Corpus iurisprudentiae Romanae

Repertorium zu den Quellen des römischen Rechts

Digesta Iustiniani Augusti

Recognovit Mommsen (1870) et retractavit Krüger (1928)
Convertit in Anglica lingua Scott (1932)
Dig. V1,
De iudiciis: ubi quisque agere vel conveniri debeat
Liber quintus
I.

De iudiciis: ubi quisque agere vel conveniri debeat

(Concerning Trials and Where Anyone Ought to Bring Suit, or Be Sued.)

1Ul­pia­nus li­bro se­cun­do ad edic­tum. Si se sub­iciant ali­qui iu­ris­dic­tio­ni et con­sen­tiant, in­ter con­sen­tien­tes cu­ius­vis iu­di­cis, qui tri­bu­na­li prae­est vel aliam iu­ris­dic­tio­nem ha­bet, est iu­ris­dic­tio.

1Ad Dig. 5,1,1ROHGE, Bd. 10 (1874), S. 328: Voraussetzung der stillschweigenden Prorogation des Gerichtsstandes.Ulpianus, On the Edict, Book II. Where persons voluntarily agree to submit to the jurisdiction of some court, then this case can be heard by any judge who presides over said court, or has jurisdiction therein, so far as the consenting parties are concerned.

2Idem li­bro ter­tio ad edic­tum. Con­sen­sis­se au­tem vi­den­tur, qui sciant se non es­se sub­iec­tos iu­ris­dic­tio­ni eius et in eum con­sen­tiant. ce­te­rum si pu­tent eius iu­ris­dic­tio­nem es­se, non erit eius iu­ris­dic­tio: er­ror enim li­ti­ga­to­rum, ut Iu­lia­nus quo­que li­bro pri­mo di­ges­to­rum scri­bit, non ha­bet con­sen­sum. aut si pu­ta­ve­runt alium es­se prae­to­rem pro alio, ae­que er­ror non de­dit iu­ris­dic­tio­nem. aut si, cum re­sti­tis­set qui­vis ex li­ti­ga­to­ri­bus, vi­ri­bus prae­tu­rae com­pul­sus est, nul­la iu­ris­dic­tio est. 1Con­ve­ni­re au­tem utrum in­ter pri­va­tos suf­fi­cit an ve­ro et­iam ip­sius prae­to­ris con­sen­sus ne­ces­sa­rius est? lex Iu­lia iu­di­cio­rum ait ‘quo mi­nus in­ter pri­va­tos con­ve­niat’: suf­fi­cit er­go pri­va­to­rum con­sen­sus. pro­in­de si pri­va­ti con­sen­tiant, prae­tor au­tem igno­ret con­sen­ti­re et pu­tet suam iu­ris­dic­tio­nem, an le­gi sa­tis­fac­tum sit, vi­den­dum est: et pu­to pos­se de­fen­di eius es­se iu­ris­dic­tio­nem. 2Si et iu­dex ad tem­pus da­tus et om­nes li­ti­ga­to­res con­sen­tiant: ni­si spe­cia­li­ter prin­ci­pa­li ius­sio­ne pro­ro­ga­tio fue­rit in­hi­bi­ta, pos­sunt tem­po­ra, in­tra quae ius­sus est li­tem dir­ime­re, pro­ro­ga­ri. 3Le­ga­tis in eo quod an­te le­ga­tio­nem con­tra­xe­runt, item his qui tes­ti­mo­nii cau­sa evo­ca­ti sunt vel si qui iu­di­can­di cau­sa ar­ces­si­ti sunt vel in pro­vin­ciam de­sti­na­ti, re­vo­can­di do­mum suam ius da­tur. eo quo­que qui ip­se pro­vo­ca­vit non im­po­ni­tur ne­ces­si­tas in­tra tem­po­ra pro­vo­ca­tio­nis ex­er­cen­dae Ro­mae vel alio lo­co ubi pro­vo­ca­tio ex­er­ce­tur aliis pul­san­ti­bus re­spon­de­re: nam Cel­sus huic et­iam do­mus re­vo­ca­tio­nem dan­dam ait, quon­iam ob aliam cau­sam ve­ne­rit: haec Cel­si sen­ten­tia et ra­tio­na­bi­lis est. nam et di­vus Pius Plo­tio Cel­sia­no re­scrip­sit eum, qui tu­te­lae red­den­dae cau­sa Ro­mam erat a se evo­ca­tus, al­te­rius tu­te­lae cau­sa, cu­ius cau­sa non erat evo­ca­tus, non de­be­re com­pel­li iu­di­cium sus­ci­pe­re. idem Clau­dio Fla­via­no re­scrip­sit mi­no­rem vi­gin­ti quin­que an­nis, qui de­si­de­ra­rat in in­te­grum re­sti­tui ad­ver­sus Asi­nia­num, qui al­te­rius neg­otii cau­sa ve­ne­rat, non es­se Ro­mae au­dien­dum. 4Om­nes au­tem is­ti do­mum re­vo­cant, si non ibi con­tra­xe­runt, ubi con­ve­niun­tur. ce­te­rum si con­tra­xe­runt ibi, re­vo­can­di ius non ha­bent: ex­cep­tis le­ga­tis, qui li­cet ibi con­tra­xe­runt, dum­mo­do an­te le­ga­tio­nem con­tra­xe­runt, non com­pel­lun­tur se Ro­mae de­fen­de­re, quam­diu le­ga­tio­nis cau­sa hic de­mo­ran­tur. quod et Iu­lia­nus scri­bit et di­vus Pius re­scrip­sit. pla­ne si per­fec­ta le­ga­tio­ne sub­sis­tant, con­ve­nien­dos eos di­vus Pius re­scrip­sit. 5Item si ex­tra pro­vin­ciam suam con­tra­xe­runt, li­cet non in Ita­lia, quaes­tio­nis est, an Ro­mae con­ve­ni­ri pos­sint. et Mar­cel­lus in eo so­lo pri­vi­le­gio eos uti do­mum re­vo­can­di, quod in ci­vi­ta­te sua vel cer­te in­tra pro­vin­ciam con­tra­xe­runt: quod est ve­rum. sed et si agant, com­pel­lun­tur se ad­ver­sus om­nes de­fen­de­re: non ta­men si in­iu­riam suam per­se­quan­tur vel fur­tum vel dam­num quod nunc pas­si sunt: alio­quin, ut et Iu­lia­nus ele­gan­ter ait, aut im­pu­ne con­tu­me­liis et dam­nis ad­fi­cien­tur aut erit in po­tes­ta­te cu­ius­que pul­san­do eos sub­ice­re ip­sos iu­ris­dic­tio­ni, dum se vin­di­cant. 6Sed si du­bi­te­tur, utrum in ea quis cau­sa sit, ut do­mum re­vo­ca­re pos­sit, nec ne, ip­se prae­tor de­bet cau­sa co­gni­ta sta­tue­re. quod si con­sti­te­rit in ea eum es­se cau­sa, ut do­mum re­vo­cet, de­be­bit ca­ve­re in iu­di­cio sis­ti, sta­tuen­te prae­to­re in quem diem pro­mit­tat. sed utrum nu­da cau­tio­ne an sa­tis­da­to, Mar­cel­lus du­bi­tat: mi­hi vi­de­tur so­la pro­mis­sio­ne, quod et Me­la scri­bit: alio­quin com­pel­le­tur iu­di­cium ac­ci­pe­re quam in­ve­ni­re eos qui sa­tis pro eo dent. 7In om­ni­bus au­tem, in qui­bus pro­te­la­tur ad­mo­ni­tio, hoc pro­ce­de­re si­ne tem­po­ra­li dam­no cre­di­to­rum opor­tet. 8His da­tur mul­tae di­cen­dae ius, qui­bus pu­bli­ce iu­di­cium est, et non aliis: ni­si hoc spe­cia­li­ter eis per­mis­sum est.

2The Same, On the Edict, Book III. Ad Dig. 5,1,2 pr.ROHGE, Bd. 10 (1874), S. 328: Voraussetzung der stillschweigenden Prorogation des Gerichtsstandes.To “agree” is considered to mean that parties who are aware that they are not subject to the jurisdiction of a certain judge, nevertheless consent that he shall preside. If, however, they think that he has jurisdiction, he will not, merely for that reason, have it; for, (as Julianus says in the First Book of the Digest) the mistake of litigants does not constitute an agreement; or, where they think that a person is a Prætor who is not one, this error does not also confer jurisdiction, nor does any jurisdiction exist where one of the litigants refuses to comply with the decision of the Prætor and is forcibly compelled to do so. 1Is it sufficient for private parties to agree with one another, or is the consent of the Prætor also necessary? The Lex Julia on Trials says, “In order to prevent private persons from coming to an agreement”. Hence, if private persons do agree, and the Prætor is not aware that they have done so, and he thinks that he has jurisdiction, should it not be considered whether the requirements of the law have been complied with, or not? And I think it may be held that he has jurisdiction. 2Where anyone is appointed judge for a certain time, and all the litigants agree that the time which he ordered to hear the case may be extended, this may be done; unless an extension of time was especially prohibited by order of the Emperor. 3The right is granted deputies to have a case transferred to the place of their residence, where some contract was entered into by them before they were appointed; and similar privileges are conceded to those who were summoned to give evidence, or have been sent for or appointed to go to some province to preside as judges. Where a party has himself appealed, he is not required to answer in proceedings instituted by others during the time of his appeal at Rome, or elsewhere; for Celsus states that, in this instance, the case may be transferred to the place of his residence, since he came to Rome for some other purpose. This opinion of Celsus is a reasonable one. For the Divine Pius stated in a Rescript to Plotius Celsianus, that a party whom he had summoned to Rome for the purpose of rendering the account of a guardianship could not be compelled to join issue in a case involving another guardianship in which he had not been summoned. He also stated in the Rescript to Claudius Flavianus that a minor under twenty-five years of age who petitioned for complete restitution against one Asinianus who had come to Rome on some other business, had no right to be heard there. 4All these persons can have their cases transferred to the places of their own domicile, if they did not contract where suit was brought against them. If, however, they made the contract there, they have not the right of removal; except envoys who, although they may have contracted at Rome, provided they did so before their mission, are not compelled to defend themselves in that city, so long as they remain there as envoys. This Julianus also held, and the Divine Pius stated in a Rescript. It is evident that if they remained at Rome after their mission was concluded, then, as the Divine Pius stated in a Rescript, suit can be brought against them there. 5Moreover, if they entered into a contract outside of their own province, but not in Italy, the question arises, can they be sued at Rome? Marcellus states that they can only use the privilege of having a case transferred to the place of their residence, when they entered into the contract in their own city, or, at all events, in their own province; which is true. But if they themselves bring an action, they must defend themselves against all others; but not, however, where they bring suit for injury done to them, or for theft, or for damages which they have sustained during their absence from home; otherwise, as Julianus very properly says, they would have to endure insult and loss without being able to obtain redress; or anyone, by attacking them would have the power to subject them to jurisdiction as soon as they claim reparation. 6If, however, any doubt should arise whether anyone in a case of this kind can have it transferred to the place of his residence or not, the Prætor should decide the question after investigation. If he should determine that the party had a right to have the case transferred to the place of his residence, the latter must make arrangements to appear in court for trial, after the Prætor has fixed the day of his appearance. Marcellus doubts whether he should merely execute a mere undertaking to appear, or give security to do so, and it seems to me that his promise alone would be sufficient, and this Mela also stated; otherwise, he would be compelled to join issue instead of finding persons to give security for him. 7In all cases in which time is extended, this should be done without causing any loss to creditors by lapse of time. 8The right of imposing a fine is conferred upon those who hold the position of public judges, and to no others, unless this is specially granted to them.

