro quar­to pan­dec­ta­rum. ‘De­bi­tor’ in­tel­le­gi­tur is, a quo in­vi­to ex­igi pe­cu­nia pot­est.

108The Same, Pandects, Book IV. A debtor is understood to be one from whom money can be collected against his will.

109Idem li­bro quin­to pan­dec­ta­rum. ‘Bo­nae fi­dei emp­tor’ es­se vi­de­tur, qui igno­ra­vit eam rem alie­nam es­se, aut pu­ta­vit eum qui ven­di­dit ius ven­den­di ha­be­re, pu­ta pro­cu­ra­to­rem aut tu­to­rem es­se.

109The Same, Pandects, Book V. A purchaser in good faith is one who was not aware that the property which he bought belonged to another; or thought that he who sold it had the right to do so; as, for instance, that he was an agent, or a guardian.

110Idem li­bro sex­to pan­dec­ta­rum. ‘Se­ques­ter’ di­ci­tur, apud quem plu­res ean­dem rem, de qua con­tro­ver­sia est, de­po­sue­runt: dic­tus ab eo, quod oc­cur­ren­ti aut qua­si se­quen­ti eos qui con­ten­dunt com­mit­ti­tur.

110The Same, Pandects, Book VI. He is called an arbiter in whose hands several persons have deposited property which is in dispute, whether he has been appointed by a judge, to whom application had been made; or whether the property has been submitted to him for arbitration by those who claim it.

111Ia­vo­le­nus li­bro sex­to ex Cas­sio. ‘Cen­se­re’ est con­sti­tue­re et prae­ci­pe­re. un­de et­iam di­ce­re so­le­mus ‘cen­seo hoc fa­cias’ et ‘se­met ali­quid cen­suis­se’. in­de cen­so­ris no­men vi­de­tur es­se trac­tum.

111Javolenus, On Cassius, Book VI. The expression, “To be of the opinion,” means to determine and direct; hence, we are accustomed to say, “I am of the opinion that you should do this,” and “The Senate directed that such-and-such a thing should be done.” It is from this verb that the word “censor” is derived.

112Idem li­bro un­de­ci­mo ex Cas­sio. Li­tus pu­bli­cum est ea­te­nus, qua ma­xi­me fluc­tus ex­aes­tuat. idem­que iu­ris est in la­cu, ni­si is to­tus pri­va­tus est.

112The Same, On Cassius, Book XI. The shore of the sea is public as far as high-water mark. The same rule of law applies to a lake, unless it is all private property.

113Idem li­bro quar­to de­ci­mo ex Cas­sio. ‘Mor­bus son­ti­cus’ est, qui cui­que rei no­cet.

113The Same, On Cassius, Book XIV. A serious illness is one which interferes with every kind of business.

114Idem li­bro quin­to de­ci­mo ex Cas­sio. Sol­ven­do es­se ne­mo in­tel­le­gi­tur, ni­si qui so­li­dum pot­est sol­ve­re.

114The Same, On Cassius, Book XV. No one is understood to be solvent unless he can pay everything that he owes.

115Idem li­bro quar­to epis­tu­la­rum. Quaes­tio est, fun­dus a pos­ses­sio­ne vel agro vel prae­dio quid di­stet. ‘fun­dus’ est om­ne, quid­quid so­lo te­ne­tur. ‘ager’ est, si spe­cies fun­di ad usum ho­mi­nis com­pa­ra­tur. ‘pos­ses­sio’ ab agro iu­ris pro­prie­ta­te di­stat: quid­quid enim ad­pre­hen­di­mus, cu­ius pro­prie­tas ad nos non per­ti­net aut nec pot­est per­ti­ne­re, hoc pos­ses­sio­nem ap­pel­la­mus: pos­ses­sio er­go usus, ager pro­prie­tas lo­ci est. ‘prae­dium’ utrius­que su­pra scrip­tae ge­ne­ra­le no­men est: nam et ager et pos­ses­sio hu­ius ap­pel­la­tio­nis spe­cies sunt.

115The Same, Epistles, Book IV. There is a question as to what difference exists between the possession of a tract of land or of a field. A tract of land includes everything belonging to the soil; a field is a kind of a tract which is adapted to the use of man. Possession, in law, is distinct from the ownership of land; for we call possession everything which we hold, without the ownership of the property belonging to us, or where there is no possibility of its becoming ours. Therefore possession indicates use, and a field means the ownership of the property. A tract of land is the common name for both the things above mentioned; for a tract of land and possession are different forms of the same expression.

116Idem li­bro sep­ti­mo epis­tu­la­rum. ‘Quis­quis mi­hi alius fi­lii fi­lius­ve he­res sit’: La­beo non vi­de­ri fi­liam con­ti­ne­ri, Pro­cu­lus con­tra. mi­hi La­beo vi­de­tur ver­bo­rum fi­gu­ram se­qui, Pro­cu­lus men­tem tes­tan­tis. re­spon­dit: non du­bi­to, quin La­beo­nis sen­ten­tia ve­ra non sit.

116The Same, Epistles, Book VII. Labeo says that the clause, “Let any son born to my son, be my heir,” does not seem to include a daughter. Proculus is of the opposite opinion. Labeo appears to me to have followed the form of the words; Proculus the intention of the testator. I have no doubt that the opinion of Labeo is not correct.

117Idem li­bro no­no epis­tu­la­rum. Non pot­est vi­de­ri ‘mi­nus sol­vis­se’ is, in quem am­plio­ris sum­mae ac­tio non com­pe­tit.

117The Same, Epistles, Book IX. He is not considered to have paid less than he owed against whom an action for a larger sum will not lie.

118Pom­po­nius li­bro se­cun­do ad Quin­tum Mu­cium. ‘Hos­tes’ hi sunt, qui no­bis aut qui­bus nos pu­bli­ce bel­lum de­cre­vi­mus: ce­te­ri ‘la­tro­nes’ aut ‘prae­do­nes’ sunt.

118Pomponius, On Quintus Mucius, Book II. Those are enemies who declare war against us, or against whom we publicly declare war; others are robbers or brigands.

119Idem li­bro ter­tio ad Quin­tum Mu­cium. ‘He­redi­ta­tis’ ap­pel­la­tio si­ne du­bio con­ti­net et­iam dam­no­sam he­redi­ta­tem: iu­ris enim no­men est sic­uti bo­no­rum pos­ses­sio.

119The Same, On Quintus Mucius, Book III. The term “estate” undoubtedly includes one which may be onerous; for the name is the same in law as prætorian possession of property.

120Idem li­bro quin­to ad Quin­tum Mu­cium. Ver­bis le­gis duo­de­cim ta­bu­la­rum his ‘uti le­gas­sit suae rei, ita ius es­to’ la­tis­si­ma po­tes­tas tri­bu­ta vi­de­tur et he­redis in­sti­tuen­di et le­ga­ta et li­ber­ta­tes dan­di, tu­te­las quo­que con­sti­tuen­di. sed id in­ter­pre­ta­tio­ne co­an­gus­ta­tum est vel le­gum vel auc­to­ri­ta­te iu­ra con­sti­tuen­tium.

120The Same, On Quintus Mucius, Book V. By the following words of the Law of the Twelve Tables, “Let a man have a right to dispose of his property by will,” the most extensive power is considered to have been granted to appoint heirs, to bequeath legacies and grants of freedom, as well as to establish guardianships. This privilege, however, has been limited either by the interpretation of the laws, or by the authority of jurists.

121Idem li­bro sex­to ad Quin­tum Mu­cium. Usu­ra pe­cu­niae, quam per­ci­pi­mus, in fruc­tu non est, quia non ex ip­so cor­po­re, sed ex alia cau­sa est, id est no­va ob­li­ga­tio­ne.

121The Same, On Quintus Mucius, Book VI. The interest on money which we collect is not included in the term “profits,” because it is not derived from the property itself, but from another source, that is to say, from a new obligation.

122Idem li­bro oc­ta­vo ad Quin­tum Mu­cium. Ser­vius ait, si ita scrip­tum sit: ‘fi­lio fi­liis­que meis hos­ce tu­to­res do’, mas­cu­lis dum­ta­xat tu­to­res da­tos, quon­iam a sin­gu­la­ri ca­su hoc ‘fi­lio’ ad plu­ra­lem vi­de­tur trans­is­se con­ti­nen­tem eun­dem se­xum, quem sin­gu­la­ris prior po­si­tus ha­buis­set. sed hoc fac­ti, non iu­ris ha­bet quaes­tio­nem: pot­est enim fie­ri, ut sin­gu­la­ri ca­su de fi­lio sen­se­rit, de­in­de ple­nius om­ni­bus li­be­ris pro­spe­xis­se in tu­to­re dan­do vo­lue­rit. quod ma­gis ra­tio­na­bi­le es­se vi­de­tur.

122The Same, On Quintus Mucius, Book VIII. Servius says that if it was written in a will, “I appoint So-and-So guardians for my son, and for my sons,” guardians are only appointed for the male children, as by alluding to his son in the singular number, and then using the plural, the testator is considered to have had reference to persons of the same sex which he had previously mentioned. This, however, is a question of fact, and not of law; for it might happen that he only thought of his own at first, and afterwards, when appointing a guardian, had in mind all his children. This seems to be the more reasonable opinion.

123Idem li­bro vi­cen­si­mo sex­to ad Quin­tum Mu­cium. Ver­bum ‘erit’ in­ter­dum et­iam prae­ter­itum nec so­lum fu­tu­rum tem­pus de­mons­trat. quod est no­bis ne­ces­sa­rium sci­re et cum co­di­cil­li ita con­fir­ma­ti tes­ta­men­to fue­rint: ‘quod in co­di­cil­lis scrip­tum erit’, utrum­ne fu­tu­ri tem­po­ris de­mons­tra­tio fiat an et­iam prae­ter­iti, si an­te scrip­tos co­di­cil­los quis re­lin­quat. quod qui­dem ex vo­lun­ta­te scri­ben­tis in­ter­pre­tan­dum est. quem­ad­mo­dum au­tem hoc ver­bum ‘est’ non so­lum prae­sens, sed et prae­ter­itum tem­pus sig­ni­fi­cat, ita et hoc ver­bum ‘erit’ non so­lum fu­tu­rum, sed in­ter­dum et­iam prae­ter­itum tem­pus de­mons­trat. nam cum di­ci­mus ‘Lu­cius Ti­tius so­lu­tus est ab ob­li­ga­tio­ne’, et prae­ter­itum et prae­sens sig­ni­fi­ca­mus: sic­ut hoc ‘Lu­cius Ti­tius al­li­ga­tus est’. et idem fit, cum ita lo­qui­mur ‘troia cap­ta est’: non enim ad prae­sen­tis fac­ti de­mons­tra­tio­nem re­fer­tur is ser­mo, sed ad prae­ter­itum.

123The Same, On Quintus Mucius, Book XXVI. The words “shall be” sometimes indicate past as well as future time; which is necessary for us to know. When a codicil is confirmed by a will in the following terms, “Whatever shall be included in my codicil,” do they refer to future, or to past time, if the testator had already drawn up a codicil? This must be determined by his intention; for as the word “is” relates not only to present, but to past time; so the words “shall be” not only indicate future, but sometimes, also, past time, for when we say “Lucius Titius is released from his obligation,” we refer to both past and present time; just as when we say, “Lucius Titius is bound.” The same rule applies when we say, “Troy is taken,” for this expression has no reference to the present time, but to something that has already occurred.

124Pro­cu­lus li­bro se­cun­do epis­tu­la­rum. Haec ver­ba ‘il­le aut il­le’ non so­lum dis­iunc­ti­va, sed et­iam sub­dis­iunc­ti­vae ora­tio­nis sunt. dis­iunc­ti­vum est, vel­uti cum di­ci­mus ‘aut dies aut nox est’, quo­rum po­si­to al­te­ro ne­ces­se est tol­li al­te­rum, item sub­la­to al­te­ro po­ni al­te­rum. ita si­mi­li fi­gu­ra­tio­ne ver­bum pot­est es­se sub­dis­iunc­ti­vum. sub­dis­iunc­ti­vi au­tem ge­ne­ra sunt duo: unum, cum ex pro­pos­i­tis fi­ni­bus ita non pot­est uter­que es­se, ut pos­sit ne­uter es­se, vel­uti cum di­ci­mus ‘aut se­det aut am­bu­lat’: nam ut ne­mo pot­est utrum­que si­mul fa­ce­re, ita ali­quis pot­est ne­utrum, vel­uti is qui ac­cum­bit. al­te­rius ge­ne­ris est, cum ex pro­pos­i­tis fi­ni­bus ita non pot­est ne­uter es­se, ut pos­sit utrum­que es­se, vel­uti cum di­ci­mus ‘om­ne ani­mal aut fa­cit aut pa­ti­tur’: nul­lum est enim quod nec fa­ciat nec pa­tia­tur: at pot­est si­mul et fa­ce­re et pa­ti.

124Proculus, Epistles, Book II. The following words, “So-and-So or So-and-So,” are not only disjunctive, but subdisjunctive in their signification. They are disjunctive; for example, when we say, “It is either day or night,” for having suggested one of two things, the other is necessarily impossible, since to suppose one disposes of the other. Therefore, by a similar form of words, an expression can be subdisjunctive. There are, however, two kinds of subdisjunctives; one where in a proposition both things cannot be true, and neither of them may be; as, for instance, when we say, “He is either sitting or walking,” for as no one can do both these things at the same time, neither of them may be true, for example, if the person should be lying down. The other kind of disjunctive occurs in a statement where of two things neither may be true, but both of them can happen to be; for instance, when we say “Every animal either acts or suffers,” for there is no animal which neither acts nor suffers, but an animal may act and suffer at the same time.

125Idem li­bro quin­to epis­tu­la­rum. Ne­pos Pro­cu­lo suo sa­lu­tem. Ab eo, qui ita do­tem pro­mi­sit: ‘cum com­mo­dum erit, do­tis fi­liae meae ti­bi erunt au­rei cen­tum’, pu­tas­ne pro­ti­nus nup­tiis fac­tis do­tem pe­ti pos­se? quid si ita pro­mi­sis­set: ‘cum po­tue­ro, do­ti erunt?’ quod si ali­quam vim ha­beat pos­te­rior ob­li­ga­tio, ‘pos­sit’ ver­bum quo­mo­do in­ter­pre­ta­ris, utrum ae­re alie­no de­duc­to an ex­tan­te? Pro­cu­lus: cum do­tem quis ita pro­mi­sit: ‘cum po­tue­ro, do­ti ti­bi erunt cen­tum’, ex­is­ti­mo ad id quod ac­tum est in­ter­pre­ta­tio­nem red­igen­dam es­se: nam qui amb­igue lo­qui­tur, id lo­qui­tur, quod ex his quae sig­ni­fi­can­tur sen­sit. pro­pius est ta­men, ut hoc eum sen­sis­se ex­is­ti­mem ‘de­duc­to ae­re alie­no pot­ero’. pot­est et­iam il­la ac­ci­pi sig­ni­fi­ca­tio ‘cum sal­va dig­ni­ta­te mea pot­ero’: quae in­ter­pre­ta­tio eo ma­gis ac­ci­pien­da est, si ita pro­mis­sum est ‘cum com­mo­dum erit’, hoc est ‘cum si­ne in­com­mo­do meo pot­ero’.

125The Same, Epistles, Book V. His grandson to his Uncle Proculus, Greeting. In the case of a person who promised a dowry as follows, “When it is convenient, I will give you a hundred aurei as my daughter’s dowry,” do you think that the dowry can be demanded immediately after the marriage takes place? Where he made the promise in the following words, “I will give you the dowry when I am able to do so,” if the last obligation is of any force, in what way do you interpret the words, “am able”? Do they mean after the debts have been paid, or before? Proculus: When anyone promises a dowry in the following terms, “I will pay you a hundred aurei, by way of dowry, when I am able to do so,” I think that a suitable interpretation can be given to them. For when anyone makes use of ambiguous language, he says what he believes is meant by the words which he employs. I think, however, that it is better to hold that he intended to say that he would give the dowry if he could do so after his debts were paid. The meaning may also be, “If I can do so consistently with the maintenance of my honor,” which interpretation is preferable. But if he had promised to do this, “When it will be convenient,” this means when I can bestow the dowry without incommoding myself.