3Idem li­bro quar­to ad edic­tum. Non vi­de­tur frus­tran­dae ac­tio­nis cau­sa la­ti­ta­re, qui prae­sens sus­ci­pe­re iu­di­cium non com­pel­li­tur.

3The Same, On the Edict, Book IV. A person is not presumed to conceal himself for the purpose of avoiding a suit, if, even while he was present, he could not be compelled to join issue.

4Gaius li­bro pri­mo ad edic­tum pro­vin­cia­le. Lis nul­la no­bis es­se pot­est cum eo quem in po­tes­ta­te ha­be­mus, ni­si ex cas­tren­si pe­cu­lio.

4Gaius, On the Provincial Edict, Book I. We have no legal right to bring an action against a person who is under our control, unless with reference to castrense peculium.

5Ul­pia­nus li­bro quin­to ad edic­tum. Si quis ex alie­na iu­ris­dic­tio­ne ad prae­to­rem vo­ce­tur, de­bet venire, ut et Pom­po­nius et Vin­dius scrip­se­runt: prae­to­ris est enim aes­ti­ma­re, an sua sit iu­ris­dic­tio, vo­ca­ti au­tem non con­tem­ne­re auc­to­ri­ta­tem prae­to­ris: nam et le­ga­ti ce­te­ri­que qui re­vo­can­di do­mum ius ha­bent in ea sunt cau­sa, ut in ius vo­ca­ti ve­niant pri­vi­le­gia sua al­le­ga­tu­ri.

5Ulpianus, On the Edict, Book V. Where a party is summoned before the Prætor from another jurisdiction, he must appear, as is stated by Pomponius and Vindius; as it is the duty of the Prætor to decide whether he has jurisdiction, and those who are summoned should not treat the “authority of the Prætor with contempt; for envoys and other persons who have the right to have their cases transferred to the places where they reside, are in such a position that they must appear, after having been summoned, in order to state their privileges.

6Idem li­bro sex­to ad edic­tum. Cae­cus iu­di­can­di of­fi­cio fun­gi­tur.

6The Same, On the Edict, Book VI. A blind man can perform the duties of a judge.

7Idem li­bro sep­ti­mo ad edic­tum. Si quis, post­ea­quam in ius vo­ca­tus est, mi­les vel al­te­rius fo­ri es­se coe­pe­rit, in ea cau­sa ius re­vo­can­di fo­rum non ha­be­bit qua­si prae­ven­tus.

7The Same, On the Edict, Book VII. Where anyone has become a soldier, or subject to some other jurisdiction after he has been summoned to appear in court, he will not have the right to have his cause transferred, because he has been, as it were, anticipated.

8Gaius li­bro se­cun­do ad edic­tum pro­vin­cia­le. Si quis in le­ga­tio­ne con­sti­tue­rit quod an­te le­ga­tio­nem de­bue­rit, non co­gi eum ibi iu­di­cium pa­ti ubi con­sti­tue­rit.

8Ad Dig. 5,1,8Windscheid: Lehrbuch des Pandektenrechts, 7. Aufl. 1891, Bd. II, § 284, Note 8.Gaius, On the Provincial Edict, Book II. Where anyone, during his mission, agrees to make payment of an obligation which he contracted before becoming an envoy, he cannot be compelled to defend himself in the place where he made the promise.

9Ul­pia­nus li­bro no­no ad edic­tum. In­su­lae Ita­liae pars Ita­liae sunt et cu­ius­que pro­vin­ciae.

9Ulpianus, On the Edict, Book IX. The islands belonging to Italy are a part of Italy, and the adjacent islands are a part of each province.

10Idem li­bro de­ci­mo ad edic­tum. De­sti­tis­se11Die Großausgabe fügt is ein. vi­de­tur non qui dis­tu­lit, sed qui li­ti re­nun­tia­vit in to­tum: de­sis­te­re enim est de neg­otio abs­ti­ne­re, quod ca­lum­nian­di ani­mo in­sti­tue­rat. pla­ne si quis co­gni­ta rei ve­ri­ta­te suum neg­otium de­se­rue­rit no­lens in li­te im­pro­ba per­se­ve­ra­re, quam ca­lum­niae cau­sa non in­sti­tue­rat, is de­sti­tis­se non vi­de­tur.

10The Same, On the Edict, Book X. A party is understood to “desist”, not when he defers the case, but where he abandons it altogether; for to desist means to relinquish any proceeding which he had begun for the purpose of annoyance. It is evident that if anyone, after he has ascertained the facts in the case, gives it up, being unwilling to persevere in an action which is unjust, and which he did not institute for the purpose of causing annoyance, he is not held to have desisted.

11Idem li­bro duo­de­ci­mo ad edic­tum. Si a me fue­rit ad­ro­ga­tus qui me­cum erat li­tem con­tes­ta­tus vel cum quo ego: sol­vi iu­di­cium Mar­cel­lus li­bro ter­tio di­ges­to­rum scri­bit, quon­iam nec ab in­itio in­ter nos po­tuit con­sis­te­re.

11The Same, On the Edict, Book XII. If anyone is arrogated by me who had previously joined issue in a suit which he had brought against me, or which I had brought against him, Marcellus says in the Third Book of the Digest that the case is terminated, because no suit could have existed between us in the beginning.

12Pau­lus li­bro sep­ti­mo de­ci­mo ad edic­tum. Cum prae­tor unum ex plu­ri­bus iu­di­ca­re ve­tat, ce­te­ris id com­mit­te­re vi­de­tur. 1Iu­di­cem da­re pos­sunt, qui­bus hoc le­ge vel con­sti­tu­tio­ne vel se­na­tus con­sul­to con­ce­di­tur. le­ge, sic­ut pro­con­su­li. is quo­que cui man­da­ta est iu­ris­dic­tio iu­di­cem da­re pot­est: ut sunt le­ga­ti pro­con­su­lum. item hi qui­bus id mo­re con­ces­sum est prop­ter vim im­pe­rii, sic­ut prae­fec­tus ur­bi ce­te­ri­que Ro­mae ma­gis­tra­tus. 2Non au­tem om­nes iu­di­ces da­ri pos­sunt ab his qui iu­di­cis dan­di ius ha­bent: qui­dam enim le­ge im­pe­diun­tur ne iu­di­ces sint, qui­dam na­tu­ra, qui­dam mo­ri­bus. na­tu­ra, ut sur­dus mu­tus: et per­pe­tuo fu­rio­sus et im­pu­bes, quia iu­di­cio ca­rent. le­ge im­pe­di­tur, qui se­na­tu mo­tus est. mo­ri­bus fe­mi­nae et ser­vi, non quia non ha­bent iu­di­cium, sed quia re­cep­tum est, ut ci­vi­li­bus of­fi­ciis non fun­gan­tur. 3Qui pos­sunt es­se iu­di­ces, ni­hil in­ter­est in po­tes­ta­te an sui iu­ris sint.

12Paulus, On the Edict, Book XVII. Where the Prætor forbids one of several persons to preside as judge, he is held to have allowed the others to do so. 1Those authorities can appoint a judge to whom this right is granted by a law, or by a constitution, or by a decree of the Senate. By a law; for example, this right may be conferred upon a Proconsul. He also can appoint a judge to whom jurisdiction has been delegated, as, for instance, the Deputies of Proconsuls. Moreover, those can do so to whom it has been permitted by custom, on account of the Imperial authority which they enjoy, for instance, the Prefect of the City, and other magistrates at Rome. 2Those who have the right to appoint judges cannot appoint them indiscriminately; for some persons are prevented by law from becoming judges; others are prevented by nature; and others, still, by custom. By nature; as persons who are deaf, dumb, and such as are incurably insane, as well as boys who are minors, because they are deficient in judgment. A party is prevented by law, who has been expelled from the Senate. Women and slaves are prevented by custom, not because they are deficient in judgment, but because it has been established that they cannot perform the duties belonging to civil employments. 3When persons are eligible as judges, it makes no difference whether they are under the control of another, or are their own masters.

13Gaius li­bro sep­ti­mo ad edic­tum pro­vin­cia­le. In tri­bus is­tis iu­di­ciis fa­mi­liae er­cis­cun­dae, com­mu­ni di­vi­dun­do et fi­nium re­gun­do­rum quae­ri­tur quis ac­tor in­tel­le­ga­tur, quia par cau­sa om­nium vi­de­tur. sed ma­gis pla­cuit eum vi­de­ri ac­to­rem qui ad iu­di­cium pro­vo­cas­set.

13Gaius, On the Provincial Edict, Book VII. In the three following actions, namely: those for partition of an estate, the division of property held in common, and the establishment of boundaries, the question arises who shall be considered as plaintiff, because the condition of all the parties seems to be the same? It is the better opinion that he should be considered the plaintiff who makes application to the court.

14Ul­pia­nus li­bro se­cun­do dis­pu­ta­tio­num. Sed cum am­bo ad iu­di­cium pro­vo­cant, sor­te res dis­cer­ni so­let.

14Ulpianus, Disputations, Book II. Where, however, both parties apply to the court, it is customary to determine the question by lot.

15Idem li­bro vi­cen­si­mo pri­mo ad edic­tum. Fi­lius fa­mi­lias iu­dex si li­tem suam fa­ciat, in tan­tam quan­ti­ta­tem te­ne­tur, quae tunc in pe­cu­lio fuit, cum sen­ten­tiam di­ce­bat. 1Iu­dex tunc li­tem suam fa­ce­re in­tel­le­gi­tur, cum do­lo ma­lo in frau­dem le­gis sen­ten­tiam di­xe­rit (do­lo ma­lo au­tem vi­de­tur hoc fa­ce­re, si evi­dens ar­gua­tur eius vel gra­tia vel in­imi­ci­tia vel et­iam sor­des), ut ve­ram aes­ti­ma­tio­nem li­tis prae­sta­re co­ga­tur.

15The Same, On the Edict, Book XXI. Where the son of a family is a judge, and makes the case his own, he is liable for a sum equal in value to his peculium when he rendered his decision. 1A judge is understood to make the case his own when he maliciously renders a decision in violation of law. He is held to do this maliciously, where it is clearly proved that either favor, enmity, or even corruption, influenced him; and, under these circumstances, he can be forced to pay the true amount of the matter in controversy.

16Idem li­bro quin­to ad edic­tum. Iu­lia­nus au­tem in he­redem iu­di­cis, qui li­tem suam fe­cit, pu­tat ac­tio­nem com­pe­te­re: quae sen­ten­tia ve­ra non est et a mul­tis no­ta­ta est.

16The Same, On the Edict, Book V. Julianus thinks that where a judge makes a case his own, an action can be brought against his heir; but this opinion is not correct, and has been rejected by many authorities.

17Idem li­bro vi­cen­si­mo se­cun­do ad edic­tum. Iu­lia­nus ait, si al­ter ex li­ti­ga­to­ri­bus iu­di­cem so­lum he­redem vel ex par­te fe­ce­rit, alius iu­dex ne­ces­sa­rio su­men­dus est, quia in­iquum est ali­quem suae rei iu­di­cem fie­ri.