126Idem li­bro sex­to epis­tu­la­rum. Si, cum fun­dum ti­bi da­rem, le­gem ita di­xi ‘uti op­ti­mus ma­xi­mus­que es­set’ et ad­ie­ci ‘ius fun­di de­te­rius fac­tum non es­se per do­mi­num, prae­sta­bi­tur’, am­plius eo prae­sta­bi­tur ni­hil, et­iam­si prior pars, qua scrip­tum est ‘ut op­ti­mus ma­xi­mus­que sit’ li­be­rum es­se sig­ni­fi­cat eo­que, si pos­te­rior pars ad­iec­ta non es­set, li­be­rum prae­sta­re de­be­rem. ta­men in­fe­rio­re par­te sa­tis me li­be­ra­tum pu­to, quod ad iu­ra at­ti­net, ne quid aliud prae­sta­re de­beam, quam ius fun­di per do­mi­num de­te­rius fac­tum non es­se.

126The Same, Epistles, Book VI. If I transfer to you a tract of land and say, “It is in the very best possible condition,” and then add, “It has not become any worse since I have acquired its ownership,” I will not be liable for anything else; for although it is stated in the first clause, “in the best possible condition,” this means that the land is free, and if the second part had not been added, I would be compelled to render it free; still, I think that I am sufficiently released by the second clause, because, so far as the rights attaching to the land are concerned, I am not obliged to guarantee anything more than that the title has not become any worse during my ownership.

127Cal­lis­tra­tus li­bro quar­to de co­gni­tio­ni­bus. ‘Ves­tis’ ap­pel­la­tio­ne tam vi­ri­lis quam mu­lie­bris et scae­ni­ca, et­iam­si tra­gi­ca aut ci­tha­roe­di­ca sit, con­ti­ne­tur.

127Callistratus, Judicial Inquiries, Book IV. By the term “clothing” is meant that ordinarily worn by both men and women, as well as theatrical costumes, whether used in a tragedy or comedy.

128Ul­pia­nus li­bro pri­mo ad le­gem Iu­liam et Pa­piam. Spa­do­num ge­ne­ra­lis ap­pel­la­tio est: quo no­mi­ne tam hi, qui na­tu­ra spa­do­nes sunt, item thli­biae thla­siae, sed et si quod aliud ge­nus spa­do­num est, con­ti­nen­tur.

128Ulpianus, On the Lex Julia et Papia, Book I. The term “eunuch” is one of general application, and under it are included not only persons who are eunuchs by nature, but also those made such by crushing or pressure, as well as every other kind of eunuch whatsoever.

129Pau­lus li­bro pri­mo ad le­gem Iu­liam et Pa­piam. Qui mor­tui nas­cun­tur, ne­que na­ti ne­que pro­crea­ti vi­den­tur, quia num­quam li­be­ri ap­pel­la­ri po­tue­runt.

129Paulus, On the Lex Julia et Papia, Book I. Still-born infants are not considered either to have been born or begotten, because they have never been able to be called children.

130Ul­pia­nus li­bro se­cun­do ad le­gem Iu­liam et Pa­piam. Le­ge ob­ve­ni­re he­redi­ta­tem non in­pro­prie quis di­xe­rit et eam, quae ex tes­ta­men­to de­fer­tur, quia le­ge duo­de­cim ta­bu­la­rum tes­ta­men­ta­riae he­redi­ta­tes con­fir­man­tur.

130Ulpianus, On the Lex Julia et Papia, Book II. Anyone can very properly say that an estate which falls to a person as heir at law, or by will, legally belongs to him, because by the Law of the Twelve Tables testamentary estates are confirmed.

131Idem li­bro ter­tio ad le­gem Iu­liam et Pa­piam. Aliud ‘fraus’ est, aliud ‘poe­na’: fraus enim si­ne poe­na es­se pot­est, poe­na si­ne frau­de es­se non pot­est. poe­na est no­xae vin­dic­ta, fraus et ip­sa no­xa di­ci­tur et qua­si poe­nae quae­dam prae­pa­ra­tio. 1In­ter ‘mul­tam’ au­tem et ‘poe­nam’ mul­tum in­ter­est, cum poe­na ge­ne­ra­le sit no­men om­nium de­lic­to­rum co­er­ci­tio, mul­ta spe­cia­lis pec­ca­ti, cu­ius anim­ad­ver­sio ho­die pe­cu­nia­ria est: poe­na au­tem non tan­tum pe­cu­nia­ria, ve­rum ca­pi­tis et ex­is­ti­ma­tio­nis ir­ro­ga­ri so­let. et mul­ta qui­dem ex ar­bi­trio eius venit, qui mul­tam di­cit: poe­na non ir­ro­ga­tur, ni­si quae qua­que le­ge vel quo alio iu­re spe­cia­li­ter huic de­lic­to im­po­si­ta est: quin im­mo mul­ta ibi di­ci­tur, ubi spe­cia­lis poe­na non est im­po­si­ta. item mul­tam is di­ce­re pot­est, cui iu­di­ca­tio da­ta est: ma­gis­tra­tus so­los et prae­si­des pro­vin­cia­rum pos­se mul­tam di­ce­re man­da­tis per­mis­sum est. poe­nam au­tem unus­quis­que in­ro­ga­re pot­est, cui hu­ius cri­mi­nis si­ve de­lic­ti ex­se­cu­tio com­pe­tit.

131The Same, On the Lex Julia et Papia, Book III. Fraud is one thing, and the penalty for it another; for fraud can exist without a penalty, but there cannot be a penalty for it without a fraud. A penalty is the punishment of an offence, a fraud is the offence itself and is, as it were, a kind of preparation for the penalty. 1A great difference exists between a fine and a penalty, for the term “penalty” is a general one, and means the punishment of all crimes; but a fine is imposed for some particular offence, whose punishment is, at present, a pecuniary one. A penalty, however, is not only pecuniary, but usually implies the loss of life and reputation. A fine is left to the discretion of the magistrate who passes sentence; a penalty is not inflicted unless it is expressly imposed by law, or by some other authority. And, indeed, a fine is inflicted where a special penalty has not been prescribed. Moreover, he can impose a penalty upon whom jurisdiction has been conferred. Magistrates and Governors of provinces alone are permitted by the Imperial Mandates to impose fines; anyone, however, who has a right to take judicial cognizance of a crime or a misdemeanor can inflict the penalty.

132Pau­lus li­bro ter­tio ad le­gem Iu­liam et Pa­piam. ‘An­ni­cu­lus’ amit­ti­tur, qui ex­tre­mo an­ni die mo­ri­tur. et con­sue­tu­do lo­quen­di id ita es­se de­cla­rat: ‘an­te diem de­ci­mum ka­len­da­rum’, ‘post diem de­ci­mum ka­len­da­rum’: ne­utro enim ser­mo­ne un­de­cim dies sig­ni­fi­can­tur. 1Fal­sum est eam pe­pe­ris­se, cui mor­tuae fi­lius ex­sec­tus est.

132Paulus, On the Lex Julia et Papia, Book III. Ad Dig. 50,16,132 pr.Windscheid: Lehrbuch des Pandektenrechts, 7. Aufl. 1891, Bd. I, § 103, Note 12.A child dies at the age of a year who expires on the last day of the year; and the ordinary use of language shows this to be the case when it is stated “That it died before the tenth day of the kalends,” or “after the tenth day of the kalends”; for in both instances eleven days are understood. 1It is improper to say that a woman has brought forth a child, from whom, while dead, a child was removed by the Cæsarean operation.

133Ul­pia­nus li­bro quar­to ad le­gem Iu­liam et Pa­piam. Si quis sic di­xe­rit ‘ut in­tra diem mor­tis eius ali­quid fiat’, ip­se quo­que dies, quo quis mor­tuus est, nu­me­ra­tur.

133Ulpianus, On the Lex Julia et Papia, Book IV. Where anyone provides that something shall be done before his death, the very day on which he died is counted.

134Pau­lus li­bro se­cun­do ad le­gem Iu­liam et Pa­piam. ‘An­ni­cu­lus’ non sta­tim ut na­tus est, sed tre­cen­te­si­mo se­xa­gen­si­mo quin­to die di­ci­tur, in­ci­pien­te pla­ne, non ex­ac­to die, quia an­num ci­vi­li­ter non ad mo­men­ta tem­po­rum, sed ad dies nu­me­ra­mus.

134Paulus, On the Lex Julia et Papia, Book II. A child is not considered a year old as soon as it is born, but is said to be of that age after three hundred and sixty-five days have elapsed, if the last day has begun, but is not completed; because, according to the Civil Law, we reckon the year, not by moments, but by days.

135Ul­pia­nus li­bro quar­to ad le­gem Iu­liam et Pa­piam. Quae­ret ali­quis si por­ten­tos­um vel mons­tro­sum vel de­bi­lem mu­lier edi­de­rit vel qua­lem vi­su vel va­gi­tu no­vum, non hu­ma­nae fi­gu­rae, sed al­te­rius, ma­gis ani­ma­lis quam ho­mi­nis, par­tum, an, quia eni­xa est, prod­es­se ei de­beat? et ma­gis est, ut haec quo­que pa­ren­ti­bus pro­sint: nec enim est quod eis im­pu­te­tur, quae qua­li­ter po­tue­runt, sta­tu­tis ob­tem­pe­ra­ve­runt, ne­que id quod fa­ta­li­ter ac­ces­sit, ma­tri dam­num in­iun­ge­re de­bet.

135Ulpianus, On the Lex Julia et Papia, Book IV. Where a woman brings forth a child that is deformed, or a monster, or defective, or which has something unusual in its appearance or its voice, and which has no resemblance to a human being, but seems to be rather an animal than a man, someone may ask, will it be any benefit to her to have brought such a creature into the world? The better opinion is, that consideration must be had for its parents, for they ought not to be censured, as they have done their duty as far as they could, nor should the mother be prejudiced, because an unfortunate occurrence has taken place.

136Idem li­bro quin­to ad le­gem Iu­liam et Pa­piam. ‘Ge­ne­ri’ ap­pel­la­tio­ne et nep­tis et pro­nep­tis tam ex fi­lio quam ex fi­lia edi­to­rum ce­te­ra­rum­que ma­ri­tos con­ti­ne­ri ma­ni­fes­tum est.

136The Same, On the Lex Julia et Papia, Book V. It is evident that, under the term “son-in-law” are included the husbands of granddaughters, and great-granddaughters, and their descendants; whether they are the offspring of a son or a daughter.

137Pau­lus li­bro se­cun­do ad le­gem Iu­liam et Pa­piam. ‘Ter eni­xa’ vi­de­tur et­iam quae tri­ge­mi­nos pe­pe­re­rit.

137Paulus, On the Lex Julia et Papia, Book II. A woman who has brought forth three children at a birth is considered to have had three parturitions.

138Idem li­bro quar­to ad le­gem Iu­liam et Pa­piam. ‘He­redi­ta­tis’ ap­pel­la­tio­ne bo­no­rum quo­que pos­ses­sio con­ti­ne­tur.

138The Same, On the Lex Julia et Papia, Book IV. Prætorian possession of an estate is included in the term “inheritance.”

139Ul­pia­nus li­bro sep­ti­mo ad le­gem Iu­liam et Pa­piam. Ae­di­fi­cia ‘Ro­mae’ fie­ri et­iam ea vi­den­tur, quae in con­ti­nen­ti­bus Ro­mae ae­di­fi­ciis fiant. 1‘Per­fe­cis­se’ ae­di­fi­cium is vi­de­tur, qui ita con­sum­ma­vit, ut iam in usu es­se pos­sit.

139Ulpianus, On the Lex Julia et Papia, Book VII. Houses are considered to be built at Rome when they are erected contiguous to the city. 1He is considered to have finished a house who has completed it so that it can be occupied.

140Pau­lus li­bro sex­to ad le­gem Iu­liam et Pa­piam. ‘Ce­pis­se’ quis in­tel­le­gi­tur, quam­vis alii ad­quisiit.

140Paulus, On the Lex Julia et Papia, Book VI. A man is understood to have acquired something, even though he may have acquired it for another.

141Ul­pia­nus li­bro oc­ta­vo ad le­gem Iu­liam et Pa­piam. Et­iam ea mu­lier cum mo­re­re­tur cre­di­tur fi­lium ha­be­re, quae ex­ci­so ute­ro ede­re pos­sit. nec non et­iam alio ca­su mu­lier pot­est ha­be­re fi­lium, quem mor­tis tem­po­re non ha­buit, ut pu­ta eum qui ab hos­ti­bus re­mea­bit.

141Ulpianus, On the Lex Julia et Papia, Book VIII. As a woman, when moribund, is considered to have had a child if it is taken from her by means of the Cæsarean operation; so, under other circumstances, she can be held to have had a child whom she did not bring forth at the time of her death; for instance, one who returns from the hands of the enemy.

142Pau­lus li­bro sex­to ad le­gem Iu­liam et Pa­piam. Tri­pli­ci mo­do con­iunc­tio in­tel­le­gi­tur: aut enim re per se con­iunc­tio con­tin­git, aut re et ver­bis, aut ver­bis tan­tum. nec du­bium est, quin con­iunc­ti sint, quos et no­mi­num et rei com­ple­xus iun­git, vel­uti ‘Ti­tius et Mae­vius ex par­te di­mi­dia he­redes sun­to’, vel ita ‘Ti­tius Mae­vius­que he­redes sun­to’, vel ‘Ti­tius cum Mae­vio ex par­te di­mi­dia he­redes sun­to’. vi­dea­mus au­tem, ne et­iam si hos ar­ti­cu­los de­tra­has ‘et’ ‘que’ ‘cum’, in­ter­dum ta­men con­iunc­tos ac­ci­pi opor­teat, vel­uti ‘Lu­cius Ti­tius, Pu­blius Mae­vius ex par­te di­mi­dia he­redes sun­to’, vel ita ‘Pu­blius Mae­vius, Lu­cius Ti­tius he­redes sun­to. Sem­pro­nius ex par­te di­mi­dia he­res es­to’, ut Ti­tius et Mae­vius ve­niant in par­tem di­mi­diam et re et ver­bis con­iunc­ti vi­dean­tur. ‘Lu­cius Ti­tius ex par­te di­mi­dia he­res es­to. Se­ius ex par­te, qua Lu­cium Ti­tium he­redem in­sti­tui, he­res es­to. Sem­pro­nius ex par­te di­mi­dia he­res es­to’. Iu­lia­nus du­bi­ta­ri pos­se, tres sem­is­ses fac­ti sint an Ti­tius in eun­dem sem­is­sem cum Gaio Se­io in­sti­tu­tus sit. sed eo, quod Sem­pro­nius quo­que ex par­te di­mi­dia scrip­tus est, ve­ri­si­mi­lius es­se in eun­dem sem­is­sem duos co­ac­tos et con­iunc­tim he­redes scrip­tos es­se.

142Paulus, On the Lex Julia et Papia, Book VI. A joinder of heirs can take place in three different ways, for it can either be made by means of the property itself; or by means of the property and words contained in the will; or by the words alone. There is no doubt that those are joined who are connected by both their names and by the property; for example, “Let Titius and Mævius be heirs to half my estate;” or “Let Titius and Mævius be my heirs;” or “Let Titius, with Mævius, be heirs to half of my estate.” Let us see, however, if we omit the particles “and” “and with,” whether the parties can be considered to be joined, for instance: “Let Lucius Titius, Publius Mævius be heirs to half of my estate,” or, “Let Publius Mævius, Lucius Titius, be my heirs; let Sempronius be the heir to half my estate.” As Titius and Mævius are entitled to half of the estate, they are understood to be joined with reference to the property, and the terms of the will. “Let Lucius Titius be heir to half of my estate; let Seius be the heir to the same share to which I have appointed Lucius Titius; let Sempronius be the heir to half of my estate.” Julianus says that a doubt may arise as to whether the estate was divided into three parts, or whether Titius was appointed heir to the same share as Gaius Seius. But, for the reason that Sempronius was also appointed an heir to half the estate, it is more probable that the two others were to share the same half and were made heirs conjointly.