17The Same, On the Edict, Book XXII. Julianus says: That if one of the parties makes a judge his heir to either the whole or a portion of his estate, recourse must be had to another judge; because it is unjust for anyone to be made the judge of his own cause.

18Idem li­bro vi­cen­si­mo ter­tio ad edic­tum. Si lon­gius spa­tium in­ter­ces­su­rum erit, quo mi­nus iu­dex da­tus ope­ram pos­sit da­re, mu­ta­ri eum iu­bet prae­tor: hoc est si for­te oc­cu­pa­tio ali­qua iu­di­cem non pa­tia­tur ope­ram iu­di­cio da­re, in­ci­den­te in­fir­mi­ta­te vel ne­ces­sa­ria pro­fec­tio­ne vel rei suae fa­mi­lia­ris pe­ri­cu­lo. 1Si fi­lius fa­mi­lias ex ali­qua no­xa, ex qua pa­tri ac­tio com­pe­tit, ve­lit ex­per­i­ri, ita de­mum per­mit­ti­mus ei age­re, si non sit qui pa­tris no­mi­ne agat. nam et Iu­lia­no pla­cet, si fi­lius fa­mi­lias le­ga­tio­nis vel stu­dio­rum gra­tia ab­erit et vel fur­tum vel dam­num in­iu­ria pas­sus sit: pos­se eum uti­li iu­di­cio age­re, ne dum pa­ter ex­spec­ta­tur im­pu­ni­ta sint ma­le­fi­cia, quia pa­ter ven­tu­rus non est vel dum venit, se sub­tra­hit is qui no­xam com­mi­sit. un­de ego sem­per pro­ba­vi, ut, si res non ex ma­le­fi­cio ve­niat, sed ex con­trac­tu, de­beat fi­lius age­re uti­li iu­di­cio, for­te de­po­si­tum re­pe­tens vel man­da­ti agens vel pe­cu­niam quam cre­di­dit pe­tens, si for­te pa­ter in pro­vin­cia sit, ip­se au­tem for­te Ro­mae vel stu­dio­rum cau­sa vel alia ius­ta ex cau­sa agat: ne, si ei non de­de­ri­mus ac­tio­nem, fu­tu­rum sit, ut im­pu­ne frau­dem pa­tia­tur et eges­ta­te Ro­mae la­bo­ret via­ti­cu­lo suo non re­cep­to, quod ad sump­tum pa­ter ei de­sti­na­ve­rat. et fin­ge se­na­to­rem es­se fi­lium fa­mi­lias qui pa­trem ha­bet in pro­vin­cia, non­ne au­ge­tur uti­li­tas per dig­ni­ta­tem?

18The Same, On the Edict, Book XXIII. If a long time must elapse until the judge who has been appointed can hear the case, the Prætor orders him to be changed; and this happens, for example, where some business occupies the judge and prevents him from giving his attention to the trial; for instance, where he is attacked by disease, or is compelled to go on a journey, or where his private property is in danger. 1Where the son of a family wishes to institute proceedings for reparation for an injury on account of which his father has a right of action, we only permit him to bring suit where there is no one who can do so in behalf of his father; for it is the opinion of Julianus that if the son of a family is absent on an embassy, or for the purpose of pursuing his studies, and suffers theft, or unlawful damage to his property, he is entitled to bring a prætorian action; since, if he waited for his father to bring suit, the malicious act would go unpunished, because his father might not come, or the party who committed the wrong might absent himself before he arrived. Wherefore, I have always held the opinion that where the cause of action did not arise from a malicious act, but from a contract, the son ought to bring a prætorian action; as, for instance, where he wishes to recover a deposit, or sue on a mandate, or for money which he had loaned; and, in that case, if his father was in the province, and he happened to be at Rome, for the purpose of prosecuting his studies or for some other good reason, and we did not grant him the action, he would, in consequence, be defrauded with impunity, and live at Rome in want, because he did not obtain the property which his father intended for his expenses. And suppose that the son of a family in question is a Senator, and has a father in the province; would not the equity of this be increased by his rank?

19Idem li­bro se­xa­gen­si­mo ad edic­tum. He­res ab­sens ibi de­fen­den­dus est, ubi de­func­tus de­buit, et con­ve­nien­dus, si ibi in­ve­nia­tur, nul­lo­que suo pro­prio pri­vi­le­gio ex­cu­sa­tur. 1Si quis tu­te­lam vel cu­ram vel neg­otia vel ar­gen­ta­riam vel quid aliud, un­de ob­li­ga­tio ori­tur, cer­to lo­ci ad­mi­nis­tra­vit: et­si ibi do­mi­ci­lium non ha­buit, ibi se de­be­bit de­fen­de­re et, si non de­fen­dat ne­que ibi do­mi­ci­lium ha­beat, bo­na pos­si­de­ri pa­tie­tur. 2Pro­in­de et si mer­ces ven­di­dit cer­to lo­ci vel dis­po­suit vel com­pa­ra­vit: vi­de­tur, ni­si alio lo­ci ut de­fen­de­ret con­ve­nit, ibi­dem se de­fen­de­re. num­quid di­ci­mus eum, qui a mer­ca­to­re quid com­pa­ra­vit ad­ve­na, vel ei ven­di­dit quem scit in­de con­fes­tim pro­fec­tu­rum, non opor­tet ibi bo­na pos­si­de­ri, sed do­mi­ci­lium se­qui eius? at si quis ab eo qui ta­ber­nam vel of­fi­ci­nam cer­to lo­ci con­duc­tam ha­buit, in ea cau­sa est ut il­lic con­ve­nia­tur: quod ma­gis ha­bet ra­tio­nem. nam ubi sic venit ut con­fes­tim dis­ce­dat, qua­si a via­to­re emp­tis, vel eo qui trans­ve­he­ba­tur, vel eo qui παραπλεῖ, emit: du­ris­si­mum est, quot­quot lo­cis quis na­vi­gans vel iter fa­ciens de­la­tus est, tot lo­cis se de­fen­di. at si quo con­sti­tit, non di­co iu­re do­mi­ci­lii, sed ta­ber­nu­lam per­gu­lam hor­reum ar­ma­rium of­fi­ci­nam con­du­xit ibi­que dis­tra­xit egit: de­fen­de­re se eo lo­ci de­be­bit. 3Apud La­beo­nem quae­ri­tur, si ho­mo pro­vin­cia­lis ser­vum in­sti­to­rem ven­den­da­rum mer­cium gra­tia Ro­mae ha­beat: quod cum eo ser­vo con­trac­tum est, ita ha­ben­dum at­que si cum do­mi­no con­trac­tum sit: qua­re ibi se de­be­bit de­fen­de­re. 4Il­lud scien­dum est eum, qui ita fuit ob­li­ga­tus ut in Ita­lia sol­ve­ret, si in pro­vin­cia ha­buit do­mi­ci­lium, utru­bi­que pos­se con­ve­ni­ri et hic et ibi: et ita et Iu­lia­no et mul­tis aliis vi­de­tur.

19The Same, On the Edict, Book LX. When the heir is absent, he must make his defence in the place where the deceased contracted the debt, and he must be sued there if he can be found; and he cannot allege any peculiar privilege by way of exemption. 1Where anyone has been managing a guardianship or a curatorship, or some business, or banking, or anything else from which obligations arise, in any particular place, he must defend himself there, even if that is not his residence; and if he does not make a defence and has no home there, he must permit possession to be taken of his property. 2In like manner, if he sold merchandise in any particular place, or otherwise disposed of it, or purchased it; it is held that he must defend himself there, unless it had been agreed upon that he should do so elsewhere. Shall we say then that a party who has made purchases from a merchant who is a stranger, or sold goods to someone whom he knew was about to depart immediately, has no right to obtain possession of his property, but must follow the latter to the place where he resides; while if anyone makes a purchase from a person who has rented a shop, or a warehouse, in some particular place, is he in such a position that he can be sued there? This conclusion is the more reasonable one, for when a party comes to a place with the expectation of soon leaving it, you can make a purchase from him just as you could from a traveller, or from one who is making a journey either by land or sea; and it would be a great hardship that no matter where a man travelled either by sea or land he could be sued, and be compelled to defend himself. But if he remains anywhere, I do not mean by way of residence, but because he rented a small shop, or booth, or granary, or warehouse, or office, and sells merchandise there, he will then be compelled to defend himself in that place. 3The question is raised by Labeo, if a man belonging to a province has a slave acting as his agent for the purpose of selling merchandise at Rome, any contract entered into with said slave must be considered as if it was made with his master; and therefore, the party must defend himself at Rome. 4It should be remembered that a person who is bound to make payment in Italy, if his residence is in a province, can be sued in either place; and this opinion is adopted also by Julianus and many others.

20Pau­lus li­bro quin­qua­gen­si­mo oc­ta­vo ad edic­tum. Om­nem ob­li­ga­tio­nem pro con­trac­tu ha­ben­dam ex­is­ti­man­dum est, ut, ubi­cum­que ali­quis ob­li­ge­tur, et con­tra­hi vi­dea­tur, quam­vis non ex cre­di­ti cau­sa de­bea­tur.

20Paulus, On the Edict, Book LVIII. It must be held that every obligation should be considered as based upon a contract, so that, wherever anyone binds himself, he is held to have made a contract, even though the transaction was not one of indebtedness arising out of a loan.

21Ul­pia­nus li­bro sep­tua­gen­si­mo ad edic­tum. Si de­bi­to­ri meo ve­lim ac­tio­nem ede­re, pro­ban­dum erit, si fa­tea­tur se de­be­re pa­ra­tum­que di­cat sol­ve­re, au­dien­dum eum, dan­dum­que diem cum com­pe­ten­ti cau­te­la ad sol­ven­dam pe­cu­niam: ne­que enim mag­num dam­num est in mo­ra mo­di­ci tem­po­ris. mo­di­cum au­tem tem­pus hic in­tel­le­gen­dum est, quod post con­dem­na­tio­nem reis in­dul­tum est.

21Ulpianus, On the Edict, Book LXX. Where I wish to institute proceedings against a debtor, the approved course is that, if he admits that he owes the money and states that he is ready to pay it, he must be heard, and time must be granted him for making payment under a sufficient bond; for no great injury can result from delay for a reasonable time. By a “reasonable time” must be understood that which is granted defendants for payment, after judgment has been rendered against them.

22Pau­lus li­bro ter­tio ad Plau­tium. Qui non co­gi­tur in ali­quo lo­co iu­di­cium pa­ti, si ip­se ibi agat, co­gi­tur ex­ci­pe­re ac­tio­nes et ad eun­dem iu­di­cem mit­ti.

22Paulus, On Plautius, Book III. Where a party is not compelled to defend an action in a certain place; if he himself brings suit there, he can be compelled to defend suits also, and to appear before the same judge.

23Idem li­bro sep­ti­mo ad Plau­tium. Non pot­est vi­de­ri in iu­di­cium venis­se id quod post iu­di­cium ac­cep­tum ac­ci­dis­set: id­eo­que alia in­ter­pel­la­tio­ne opus est.