143Ul­pia­nus li­bro no­no ad le­gem Iu­liam et Pa­piam. Id ‘apud se’ quis ‘ha­be­re’ vi­de­tur, de quo ha­bet ac­tio­nem: ha­be­tur enim quod pe­ti pot­est.

143Ulpianus, On the Lex Julia et Papia, Book IX. Anyone is considered to have property if he is entitled to an action to recover it, for he has anything which he has a right to demand.

144Pau­lus li­bro de­ci­mo ad le­gem Iu­liam et Pa­piam. Li­bro me­mo­ria­lium Mas­su­rius scri­bit ‘pel­li­cem’ apud an­ti­quos eam ha­bi­tam, quae, cum uxor non es­set, cum ali­quo ta­men vi­ve­bat: quam nunc ve­ro no­mi­ne ami­cam, pau­lo ho­nes­tio­re con­cu­bi­nam ap­pel­la­ri. gra­nius Flac­cus in li­bro de iu­re Pa­pi­ria­no scri­bit pel­li­cem nunc vol­go vo­ca­ri, quae cum eo, cui uxor sit, cor­pus mis­ceat: quos­dam eam, quae uxo­ris lo­co si­ne nup­tiis in do­mo sit, quam παλλακὴν Grae­ci vo­cant.

144Paulus, On the Lex Julia et Papia, Book X. Massurius stated in his Book on Memorials that a mistress was considered by the ancients to be a woman who lived with a man without being his wife, and who is now known by the name of friend, or by the slightly more honorable appellation, concubine. Granius Flaccus, in his Book on the Papirian Law, says that the word “mistress” means a woman who cohabits with a man who has a wife; and others hold one is meant who lives in his house, as his wife, without being married to him, and whom the Greeks call pallakyn.

145Ul­pia­nus li­bro de­ci­mo ad le­gem Iu­liam et Pa­piam. ‘Vi­ri­lis’ ap­pel­la­tio­ne in­ter­dum et­iam to­tam he­redi­ta­tem con­ti­ne­ri di­cen­dum est.

145Ulpianus, On the Lex Julia et Papia, Book X. It must be said that by the term “individual share” the entire estate sometimes is meant.

146Te­ren­tius Cle­mens li­bro se­cun­do ad le­gem Iu­liam et Pa­piam. ‘So­ce­ri’ ‘so­crus’ ap­pel­la­tio­ne avum quo­que et aviam uxo­ris vel ma­ri­ti con­ti­ne­ri re­spon­de­tur.

146Terentius Clemens, On the Lex Julia et Papia, Book III. It is established that the grandfather and the grandmother of either a wife or a husband are included under the terms “father-in-law” and “mother-in-law.”

147Idem li­bro ter­tio ad le­gem Iu­liam et Pa­piam. Qui in con­ti­nen­ti­bus ur­bis na­ti sunt, ‘Ro­mae’ na­ti in­tel­le­gun­tur.

147The Same, On the Lex Julia et Papia, Book III. Persons who are born in the suburbs of the City are understood to be born at Rome.

148Gaius li­bro oc­ta­vo ad le­gem Iu­liam et Pa­piam. Non est si­ne li­be­ris, cui vel unus fi­lius una­ve fi­lia est: haec enim enun­tia­tio ‘ha­bet li­be­ros’ ‘non ha­bet li­be­ros’ sem­per plu­ra­ti­vo nu­me­ro pro­fer­tur, sic­ut et pu­gil­la­res et co­di­cil­li:

148Gaius, On the Lex Julia et Papia, Book VIII. A man who has only one son or one daughter is not without children; for the expression, “He has children,” or “he has not children,” is always used in the plural number, just as writing tablets and codicils are.

149Idem li­bro de­ci­mo ad le­gem Iu­liam et Pa­piam. nam quem si­ne li­be­ris es­se di­ce­re non pos­su­mus, hunc ne­ces­se est di­ca­mus li­be­ros ha­be­re.

149The Same, On the Lex Julia et Papia, Book X. For we cannot say of such a person that he is childless, and we must necessarily say that he has children.

150Idem li­bro no­no ad le­gem Iu­liam et Pa­piam. Si ita a te sti­pu­la­tus fue­ro: ‘quan­to mi­nus a Ti­tio con­se­cu­tus fue­ro, tan­tum da­re spon­des?’, non so­let du­bi­ta­ri, quin, si ni­hil a Ti­tio fue­ro con­se­cu­tus, to­tum de­beas quod Ti­tius de­bue­rit.

150The Same, On the Lex Julia et Papia, Book IX. If I stipulate with you as follows: “Do you promise to pay me whatever I may fail to collect from Titius?” there is no doubt that if I should not collect anything from Titius you will be indebted to me for all that he owed me.

151Te­ren­tius Cle­mens li­bro quin­to ad le­gem Iu­liam et Pa­piam. ‘De­la­ta’ he­redi­tas in­tel­le­gi­tur, quam quis pos­sit ad­eun­do con­se­qui.

151Ad Dig. 50,16,151Windscheid: Lehrbuch des Pandektenrechts, 7. Aufl. 1891, Bd. III, § 594, Note 1.Terentius Clemens, On the Lex Julia et Papia, Book V. An estate is understood to have been granted to anyone when he can acquire it by entering upon the same.

152Gaius li­bro de­ci­mo ad le­gem Iu­liam et Pa­piam. ‘Ho­mi­nis’ ap­pel­la­tio­ne tam fe­mi­nam quam mas­cu­lum con­ti­ne­ri non du­bi­ta­tur.

152Gaius, On the Lex Julia et Papia, Book X. There is no doubt that both males and females are included under the term “man.”

153Te­ren­tius Cle­mens li­bro un­de­ci­mo ad le­gem Iu­liam et Pa­piam. In­tel­le­gen­dus est mor­tis tem­po­re fuis­se, qui in ute­ro re­lic­tus est.

153Terentius Clemens, On the Lex Julia et Papia, Book XI. When a child is in its mother’s womb at the time of its father’s death, it is understood to be legally in existence.

154Ma­cer li­bro pri­mo ad le­gem vi­cen­si­mam. Mil­le pas­sus non a mi­lia­rio ur­bis, sed a con­ti­nen­ti­bus ae­di­fi­ciis nu­me­ran­di sunt.

154Macer, On the Law Relating to the Twentieth. The thousand paces constituting a mile are not reckoned from the milestone of the City of Rome, but from the houses contiguous thereto.

155Li­cin­nius Ru­fi­nus li­bro sep­ti­mo re­gu­la­rum. ‘Pro­xi­mi’ ap­pel­la­tio­ne et­iam il­le con­ti­ne­tur, qui so­lus est.

155Licinius Rufus, Rules, Book VII. Where there is only one relative, he is included in the term “next of kin.”

156Idem li­bro de­ci­mo re­gu­la­rum. ‘Ma­io­re par­te an­ni’ pos­se­dis­se quis in­tel­le­gi­tur, et­iam­si duo­bus men­si­bus pos­se­de­rit, si mo­do ad­ver­sa­rius eius aut pau­cio­ri­bus die­bus aut nul­lis pos­se­de­rit.

156The Same, Rules, Book X. Anyone is understood to have had possession of property for the greater part of the year, even if he has held it only two months, provided his adversary has had possession of it for a shorter time, or not at all.

157Ae­lius Gal­lus li­bro pri­mo de ver­bo­rum quae ad ius per­ti­nent sig­ni­fi­ca­tio­ne. ‘Pa­ries’ est, si­ve mu­rus si­ve ma­ce­ria est. 1Item ‘via’ est, si­ve se­mi­ta si­ve iter est.

157Ælius Gallus, On the Meaning of Words Relating to the Law, Book I. A wall is one which is built either with or without mortar. 1A road is either a path, or a highway.

158Cel­sus li­bro vi­cen­si­mo quin­to di­ges­to­rum. In usu iu­ris fre­quen­ter uti nos Cas­cel­lius ait sin­gu­la­ri ap­pel­la­tio­ne, cum plu­ra ge­ne­ris eius­dem sig­ni­fi­ca­re vel­le­mus: nam ‘mul­tum ho­mi­nem venis­se Ro­mam’ et ‘pis­cem vi­lem es­se’ di­ci­mus. item in sti­pu­lan­do sa­tis ha­be­mus de he­rede ca­ve­re ‘si ea res se­cun­dum me he­redem­ve meum iu­di­ca­ta erit’ et rur­sus ‘quod ob eam rem te he­redem­ve tuum’: nem­pe ae­que si plu­res he­redes sint, con­ti­nen­tur sti­pu­la­tio­ne.

158Celsus, Digest, Book XXV. Cascellius states that, in legal phraseology, we frequently make use of the singular number when we wish to indicate several things of the same kind; for we say many a man has arrived at Rome, and also that there are bad fish. Likewise, in making a stipulation, it is sufficient to refer to the heirs in the singular number, “If the case is decided in favor of me, or my heir,” and again, “Whatever concerns you or your heir,” as it is clear that if there are several heirs, they are included in a stipulation of this kind.

159Ul­pia­nus li­bro pri­mo ad Sa­binum. Et­iam au­reos num­mos ‘aes’ di­ci­mus.

159Ulpianus, On Sabinus, Book I. We also use the term “money” to denote gold coins.

160Idem li­bro se­cun­do ad Sa­binum. ‘Ce­te­ro­rum’ et ‘re­li­quo­rum’ ap­pel­la­tio­ne et­iam om­nes con­ti­nen­tur, ut Mar­cel­lus di­xit cir­ca eum, cui op­tio ser­vi le­ga­ta est, ce­te­ri Sem­pro­nio: nam temp­tat, si non op­tet, om­nes ad Sem­pro­nium per­ti­ne­re.

160The Same, On Sabinus, Book II. Everything is included in the terms, “the others,” and, “the balance,” as Marcellus says with reference to a man to whom the choice of a slave was bequeathed, the others being left to Sempronius; for he holds that if he should not make a choice, all the slaves will belong to Sempronius.

161Idem li­bro sep­ti­mo ad Sa­binum. Non est ‘pu­pil­lus’, qui in ute­ro est.

161The Same, On Sabinus, Book VII. An unborn child is not a minor.

162Pom­po­nius li­bro se­cun­do ad Sa­binum. In vul­ga­ri sub­sti­tu­tio­ne, qua ei qui ‘su­pre­mus’ mo­rie­tur he­res sub­sti­tui­tur, rec­te sub­sti­tu­tus et­iam uni­co in­tel­le­gi­tur, ex­em­plo duo­de­cim ta­bu­la­rum, ex qui­bus ‘pro­xi­mus’ ad­gna­tus et so­lus ha­be­tur. 1Si quis ita in tes­ta­men­to scrip­se­rit ‘si quid fi­lio meo ac­ci­de­rit, Da­ma ser­vus meus li­ber es­to’, mor­tuo fi­lio Da­ma li­ber erit. li­cet enim ‘ac­ci­dunt’ et vi­vis, sed vul­gi ser­mo­ne et­iam mors sig­ni­fi­ca­tur.

162Pomponius, On Sabinus, Book II. An ordinary substitution, by which an heir is substituted “for him who may die last,” is understood to have been made legally if there should be only one heir, in accordance with the Law of the Twelve Tables, by which, when there is only one heir, he is referred to as the next of kin. 1Where a testator makes the following provision in his will, “If anything should happen to my son, let my slave Damas be free,” and the son should die, Damas will become free; for although an accident may also happen to the living, death is understood by this expression, according to the ordinary signification of the language.

163Pau­lus li­bro se­cun­do ad Sa­binum. Il­la ver­ba ‘op­ti­mus ma­xi­mus­que’ vel in eum ca­de­re pos­sunt, qui so­lus est. sic et cir­ca edic­tum prae­to­ris ‘su­pre­mae ta­bu­lae’ ha­ben­tur et so­lae. 1‘Pue­ri’ ap­pel­la­tio­ne et­iam puel­la sig­ni­fi­ca­tur: nam et fe­mi­nas puer­pe­ras ap­pel­lant re­cen­tes ex par­tu et Grae­ce παιδίον com­mu­ni­ter ap­pel­la­tur.

163Paulus, On Sabinus, Book II. The following words, “The very best and greatest possible,” may have reference to a single person. Likewise, the last will mentioned in the Edict of the Prætor has reference to the only will. 1Under the term “child” a girl also is included, for women who have recently brought forth children are called puerperse, and are generally styled by the Greeks.

164Ul­pia­nus li­bro quin­to de­ci­mo ad Sa­binum. No­men ‘fi­lia­rum’ et in pos­tu­mam ca­de­re quaes­tio­nis non est, quam­vis ‘pos­tu­mae’ non ca­de­re in eam, quae iam in re­bus hu­ma­nis sit, cer­tum sit. 1‘Par­ti­tio­nis’ no­men non sem­per di­mi­dium sig­ni­fi­cat, sed pro­ut est ad­iec­tum. pot­est enim iu­be­ri ali­quis et ma­xi­mam par­ti­ri: pos­se et vi­cen­si­mam et ter­tiam et pro­ut li­bue­rit. sed si non fue­rit por­tio ad­iec­ta, di­mi­dia pars de­be­tur. 2‘Ha­be­re’ sic­ut per­ve­ni­re cum ef­fec­tu ac­ci­pien­dum est.

164Ulpianus, On Sabinus, Book XV. There is no question that the word “daughters” includes posthumous children, while it is certain that the term “posthumous” is not applicable to a daughter who is already born. 1The word “share” does not always mean the half, but the part which is indicated by it; for anyone can be directed to have the largest share, or the twentieth, or the third, or as much as the testator pleases. If nothing is mentioned but the share, half of the estate will be due. 2The expressions “To have,” and “To come into one’s hands,” should be understood to mean legal possession.

165Pom­po­nius li­bro quin­to ad Sa­binum. Venis­se ad he­redem ni­hil in­tel­le­gi­tur ni­si de­duc­to ae­re alie­no.

165Pomponius, On Sabinus, Book V. Nothing is understood to “come into the hands of the heir” unless all the debts of the estate have been paid.

166Idem li­bro sex­to ad Sa­binum. ‘Ur­ba­na fa­mi­lia’ et ‘rus­ti­ca’ non lo­co, sed ge­ne­re di­stin­gui­tur: pot­est enim ali­quis dis­pen­sa­tor non es­se ser­vo­rum ur­ba­no­rum nu­me­ro: vel­uti is, qui rus­ti­ca­rum re­rum ra­tio­nes dis­pen­set ibi­que ha­bi­tet. non mul­tum ab­est a vi­li­co in­su­la­rius: au­tem ur­ba­no­rum nu­me­ro est. vi­den­dum ta­men est, ip­se do­mi­nus quo­rum lo­co quem­que ha­bue­rit: quod ex nu­me­ro fa­mi­liae et vi­ca­riis ap­pa­re­bit. 1‘Per­noc­ta­re ex­tra ur­bem’ in­tel­le­gen­dus est, qui nul­la par­te noc­tis in ur­be est: ‘per’ enim to­tam noc­tem sig­ni­fi­cat.

166The Same, On Sabinus, Book VI. Urban and rustic slaves are not distinguished from one another by the place, but by the nature of their respective occupations. For a steward may not be included in the number of urban slaves, as, for instance, one who keeps the accounts of transactions in the country, where he lives, for he does not differ greatly from a farmer. A slave attached to a household in a city is included among urban slaves. It should, however, be considered whether the master himself employs anyone in their stead, which can be ascertained from the number of the slaves and their sub-slaves. 1He is understood to have spent the night outside of a city who passed no part of it therein; for the expression means the entire night.

167Ul­pia­nus li­bro vi­cen­si­mo quin­to ad Sa­binum. ‘Car­bo­num’ ap­pel­la­tio­ne ma­te­riam non con­ti­ne­ri: sed an ‘lig­no­rum?’ et for­tas­sis quis di­cet nec lig­no­rum: non enim lig­no­rum gra­tia ha­buit. sed et Ti­tio­nes et alia lig­na coc­ta ne fu­mum fa­ciant utrum lig­no an car­bo­ni an suo ge­ne­ri ad­nu­me­ra­bi­mus? et ma­gis est, ut pro­prium ge­nus ha­bea­tur. sul­pu­ra­ta quo­que de lig­no ae­que ean­dem ha­be­bunt de­fi­ni­tio­nem. ad fa­ces quo­que pa­ra­ta non erunt lig­no­rum ap­pel­la­tio­ne com­pre­hen­sa, ni­si haec fuit vo­lun­tas. idem et de nu­cleis oli­va­rum, sed et de ba­la­nis est, vel si qui alii nu­clei. de pi­nu au­tem in­te­gri stro­bi­li lig­ni ap­pel­la­tio­ne con­ti­ne­bun­tur.

167Ulpianus, On Sabinus, Book XXV. The material of which it is composed is not included in the term “charcoal,” but is it included in that of “firewood”? Perhaps someone may say that it is not, for all wood is not firewood; but shall we include under the terms “firewood” or “charcoal” firebrands which have been extinguished, and other burnt wood which does not make any smoke, or shall we place it in a class of its own? The better opinion is that it has a class of its own. Wood which has been treated with sulphur is included in the term “firewood.” Wood which is prepared for torches does not come under the head of “firewood,” unless it was specially intended that this should be done. The same rule applies to olive seeds, acorns, and any other seeds. When pine cones are entire, they are included in the term “firewood.”

168Pau­lus li­bro quar­to ad Sa­binum. Pa­li et per­ti­cae in nu­me­rum ma­te­riae red­igen­di sunt, et id­eo ‘lig­no­rum’ ap­pel­la­tio­ne non con­ti­nen­tur.

168Paulus, On Sabinus, Book IV. Poles and stakes are classed as building material, and therefore are not included under the term “firewood.”

169Idem li­bro quin­to ad Sa­binum. Non tan­tum in tra­di­tio­ni­bus, sed et in emp­tio­ni­bus et sti­pu­la­tio­ni­bus et tes­ta­men­tis ad­iec­tio haec ‘uti op­ti­mus ma­xi­mus­que est’ hoc sig­ni­fi­cat, ut li­be­rum prae­ste­tur prae­dium, non ut et­iam ser­vi­tu­tes ei de­bean­tur.

169The Same, On Sabinus, Book V. The following clause is not only inserted in contracts for the delivery of property, but also in purchases, stipulations, and wills, namely, “In the best condition possible,” and means that land is guaranteed to be free from all encumbrances, but not that servitudes are due to it.

170Ul­pia­nus li­bro tri­gen­si­mo ter­tio ad Sa­binum. ‘He­redis’ ap­pel­la­tio­ne om­nes sig­ni­fi­ca­ri suc­ces­so­res cre­den­dum est, et­si ver­bis non sint ex­pres­si.

170Ulpianus, On Sabinus, Book XXXIII. It is held that all successors are meant by the word “heir,” although this may not be expressly stated.

171Pom­po­nius li­bro sex­to de­ci­mo ad Sa­binum. ‘Per­ve­nis­se ad te’ rec­te di­ci­tur, quod per te ad alium per­ve­ne­rit, ut in he­redi­ta­te a li­ber­to per pa­tro­num fi­lium fa­mi­lias pa­tri eius ad­op­ti­vo ad­quisi­ta re­spon­sum est.

171Pomponius, On Sabinus, Book XVI. Anything is properly said to have come into your hands where it has passed to another through you, as was determined in the case of an estate acquired by a freedman through his patron, who was a son under paternal control, for the benefit of his adoptive father.

172Ul­pia­nus li­bro tri­gen­si­mo oc­ta­vo ad Sa­binum. ‘Li­ber­ti’ ap­pel­la­tio­ne et­iam li­ber­tam con­ti­ne­ri pla­cuit.

172Ulpianus, On SoMnus, Book XXXVIII. It is established that a freedwoman is also included under the term “freedman.”

173Idem li­bro tri­gen­si­mo no­no ad Sa­binum. ‘Col­le­ga­rum’ ap­pel­la­tio­ne hi con­ti­nen­tur, qui sunt eius­dem po­tes­ta­tis. 1Qui ex­tra con­ti­nen­tia ur­bis est, ‘ab­est’: ce­te­rum us­que ad con­ti­nen­tia non ab­es­se vi­de­bi­tur.

173The Same, On Sabinus, Book XXXVIII. Those are included under the term “colleagues” who possess the same authority. 1Anyone who is outside of the suburbs of a city is considered to be absent; but he is not considered to be absent while still within the suburbs.

174Idem li­bro qua­dra­gen­si­mo se­cun­do ad Sa­binum. Aliud est pro­mit­te­re ‘fu­rem non es­se’, aliud ‘fur­to no­xa­que so­lu­tum’: qui enim di­cit fu­rem non es­se, de ho­mi­nis pro­pos­i­to lo­qui­tur, qui fur­tis no­xa­que so­lu­tum, ne­mi­ni es­se fur­ti ob­li­ga­tum pro­mit­tit.

174The Same, On Sabinus, Book XLII. It is one thing to allege that a slave is not a thief, and another to say that he will not be liable for theft or damage committed by him. For when a man says that a slave is not a thief, he has reference to his disposition; but when he says that he will not be liable for theft or damage committed by him, he states that he will not be responsible to anyone for his depredations.

175Pom­po­nius li­bro vi­cen­si­mo se­cun­do ad Sa­binum. ‘Fa­cien­di’ ver­bo red­den­di et­iam cau­sa con­ti­ne­tur.

175Pomponius, On Sabinus, Book XXII. In the term “To do” is also included that “To give.”

176Ul­pia­nus li­bro qua­dra­gen­si­mo quin­to ad Sa­binum. ‘So­lu­tio­nis’ ver­bo sa­tis­fac­tio­nem quo­que om­nem ac­ci­pien­dam pla­cet. ‘sol­ve­re’ di­ci­mus eum, qui fe­cit quod fa­ce­re pro­mi­sit.

176Ad Dig. 50,16,176ROHGE, Bd. 24 (1879), Nr. 20, S. 66: Begriff der Zahlung. Willensübereinstimmung.Ulpianus, On Sabinus, Book XLV. It has been established that every kind of satisfaction should be understood to be included in the term “payment.” We say that he has paid who has done what he promised to do.

177Idem li­bro qua­dra­gen­si­mo sep­ti­mo ad Sa­binum. Na­tu­ra ca­vil­la­tio­nis, quam Grae­ci σωρίτην ap­pel­la­ve­runt, haec est, ut ab evi­den­ter ve­ris per bre­vis­si­mas mu­ta­tio­nes dis­pu­ta­tio ad ea, quae evi­den­ter fal­sa sunt, per­du­ca­tur.

177The Same, On Sabinus, Book XLVII. The nature of the sophistry which the Greeks call a concise syllogism is disclosed where, by making slight changes in something which is absolutely true, a conclusion is arrived at which is evidently false.

178Idem li­bro qua­dra­gen­si­mo no­no ad Sa­binum. ‘Pe­cu­niae’ ver­bum non so­lum nu­me­ra­tam pe­cu­niam com­plec­ti­tur, ve­rum om­nem om­ni­no pe­cu­niam, hoc est om­nia cor­po­ra: nam cor­po­ra quo­que pe­cu­niae ap­pel­la­tio­ne con­ti­ne­ri ne­mo est qui amb­iget. 1‘He­redi­tas’ iu­ris no­men est, quod et ac­ces­sio­nem et de­ces­sio­nem in se re­ci­pit: he­redi­tas au­tem vel ma­xi­me fruc­ti­bus au­ge­tur. 2‘Ac­tio­nis’ ver­bum et spe­cia­le est et ge­ne­ra­le. nam om­nis ac­tio di­ci­tur, si­ve in per­so­nam si­ve in rem sit pe­ti­tio: sed ple­rum­que ‘ac­tio­nes’ per­so­na­les so­le­mus di­ce­re. ‘pe­ti­tio­nis’ au­tem ver­bo in rem ac­tio­nes sig­ni­fi­ca­ri vi­den­tur. ‘per­se­cu­tio­nis’ ver­bo ex­tra­or­di­na­rias per­se­cu­tio­nes pu­to con­ti­ne­ri, ut pu­ta fi­dei­com­mis­so­rum et si quae aliae sunt, quae non ha­bent iu­ris or­di­na­rii ex­se­cu­tio­nem. 3Hoc ver­bum ‘de­buit’ om­nem om­ni­no ac­tio­nem com­pre­hen­de­re in­tel­le­gi­tur, si­ve ci­vi­lis si­ve ho­no­ra­ria si­ve fi­dei­com­mis­si fuit per­se­cu­tio.

178The Same, On Sabinus, Book XLIX. The term “money” not only includes coin, but all kinds of property, that is to say, everything which is corporeal; for there is no one who has any doubt that corporeal property is also included in the word “money.” 1Inheritance is a legal term which has reference to both the increase and the diminution of an estate, as an inheritance is greatly increased by the profits. 2The term “action” is both special and general; for the same word is used whether a claim is made against the person or against the property. We are, however, for the most part, accustomed to call the former personal and the latter real. I think that extraordinary proceedings are included under the term “pursuit,” as for instance, those arising from trusts, and any others which do not come within the scope of ordinary law. 3The expression, “He owes,” is understood to include every action whatsoever which can be brought against anyone; whether it is civil or prætorian, or involves the execution of a trust.

179Idem li­bro quin­qua­gen­si­mo pri­mo ad Sa­binum. In­ter haec ver­ba ‘quan­ti ea res erit’ vel ‘quan­ti eam rem es­se pa­ret’ ni­hil in­ter­est: in utra­que enim clau­su­la pla­cet ve­ram rei aes­ti­ma­tio­nem fie­ri.

179The Same, On Sabinus, Book LI. There is no difference between the expressions, “As much as a thing is worth,” and “As much as a thing appears to be worth,” for it has been established that in both instances a true valuation of the property must be made.

180Pom­po­nius li­bro tri­gen­si­mo ad Sa­binum. ‘Tu­gu­rii’ ap­pel­la­tio­ne om­ne ae­di­fi­cium, quod rus­ti­cae ma­gis cus­to­diae con­ve­nit quam ur­ba­nis ae­di­bus, sig­ni­fi­ca­tur. 1Ofi­lius ait tu­gu­rium a tec­to tam­quam te­gu­la­rium es­se dic­tum, ut to­ga, quod ea te­ga­mur.

180Pomponius, On Sabinus, Book XXX. By the term “hut,” every building erected for the purpose of protecting the crops on a farm, and not a house in town, is meant. 1Ofilius says that the word tugurium is derived from a roof, as a place is said to be covered with tiles; just as toga is so called because we use it as a covering.

181Idem li­bro tri­gen­si­mo quin­to ad Sa­binum. Ver­bum il­lud ‘per­ti­ne­re’ la­tis­si­me pa­tet: nam et eis re­bus pe­ten­dis ap­tum est, quae do­mi­nii nos­tri sint, et eis, quas iu­re ali­quo pos­si­dea­mus, quam­vis non sint nos­tri do­mi­nii: per­ti­ne­re ad nos et­iam ea di­ci­mus, quae in nul­la eo­rum cau­sa sint, sed es­se pos­sint.

181The Same, On Sabinus, Book XXXV. The verb, “To belong,” has an extremely broad signification, for it not only applies to such things as are included in our ownership, but also to those which we possess under any title, even if they are not ours; and we say that articles belong to us to which we have no title at present, but to which we may subsequently acquire one.

182Ul­pia­nus li­bro vi­cen­si­mo sep­ti­mo ad edic­tum. Pa­ter fa­mi­lias li­ber ‘pe­cu­lium’ non pot­est ha­be­re, quem­ad­mo­dum nec ser­vus ‘bo­na’.

182Ulpianus, On the Edict, Book XXVII. The head of a household who is free cannot have a peculium, just as a slave cannot have an estate.

183Idem li­bro vi­cen­si­mo oc­ta­vo ad edic­tum. ‘Ta­ber­nae’ ap­pel­la­tio de­cla­rat om­ne uti­le ad ha­bi­tan­dum ae­di­fi­cium, non ex eo quod ta­bu­lis clu­di­tur.

183The Same, On the Edict, Book XXVIII. The term “shop” means every kind of building which is fit for a habitation; evidently for the reason that these are generally closed with boards (tabulæ).

184Pau­lus li­bro tri­gen­si­mo ad edic­tum. In­de ta­ber­na­cu­la et con­tu­ber­na­les dic­ti sunt.

184Paulus, On the Edict, Book XXX. From it the words “tabernacle” and “contubernales” are derived.

185Ul­pia­nus li­bro vi­cen­si­mo oc­ta­vo ad edic­tum. ‘In­struc­tam’ au­tem ta­ber­nam sic ac­ci­pie­mus, quae et re­bus et ho­mi­ni­bus ad neg­otia­tio­nem pa­ra­tis con­stat.

185Ulpianus, On the Edict, Book XXVIII. We understand a furnished shop to be one in which the goods and the clerks are ready for business.

186Idem li­bro tri­gen­si­mo ad edic­tum. ‘Com­men­da­re’ ni­hil aliud est quam de­po­ne­re.

186The Same, On the Edict, Book XXX. To entrust something to anyone’s care means nothing more than to deposit it with him.

187Idem li­bro tri­gen­si­mo se­cun­do ad edic­tum. Ver­bum ‘ex­ac­tae pe­cu­niae’ non so­lum ad so­lu­tio­nem re­fe­ren­dum est, ve­rum et­iam ad dele­ga­tio­nem.

187Ad Dig. 50,16,187Windscheid: Lehrbuch des Pandektenrechts, 7. Aufl. 1891, Bd. II, § 412, Note 17.The Same, On the Edict, Book XXXII. The expression, “Money collected,” relates not only to payment, but also to the delegation of the claim.

188Pau­lus li­bro tri­gen­si­mo ter­tio ad edic­tum. ‘Ha­be­re’ duo­bus mo­dis di­ci­tur, al­te­ro iu­re do­mi­nii, al­te­ro op­ti­ne­re si­ne in­ter­pel­la­tio­ne id quod quis eme­rit. 1‘Cau­tum’ in­tel­le­gi­tur, si­ve per­so­nis si­ve re­bus cau­tum sit.

188Paulus, On the Edict, Book XXXIII. The verb, “To have,” is understood in two different ways: in one, where the right of ownership exists; in the other, where property purchased by anyone cannot be obtained without a contest. 1Security means responsibility assumed either with reference to persons or things.

189Idem li­bro tri­gen­si­mo quar­to ad edic­tum. ‘Fa­ce­re opor­te­re’ et hanc sig­ni­fi­ca­tio­nem ha­bet, ut abs­ti­neat quis ab eo fac­to, quod con­tra con­ven­tio­nem fie­ret, et cu­ra­ret ne fiat.

189The Same, On the Edict, Book XXXIV. The expression, “To be obliged to do,” has the following signification; namely, that a person will abstain from doing something which is contrary to an agreement, or will take care that it is not done.

190Ul­pia­nus li­bro tri­gen­si­mo quar­to ad edic­tum. ‘Pro­vin­cia­les’ eos ac­ci­pe­re de­be­mus, qui in pro­vin­cia do­mi­ci­lium ha­bent, non eos, qui ex pro­vin­cia ori­un­di sunt.

190Ulpianus, On the Edict, Book XXXIV. We must understand provincials to be persons who have their domicile in a province, and not those who are born there.

191Pau­lus li­bro tri­gen­si­mo quin­to ad edic­tum. In­ter ‘di­vor­tium’ et ‘re­pu­dium’ hoc in­ter­est, quod re­pu­dia­ri et­iam fu­tu­rum ma­tri­mo­nium pot­est, non rec­te au­tem spon­sa di­vor­tis­se di­ci­tur, quod di­vor­tium ex eo dic­tum est, quod in di­ver­sas par­tes eunt qui dis­ce­dunt.