23Ad Dig. 5,1,23Windscheid: Lehrbuch des Pandektenrechts, 7. Aufl. 1891, Bd. I, § 128, Note 5.The Same, On Plautius, Book VII. Anything which comes up after issue has been joined cannot be considered as before the court; and therefore it will be necessary to make a new application.

24Idem li­bro sep­ti­mo de­ci­mo ad Plau­tium. Non alias in eos, quos prin­ceps evo­ca­vit, Ro­mae com­pe­tit ac­tio, quam si hoc tem­po­re con­tra­xe­rint. 1Le­ga­ti ex de­lic­tis in le­ga­tio­ne com­mis­sis co­gun­tur iu­di­cium Ro­mae pa­ti, si­ve ip­si ad­mi­se­runt si­ve ser­vi eo­rum. 2Sed si pos­tu­la­tur in rem ac­tio ad­ver­sus le­ga­tum, num­quid dan­da sit, quon­iam ex prae­sen­ti pos­ses­sio­ne haec ac­tio est? Cas­sius re­spon­dit sic ser­van­dum, ut, si sub­du­ca­tur mi­nis­te­rium ei, non sit con­ce­den­da ac­tio, si ve­ro ex mul­tis ser­vis de uno aga­tur, non sit in­hi­ben­da: Iu­lia­nus si­ne di­stinc­tio­ne de­ne­gan­dam ac­tio­nem: me­ri­to: id­eo enim non da­tur ac­tio, ne ab of­fi­cio sus­cep­to le­ga­tio­nis avo­ce­tur.

24The Same, On Plautius, Book XVII. No action will lie at Rome against persons whom the Emperor has summoned there, except where they make a contract during the time they remain. 1Envoys are compelled to answer in suits at Rome on account of offences committed while there in that capacity, whether they themselves commit them or their slaves. 2Where an action in rem is asked for against an envoy, and the said action is founded on present possession, shall it be granted? Cassius stated that the rule to be observed is that, if the action would cause the envoy to be deprived of all his slaves, it should not be granted; but if it only related to one slave out of several, it ought not to be refused. Julianus says, without making any distinction, that the action should be denied, and this is reasonable, since the action is not granted lest the party be turned aside from the duties of the office which he has undertaken.

25Iu­lia­nus li­bro pri­mo di­ges­to­rum. Si le­ga­tio­nis tem­po­re quis ser­vum vel aliam rem eme­rit aut ex alia cau­sa pos­si­de­re coe­pe­rit, non in­ique co­ge­tur eius no­mi­ne iu­di­cium ac­ci­pe­re: ali­ter enim po­tes­tas da­bi­tur le­ga­tis sub hac spe­cie res alie­nas do­mum au­fe­ren­di.

25Julianus, Digest, Book I. Where a man, while on a mission, purchases a slave, or any other property, or, for any other reason comes into possession of the same, he is not unjustly required to join issue in a suit having reference to said property; otherwise, power will be given to envoys under this pretext to carry away to their own homes the property of others.

26Pau­lus li­bro sep­ti­mo de­ci­mo ad Plau­tium. De eo au­tem qui ad­iit he­redi­ta­tem Cas­sius scri­bit, quam­vis Ro­mae ad­ie­rit he­redi­ta­tem, non com­pe­te­re in eum ac­tio­nem, ne im­pe­dia­tur le­ga­tio, et hoc ve­rum est. sed nec le­ga­ta­riis da­tur ac­tio, sed ni­si sa­tis­det, mit­tun­tur in pos­ses­sio­nem re­rum he­redi­ta­ria­rum: quod et in he­redi­ta­riis cre­di­to­ri­bus di­cen­dum est.

26Paulus, On Plautius, Book XVII. Cassius states with reference to an envoy who entered upon an estate, that, even where he enters upon it at Rome, an action cannot be brought against him, lest his mission might be interfered with; and this is true. An action is not even granted to legatees against him, but they can be put in possession of property belonging to the estate, unless he gives security, which rule also applies to creditors of the estate.

27Iu­lia­nus li­bro pri­mo di­ges­to­rum. Quid enim pro­hi­bet le­ga­tum pu­bli­co mu­ne­re fun­gi et ac­to­rem cus­to­diae cau­sa in pos­ses­sio­ne re­rum he­redi­ta­ria­rum es­se?

27Julianus, Digest, Book I. For what will prevent an envoy from performing the duties of his office while there is an agent in possession of the property of the estate for the purpose of taking care of it?

28Pau­lus li­bro sep­ti­mo de­ci­mo ad Plau­tium. Sed et si re­sti­tua­tur ei he­redi­tas ex Tre­bel­lia­no, ac­tio in eum non da­bi­tur, si­ve spon­te si­ve co­ac­tus he­res eam ad­ie­rit: com­mo­dius enim est red­di qui­dem ei he­redi­ta­tem, per­in­de au­tem ha­ben­dum, ac si ip­se ad­is­set he­redi­ta­tem. 1Con­tra si le­ga­tus tem­po­re le­ga­tio­nis ad­ie­rit et re­sti­tue­rit, da­tur in fi­dei­com­mis­sa­rium ac­tio, nec ex­cep­tio Tre­bel­lia­ni ob­stat ex per­so­na le­ga­ti, quia hoc le­ga­ti per­so­na­le be­ne­fi­cium est. 2Ex qui­bus au­tem cau­sis non co­gi­tur le­ga­tus iu­di­cium ac­ci­pe­re, nec iu­ra­re co­gen­dus est se da­re non opor­te­re, quia hoc ius­iu­ran­dum in lo­cum li­tis con­tes­ta­tae suc­ce­dit. 3Ae­dium no­mi­ne le­ga­tus dam­ni in­fec­ti pro­mit­te­re de­bet aut vi­ci­num ad­mit­te­re in pos­ses­sio­nem. 4Sed et si dies ac­tio­nis ex­itu­ra erit, cau­sa co­gni­ta ad­ver­sus eum iu­di­cium prae­tor da­re de­bet, ut lis con­tes­te­tur ita, ut in pro­vin­ciam trans­fe­ra­tur. 5Si pa­ter fa­mi­lias mor­tuus es­set re­lic­to uno fi­lio et uxo­re prae­gna­te, non rec­te fi­lius a de­bi­to­ri­bus par­tem di­mi­diam cre­di­ti pe­te­re pot­est, quam­vis post­ea unus fi­lius na­tus sit, quia pot­erant plu­res nas­ci: cum per re­rum na­tu­ram cer­tum fue­rit unum nas­ci. sed Sa­b­inus Cas­sius par­tem quar­tam pe­ti de­buis­se, quia in­cer­tum es­set an tres nas­ce­ren­tur: nec re­rum na­tu­ram in­tuen­dam, in qua om­nia cer­ta es­sent, cum fu­tu­ra uti­que fie­rent, sed nos­tram in­scien­tiam aspi­ci de­be­re.

28Paulus, On Plautius, Book XVII. But where an estate is delivered to him under the Trebellian Decree, an action against him will not be granted, whether the heir entered upon the estate voluntarily, or under compulsion; for it is certainly more convenient for the estate to be delivered to him; hence it should be considered as if he himself had entered upon the estate. 1On the other hand, if an envoy, during the time of his mission, enters upon an estate and delivers it, an action will be granted against the beneficiary of the trust; nor will an exception under the Trebellian law be available, on account of the position of the envoy; as this is for the personal benefit of the latter. 2In those instances where an envoy is not forced to join issue in an action, he cannot be compelled to make oath that he is not obliged to pay, for the reason that his oath takes the place of a joinder of issue. 3An envoy must promise reparation for threatened injury, or permit his neighbor to take possession of the building. 4Where the time for bringing an action is about to expire, the Prætor shall permit it to be brought against the envoy, if proper cause is shown, in order that issue may be joined, and the case transferred to the envoy’s place of residence. 5Ad Dig. 5,1,28,5Windscheid: Lehrbuch des Pandektenrechts, 7. Aufl. 1891, Bd. I, § 87, Note 2.Where the head of a family dies and leaves a son, and his widow is pregnant, the son cannot legally collect from the debtors half the money loaned to them, although afterwards one son should be born; because several more might have been born, since, in the nature of things, it was certain that one child would be born. Sabinus and Cassius, however, are of the opinion that a fourth part of the debts might be collected, for the reason that it is uncertain whether three would not be born, and that we need not pay any attention to the nature of things where all are certain, as whatever is going to occur does occur; but we should consider our own ignorance.

29Idem li­bro oc­ta­vo ad Plau­tium. Qui ap­pel­lat prior, agit.

29The Same, On Plautius, Book VIII. The party who first makes application is the plaintiff.

30Mar­cel­lus li­bro pri­mo di­ges­to­rum. Ubi ac­cep­tum est se­mel iu­di­cium, ibi et fi­nem ac­ci­pe­re de­bet.

30Marcellus, Digest, Book I. Wherever issue is joined, the case should also be terminated there.

31Cel­sus li­bro vi­cen­si­mo sep­ti­mo di­ges­to­rum. Si pe­ti­tor plu­res he­redes re­li­que­rit unus­que eo­rum iu­di­cio ege­rit, non erit ve­rum to­tam rem quae in prio­re iu­di­cio fue­rit de­duc­tam es­se: nec enim quis­quam alie­nam ac­tio­nem in iu­di­cium in­vi­to co­he­rede per­du­ce­re pot­est.

31Celsus, Digest, Book XXVII. Where a plaintiff dies and leaves several heirs, and one of them institutes proceedings, it is not true that everything involved in the case up to that time is in Court; for no one can conduct a suit in court which has already been begun by another, if his co-heir does not consent.

32Ul­pia­nus li­bro pri­mo de of­fi­cio con­su­lis. Si iu­dex, cui cer­ta tem­po­ra prae­sti­ta erant, de­ces­se­rit et alius in lo­cum eius da­tus fue­rit, tan­ta ex in­te­gro tem­po­ra in per­so­na eius prae­sti­tu­ta in­tel­le­ge­mus, quam­vis ma­gis­tra­tus no­mi­na­tim hoc in se­quen­tis da­tio­ne non ex­pres­se­rit: ita ta­men ut le­gi­ti­mum tem­pus non ex­ce­dat.

32Ulpianus, On the Office of Proconsul, Book I. Where the judge appointed to render a decision within a certain time dies, and another is appointed in his stead, we understand that the same time is fixed with respect to the latter, although the magistrate did not expressly mention this when making the appointment; provided that the term prescribed by law is not exceeded.

33Mo­des­ti­nus li­bro ter­tio re­gu­la­rum. Non vi­de­tur in iu­di­cem con­sen­sis­se, qui edi si­bi ge­nus apud eun­dem iu­di­cem de­si­de­rat ac­tio­nis.

33Modestinus, Rules, Book III. A party is not held to have accepted a certain judge who asks his adversary to state the nature of his case before that judge.

34Ia­vo­le­nus li­bro quin­to de­ci­mo ex Cas­sio. Si is qui Ro­mae iu­di­cium ac­ce­pe­rat de­ces­sit, he­res eius quam­vis do­mi­ci­lium trans ma­re ha­bet, Ro­mae ta­men de­fen­di de­bet, quia suc­ce­dit in eius lo­cum, a quo he­res re­lic­tus est.

34Javolenus, On Cassius, Book XV. When a party dies after having joined issue at Rome, his heir, even though he resides beyond sea, must defend the case at Rome, because he succeeds to the place of him by whom he was appointed heir.