191Paulus, On the Edict, Book XXXV. The following difference exists between divorce and repudiation: repudiation may take place even before marriage; but a woman who is betrothed cannot properly be said to be divorced, since divorce is so called because the parties who separate are free to go their different ways.

192Ul­pia­nus li­bro tri­gen­si­mo sep­ti­mo ad edic­tum. Haec ad­iec­tio ‘plu­ris­ve’ non in­fi­ni­tam pe­cu­niam con­ti­net, sed mo­di­cam, ut ta­xa­tio haec ‘so­li­dos de­cem plu­ris­ve’ ad mi­nu­tu­lam sum­mam re­fe­ra­tur.

192Ulpianus, On the Edict, Book XXXVII. The expression, “Or more,” does not include an unlimited sum of money, but a moderate one; just as the limiting clause, “Ten or more solidi,” has reference to the smaller sum.

193Idem li­bro tri­gen­si­mo oc­ta­vo ad edic­tum. Haec ver­ba ‘quan­ti eam rem pa­ret es­se’ non ad quod in­ter­est, sed ad rei aes­ti­ma­tio­nem re­fe­run­tur.

193The Same, On the Edict, Book XXXVIII. These words, “As much as the property appears to be worth,” do not refer to the measure of damage, but to the estimated value of the property.

194Ul­pia­nus li­bro qua­dra­gen­si­mo ter­tio ad edic­tum. In­ter ‘do­num’ et ‘mu­nus’ hoc in­ter­est, quod in­ter ge­nus et spe­ciem: nam ge­nus es­se do­num La­beo a do­nan­do dic­tum, mu­nus spe­ciem: nam mu­nus es­se do­num cum cau­sa, ut pu­ta na­ta­li­cium, nup­ta­li­cium.

194Ulpianus, On the Edict, Book XXXIII. The same difference exists between a gift and a present as exists between genus and species; for Labeo says that a gift is a genus, and is derived from the verb “to give,” and that a present is a species, for it is a gift bestowed for some reason, for instance, on account of a birth, or a marriage.

195Idem li­bro qua­dra­gen­si­mo sex­to ad edic­tum. Pro­nun­tia­tio ser­mo­nis in se­xu mas­cu­li­no ad utrum­que se­xum ple­rum­que por­ri­gi­tur. 1‘Fa­mi­liae’ ap­pel­la­tio qua­li­ter ac­ci­pia­tur, vi­dea­mus. et qui­dem va­rie ac­cep­ta est: nam et in res et in per­so­nas de­du­ci­tur. in res, ut pu­ta in le­ge duo­de­cim ta­bu­la­rum his ver­bis ‘ad­gna­tus pro­xi­mus fa­mi­liam ha­be­to’. ad per­so­nas au­tem re­fer­tur fa­mi­liae sig­ni­fi­ca­tio ita, cum de pa­tro­no et li­ber­to lo­qui­tur lex: ‘ex ea fa­mi­lia’, in­quit, ‘in eam fa­mi­liam’: et hic de sin­gu­la­ri­bus per­so­nis le­gem lo­qui con­stat. 2Fa­mi­liae ap­pel­la­tio re­fer­tur et ad cor­po­ris cu­ius­dam sig­ni­fi­ca­tio­nem, quod aut iu­re pro­prio ip­so­rum aut com­mu­ni uni­ver­sae co­gna­tio­nis con­ti­ne­tur. iu­re pro­prio fa­mi­liam di­ci­mus plu­res per­so­nas, quae sunt sub unius po­tes­ta­te aut na­tu­ra aut iu­re sub­iec­tae, ut pu­ta pa­trem fa­mi­lias, ma­trem fa­mi­lias, fi­lium fa­mi­lias, fi­liam fa­mi­lias qui­que de­in­ceps vi­cem eo­rum se­quun­tur, ut pu­ta ne­po­tes et nep­tes et de­in­ceps. pa­ter au­tem fa­mi­lias ap­pel­la­tur, qui in do­mo do­mi­nium ha­bet, rec­te­que hoc no­mi­ne ap­pel­la­tur, quam­vis fi­lium non ha­beat: non enim so­lam per­so­nam eius, sed et ius de­mons­tra­mus: de­ni­que et pu­pil­lum pa­trem fa­mi­lias ap­pel­la­mus. et cum pa­ter fa­mi­lias mo­ri­tur, quot­quot ca­pi­ta ei sub­iec­ta fue­rint, sin­gu­las fa­mi­lias in­ci­piunt ha­be­re: sin­gu­li enim pa­trum fa­mi­lia­rum no­men sub­eunt. idem­que eve­niet et in eo qui em­an­ci­pa­tus est: nam et hic sui iu­ris ef­fec­tus pro­priam fa­mi­liam ha­bet. com­mu­ni iu­re fa­mi­liam di­ci­mus om­nium ad­gna­to­rum: nam et­si pa­tre fa­mi­lias mor­tuo sin­gu­li sin­gu­las fa­mi­lias ha­bent, ta­men om­nes, qui sub unius po­tes­ta­te fue­runt, rec­te eius­dem fa­mi­liae ap­pel­la­bun­tur, qui ex ea­dem do­mo et gen­te pro­di­ti sunt. 3Ser­vi­tu­tium quo­que so­le­mus ap­pel­la­re fa­mi­lias, ut in edic­to prae­to­ris os­ten­di­mus sub ti­tu­lo de fur­tis, ubi prae­tor lo­qui­tur de fa­mi­lia pu­bli­ca­no­rum. sed ibi non om­nes ser­vi, sed cor­pus quod­dam ser­vo­rum de­mons­tra­tur hu­ius rei cau­sa pa­ra­tum, hoc est vec­ti­ga­lis cau­sa. alia au­tem par­te edic­ti om­nes ser­vi con­ti­nen­tur: ut de ho­mi­ni­bus co­ac­tis et vi bo­no­rum rap­to­rum, item red­hi­bi­to­ria, si de­te­rior res red­da­tur emp­to­ris ope­ra aut fa­mi­liae eius, et in­ter­dic­to un­de vi fa­mi­liae ap­pel­la­tio om­nes ser­vos com­pre­hen­dit. sed et fi­lii con­ti­nen­tur. 4Item ap­pel­la­tur fa­mi­lia plu­rium per­so­na­rum, quae ab eius­dem ul­ti­mi ge­ni­to­ris san­gui­ne pro­fi­cis­cun­tur (sic­uti di­ci­mus fa­mi­liam Iu­liam), qua­si a fon­te quo­dam me­mo­riae. 5Mu­lier au­tem fa­mi­liae suae et ca­put et fi­nis est.

195The Same, On the Edict, Book XLVI. The term “masculine” frequently extends to both sexes. 1Let us see how the word “family” should be understood. And indeed, it is understood in various ways, for it has reference to both property and persons; to property, as in the Law of the Twelve Tables where it is said, “Let the next of kin on the father’s side have the estate” (familia). The term “family” also has reference to persons, as where the same law referring to a patron and his freedman says, “From this family to that.” In this instance, it is established that the law has reference to individuals. 2The term “family” has reference to every collection of persons which are connected by their own rights as individuals, or by the common bond of general relationship. We say that a family is connected by its own rights where several are either by nature or by law subjected to the authority of one; for example, the father of a family, the mother of a family, and a son and a daughter under paternal control, as well as their descendants; for instance, grandsons, granddaughters, and their successors. He is designated the father of a family who has authority over the household, and he is properly so called even if he has no son, for we do not merely consider his person, but also his right. Then we also style a minor the father of a family, when his father dies, and each of the persons who were under his control begins to have a separate household, and all obtain the title of father of a family. The same thing happens in the case of a son who is emancipated, for he also has his own family when he becomes independent. We say that the family of all the agnates is a common one, because even though the head of the household may be dead, and each of them has a separate family, still, all who were under the control of him alone are properly said to belong to the same family, as they have sprung from the same house and race. 3We are also accustomed to apply the term “family” to bodies of slaves, as we explained, according to the Edict of the Prætor, under the Title of Theft, where the Prætor mentions the family of farmers of the revenue. In this instance, all slaves are not meant, but only those are designated who were appointed for this purpose, that is to say, for the collection of taxes. In another part of the Edict all slaves are included; as in the case of unlawful assemblies, and property taken by force, and also where suit for the annulment of a contract can be brought, and the property is returned in a worse condition through the act of the purchaser or his family; and finally, in the case of the interdict Unde vi, the term family embraces not only all the slaves, but also the children. 4The word “family” also applies to all those persons, who are descended from the last father, as we say the Julian Family, referring, as it were, to persons derived from a certain origin within our memory. 5The wife is the beginning and the end of her family.

196Gaius li­bro sex­to de­ci­mo ad edic­tum pro­vin­cia­le. Fa­mi­liae ap­pel­la­tio­ne et ip­se prin­ceps fa­mi­liae con­ti­ne­tur. 1Fe­mi­na­rum li­be­ros in fa­mi­lia ea­rum non es­se pa­lam est, quia qui nas­cun­tur, pa­tris fa­mi­liam se­quun­tur.

196Gaius, On the Provincial Edict, Book XVI. The head of the family himself is included in the term “family.” 1It is clear that children do not belong to the family of the wife, because anyone who is born to a father does not follow the family of his mother.

197Ul­pia­nus li­bro quin­qua­gen­si­mo ad edic­tum. ‘In­di­cas­se’ est de­tu­lis­se: ‘ar­guis­se’ ac­cu­sas­se et con­vi­cis­se.

197Ulpianus, On the Edict, Book L. “To inform” is to denounce, to impeach, to accuse, and to convict.

198Idem li­bro se­cun­do de om­ni­bus tri­bu­na­li­bus. ‘Ur­ba­na prae­dia’ om­nia ae­di­fi­cia ac­ci­pi­mus, non so­lum ea quae sunt in op­pi­dis, sed et si for­te sta­bu­la sunt vel alia me­ri­to­ria in vil­lis et in vi­cis, vel si prae­to­ria vo­lup­ta­ti tan­tum de­ser­vien­tia: quia ur­ba­num prae­dium non lo­cus fa­cit, sed ma­te­ria. pro­in­de hor­tos quo­que, si qui sunt in ae­di­fi­ciis con­sti­tu­ti, di­cen­dum est ur­ba­no­rum ap­pel­la­tio­ne con­ti­ne­ri. pla­ne si plu­ri­mum hor­ti in red­itu sunt, vi­nea­rii for­te vel et­iam ho­li­to­rii, ma­gis haec non sunt ur­ba­na.

198The Same, On All Tribunals, Book II. We understand by the term “urban estates” not only all buildings which are situated in towns, but also inns, and such houses as are used for trade in the suburbs, and in villages, as well as palaces intended only for pleasure; but the materials, and not the location, are what constitute an urban estate. Hence, if there are any gardens attached to these buildings, it must be said that they are included under the term “urban estates.” It is clear that if these gardens afford more revenue than they do pleasure, that is to say, if they contain vines or olive trees, they should not be designated “urban estates.”

199Idem li­bro oc­ta­vo de om­ni­bus tri­bu­na­li­bus. ‘Ab­sen­tem’ ac­ci­pe­re de­be­mus eum, qui non est eo lo­ci, in quo lo­co pe­ti­tur: non enim trans ma­re ab­sen­tem de­si­de­ra­mus: et si for­te ex­tra con­ti­nen­tia ur­bis sit, ab­est. ce­te­rum us­que ad con­ti­nen­tia non ab­es­se vi­de­bi­tur, si non la­ti­tet. 1Ab­es­se non vi­de­tur, qui ab hos­ti­bus cap­tus est, sed qui a la­tro­ni­bus de­ti­ne­tur.

199The Same, On All Tribunals, Book VIII. We should consider a person to be absent who is not in the place where his presence is demanded; for we do not require that he be beyond seas, since he is absent if he happens to be outside the suburbs of the city; but if he is within the suburbs, he is not held to be absent if he does not conceal himself. 1Anyone who has been captured by the enemy is not considered to be absent, but he who is detained by robbers is.

200Iu­lia­nus li­bro se­cun­do di­ges­to­rum. Haec sti­pu­la­tio ‘no­xis so­lu­tum prae­sta­ri’ non ex­is­ti­ma­tur ad eas no­xas per­ti­ne­re, quae pu­bli­cam ex­er­ci­tio­nem et co­er­ci­tio­nem ca­pi­ta­lem ha­bent.

200Julianus, Digest, Book II. The following stipulation, “To furnish a slave free from liability for damage committed,” is not held to apply to such offences as call for public prosecution and punishment.

201Idem li­bro octagen­si­mo pri­mo di­ges­to­rum. Ius­ta in­ter­pre­ta­tio­ne re­ci­pien­dum est, ut ap­pel­la­tio­ne ‘fi­lii’, sic­uti fi­liam fa­mi­lias con­ti­ne­ri sae­pe re­spon­de­bi­mus, ita et ne­pos vi­dea­tur com­pre­hen­di, et ‘pa­tris’ no­mi­ne avus quo­que de­mons­tra­ri in­tel­le­ga­tur.

201The Same, Digest, Book LXXXI. According to a just interpretation it should be understood, as we have often said, that as a daughter under paternal control is included under the term “son,” a grandson should likewise be included; and a grandfather also be understood to be designated by the term “father.”

202Al­fe­nus Va­rus li­bro se­cun­do di­ges­to­rum. Cum in tes­ta­men­to scrip­tum es­set, ut he­res in fu­ne­re aut in mo­nu­men­to ‘dum­ta­xat au­reos cen­tum’ con­su­me­ret, non li­cet mi­nus con­su­me­re: si am­plius vel­let, li­cet ne­que ob eam rem con­tra tes­ta­men­tum fa­ce­re vi­de­tur.

202Alfenus Varus, Digest, Book II. When it is stated in a will that the heir shall only expend a hundred aurei for funeral expenses, or for the erection of a monument, he cannot spend any less than that amount; but, if he desires to spend more, he can do so, and he will not be considered to have done anything contrary to the terms of the will.

203Idem li­bro sep­ti­mo di­ges­to­rum. In le­ge cen­so­ria por­tus Si­ci­liae ita scrip­tum erat: ‘ser­vos, quos do­mum quis du­cet suo usu, pro is por­to­rium ne da­to’. quae­re­ba­tur, si quis a Si­ci­lia ser­vos Ro­mam mit­te­ret fun­di in­struen­di cau­sa, utrum pro his ho­mi­ni­bus por­to­rium da­re de­be­ret nec ne. re­spon­dit duas es­se in hac scrip­tu­ra quaes­tio­nes, pri­mam quid es­set ‘do­mum du­ce­re’, al­te­ram, quid es­set ‘suo usu du­ce­re’. igi­tur quae­ri so­le­ret, utrum, ubi quis­que ha­bi­ta­ret si­ve in pro­vin­cia si­ve in Ita­lia, an dum­ta­xat in sua cu­ius­que pa­tria do­mus es­se rec­te di­ce­tur. Sed de ea re con­sti­tu­tum es­se eam do­mum uni­cui­que nos­trum de­be­re ex­is­ti­ma­ri, ubi quis­que se­des et ta­bu­las ha­be­ret sua­rum­que re­rum con­sti­tu­tio­nem fe­cis­set. quid au­tem es­set ‘usu suo’, mag­nam ha­buis­se du­bi­ta­tio­nem. et ma­gis pla­cet, quod vic­tus sui cau­sa pa­ra­tum est, tan­tum con­ti­ne­ri. item­que de ser­vis ea­dem ra­tio­ne quae­ri, qui eo­rum usus sui cau­sa pa­ra­ti es­sent? utrum dis­pen­sa­to­res, in­su­la­rii, vi­li­ci, atrien­ses, tex­to­res, ope­ra­rii quo­que rus­ti­ci, qui agro­rum co­len­do­rum cau­sa ha­be­ren­tur, ex qui­bus agris pa­ter fa­mi­lias fruc­tus ca­pe­ret, qui­bus se to­le­ra­ret, om­nes de­ni­que ser­vos, quos quis­que emis­set, ut ip­se ha­be­ret at­que eis ad ali­quam rem ute­re­tur, ne­que id­eo emis­set, ut ven­de­ret? et si­bi vi­de­ri eos de­mum usus sui cau­sa pa­trem fa­mi­lias ha­be­re, qui ad eius cor­pus tuen­dum at­que ip­sius cul­tum prae­po­si­ti de­sti­na­ti­que es­sent, quo in ge­ne­re iunc­to­res, cu­bicu­la­rii, co­ci, mi­nis­tra­to­res at­que alii, qui ad eius­mo­di usum pa­ra­ti es­sent, nu­me­ra­ren­tur.

203The Same, Digest, Book VII. It was stated in the law relating to the collection of duties in the harbors of Sicily: “That no one should pay any duty on slaves which he was taking to his own house for private use.” The question arose if anyone should send slaves from Sicily to Rome, for the purpose of cultivating land, whether or not he would be compelled to pay duty on them. The answer was that in this law two points were involved: first, what did the words, “Take to his own house,” mean; and second, what was the meaning of the expression, “For his private use”? Therefore, if the word “house” meant where someone lived, inquiry should be made whether this was in a province, or in Italy; or whether his house could only properly be said to be in his own country. On this point it was decided that anyone’s house should be considered to be where he had his home, kept his accounts, and transacted his business. There is, however, great doubt as to the signification of the expression, “For his private use,” and it was decided that this only had reference to what was prepared for his subsistence. For the same reason it might also be asked with reference to slaves who are alleged to be for the use of their master whether stewards, porters, farmers, overseers, weavers, and farm laborers, who are employed in the cultivation of the soil, from which the owner obtains his living and supports himself, are meant; or whether all the slaves which any person purchased and kept for his own use, as well as those whom he employed for other purposes, and were not bought to sell again, are included. It seems to me that only those destined for the use of the head of the family, who are appointed for his personal service and support, which class includes valets, domestic, servants, cooks, attendants, and all others devoted to employments of this kind are meant.

204Pau­lus li­bro se­cun­do epi­to­ma­rum Al­fe­ni. ‘Pue­ri’ ap­pel­la­tio tres sig­ni­fi­ca­tio­nes ha­bet: unam, cum om­nes ser­vos pue­ros ap­pel­la­re­mus: al­te­ram, cum pue­rum con­tra­rio no­mi­ne puel­lae di­ce­re­mus: ter­tiam, cum ae­ta­tem pue­ri­lem de­mons­tra­re­mus.

204Paulus, Epitomes of Alfenus, Book II. The term “boy” has three significations: first, we call all slaves “boys”; second, we speak of a boy in contradistinction to a girl; and third, we make use of the word to denote the age of childhood.

205Idem li­bro quar­to epi­to­ma­rum Al­fe­ni. Qui fun­dum ven­di­dit, ‘po­mum’ re­ce­pit: nu­ces et fi­cos et uvas dum­ta­xat du­ra­ci­nas et pur­pu­reas et quae eius ge­ne­ris es­sent, quas non vi­ni cau­sa ha­be­re­mus, quas Grae­ci τρωξίμους ap­pel­la­rent, re­cep­ta vi­de­ri.

205The Same, Epitomes of Alfenus, Book IV. When anyone sells a tract of land, reserving the fruit, he is understood to reserve the nuts, figs, and grapes whose skins are hard and purple, and are of the kind which we do not use in making wine, and which the Greeks call suitable for eating purposes.

206Iu­lia­nus li­bro sex­to ex Mi­n­icio. ‘Vi­na­ria’ va­sa pro­prie va­sa tor­cu­la­ria es­se pla­cet: do­lia au­tem et se­rias tam­diu in ea cau­sa es­se, quam­diu vi­num ha­be­rent, cum si­ne vi­no es­se de­si­ne­rent, in eo nu­me­ro non es­se, quon­iam ad alium usum trans­fer­ri pos­sent, vel­uti si fru­men­tum in his ad­da­tur. ean­dem cau­sam am­pho­ra­rum es­se, ut, cum vi­num ha­beant, tum in va­sis vi­na­riis, cum in­anes sint, tum ex­tra nu­me­rum vi­na­rio­rum sint, quia aliud in his ad­di pos­sit.

206Julianus, On Minicius, Book VI. It is held that the expression “wine-jars” is properly applied to jars used at the wine press; for casks and other vessels are only classed as such while they contain wine; for, when they cease to do so, they have not this appellation, as they can be put to other uses; for instance, where grain is placed in them. The same rule applies to other earthen jars, when they are used for wine, just as it does to the former, for when they are empty, they are not included in the number of receptacles for wine, because other things can be kept in them.

207Afri­ca­nus li­bro ter­tio quaes­tio­num. ‘Mer­cis’ ap­pel­la­tio­ne ho­mi­nes non con­ti­ne­ri Me­la ait: et ob eam rem man­go­nes non mer­ca­to­res sed ve­na­li­cia­rios ap­pel­la­ri ait, et rec­te.

207Africanus, Questions, Book III. Mela says that slaves are not included in the term “merchandise,” and for this reason those who sell them are not designated merchants, but dealers in slaves; and this is correct.

208Idem li­bro quar­to quaes­tio­num. ‘Bo­no­rum’ ap­pel­la­tio, sic­ut he­redi­ta­tis, uni­ver­si­ta­tem quan­dam ac ius suc­ces­sio­nis et non sin­gu­las res de­mons­trat.

208The Same, Questions, Book IV. The terms “property” and “estate” apply to everything taken together, including the right of succession, but not to individual articles.

209Flo­ren­ti­nus li­bro de­ci­mo in­sti­tu­tio­num. ‘Co­ram Ti­tio’ ali­quid fa­ce­re ius­sus non vi­de­tur prae­sen­te eo fe­cis­se, ni­si is in­tel­le­gat: ita­que si fu­rio­sus aut in­fans sit aut dor­miat, non vi­de­tur co­ram eo fe­cis­se. sci­re au­tem, non et­iam vel­le is de­bet: nam et in­vi­to eo rec­te fit quod ius­sum est.

209Florentinus, Institutes, Book X. Where anyone is ordered to do something in the presence of Titius, he is not understood to have done it in his presence, unless Titius understands that this is the case; therefore, if he should be insane, or a child, or asleep, he is not considered to have performed the act in his presence. He must know that it is done, but it is not necessary that he should be willing, for what is ordered will be legally done, even against his consent.

210Mar­cia­nus li­bro sep­ti­mo in­sti­tu­tio­num. Is, qui na­tus est ex man­ci­piis ur­ba­nis et mis­sus est in vil­lam nu­trien­dus, in ur­ba­nis ser­vis con­sti­tue­tur.

210Marcianus, Institutes, Book VII. It has been decided that he who is born of urban slaves and is sent to the country to be brought up shall be classed as an urban slave.

211Flo­ren­ti­nus li­bro oc­ta­vo in­sti­tu­tio­num. ‘Fun­di’ ap­pel­la­tio­ne om­ne ae­di­fi­cium et om­nis ager con­ti­ne­tur. sed in usu ur­ba­na ae­di­fi­cia ‘ae­des’, rus­ti­ca ‘vil­lae’ di­cun­tur. lo­cus ve­ro si­ne ae­di­fi­cio in ur­be ‘area’, ru­re au­tem ‘ager’ ap­pel­la­tur. idem­que ager cum ae­di­fi­cio ‘fun­dus’ di­ci­tur.

211Florentinus, Institutes, Book VIII. By the term “real property” all buildings and all land are understood; in speaking of buildings in a city, however, we usually call them sedes, and in the country villas. A site without a building in a city is called area, and in the country ager, and the latter, when a house is erected upon it, is styled fundus.

212Ul­pia­nus li­bro pri­mo de ad­ul­te­riis. ‘Prae­va­ri­ca­to­res’ eos ap­pel­la­mus, qui cau­sam ad­ver­sa­riis suis do­nant et ex par­te ac­to­ris in par­tem rei con­ce­dunt: a va­ri­can­do enim prae­va­ri­ca­to­res dic­ti sunt.

212Ulpianus, On Adultery, Book I. We call those persons prevaricators who assist the cause of their adversaries, and while on the side of the plaintiff favor that of the defendant; for the term “prevaricator” is derived from the verb “varico,” to straddle.

213Idem li­bro pri­mo re­gu­la­rum. ‘Ce­de­re diem’ sig­ni­fi­cat in­ci­pe­re de­be­ri pe­cu­niam: ‘venire diem’ sig­ni­fi­cat eum diem venis­se, quo pe­cu­nia pe­ti pos­sit. ubi pu­re quis sti­pu­la­tus fue­rit, et ces­sit et venit dies: ubi in diem, ces­sit dies, sed non­dum venit: ubi sub con­di­cio­ne, ne­que ces­sit ne­que venit dies pen­den­te ad­huc con­di­cio­ne. 1‘Aes alie­num’ est, quod nos aliis de­be­mus: ‘aes suum’ est, quod alii no­bis de­bent. 2‘La­ta cul­pa’ est ni­mia neg­le­gen­tia, id est non in­tel­le­ge­re quod om­nes in­tel­le­gunt.

213The Same, Rules, Book I. The expression “cedere diem” means to begin to owe a sum of money: “venire diem” means the day has come when the money can be collected. When anyone makes an absolute stipulation, the money begins to be due, and the day of payment arrives immediately. When he agrees to pay it at a certain time, the indebtedness begins at once, but the time of payment does not; when he agrees to pay it under a condition, the indebtedness is not incurred, nor is the sum payable, while the condition is pending. 1“Æs alienum” means what we owe to others: “æs suum” is what others owe us. 2Gross negligence is extreme negligence, that is to say, not to know what everybody else knows.

214Mar­cia­nus li­bro pri­mo pu­bli­co­rum iu­di­cio­rum. ‘Mu­nus’ pro­prie est, quod ne­ces­sa­rie ob­imus le­ge mo­re im­pe­rio­ve eius, qui iu­ben­di ha­bet po­tes­ta­tem. ‘do­na’ au­tem pro­prie sunt, quae nul­la ne­ces­si­ta­te iu­ris of­fi­ciis et spon­te prae­stan­tur: quae si non prae­sten­tur, nul­la re­prae­hen­sio est et, si prae­sten­tur, ple­rum­que laus in­est. sed in sum­ma in hoc ven­tum est, ut non quod­cum­que mu­nus, id et do­num ac­ci­pia­tur, at quod do­num fue­rit, id mu­nus rec­te di­ca­tur.

214Marcianus, Public Prosecutions, Book I. An “obligation,” properly speaking, is something which we are obliged to do according to law, custom, or the command of someone who has the right to order it to be done. Gifts, however, are, correctly speaking, things which we voluntarily give without being compelled to do so by either law or our duty; and if they are not given, no one can be blamed, and if they are given, the donor is generally entitled to praise. In a word, it has been decided that the two terms are not interchangeable, but that a gift may properly give rise to an obligation.

215Pau­lus li­bro sin­gu­la­ri ad le­gem Fu­fiam Ca­ni­niam. ‘Po­tes­ta­tis’ ver­bo plu­ra sig­ni­fi­can­tur: in per­so­na ma­gis­tra­tuum im­pe­rium: in per­so­na li­be­ro­rum pa­tria po­tes­tas: in per­so­na ser­vi do­mi­nium. at cum agi­mus de no­xae de­di­tio­ne cum eo qui ser­vum non de­fen­dit, prae­sen­tis cor­po­ris co­piam fa­cul­ta­tem­que sig­ni­fi­ca­mus. in le­ge Ati­nia in po­tes­ta­tem do­mi­ni rem fur­ti­vam venis­se vi­de­ri, et si eius vin­di­can­dae po­tes­ta­tem ha­bue­rit, Sa­b­inus et Cas­sius aiunt.

215Paulus, On the Lex Fufia Caninia. The word “power” has several meanings: with reference to magistrates, it signifies jurisdiction; with reference to children, it signifies paternal control; with reference to slaves, it signifies the authority of a master. But when we bring suit for the surrender of a slave by way of reparation for damage committed by him, against his master who does not defend him, we mean the body of the slave and the authority over him. Sabinus and Cassius say that, under the Atinian Law, stolen property is considered to have come under the control of the master, if he should have the power to recover it.

216Ul­pia­nus li­bro pri­mo ad le­gem Ae­liam Sen­tiam. Ve­rum est eum, qui in car­ce­re clu­sus est, non vi­de­ri ne­que ‘vinc­tum’ ne­que ‘in vin­cu­lis’ es­se, ni­si cor­po­ri eius vin­cu­la sint ad­hi­bi­ta.

216Ulpianus, On the Lex Ælia Sentia, Book I. It is true that when anyone is imprisoned, he is not held to be either chained or placed in chains unless they are attached to his body.

217Ia­vo­le­nus li­bro pri­mo ex pos­te­rio­ri­bus La­beo­nis. In­ter il­lam con­di­cio­nem ‘cum fa­ri po­tue­rit’ et ‘post­quam fa­ri po­tue­rit’ mul­tum in­ter­est: nam pos­te­rio­rem scrip­tu­ram ube­rio­rem es­se con­stat, ‘cum fa­ri po­tue­rit’ ar­tio­rem et id tan­tum­mo­do tem­pus sig­ni­fi­ca­ri, quo pri­mum fa­ri pos­sit. 1Item ita da­ta con­di­cio­ne ‘il­lud fa­ci­to in die­bus’, si ni­hil prae­ter­ea fuis­set ad­iec­tum, in bi­duo con­di­cio­nem im­ple­ri opor­tet.

217Javolenus, On the Last Works of Labeo, Book I. There is a great difference between the conditions, “When he will be able to speak,” and “After he shall have been able to speak,” for it is established that the latter has a broader signification than the former, which only has reference to the time when the person can speak for the first time. 1Likewise, when a condition is stated as follows, “Do this in so many days,” if nothing more should be added, the condition must be complied with within two days.

218Pa­pi­nia­nus li­bro vi­cen­si­mo sep­ti­mo quaes­tio­num. Ver­bum ‘fa­ce­re’ om­nem om­ni­no fa­cien­di cau­sam com­plec­ti­tur dan­di, sol­ven­di, nu­me­ran­di, iu­di­can­di, am­bu­lan­di.

218Papinianus, Questions, Book XXVII. The words “to do,” include everything which can be done; just as “to give,” “to pay,” “to count,” “to judge,” “to walk.”

219Idem li­bro se­cun­do re­spon­so­rum. In con­ven­tio­ni­bus con­tra­hen­tium vo­lun­ta­tem po­tius quam ver­ba spec­ta­ri pla­cuit. cum igi­tur ea le­ge fun­dum vec­ti­ga­lem mu­ni­ci­pes lo­ca­ve­rint, ut ad he­redem eius qui sus­ce­pit per­ti­ne­ret, ius he­redum ad le­ga­ta­rium quo­que trans­fer­ri po­tuit.

219The Same, Opinions, Book II. It has been established, that, in agreements, the intention of the contracting parties should rather be considered than the terms of the stipulation. Therefore, when municipal magistrates lease land belonging to their city, under the condition, “that the heir of the person who leases it shall enjoy it,” the right of the heir can also be transferred to his legatee.