35Idem li­bro de­ci­mo epis­tu­la­rum. Non quem­ad­mo­dum fi­de­ius­so­ris ob­li­ga­tio in pen­den­ti pot­est es­se et vel in fu­tu­rum con­ci­pi, ita iu­di­cium in pen­den­ti pot­est es­se vel de his re­bus quae post­ea in ob­li­ga­tio­nem ad­ven­tu­rae sunt. nam ne­mi­nem pu­to du­bi­ta­tu­rum, quin fi­de­ius­sor an­te ob­li­ga­tio­nem rei ac­ci­pi pos­sit: iu­di­cium ve­ro, an­te­quam ali­quid de­bea­tur, non pos­se.

35Ad Dig. 5,1,35ROHGE, Bd. 9 (1873), S. 33: Zulässigkeit der Klagen auf Feststellung eines obligatorischen Verhältnisses.The Same, Epistles, Book X. It is not true that, as the obligation of a surety can be left dependent upon circumstances or contracted for at some future time, so also a suit may be contingent, or in such terms that an obligation may be subsequently incurred; for I do not think that anyone would doubt that a surety can be accepted before the obligation of the principal debtor is incurred, but issue cannot be joined before some indebtedness arises.

36Cal­lis­tra­tus li­bro pri­mo co­gni­tio­num. In­ter­dum ex ius­tis cau­sis et ex cer­tis per­so­nis sus­ti­nen­dae sunt co­gni­tio­nes: vel­uti si in­stru­men­ta li­tis apud eos es­se di­can­tur qui rei pu­bli­cae cau­sa ab­erunt: id­que di­vi fra­tres in haec ver­ba re­scrip­se­runt. hu­ma­num est prop­ter for­tui­tos ca­sus di­la­tio­nem ac­ci­pi, vel­uti quod pa­ter li­ti­ga­tor fi­lium vel fi­liam vel uxor vi­rum vel fi­lius pa­ren­tem amis­e­rit, et in si­mi­li­bus cau­sis co­gni­tio­nem ad ali­quem mo­dum sus­ti­ne­ri. 1Se­na­tor si neg­otiis alie­nis se op­tu­le­rit in pro­vin­cia, non de­bet iu­di­cium re­cu­sa­re neg­otio­rum ges­to­rum, sed ac­tio­nem eum ex­ci­pe­re opor­te­re Iu­lia­nus re­spon­dit, cum sua spon­te si­bi hanc ob­li­ga­tio­nem con­tra­xe­rit.

36Callistratus, Inquiries, Book I. Sometimes hearings are postponed for good reasons and on account of certain parties; as, for instance, where documents relating to a case are said to be in possession of persons who will be absent on public business. Therefore the Divine Brothers stated the following in a Rescript: “Humanity demands that postponement should be granted on account of accidental misfortunes; for example, where a father who was a party to the case has lost his son, or his daughter; or a wife her husband; or a son his parent; and in similar cases the hearing should be postponed for a reasonable time.” 1Where a Senator voluntarily undertakes to attend to the affairs of another in a province, he can not refuse to defend an action on the ground of business transacted; and Julianus says that he must defend the action, since he voluntarily assumed this obligation.

37Idem li­bro quin­to co­gni­tio­num. Si de vi et pos­ses­sio­ne quae­ra­tur, prius co­gnos­cen­dum de vi quam de pro­prie­ta­te rei di­vus Ha­d­ria­nus τῷ κοινῷ τῶν Θεσσαλῶν Grae­ce re­scrip­sit.

37The Same, Inquiries, Book V. Where inquiry is made concerning violence and the existence of possession, investigation must be made of the violence before the ownership of the property is considered; in accordance with a Rescript of the Divine Hadrian in the Greek language directed to the Commonwealth of Thessaly.

38Li­cin­nius Ru­fi­nus li­bro quar­to re­gu­la­rum. Quod le­ga­tur, si qui­dem per per­so­na­lem ac­tio­nem ex­ige­tur, ibi da­ri de­bet ubi est, ni­si si do­lo ma­lo he­redis sub­duc­tum fue­rit: tunc enim ibi da­ri de­bet ubi pe­ti­tur. prae­ter­ea quod pon­de­re aut nu­me­ro aut men­su­ra con­ti­ne­tur, ibi da­ri de­bet ubi pe­ti­tur, ni­si si ad­iec­tum fue­rit ‘cen­tum mo­dios ex il­lo hor­reo’ aut ‘vi­ni am­pho­ras ex il­lo do­lio’. si au­tem per in rem ac­tio­nem le­ga­tum pe­te­tur, et­iam ibi pe­ti de­bet ubi res est. et si mo­bi­lis sit res, ad ex­hi­ben­dum agi cum he­rede pot­erit, ut ex­hi­beat rem: sic enim vin­di­ca­ri a le­ga­ta­rio pot­erit.

38Licinnius Rufinus, Rules, Book IV. Where property is bequeathed by a legacy, and suit is brought to recover it by an action in personam, it must be delivered where it is, unless it has been maliciously removed by the heir; and then it shall be surrendered where suit is brought for it. Again, a legacy consisting of articles which may be weighed, counted, or measured, must be delivered where suit is brought for it; unless the following words were added, “A hundred measures of corn from such-and-such a granary”, or “so many amphoræ from such-and-such a cask”. Where, however, suit is brought for a legacy by an action in rem, it must also be brought where the property is. If the latter is movable, an action for its production will lie against the heir to compel him to produce it, for then suit can be brought by the legatee for its recovery.

39Pa­pi­nia­nus li­bro ter­tio quaes­tio­num. Cum fu­rio­sus iu­dex ad­di­ci­tur, non id­eo mi­nus iu­di­cium erit, quod ho­die non pot­est iu­di­ca­re: ut sci­li­cet suae men­tis ef­fec­tus quod sen­ten­tiae di­xe­rit, ra­tum sit: ne­que enim in ad­di­cen­do prae­sen­tia vel scien­tia iu­di­cis ne­ces­sa­ria est. 1Qui le­ga­tio­nis cau­sa Ro­mam venit, ex qua­li­bet cau­sa fi­de­iu­be­re pot­est, cum pri­vi­le­gio suo, cum sit in Ita­lia con­trac­tum, uti non pot­est.

39Papinianus, Questions, Book III. Where an insane person is appointed judge, the trial will not be prevented because he cannot preside at that time; so that, when he renders a decision after having recovered the use of his faculties, it may stand. In the appointment of a judge neither his presence nor his knowledge is necessary. 1Where a party comes to Rome on a mission, he can become a surety in any case; since he cannot make use of his privilege when he enters into a contract in Italy.

40Idem li­bro quar­to quaes­tio­num. Non quid­quid iu­di­cis po­tes­ta­ti per­mit­ti­tur, id sub­ici­tur iu­ris ne­ces­si­ta­ti. 1Iu­dex si quid ad­ver­sus le­gis prae­cep­tum in iu­di­can­do do­lo ma­lo prae­ter­mi­se­rit, le­gem of­fen­dit.

40The Same, Questions, Book IV. It is not every act which can be performed by the authority of a judge which is subjected to the restraints of the law. 1If a judge, in the performance of his functions, should maliciously omit something which is contrary to the rules of law, he is guilty of an offence against the law.

41Idem li­bro un­de­ci­mo quaes­tio­num. In om­ni­bus bo­nae fi­dei iu­di­cis, cum non­dum dies prae­stan­dae pe­cu­niae venit, si agat ali­quis ad in­ter­po­nen­dam cau­tio­nem, ex ius­ta cau­sa con­dem­na­tio fit.

41Ad Dig. 5,1,41Windscheid: Lehrbuch des Pandektenrechts, 7. Aufl. 1891, Bd. I, § 89, Note 13.The Same, Questions, Book XI. In all bona fide actions, when the day of payment of money has not arrived, and anyone makes application for the execution of a bond, it will be allowed where proper cause is shown.

42Idem li­bro vi­cen­si­mo quar­to quaes­tio­num. Si uxor a le­ga­to Ro­mae di­ver­te­rit, do­tis no­mi­ne de­fen­den­dum Ro­mae vi­rum re­spon­sum est.

42The Same, Questions, Book XXIV. Where the wife of an envoy is divorced at Rome, it has been held that her husband must make his defence at Rome, when the recovery of her dowry is involved.

43Idem li­bro vi­cen­si­mo sep­ti­mo quaes­tio­num. Eum, qui in­su­lam Capuae fie­ri cer­to tem­po­re sti­pu­la­tus est, eo fi­ni­to quo­cum­que lo­co age­re pos­se in id quod in­ter­est con­stat.

43The Same, Questions, Book XXVII. Where a person stipulates that a house shall be built for him at Capua within a certain time; it is established that when the time has elapsed, he can bring an action for damages for the amount of his interest, anywhere.

44Idem li­bro se­cun­do re­spon­so­rum. Non id­cir­co iu­di­cis of­fi­cium im­pe­di­tur, quod qui­dam ex tu­to­ri­bus post li­tem ad­ver­sus om­nes in­choa­tam rei pu­bli­cae cau­sa ab­es­se coe­pe­runt, cum prae­sen­tium et eo­rum qui non de­fen­dun­tur ad­mi­nis­tra­tio dis­cer­ni et aes­ti­ma­ri pos­sit. 1Cum post­ea ser­vus ap­pa­ruit, cu­ius no­mi­ne per pro­cu­ra­to­rem fue­rat ac­tum, ab­sol­vi de­bi­to­rem opor­tet: quae res do­mi­no quan­do­que pro­priam li­tem in­fe­ren­ti non ob­sta­bit.

44The Same, Opinions, Book II. The functions of a judge are not interfered with by the fact that, after a suit has been begun against all the guardians, some of them have been absent on public business; since the administration of those who are present can be distinguished and investigated separately from that of those who are not defended. 1Where a person in whose behalf an action has been brought by an agent is afterwards ascertained to be a slave, the debtor should be discharged; but the principal will not be barred for this reason, if he should subsequently decide to bring the action himself.

45Idem li­bro ter­tio re­spon­so­rum. Ar­gen­ta­rium ubi con­trac­tum est con­ve­ni­ri opor­tet nec in hoc di­la­tio­nem ni­si ex ius­ta cau­sa da­ri, ut ex pro­vin­cia co­di­ces ad­fe­ran­tur. idem in ac­tio­ne tu­te­lae pla­cuit. 1No­mi­ne puel­lae tu­to­ri­bus in pro­vin­cia con­dem­na­tis cu­ra­to­res puel­lae iu­di­ca­tum Ro­mae fa­ce­re co­gun­tur, ubi mu­tuam pe­cu­niam ma­ter ac­ce­pit, cui fi­lia he­res ex­ti­tit.

45The Same, Opinions, Book III. A banker must be sued where the contract was made with him, and, in such a case, a postponement will not be granted except for good cause; as, for instance, to permit his books to be brought from a province. The same rule applies to an action on guardianship. 1Where the guardians of a female ward have a decision rendered against them in a province, the curators of the ward may be comoelled to comply with the decree at Rome, where the mother of the ward borrowed the money, and her daughter was her heir.

46Pau­lus li­bro se­cun­do quaes­tio­num. Iu­dex da­tus in eo­dem of­fi­cio per­ma­net, li­cet fu­re­re coe­pe­rit, quia rec­te ab in­itio iu­dex ad­dic­tus est: sed iu­di­can­di ne­ces­si­ta­tem mor­bus son­ti­cus re­mit­tit. er­go mu­ta­ri de­bet.

46Paulus, Questions, Book II. Where a judge has been appointed, he remains in office even though he becomes insane, because he was properly appointed judge in the beginning; but a serious illness excuses him from presiding, and therefore some one should be appointed in his stead.

47Cal­lis­tra­tus li­bro pri­mo quaes­tio­num. Ob­ser­van­dum est, ne is iu­dex de­tur quem al­te­ra pars no­mi­na­tim pe­tat: id enim in­iqui ex­em­pli es­se di­vus Ha­d­ria­nus re­scrip­sit: ni­si hoc spe­cia­li­ter a prin­ci­pe ad ve­re­cun­diam pe­ti­ti iu­di­cis re­spi­cien­te per­mit­te­tur.

47Callistratus, Questions, Book I. Care must be exercised that a person be not appointed judge, whom either side expressly petitions for; as the Divine Hadrian stated in a Rescript that this would offer a bad precedent unless it should be especially allowed by the Emperor through respect for him whose appointment was requested.

48Pau­lus li­bro se­cun­do re­spon­so­rum. Pars lit­te­ra­rum di­vi Ha­d­ria­ni: τοὺς ἄρχοντας ἐν ᾧ ἄρχουσιν ἐνιαυτῷ μήτε εἰσιέναι δίκην ἰδίαν μήτε διωκόντων μήτε φευγόντων, μήτε περὶ ὧν ἐπίτροποι ἢ κουράτορες εἶεν κρινέτωσαν. ἐπειδὰν δὲ ἐξήκῃ ἡ ἀρχή, καὶ αὐτοῖς πρὸς τοὺς φεύγοντας καὶ τοῖς φεύγουσι πρὸς αὐτοὺς εἰσαγωγίμους εἶναι τὰς δίκας.

48Paulus, Opinions, Book II. The following is a portion of a letter of the Divine Hadrian, “Magistrates, during the year of their office, cannot institute any legal proceedings of their own either as plaintiffs or as defendants; nor can they act officially in any matter in which they are interested on the ground of either guardianship or curatorship. But as soon as the term of their magistracy has expired, it will be just and proper for actions to be brought both for and against them”.

49Idem li­bro ter­tio re­spon­so­rum. Ven­di­tor ab emp­to­re de­nun­tia­tus, ut eum evic­tio­nis no­mi­ne de­fen­de­ret, di­cit se pri­vi­le­gium ha­be­re sui iu­di­cis: quae­ri­tur, an pos­sit li­tem ab eo iu­di­ce, apud quem res in­ter pe­ti­to­rem et emp­to­rem coep­ta est, ad suum iu­di­cem re­vo­ca­re. Pau­lus re­spon­dit ven­di­to­rem emp­to­ris iu­di­cem se­qui so­le­re. 1Iu­di­ces a prae­si­de da­ti so­lent et­iam in tem­pus suc­ces­so­rum eius du­ra­re et co­gi pro­nun­tia­re eas­que sen­ten­tias ser­va­ri. in eun­dem sen­sum et­iam Scae­vo­la re­spon­dit.

49The Same, Opinions, Book III. A vendor who was called upon by a purchaser to defend him in a suit brought by a party who claimed the property as owner, stated that he had the right to have his own judge. The question arose whether he could remove the case from the tribunal of the judge before whom proceedings had been begun between the plaintiff and the purchaser to that of his own judge. Paulus answered that it is customary for the vendor to appear before the judge of the purchaser.

50Ul­pia­nus li­bro sex­to fi­dei­com­mis­so­rum. Si fi­dei­com­mis­sum ab ali­quo pe­ta­tur is­que di­cat ali­bi es­se ma­io­rem par­tem he­redi­ta­tis, non erit ad prae­sta­tio­nem com­pel­len­dus: et ita mul­tis con­sti­tu­tio­ni­bus ca­ve­tur, ut ibi pe­ta­tur fi­dei­com­mis­sum, ubi ma­ior pars he­redi­ta­tis est: ni­si si pro­be­tur eo lo­co vo­luis­se tes­ta­to­rem fi­dei­com­mis­sum prae­sta­ri, ubi pe­ti­tur. 1Trac­ta­tum est de ae­re alie­no: si in ea pro­vin­cia, ubi fi­dei­com­mis­sum pe­ti­tur, plus es­set ae­ris alie­ni, an qua­si ma­ior pars ali­bi es­set, prae­scrip­tio lo­cum ha­be­ret. sed et hic pla­cuit ni­hil fa­ce­re ae­ris alie­ni no­men, cum non lo­ci sit aes alie­num, sed uni­ver­sa­rum fa­cul­ta­tium: aes enim alie­num pa­tri­mo­nium to­tum im­mi­nue­re con­sti­tit, non cer­ti lo­ci fa­cul­ta­tes. quid ta­men si for­te cer­tis one­ri­bus de­sti­na­tum sit id pa­tri­mo­nium, ut pu­ta ali­men­tis prae­stan­dis quae Ro­mae prae­sta­ri pa­ter fa­mi­lias ius­se­rat, vel tri­bu­tis vel qui­bus­dam aliis in­ex­cu­sa­bi­li­bus one­ri­bus, an pos­sit prae­scrip­tio lo­cum ha­be­re? hic pu­tem ius­tius di­ci lo­cum ha­be­re. 2Sed et re­scrip­tum est, ut il­lic fi­dei­com­mis­sum pe­ta­tur, ubi do­mi­ci­lium he­res ha­bet. 3Quo­tiens au­tem coe­pit quis fi­dei­com­mis­sum sol­ve­re, non pot­est hac prae­scrip­tio­ne uti,

50Ulpianus, Trusts, Book VI. Where an action for the execution of a trust is brought by anyone, and the defendant alleges that the greater portion of the estate is situated elsewhere, he cannot be forced to execute the trust; and it is provided by many constitutions that where an action is brought to enforce compliance with a trust, this must be done where the greater portion of the estate is situated; unless it is proved that the testator wished the trust to be executed where suit was brought. 1The question has been raised with respect to borrowed money; whether when the greater part of the indebtedness was in the province where suit is brought to enforce a trust, could the action be transferred to some other place, because the bulk of the estate was elsewhere? It was, however, established in this instance that the fact of the indebtedness is of no importance, as it is not dependent on the place, but on the entire assets of the estate; for a debt is a diminution of the entire estate, and not of the assets in any particular locality. But what if this part of the estate were charged with some burden, as, for instance, to furnish support which the testator ordered to be done at Rome, or with taxes; or with any other unavoidable burdens; in these instances would the party be entitled to have the case transferred? I think that it may be said with great justice that he would. 2It has, however, been stated in a rescript that suit should be brought to enforce a trust in the place where the heir resides. 3But whenever anyone begins to make payment in compliance with the terms of the trust, he cannot subsequently avail himself of this resource:

51Mar­cia­nus li­bro oc­ta­vo in­sti­tu­tio­num. quam­vis ad eum he­redi­tas fue­rit de­vo­lu­ta qui do­mi­ci­lium in pro­vin­cia ha­bet. sed et di­vi Se­ve­rus et An­to­ni­nus re­scrip­se­runt, si con­sen­se­rit fi­dei­com­mis­sa­rius alio lo­co da­re, ne­ces­se ha­be­re se­cun­dum con­sen­sum da­re ubi con­sen­se­rit.

51Marcianus, Institutes, Book VIII. Even though the estate should have descended to a man who has his domicile in a province. The Divine Severus and Antoninus, however, stated in a Rescript that if the party should consent to discharge the trust elsewhere, he is bound to do so in the place agreed upon.

52Ul­pia­nus li­bro sex­to fi­dei­com­mis­so­rum. Sed et si sus­ce­pit ac­tio­nem fi­dei­com­mis­si et aliis de­fen­sio­ni­bus usus hanc omi­sit, post­ea, quam­vis an­te sen­ten­tiam, re­ver­ti ad hanc de­fen­sio­nem non pot­est. 1Si li­ber­tis suis tes­se­ras fru­men­ta­rias emi vo­lue­rit, quam­vis ma­ior pars he­redi­ta­tis in pro­vin­cia sit, ta­men Ro­mae de­be­re fi­dei­com­mis­sum sol­vi di­cen­dum est, cum ap­pa­ret id tes­ta­to­rem sen­sis­se ex ge­ne­re com­pa­ra­tio­nis. 2Sed et si pro­po­nas qui­bus­dam cla­ris­si­mis vi­ris ar­gen­ti vel au­ri pon­do re­lic­ta et sit suf­fi­ciens ad hu­ius­mo­di fi­dei­com­mis­sa Ro­mae pa­tri­mo­nium: li­cet ma­ior pars to­tius pa­tri­mo­nii in pro­vin­cia sit, di­ci opor­tet Ro­mae es­se prae­stan­dum: nec enim ve­ri­si­mi­le est tes­ta­to­rem, qui ho­no­rem ha­bi­tum vo­luit his qui­bus re­li­quit tam mo­di­ca fi­dei­com­mis­sa, in pro­vin­cia prae­sta­ri vo­luis­se. 3Si ea res quae per fi­dei­com­mis­sum re­lic­ta est eo lo­ci sit, di­cen­dum est non de­be­re prae­scri­bi ei qui pe­tit, qua­si ma­ior pars he­redi­ta­tis ali­bi sit. 4Sed si non fi­dei­com­mis­sum pe­ta­tur eo lo­ci, sed fi­dei­com­mis­so sa­tis, vi­den­dum est, an haec prae­scrip­tio lo­cum ha­beat: et non pu­to ha­be­re, quin im­mo, et si ni­hil sit eo lo­ci, at­ta­men iu­ben­dum sa­tis­da­re. quid enim ve­re­tur, cum, si sa­tis non de­de­rit, mit­ta­tur ad­ver­sa­rius in pos­ses­sio­nem fi­dei­com­mis­si ser­van­di cau­sa?

52Ulpianus, Trusts, Book VI. But if the heir appears in an action on the trust and makes use of other defences, but neglects this one, he cannot afterwards have recourse to it, even before a decision is rendered. 1Where a testator directs in his will that tickets for grain should be purchased for his freedmen; then, although the greater portion of the estate is in a province, still, the trust must be carried out at Rome; which is the proper opinion, since it is evident that it was the intention of the testator that this should be done, on account of the nature of the purchase. 2Moreover, if you should suggest the following case, namely: that a certain amount of silver or gold was bequeathed to such-and-such illustrious persons, and there is enough of the estate at Rome to execute the trust, even though the greater portion of the estate is situated in a province; it should be held that the trust must be discharged at Rome; for it is not very probable that a testator who intended to show honor to those to whom he bequeathed such moderate legacies under the trust, should have desired them to be paid in the province. 3Ad Dig. 5,1,52,3Windscheid: Lehrbuch des Pandektenrechts, 7. Aufl. 1891, Bd. II, § 282, Note 7.Where the property left under a trust is at hand, it must be held that anyone who brings suit for it cannot be barred by an exception on the ground that the greater portion of the estate is elsewhere. 4Where, however, the property which is the subject of the trust is not to be sued for where it is situated, but security for the execution of the trust is to be given; it must be considered whether an exception can be pleaded (and I do not think that it can) and, indeed, even if there is no property there, still the party must be required to furnish security. For what is there to fear, since, if he does not give security, his adversary will be placed in possession in order to protect the trust?