220Cal­lis­tra­tus li­bro se­cun­do quaes­tio­num. ‘Li­be­ro­rum’ ap­pel­la­tio­ne ne­po­tes et pro­ne­po­tes ce­te­ri­que qui ex his de­scen­dunt con­ti­nen­tur: hos enim om­nes suo­rum ap­pel­la­tio­ne lex duo­de­cim ta­bu­la­rum com­pre­hen­dit. to­tiens enim le­ges ne­ces­sa­riam du­cunt co­gna­tio­nem sin­gu­lo­rum no­mi­ni­bus uti (vel­uti fi­lii, ne­po­tes, pro­ne­po­tis ce­te­ro­rum­ve qui ex his de­scen­dunt), quo­tiens non om­ni­bus, qui post eos sunt, prae­sti­tum vo­lue­rint, sed so­lis his suc­cur­rent, quos no­mi­na­tim enu­me­rent. at ubi non per­so­nis cer­tis, non qui­bus­dam gra­di­bus prae­sta­tur, sed om­ni­bus, qui ex eo­dem ge­ne­re or­ti sunt, li­be­ro­rum ap­pel­la­tio­ne com­pre­hen­dun­tur. 1Sed et Pa­pi­rius Fron­to li­bro ter­tio re­spon­so­rum ait prae­dio cum vi­li­co et con­tu­ber­na­li eius et fi­liis le­ga­to ne­po­tes quo­que ex fi­liis con­ti­ne­ri, ni­si vo­lun­tas tes­ta­to­ris ali­ter ha­beat: fi­lii enim ap­pel­la­tio­ne sae­pe et ne­po­tes ac­ci­pi mul­ti­fa­riam pla­ce­re. 2Di­vus quo­que Mar­cus re­scrip­sit non vi­de­ri si­ne li­be­ris de­func­tum, qui ne­po­tem suum he­redem re­li­quit. 3Prae­ter haec om­nia na­tu­ra nos quo­que do­cet pa­ren­tes pios, qui li­be­ro­rum pro­crean­do­rum ani­mo et vo­to uxo­res du­cunt, fi­lio­rum ap­pel­la­tio­ne om­nes qui ex no­bis de­scen­dunt con­ti­ne­re: nec enim dul­cio­re no­mi­ne pos­su­mus ne­po­tes nos­tros quam fi­lii ap­pel­la­re. et­enim id­cir­co fi­lios fi­lias­ve con­ci­pi­mus at­que edi­mus, ut ex prole eo­rum ea­rum­ve diu­tur­ni­ta­tis no­bis me­mo­riam in ae­vum re­lin­qua­mus.

220Callistratus, Questions, Book II. By the term “children,” grandchildren and great-grandchildren, and all their descendants are understood, for the Law of the Twelve Tables includes all these under the term “proper heirs.” When the laws consider it necessary to use separate names for different relatives, for instance, sons, grandsons, great-grandsons, and their descendants, they do not mean that this shall extend to all who come after them. But when certain persons or degrees are not specified, but only those are mentioned who are descended from the same stock, they are included under the term “children.” 1Papirius Fronto, however, in the Third Book of Opinions, says that where land, with a farmer and his wife and children, is devised, the grandchildren descended from the sons are also included, unless the intention of the testator was otherwise; for it has been frequently decided that in the term “children,” grandchildren are also included. 2The Divine Marcus stated in a Rescript that anyone who left a grandson his heir was not considered to have died without issue. 3In addition to all this, Nature teaches us that affectionate fathers, who marry with the intention and desire to have children, inelude under the term all who are descended from them. For we cannot designate our grandchildren by a more loving name than that of children, since we have, and rear sons and daughters for the purpose of perpetuating our memory, for all time, by means of their offspring.

221Pau­lus li­bro de­ci­mo re­spon­so­rum. Pau­lus re­spon­dit fal­sum tu­to­rem eum ve­re di­ci, qui tu­tor non est, si­ve ha­ben­ti tu­tor da­tus est si­ve non: sic­ut fal­sum tes­ta­men­tum, quod tes­ta­men­tum non est, et mo­dius in­iquus, qui mo­dius non est.

221Paulus, Opinions, Book X. Paulus says that he can properly be styled a false guardian who is not a guardian at all; or who is appointed for a minor who already has a guardian, or has none; just as is the case of a forged will, which is not a will at all, or a false measure, which in reality is not a measure.

222Her­mo­ge­nia­nus li­bro se­cun­do iu­ris epi­to­ma­rum. ‘Pe­cu­niae’ no­mi­ne non so­lum nu­me­ra­ta pe­cu­nia, sed om­nes res tam so­li quam mo­bi­les et tam cor­po­ra quam iu­ra con­ti­nen­tur.

222Hermogenianus, Epitomes of Law, Book II. By the term “money” not only coin is understood, but all kinds of property, whether it is attached to the soil, or is movable, and which is corporeal as well as incorporeal.

223Pau­lus li­bro se­cun­do sen­ten­tia­rum. La­tae cul­pae fi­nis est non in­tel­le­ge­re id quod om­nes in­tel­le­gunt. 1‘Ami­cos’ ap­pel­la­re de­be­mus non le­vi no­ti­tia con­iunc­tos, sed qui­bus fue­rint in iu­ra cum pa­tre fa­mi­lias ho­nes­tis fa­mi­lia­ri­ta­tis quae­si­ta ra­tio­ni­bus.

223Paulus, Opinions, Book II. The definition of gross negligence is not to know what all persons know. 1We should not call those persons friends with whom we have only a slight acquaintance; but those with whom our fathers have entertained honorable and familiar relations.

224Ve­nu­leius li­bro sep­ti­mo sti­pu­la­tio­num. ‘Vin­cu­lo­rum’ ap­pel­la­tio­ne vel pri­va­ta vel pu­bli­ca vin­cu­la sig­ni­fi­cant, ‘cus­to­diae’ ve­ro tan­tum pu­bli­cam cus­to­diam.

224Venuleius, Stipulations, Book VII. The term “chains” applies to both private or public restraint of liberty; “custody,” however, only has reference to public imprisonment.

225Try­pho­ni­nus li­bro pri­mo dis­pu­ta­tio­num. ‘Fu­gi­ti­vus’ est non is, qui so­lum con­si­lium fu­gien­di a do­mi­no sus­ce­pit, li­cet id se fac­tu­rum iac­ta­ve­rit, sed qui ip­so fac­to fu­gae in­itium men­te de­du­xe­rit. nam et fu­rem ad­ul­te­rum alea­to­rem quam­quam ali­qua sig­ni­fi­ca­tio­ne ex ani­mi pro­pos­i­tio­ne cu­ius­que so­la quis di­ce­re pos­set, ut et­iam is, qui num­quam alie­nam rem in­vi­to do­mi­no sub­tra­xe­rit, num­quam alie­nam ma­trem fa­mi­lias cor­ru­pe­rit, si mo­do eius men­tis sit, ut oc­ca­sio­ne da­ta id com­mis­su­rus sit, ta­men opor­te­re ea­dem haec cri­mi­na ad­sump­to ac­tu in­tel­le­gi. et id­eo fu­gi­ti­vum quo­que et er­ro­nem non se­cun­dum pro­pos­i­tio­nem so­lam, sed cum ali­quo ac­tu in­tel­le­gi con­stat.

225Tryphoninus, Disputations, Book I. A fugitive slave is not one who has merely formed the design of escaping from his master, even though he may have boasted that he intends to do so, but one who actually has begun his flight; for, as anyone may call a person a thief, an adulterer, or a gambler, from certain indications solely arising from his intentions, although he has never stolen anything from the owner, or corrupted any woman, but has merely resolved to do so, when an opportunity offered, still, he cannot be understood to have committed the offence until his design has been executed, and therefore it is established that a slave shall not be considered a fugitive or a vagabond, merely because he has had the intention of becoming one, but only after he has committed the act.

226Pau­lus li­bro pri­mo ma­nua­lium. Mag­na neg­le­gen­tia cul­pa est: mag­na cul­pa do­lus est.

226The Same, Manuals, Book I. Gross negligence is a fault: a great fault is a fraud.

227Idem li­bro se­cun­do ma­nua­lium. Ex il­la par­te edic­ti ‘tum quem ei he­redem es­se opor­tet’ he­redis he­redi­bus bo­no­rum pos­ses­sio non de­fer­tur. 1Item in sub­sti­tu­tio­ne his ver­bis ‘quis­quis mi­hi he­res erit’ pro­xi­mus he­res tan­tum sig­ni­fi­ca­tur: im­mo non tan­tum pro­xi­mus he­res, sed et­iam scrip­tus.

227The Same, Manuals, Book II. Prætorian possession of an estate is not conceded to the heirs of the heir, by the following clause of the Edict: “I will grant possession to him who is the heir of the deceased.” 1Again, in the following substitution, “Whosoever shall be my heir,” only the next heir is meant, or the appointed heir, even if he is not the one next in succession.

228Idem li­bro sin­gu­la­ri de co­gni­tio­ni­bus. ‘Mu­ni­ci­pes’ in­tel­le­gen­di sunt et qui in eo­dem mu­ni­ci­pio na­ti sunt.

228The Same, On Judicial Inquiries. By the term “fellow citizens” is meant those who are born in the same town.

229Idem li­bro sin­gu­la­ri de ta­ci­tis fi­dei­com­mis­sis. ‘Trans­ac­ta fi­ni­ta­ve’ in­tel­le­ge­re de­be­mus non so­lum qui­bus con­tro­ver­sia fuit, sed et­iam quae si­ne con­tro­ver­sia sint pos­ses­sa:

229The Same, On Implied Trusts. We should understand by the expression “matters transacted or completed,” not only such as are in dispute, but also those with reference to which no controversy exists.

230Idem li­bro sin­gu­la­ri ad se­na­tus con­sul­tum Or­fi­tia­num. ut sunt iu­di­cio ter­mi­na­ta, trans­ac­tio­ne com­po­si­ta, lon­gio­ris tem­po­ris si­len­tio fi­ni­ta.

230The Same, On the Orphitian Decree of the Senate. Among these are questions which have been judicially decided; are those with reference to which a compromise has been made; and those prescribed by lapse of time.

231Idem li­bro sin­gu­la­ri ad se­na­tus con­sul­tum Ter­tul­lia­num. Quod di­ci­mus eum, qui nas­ci spe­ra­tur, pro su­per­sti­te es­se, tunc ve­rum est, cum de ip­sius iu­re quae­ri­tur: aliis au­tem non prod­est ni­si na­tus.

231The Same, On the Tertullian Decree of the Senate. When we say that a child, who is expected to be born, is considered as already in existence, this is only true where his rights are in question, but no advantage accrues to others unless they are actually born.

232Gaius li­bro pri­mo de ver­bo­rum ob­li­ga­tio­ni­bus. Haec enun­tia­tio ‘quae sunt plu­ris au­reo­rum tri­gin­ta’ si­mul et quan­ti­ta­tis et aes­ti­ma­tio­nis sig­ni­fi­ca­ti­va est.

232Gaius, On Verbal Obligations, Book I. The statement, “Which are worth more than thirty aurei,” has reference both to a sum of money, and the valuation of property.

233Idem li­bro pri­mo ad le­gem duo­de­cim ta­bu­la­rum. ‘Si cal­vi­tur’: et mo­re­tur et frus­tre­tur. in­de et ca­lum­nia­to­res ap­pel­la­ti sunt, quia per frau­dem et frus­tra­tio­nem alios ve­xa­rent li­ti­bus: in­de et ca­vil­la­tio dic­ta est. 1Post ka­len­das Ia­nua­rias die ter­tio pro sa­lu­te prin­ci­pis vo­ta sus­ci­piun­tur. 2‘Te­lum’ vol­go qui­dem id ap­pel­la­tur, quod ab ar­cu mit­ti­tur: sed non mi­nus om­ne sig­ni­fi­ca­tur, quod mit­ti­tur ma­nu: ita se­qui­tur, ut et la­pis et lig­num et fer­rum hoc no­mi­ne con­ti­nea­tur: dic­tum­que ab eo, quod in lon­gin­quum mit­ti­tur, Grae­ca vo­ce fi­gu­ra­tum ἀπὸ τοῦ τηλοῦ. et hanc sig­ni­fi­ca­tio­nem in­ve­ni­re pos­su­mus et in Grae­co no­mi­ne: nam quod nos te­lum ap­pel­la­mus, il­li βέλος ap­pel­lant: ἀπὸ τοῦ βάλλεσθαι. ad­mo­net nos Xe­no­phon, nam ita scri­bit: καὶ τὰ βέλη ὁμόσε ἐφέρετο, λόγχαι τοξεύματα σφενδόναι, πλεῖστοι δὲ καὶ λίθοι. et id, quod ab ar­cu mit­ti­tur, apud Grae­cos qui­dem pro­prio no­mi­ne τόξευμα vo­ca­tur, apud nos au­tem com­mu­ni no­mi­ne te­lum ap­pel­la­tur.

233The Same, On the Law of the Twelve Tables, Book I. The following expressions, “If he deceives,” “If he is in default,” “If he frustrates,” are the sources from which the term “calumniators” is derived because they annoy others with lawsuits through fraud and deceit. 1On the third day after the Kalends of January, prayers are offered for the preservation of the Emperor. 2Ordinarily speaking, whatever is discharged from a bow is called a dart; now, however, it means anything which is cast by the hand; and it follows that even a stone, or a piece of wood, or iron, are included in this term. It is so called because it is sent to a distance, and is what the Greeks designate something which is thrown to a distance. We can detect this meaning in the Greek word, for what we call a dart, they style which usually means something dispatched from a bow, but it also signifies anything projected by the hand. Xenophon informs us of this fact, for he says, “They carried darts, spears, arrows, slings, and also stones.” What is sent from a bow is what the Greeks call toceuma, that is to say, an arrow, but by us it is designated by the common name of “dart.”

234Idem li­bro se­cun­do ad le­gem duo­de­cim ta­bu­la­rum. Quos nos hos­tes ap­pel­la­mus, eos ve­te­res ‘per­duel­les’ ap­pel­la­bant, per eam ad­iec­tio­nem in­di­can­tes cum qui­bus bel­lum es­set. 1‘Lo­cu­ples’ est, qui sa­tis ido­nee ha­bet pro mag­ni­tu­di­ne rei, quam ac­tor re­sti­tuen­dam es­se pe­tit. 2Ver­bum ‘vi­ve­re’ qui­dam pu­tant ad ci­bum per­ti­ne­re: sed Ofi­lius ad At­ti­cum ait his ver­bis et ves­ti­men­ta et stra­men­ta con­ti­ne­ri, si­ne his enim vi­ve­re ne­mi­nem pos­se.

234The Same, On the Law of the Twelve Tables, Book II. Those whom we style enemies the ancients called perduelles, indicating by this term that they were persons with whom they were at war. 1He is considered solvent who has sufficient property to satisfy any claim which may be brought against him by a creditor. 2Some authorities hold that the term “subsistence” has reference only to food; but Ofilius and Atticus say that under this term clothing and covering of every description are included, for without them no one can subsist.

235Idem li­bro ter­tio ad le­gem duo­de­cim ta­bu­la­rum. ‘Fer­ri’ pro­prie di­ci­mus, quae quis suo cor­po­re ba­iu­lat: ‘por­ta­ri’ ea, quae quis iu­men­to se­cum du­cit: ‘agi’ ea, quae ani­ma­lia sunt. 1‘Fa­b­ros tig­na­rios’ di­ci­mus non eos dum­ta­xat, qui tig­na do­la­rent, sed om­nes qui ae­di­fi­ca­rent.

235The Same, On the Law of the Twelve Tables, Book III. We properly apply the term “to carry,” to what anyone conveys by means of his body; “to transport,” to whatever one conveys by means of a beast of burden; and “to drive” has reference to animals. 1We call workers in wood not only those who polish lumber, but also all those who build houses.

236Idem li­bro quar­to ad le­gem duo­de­cim ta­bu­la­rum. Qui ‘ve­ne­num’ di­cit, ad­ice­re de­bet, utrum ma­lum an bo­num: nam et me­di­ca­men­ta ve­nena sunt, quia eo no­mi­ne om­ne con­ti­ne­tur, quod ad­hi­bi­tum na­tu­ram eius, cui ad­hi­bi­tum es­set, mu­tat. cum id quod nos ve­ne­num ap­pel­la­mus, Grae­ci φάρμακον di­cunt, apud il­los quo­que tam me­di­ca­men­ta quam quae no­cent, hoc no­mi­ne con­ti­nen­tur: un­de ad­iec­tio­ne al­te­rius no­mi­ne di­stinc­tio fit. ad­mo­net nos sum­mus apud eos poe­ta­rum Ho­me­rus: nam sic ait: φάρμακα, πολλὰ μὲν ἐσθλὰ μεμιγμένα, πολλὰ δὲ λυγρά. 1‘Glan­dis’ ap­pel­la­tio­ne om­nis fruc­tus con­ti­ne­tur, ut Ia­vo­le­nus ait, ex­em­plo Grae­ci ser­mo­nis, apud quos om­nes ar­bo­rum spe­cies ἀκρόδρυα ap­pel­lan­tur.