53Her­mo­ge­nia­nus li­bro pri­mo iu­ris epi­to­ma­rum. Vix cer­tis ex cau­sis ad­ver­sus do­mi­nos ser­vis con­sis­te­re per­mis­sum est: id est si qui sup­pres­sas ta­bu­las tes­ta­men­ti di­cant, in qui­bus li­ber­ta­tem si­bi re­lic­tam ad­se­ve­rant. item ar­tio­ris an­no­nae po­pu­li Ro­ma­ni, cen­sus et­iam et fal­sae mo­ne­tae cri­mi­nis reos do­mi­nos de­te­ge­re ser­vis per­mis­sum est. prae­ter­ea fi­dei­com­mis­sam li­ber­ta­tem ab his pe­tent: sed et si qui suis num­mis red­emp­tos se et non ma­nu­mis­sos con­tra pla­ci­ti fi­dem ad­se­ve­rent. li­ber et­iam es­se ius­sus si ra­tio­nes red­di­de­rit, ar­bi­trum con­tra do­mi­num ra­tio­ni­bus ex­cu­tien­dis rec­te pe­tet. sed et si quis fi­dem ali­cu­ius ele­ge­rit, ut num­mis eius red­ima­tur at­que his so­lu­tis ma­nu­mit­ta­tur, nec il­le ob­la­tam pe­cu­niam sus­ci­pe­re vel­le di­cat, con­trac­tus fi­dem de­te­gen­di ser­vo po­tes­tas tri­bu­ta est.

53Hermogenianus, Epitomes of Law, Book I. There are only a few cases in which slaves are permitted to appear against their masters; and one of them is where they state that a certain will, by which they allege they were bequeathed their freedom, has been suppressed. Slaves are also permitted to give information against their masters where the latter have withheld deliveries of grain belonging to the Roman people, as well as returns of property for taxation, and also for counterfeiting. Moreover, they can institute proceedings to obtain their freedom left to them by a trust, and also where they allege that they have been purchased with their own money, and not manumitted, in violation of the good faith of the agreement. Also, where a slave has been declared to be free by will when he renders his accounts, he can legally demand an arbiter as against his master, for the purpose of examining his accounts. Where anyone has relied upon the good faith of another, with the understanding that he should be purchased with the money of the former, and be manumitted when he had repaid it, and the party says that he is unwilling to receive the money when it is tendered, power is granted to the slave to disclose the terms of the agreement.

54Pau­lus li­bro pri­mo sen­ten­tia­rum. Per mi­no­rem cau­sam ma­io­ri co­gni­tio­ni prae­iu­di­cium fie­ri non opor­tet: ma­ior enim quaes­tio mi­no­rem cau­sam ad se tra­hit.

54Paulus, Opinions, Book I. A matter of greater importance should not be prejudiced by one of inferior moment; for the more important question attracts that which is of lesser weight.

55Idem li­bro sin­gu­la­ri de of­fi­cio ad­ses­so­rum. Edic­tum, quod ab an­te­ces­so­re da­tum est, in nu­me­ro trium edic­to­rum con­nu­me­ra­ri de­bet. pla­ne li­cet om­nis ab an­te­ces­so­re nu­me­rus fi­ni­tus sit, so­let suc­ces­sor unum edic­tum da­re.

55The Same, On the Office of Assessors. A summons issued by a former judge should be regarded as one of the three prescribed. It is evident even if the entire number has been completed by the said judge, that custom requires his successor to issue another.

56Ul­pia­nus li­bro tri­cen­si­mo ad Sa­binum. Li­cet ve­rum pro­cu­ra­to­rem in iu­di­cio rem de­du­ce­re ve­ris­si­mum est, ta­men et si quis, cum pro­cu­ra­tor non es­set, li­tem sit con­tes­ta­tus, de­in­de ra­tum do­mi­nus ha­bue­rit, vi­de­tur re­tro res in iu­di­cium rec­te de­duc­ta.

56Ulpianus, On Sabinus, Book XXX. Although it is true that a genuine agent can bring anything before a court, still, where a party who is not an agent joins issue, and his principal afterwards confirms what he has done; it is held that by retroactive effect, the matter has been properly presented to the court.

57Idem li­bro qua­dra­gen­si­mo pri­mo ad Sa­binum. Tam ex con­trac­ti­bus quam ex de­lic­tis in fi­lium fa­mi­lias com­pe­tit ac­tio: sed mor­tuo fi­lio post li­tis con­tes­ta­tio­nem trans­fer­tur iu­di­cium in pa­trem dum­ta­xat de pe­cu­lio et quod in rem eius ver­sum est. cer­te si qua­si pro­cu­ra­tor ali­cu­ius fi­lius fa­mi­lias iu­di­cium ac­ce­pe­rit, mor­tuo eo in eum quem de­fen­de­rit trans­ac­tio vel iu­di­ca­ti da­tur.

57The Same, On Sabinus, Book XLI. An action can be brought against the son of a family with reference to both contracts and offences, but where a son dies after joinder of issue, the right of action will be transferred to his father; only, however, with reference to his peculium or any advantage which he may have obtained. It is evident that if the son of a family undertakes a defence as the agent of another, then, if he dies, the right of action will be transferred to the party whom he defended.

58Pau­lus li­bro ter­tio de­ci­mo ad Sa­binum. Iu­di­cium sol­vi­tur ve­tan­te eo qui iu­di­ca­re ius­se­rat, vel et­iam eo qui ma­ius im­pe­rium in ea­dem iu­ris­dic­tio­ne ha­bet, vel et­iam si ip­se iu­dex eius­dem im­pe­rii es­se coe­pe­rit, cu­ius erat qui iu­di­ca­re ius­sit.

58Paulus, On Sabinus, Book XIII. A suit is terminated where the party who applied for it to be heard forbids it to proceed; or, indeed, anyone does so who has superior authority in the same jurisdiction; or even where the judge himself is vested with authority equal to that of him who appointed him.

59Ul­pia­nus li­bro quin­qua­gen­si­mo pri­mo ad Sa­binum. Si lo­cus in iu­ben­do iu­di­ca­re non est com­pre­hen­sus, vi­de­tur eo lo­co iu­di­ca­re ius­sis­se quo so­let iu­di­ca­ri, si­ne in­com­mo­do li­ti­gan­tium.

59Ulpianus, On Sabinus, Book LI. If, in the appointment of a judge, the place in which he is to discharge his duties is not mentioned, he is held to be appointed to act in that place where he can do so without inconvenience to the litigants.

60Pau­lus li­bro quar­to de­ci­mo ad Sa­binum. Mor­tuo iu­di­ce quod eum iu­di­ca­re opor­tue­rat, idem eum qui sub­di­tus est se­qui opor­tet.

60Paulus, On Sabinus, Book XIV. When a judge dies, he who succeeds him must follow the same course which was laid down for his predecessor.

61Ul­pia­nus li­bro vi­cen­si­mo sex­to ad edic­tum. So­le­mus qui­dem di­ce­re id venire in iu­di­cium, de quo ac­tum est in­ter li­ti­gan­tes: sed Cel­sus ait pe­ri­cu­lo­se es­se ex per­so­na rei hoc me­ti­ri, qui sem­per ne con­dem­ne­tur hoc di­cet non con­ve­nis­se. quid er­go? me­lius est di­ce­re id venire in iu­di­cium non de quo ac­tum est ut veniret, sed id non venire, de quo no­mi­na­tim ac­tum est ne veniret. 1La­trun­cu­la­tor de re pe­cu­nia­ria iu­di­ca­re non pot­est.

61Ulpianus, On the Edict, Book XXVI. We are usually accustomed to say that the matter before the court is that which was agreed upon by the litigants; but Celsus states that it is dangerous to apply to the defendant for information on this point, because he will always say that no agreement was made, in order to avoid losing his case. What then shall be done? It is better to hold that the subject of the trial is not what the parties agreed upon; but that is not the subject of the trial which it was expressly agreed that it should not be. 1A judge who has jurisdiction in cases of robbery cannot hear and decide actions in which money is involved.

62Idem li­bro tri­gen­si­mo no­no ad edic­tum. In­ter li­ti­gan­tes non ali­ter lis ex­pe­di­ri pot­est, quam si al­ter pe­ti­tor, al­ter pos­ses­sor sit: es­se enim de­bet qui one­ra pe­ti­to­ris sus­ti­neat et qui com­mo­do pos­ses­so­ris fun­ga­tur.

62The Same, On the Edict, Book LIX. An action cannot proceed between two litigants unless where one of them is the claimant and the other the possessor of the property; for there must be someone to bear the burden of the plaintiff, and another who enjoys the advantage of possession.

63Idem li­bro qua­dra­gen­si­mo no­no ad edic­tum. Rec­te de­fen­di hoc est iu­di­cium ac­ci­pe­re vel per se vel per alium, sed cum sa­tis­da­tio­ne: nec il­le vi­de­tur de­fen­di, qui quod iu­di­ca­tum est non sol­vit.

63The Same, On the Edict, Book XLIX. A legitimate defence is one where the party joins issue, either himself or by another, but always furnishing security; and no one is considered to make a legal defence who does not pay what he is ordered by the court.

64Idem li­bro pri­mo dis­pu­ta­tio­num. Non ab iu­di­ce do­li aes­ti­ma­tio ex eo quod in­ter­est fit, sed ex eo quod in li­tem iu­ra­tur: de­ni­que et prae­do­ni de­po­si­ti et com­mo­da­ti ob eam cau­sam com­pe­te­re ac­tio­nem non du­bi­ta­tur. 1Si quis alio iu­di­cio ac­tu­rus iu­di­ca­tum sol­vi sa­tis ac­ce­pe­rit, de­in­de in alio iu­di­cio agat, non com­mit­te­tur sti­pu­la­tio, quia de alia re cau­tum vi­de­tur.

64The Same, Disputations, Book I. An estimate of damages for fraud is not made by the judge with reference to the interest of the party who brings the suit, but is based upon what he swears to in court; and there is no doubt that even a thief has a right of action on the ground of deposit or loan for use. 1Where anyone is about to bring a suit of one kind and accepts security that the judgment will be complied with, and then brings another kind of a suit; an action cannot be brought on the stipulation, because it seems to have been made with reference to something else.

65Idem li­bro tri­gen­si­mo quar­to ad edic­tum. Ex­ige­re do­tem mu­lier de­bet il­lic, ubi ma­ri­tus do­mi­ci­lium ha­buit, non ubi in­stru­men­tum do­ta­le con­scrip­tum est: nec enim id ge­nus con­trac­tus est, ut et eum lo­cum spec­ta­ri opor­teat, in quo in­stru­men­tum do­tis fac­tum est, quam eum, in cu­ius do­mi­ci­lium et ip­sa mu­lier per con­di­cio­nem ma­tri­mo­nii erat red­itu­ra.

65The Same, On the Edict, Book XXXIV. A woman must bring an action for her dowry where her husband has his residence, and not where the dotal contract was entered into; for this is not such a contract that it is necessary to take into consideration the locality where the said instrument was executed, so much as the place to which the woman herself, in accordance with the condition of marriage, would always have returned as to her home.