236The Same, On the Law of the Twelve Tables, Book IV. Those who speak of poison, should add whether it is good or bad, for medicines are poisons, and they are so called because they change the natural disposition of those to whom they are administered. What we call poison the Greeks style farmakon; and among them noxious drugs as well as medicinal remedies are included under this term, for which reason they distinguish them by another name. Homer, the most distinguished of their poets, informs us of this, for he says: “There are many kinds of poisons, some of which are good, and some of which are bad.” 1Javolenus says that fruit is whatever has a seed, as in the case of the Greeks who call all kinds of trees akrodrua.

237Idem li­bro quin­to ad le­gem duo­de­cim ta­bu­la­rum. Duo­bus ne­ga­ti­vis ver­bis qua­si per­mit­tit lex ma­gis quam pro­hi­buit: id­que et­iam Ser­vius anim­ad­ver­tit.

237The Same, On the Law of the Twelve Tables, Book V. A law which contains two negative statements rather permits than forbids. This is also noted by Servius.

238Idem li­bro sex­to ad le­gem duo­de­cim ta­bu­la­rum. ‘Plebs’ est ce­te­ri ci­ves si­ne se­na­to­ri­bus. 1‘De­tes­ta­tum’ est tes­ta­tio­ne de­nun­tia­tum. 2‘Pig­nus’ ap­pel­la­tum a pug­no, quia res, quae pig­no­ri dan­tur, ma­nu tra­dun­tur. un­de et­iam vi­de­ri pot­est ve­rum es­se, quod qui­dam pu­tant, pig­nus pro­prie rei mo­bi­lis con­sti­tui. 3‘No­xiae’ ap­pel­la­tio­ne om­ne de­lic­tum con­ti­ne­tur.

238The Same, On the Law of the Twelve Tables, Book VI. The term “plebeian” applies to all citizens except Senators. 1To “call to witness,” is to give evidence. 2The word “pledge” is derived from the fist, because everything which is given by way of pledge is transferred by the hand. Wherefore some authorities hold, and it may be true, that a pledge, properly speaking, can only consist of movable property. 3All offences are embraced in the term “noxia.”

239Pom­po­nius li­bro sin­gu­la­ri en­chi­ri­dii. ‘Pu­pil­lus’ est, qui, cum im­pu­bes est, de­siit in pa­tris po­tes­ta­te es­se aut mor­te aut em­an­ci­pa­tio­ne. 1‘Ser­vo­rum’ ap­pel­la­tio ex eo flu­xit, quod im­pe­ra­to­res nos­tri cap­ti­vos ven­de­re ac per hoc ser­va­re nec oc­ci­de­re so­lent. 2‘In­co­la’ est, qui ali­qua re­gio­ne do­mi­ci­lium suum con­tu­lit: quem Grae­ci πάροικον ap­pel­lant. nec tan­tum hi, qui in op­pi­do mo­ran­tur, in­co­lae sunt, sed et­iam qui ali­cu­ius op­pi­di fi­ni­bus ita agrum ha­bent, ut in eum se qua­si in ali­quam se­dem re­ci­piant. 3‘Mu­nus pu­bli­cum’ est of­fi­cium pri­va­ti ho­mi­nis, ex quo com­mo­dum ad sin­gu­los uni­ver­sos­que ci­ves rem­que eo­rum im­pe­rio ma­gis­tra­tus ex­tra­or­di­na­rium per­ve­nit. 4‘Ad­ve­na’ est, quem Grae­ci ἄποικον ap­pel­lant. 5‘De­cu­rio­nes’ qui­dam dic­tos aiunt ex eo, quod in­itio, cum co­lo­niae de­du­ce­ren­tur, de­ci­ma pars eo­rum qui du­ce­ren­tur con­si­lii pu­bli­ci gra­tia con­scri­bi so­li­ta sit. 6‘Urbs’ ab ur­bo ap­pel­la­ta est: ur­ba­re est ara­tro de­fi­ni­re. et Va­rus ait ur­bum ap­pel­la­ri cur­va­tu­ram ara­tri, quod in ur­be con­den­da ad­hi­be­ri so­let. 7‘Op­pi­dum’ ab ope di­ci­tur, quod eius rei cau­sa moe­nia sint con­sti­tu­ta. 8‘Ter­ri­to­rium’ est uni­ver­si­tas agro­rum in­tra fi­nes cu­ius­que ci­vi­ta­tis: quod ab eo dic­tum qui­dam aiunt, quod ma­gis­tra­tus eius lo­ci in­tra eos fi­nes ter­ren­di, id est sum­mo­ven­di ius ha­bent. 9Ver­bum ‘suum’ amb­iguum est, utrum de to­to an de par­te sig­ni­fi­cat. et id­eo qui iu­ret suum non es­se, ad­ice­re de­bet ne­que si­bi com­mu­nem es­se.

239Pomponius, Enchiridion. A minor is one who has not yet reached the age of puberty, and has ceased to be under the control of his father, either by the death of the latter or his own mancipation. 1The term “slaves” is derived from the fact that the commanders of our armies formerly were accustomed to sell their captives, and preserved them for this purpose, in preference to putting them to death. 2An inhabitant is one who has his domicile in some country, and whom the Greeks call paroikon, that is, “adjoining.” Those who dwell in cities are not called inhabitants, any more than those who have land near some town, and betake themselves to it, as to a resort. 3A public employment is an office conferred upon some private individual, by means of which extraordinary benefit results to the citizens individually and collectively, as well as to their property through his magisterial authority. 4A stranger is one whom the Greeks style apoikon, that is to say, one who has left his home to become a colonist. 5Certain authorities hold that decurions are so called for the reason that, in the beginning, when colonies were established, the tenth part of those who founded them, were usually formed into a body for the purpose of giving public counsel. 6The word “city” is derived from the verb urbo, which means to mark a boundary with a plow. Varus says that the curve of a plowshare, which is ordinarily used for tracing the boundaries of a city about to be built, is called urbum. 7The term “fortified town” (oppidum), is derived from ops, for the reason that its walls are constructed to provide for the safety of property. 8The word “territory” means all the land included within the limits of any city. Some authorities hold that it is so called, because the magistrates have a right to inspire fear within its boundaries, that is to say, the right to remove the people. 9It is doubtful whether the term “his” means the whole or a part; and therefore anyone who swears that something is not his should add that he has no joint-ownership in it with another.

240Pau­lus ex li­bris sex li­bro pri­mo im­per­ia­lium sen­ten­tia­rum in co­gni­tio­ni­bus pro­la­ta­rum. Cum quae­re­ba­tur, an ver­bum ‘so­lu­to ma­tri­mo­nio do­tem red­di’ non tan­tum di­vor­tium, sed et mor­tem con­ti­ne­ret, hoc est an de hoc quo­que ca­su con­tra­hen­tes sen­ti­rent, et mul­ti pu­ta­bant hoc sen­sis­se, et qui­bus­dam aliis con­tra vi­de­ba­tur: se­cun­dum: hoc mo­tus im­pe­ra­tor pro­nun­tia­vit id ac­tum eo pac­to, ut nul­lo ca­su re­ma­ne­ret dos apud ma­ri­tum.

240Paulus, On the Six Books of Imperial Decrees having Reference to Judicial Inquiries, Book I. The question arose whether the expression, “The dowry shall be returned in case the marriage is dissolved,” refers not only to divorce, but also to death; that is to say, whether this was the intention of the contracting parties in the present instance; and several authorities think that it was the intention, while the contrary opinion is held by others. On this account, the Emperor decided that “the agreement was that, under no circumstances, the dowry should remain in the hands of the husband.

241Quin­tus Mu­cius Scae­vo­la li­bro sin­gu­la­ri ὅρων. In ‘ru­tis cae­sis’ ea sunt, quae ter­ra non te­nen­tur quae­que ope­re struc­ti­li tec­to­rio­ve non con­ti­nen­tur.

241Quintus Mucius Scævola, Definitions. Movable property is such as is not attached to the soil, that is to say, everything which does not form part of a building or other structure.

242Ia­vo­le­nus li­bro se­cun­do ex pos­te­rio­ri­bus La­beo­nis. Ma­lum na­vis es­se par­tem, ar­te­mo­nem au­tem non es­se La­beo ait, quia ple­rae­que na­ves si­ne ma­lo in­uti­les es­sent, id­eo­que pars na­vis ha­be­tur: ar­te­mo au­tem ma­gis ad­iec­ta­men­to quam pars na­vis est. 1In­ter ‘pro­iec­tum’ et ‘im­mis­sum’ hoc in­ter­es­se ait La­beo, quod pro­iec­tum es­set id quod ita pro­ve­he­re­tur ut nus­quam re­quies­ce­ret, qua­lia mae­nia­na et sug­grun­dae es­sent: im­mis­sum au­tem, quod ita fie­ret, ut ali­quo lo­co re­quies­ce­ret, vel­uti tig­na tra­bes quae im­mit­te­re­tur. 2Plum­bum, quod te­gu­lis po­ne­re­tur, ae­di­fi­cii es­se ait La­beo: sed id, quod hy­pae­thri te­gen­di cau­sa po­ne­re­tur, con­tra es­se. 3‘Vi­duam’ non so­lum eam, quae ali­quan­do nup­ta fuis­set, sed eam quo­que mu­lie­rem, quae vi­rum non ha­buis­set, ap­pel­la­ri ait La­beo: quia vi­dua sic dic­ta est qua­si ve­cors, ve­sa­nus, qui si­ne cor­de aut sa­ni­ta­te es­set: si­mi­li­ter vi­duam dic­tam es­se si­ne dui­ta­te. 4Stra­tu­ram lo­ci ali­cu­ius ex ta­bu­lis fac­tis, quae aes­ta­te tol­le­ren­tur et hie­me po­ne­ren­tur, ae­dium es­se ait La­beo, quon­iam per­pe­tui usus pa­ra­tae es­sent: ne­que ad rem per­ti­ne­re, quod in­ter­im tol­le­ren­tur.

242Javolenus, On the Last Works of Labeo, Book II. Labeo says that a mast forms part of a ship, but that small sails do not, because many ships would be useless without masts, and therefore they are considered as belonging to ships; sails, however, are held to be rather an addition to than parts of a vessel. 1Labeo says that a difference exists between what projects over, and what is inserted into anything as a projection, is put forward in such a way that it does not have a support, as for instance, balconies and roofs; and whatever is inserted into a building rests upon something, for example, joists and beams. 2Labeo says that where lead is used instead of tile to cover a house, it forms part of it; but that where it is used for the purpose of covering an open gallery it does not. 3Labeo says that a widow is not only a woman who has been married at some time, but also one who has not had a husband; for the term is also applied to a person who is idiotic or insane, and the word also means without the union of two persons. 4Labeo also says, that a building composed of boards erected for the purpose of protecting any place during the winter, and which is removed in the summer, is a house; as it is designed for perpetual use, although it is not attached to the soil, for the reason that it is removed for a part of the time.

243Scae­vo­la li­bro oc­ta­vo de­ci­mo di­ges­to­rum. Scae­vo­la re­spon­dit: sem­per ac­cep­tum est, ut li­ber­to­rum ap­pel­la­tio­ne et­iam hi con­ti­ne­ri in­tel­le­gan­tur, qui eo­dem tes­ta­men­to vel pos­te­rio­re lo­co ma­nu­mit­te­ren­tur, ni­si ma­ni­fes­te is, a quo pe­te­re­tur, con­tra de­func­ti vo­lun­ta­tem do­ce­ret pe­ti.

243Scævola, Digest, Book XVIII. Scævola gave it as his opinion that it was generally accepted that those persons should be understood to be included in the term “freedmen” who have been manumitted under a first or a succeeding will, unless he by whom they were claimed could clearly show that this is contrary to the intention of the deceased.

244La­beo li­bro quar­to pi­tha­non a Pau­lo epi­to­ma­to­rum. Si qua poe­na est, mul­ta est: si qua mul­ta est, poe­na est. Paulus: utrum­que eo­rum fal­sum est. nam­que ha­rum re­rum dis­si­mi­li­tu­do ex hoc quo­que ap­pa­ret, quod de poe­na pro­vo­ca­tio non est: si­mul at­que enim vic­tus quis est eius ma­le­fi­cii, cu­ius poe­na est sta­tu­ta, sta­tim ea de­be­tur. at mul­tae pro­vo­ca­tio est, nec an­te de­be­tur, quam aut non est pro­vo­ca­tum aut pro­vo­ca­tor vic­tus est: nec ali­ter quam si is di­xit, cui di­ce­re li­cet. ex hoc quo­que ea­rum re­rum dis­si­mi­li­tu­do ap­pa­re­re pot­erit, quia poe­nae cer­tae sin­gu­lo­rum pec­ca­to­rum sunt, mul­tae con­tra, quia eius iu­di­cis po­tes­tas est, quan­tam di­cat, ni­si cum le­ge est con­sti­tu­tum quan­tam di­cat.

244Labeo, Epitomes of Probabilities by Paulus, Book IV. A penalty is a fine, and a fine is a penalty. Paulus: Both of these statements are false; for the difference between these things is apparent from the fact that an appeal cannot be taken from a penalty, for where anyone is convicted of an offence, the penalty for it is fixed, and must be paid at once; but an appeal can be taken from a fine, for it is not due unless an appeal is not taken, or the appellant loses his case; and it is the same as if the judge had passed upon it who was authorized to do so. Hence, the difference between these things becomes apparent, because certain penalties are prescribed for certain illegal acts; but this is not the case with fines, as the judge has power to impose any fine he pleases, unless the amount which he may impose is fixed by law.

245Pom­po­nius li­bro de­ci­mo epis­tu­la­rum. Sta­tuae ad­fi­xae ba­si­bus struc­ti­li­bus aut ta­bu­lae re­li­ga­tae ca­te­nis aut er­ga pa­rie­tem ad­fi­xae aut si si­mi­li­ter co­hae­rent lych­ni, non sunt ae­dium: or­na­tus enim ae­dium cau­sa pa­ran­tur, non quo ae­des per­fi­cian­tur. idem La­beo ait. 1Pro­thy­rum, quod in ae­di­bus ite­rum qui fie­ri so­let, ae­dium est.

245Pomponius, Epistles, Book X. Statues attached to their pedestals, pictures hung by chains or fastened to the walls, and lamps similarly affixed, do not form part of a house; for they are rather placed there as ornaments than as constituting parts of buildings. 1Labeo also says that the wall usually placed in front of a house constitutes a part of it.

246Idem li­bro sex­to de­ci­mo epis­tu­la­rum. Apud La­beo­nem pi­tha­non ita scrip­tum est: ex­hi­bet, qui prae­stat eius de quo agi­tur prae­sen­tiam. nam et­iam qui sis­tit, prae­stat eius de quo agi­tur prae­sen­tiam, nec ta­men eum ex­hi­bet: et qui mu­tum aut fu­rio­sum aut in­fan­tem ex­hi­bet, non pot­est vi­de­ri eius prae­sta­re prae­sen­tiam: ne­mo enim ex eo ge­ne­re prae­sens sa­tis ap­te ap­pel­la­ri pot­est. 1Re­sti­tuit non tan­tum, qui so­lum cor­pus, sed et­iam qui om­nem rem con­di­cio­nem­que red­di­ta cau­sa prae­stet: et to­ta re­sti­tu­tio iu­ris est in­ter­pre­ta­tio.

246The Same, Letters, Book XVI. It is stated in the “Probabilities” of Labeo that the expression “To produce” has reference to the exhibition in court of the property in dispute. For anyone who appears in person does not, for that reason, produce the property in dispute; and he who produces a person who is either dumb, insane, or an infant, is not considered to produce him at all; for no one of this kind can, under any circumstances, properly be said to be present. 1The term “restitution” has reference not only to the body of the thing itself, but also to every right and condition attaching to it; hence complete restitution is meant by the law.