66Idem li­bro se­cun­do dis­pu­ta­tio­num. Si quis in­ten­tio­ne amb­igua vel ora­tio­ne usus sit, id quod uti­lius ei est ac­ci­pien­dum est.

66The Same, Disputations, Book II. Where anyone makes use of ambiguous language, or his intention is doubtful, he must be understood in the sense which is most favorable to himself.

67Idem li­bro sex­to dis­pu­ta­tio­num. Qui se di­cit suis num­mis red­emp­tum, si hoc pro­ba­ve­rit, ex­in­de li­ber erit ex quo red­emp­tus est, quia con­sti­tu­tio non li­be­rum pro­nun­tia­ri prae­ci­pit, sed re­sti­tui ei li­ber­ta­tem iu­bet. pro­in­de com­pel­len­dus erit ma­nu­mit­te­re eum qui se suis num­mis red­emit. sed et si la­ti­tet, ex­em­pla se­na­tus con­sul­to­rum ad fi­dei­com­mis­sam li­ber­ta­tem per­ti­nen­tium de­be­re in­du­ci opor­tet.

67The Same, Disputations, Book VI. Where a slave states that he has been purchased with his own money, and proves it, he will be free from the time when he was purchased; because the Imperial Constitution does not direct that he shall be declared free, but orders that his freedom shall be restored to him, hence his master can be required to manumit a slave who purchases himself with his own money; but if the master conceals himself, the precedents derived from decrees of the Senate relative to grants of freedom under a trust must be followed.

68Idem li­bro oc­ta­vo dis­pu­ta­tio­num. Ad per­emp­to­rium edic­tum hoc or­di­ne venitur, ut pri­mo quis pe­tat post ab­sen­tiam ad­ver­sa­rii edic­tum pri­mum, mox al­te­rum

68The Same, Disputations, Book VIII. In the case of a peremptory citation the following rule must be observed; the party bringing the action may apply for one summons if his adversary is absent, and subsequently for a second:

69Idem li­bro quar­to de om­ni­bus tri­bu­na­li­bus. per in­ter­val­lum non mi­nus de­cem die­rum

69The Same, On All Tribunals, Book IV. After an interval of not less than ten days;

70Idem li­bro oc­ta­vo dis­pu­ta­tio­num. et ter­tium: qui­bus pro­pos­i­tis tunc per­emp­to­rium im­pe­tret. quod in­de hoc no­men sump­sit, quod per­eme­ret dis­cep­ta­tio­nem, hoc est ul­tra non pa­te­re­tur ad­ver­sa­rium ter­gi­ver­sa­ri.

70The Same, Disputations, Book VIII. And then a third; and these having been issued, he can afterwards obtain a peremptory citation. This term is employed because it puts an end to the controversy; that is to say, it does not permit the adversary to longer delay.

71Idem li­bro quar­to de om­ni­bus tri­bu­na­li­bus. In per­emp­to­rio au­tem com­mi­na­tur is qui edic­tum de­dit et­iam ab­sen­te di­ver­sa par­te co­gni­tu­rum se et pro­nun­tia­tu­rum.

71The Same, On All Tribunals, Book IV. In the peremptory citation the magistrate who issues it gives notice that he will hear and decide the case even should the other party be absent.

72Idem li­bro oc­ta­vo dis­pu­ta­tio­num. Non­num­quam au­tem hoc edic­tum post tot nu­me­ro edic­ta quae prae­ces­se­rint da­tur, non­num­quam post unum vel al­te­rum, non­num­quam sta­tim, quod ap­pel­la­tur unum pro om­ni­bus. hoc au­tem aes­ti­ma­re opor­tet eum qui ius di­xit et pro con­di­cio­ne cau­sae vel per­so­nae vel tem­po­ris ita or­di­nem edic­to­rum vel com­pen­dium mo­de­ra­ri.

72The Same, Disputations, Book VIII. This citation is sometimes granted after the three others have preceded it, sometimes after only one, or two, have been issued, and sometimes it is granted at once, and is designated “one for all”. The course to be pursued shall be determined by him who exercises jurisdiction, and he must arrange the order of the citations, or regulate them according to the circumstances of the case, or of the person, or of the time.

73Idem li­bro quar­to de om­ni­bus tri­bu­na­li­bus. Et post edic­tum per­emp­to­rium im­pe­tra­tum, cum dies eius su­per­ve­ne­rit, tunc ab­sens ci­ta­ri de­bet: et si­ve re­spon­de­rit si­ve non re­spon­de­rit, age­tur cau­sa et pro­nun­tia­bi­tur, non uti­que se­cun­dum prae­sen­tem, sed in­ter­dum vel ab­sens, si bo­nam cau­sam ha­buit, vin­cet. 1Quod si is qui edic­tum per­emp­to­rium im­pe­tra­vit ab­sit die co­gni­tio­nis, is ve­ro ad­ver­sus quem im­pe­tra­tum est ad­sit, tum cir­cum­du­cen­dum erit edic­tum per­emp­to­rium ne­que cau­sa co­gnos­ce­tur nec se­cun­dum prae­sen­tem pro­nun­tia­bi­tur. 2Cir­cum­duc­to edic­to vi­dea­mus an am­plius reus con­ve­ni­ri pos­sit, an ve­ro sal­va qui­dem lis est, ve­rum in­stan­tia tan­tum edic­ti per­iit: et ma­gis est ut in­stan­tia tan­tum per­ie­rit, ex in­te­gro au­tem li­ti­ga­ri pos­sit. 3Scien­dum est ex per­emp­to­rio ab­sen­tem con­dem­na­tum si ap­pel­let non es­se au­dien­dum, si mo­do per con­tu­ma­ciam de­fuit: si mi­nus, au­die­tur.

73The Same, On All Tribunals, Book IV. After a peremptory citation has been obtained, and as soon as the day mentioned therein arrives, the absent party must be called; and whether he answers, or not, the case must proceed and decision be rendered, but not always in favor of the party who is present; for sometimes the absent party may prevail if he has a good case. 1But if the party who obtained the peremptory citation is absent on the day appointed for the hearing, and he against whom it was obtained is present, the peremptory citation must be annulled, and the cause shall not be heard, nor shall a decision be rendered in favor of the party who is present. 2If the citation is annulled, let us consider whether the defendant can be sued again, and whether the right of action still remains, or whether merely the proceeding relating to this citation is annulled? The better opinion is, that it only is annulled, and that the parties can litigate again. 3It should be borne in mind that where an absent party has a judgment rendered against him on account of a peremptory citation, and appeals, he shall not be heard; that is, if he was absent through contumacy; but if he was not, he should be heard.

74Iu­lia­nus li­bro quin­to di­ges­to­rum. De qua re co­gno­ve­rit iu­dex, pro­nun­tia­re quo­que co­gen­dus erit. 1Iu­dex, qui us­que ad cer­tam sum­mam iu­di­ca­re ius­sus est, et­iam de re ma­io­ri iu­di­ca­re pot­est, si in­ter li­ti­ga­to­res con­ve­niat. 2Cum ab­sen­tem de­fen­de­re vel­lem, iu­di­cium mor­tuo iam eo ac­ce­pi et con­dem­na­tus sol­vi: quae­si­tum est an he­res li­be­ra­re­tur, item quae ac­tio mi­hi ad­ver­sus eum com­pe­te­ret. re­spon­di iu­di­cium, quod iam mor­tuo de­bi­to­re per de­fen­so­rem eius ac­ci­pi­tur, nul­lum es­se et id­eo he­redem non li­be­ra­ri: de­fen­so­rem au­tem, si ex cau­sa iu­di­ca­ti sol­ve­rit, re­pe­te­re qui­dem non pos­se, neg­otio­rum ta­men ges­to­rum ei ac­tio­nem com­pe­te­re ad­ver­sus he­redem: qui sa­ne ex­cep­tio­ne do­li ma­li tue­ri se pos­sit, si ab ac­to­re con­ve­nia­tur.

74Julianus, Digest, Book V. A judge can be compelled to render a decision with reference to any matter of which he has taken cognizance. 1A judge appointed to render a decision for some particular amount can also decide with reference to a greater one, as this is agreed upon by the litigants. 2Where I once consented to defend an absent party, and joined issue when the defendant was already dead, and I was defeated, and paid the damages; the question arose whether the heir was released, and also what kind of an action I was entitled to against him? I answered that the decision was not valid, as the debtor was already dead when issue was joined, and therefore the heir was not released; but if the party conducting the defence had made payment in accordance with the judgment, while he could not recover the money, still, an action would lie in his favor against the heir on the ground of business transacted; and certainly the heir could protect himself by an exception based on bad faith, if suit was brought against him by the plaintiff.

75Idem li­bro tri­gen­si­mo sex­to di­ges­to­rum. Si prae­tor ius­se­rit eum a quo de­bi­tum pe­te­ba­tur ad­es­se et or­di­ne edic­to­rum per­ac­to pro­nun­tia­ve­rit ab­sen­tem de­be­re, non uti­que iu­dex, qui de iu­di­ca­to co­gnos­cit, de­bet de prae­to­ris sen­ten­tia co­gnos­ce­re: alio­quin lu­so­ria erunt hu­ius­mo­di edic­ta et de­cre­ta prae­to­rum. Marcellus notat: si per do­lum sciens fal­so ali­quid al­le­ga­vit et hoc mo­do con­se­cu­tum eum sen­ten­tiam prae­to­ris li­qui­do fue­rit ad­pro­ba­tum, ex­is­ti­mo de­be­re iu­di­cem que­rel­lam rei ad­mit­te­re. Paulus notat: si au­tem mor­bo im­pe­di­tus aut rei pu­bli­cae cau­sa avo­ca­tus ad­es­se non po­tuit reus, pu­to vel ac­tio­nem iu­di­ca­ti eo ca­su in eum de­ne­gan­dam vel ex­se­qui prae­to­rem ita iu­di­ca­tum non de­be­re.

75The Same, Digest, Book XXXVI. Where the Prætor has ordered a party against whom an action is brought for a debt, to appear; and the number of citations is exhausted; and he decides that the absent party owes the debt, and suit is brought to enforce the judgment; the judge who hears the case cannot examine the decree of the Prætor, otherwise citations of this kind and the decrees of the Prætors would be illusory. Marcellus says in a note: “Where the plaintiff knowingly and falsely states anything with malicious intent, and it is clearly established that in this way he obtained a judgment in his favor from the Prætor; I think that the judge should admit the complaint of the defendant.” Paulus says in a note, that if the defendant was unable to be present because he was prevented by illness, or was employed in some business for the State, it is his opinion that in this case an action to enforce the judgment against him should be refused, or the Prætor ought not to permit execution to be issued.

76Al­fe­nus li­bro sex­to di­ges­to­rum. Pro­po­ne­ba­tur ex his iu­di­ci­bus, qui in ean­dem rem da­ti es­sent, non­nul­los cau­sa au­di­ta ex­cu­sa­tos es­se in­que eo­rum lo­cum alios es­se sump­tos, et quae­re­ba­tur, sin­gu­lo­rum iu­di­cum mu­ta­tio ean­dem rem an aliud iu­di­cium fe­cis­set. re­spon­di, non mo­do si unus aut al­ter, sed et si om­nes iu­di­ces mu­ta­ti es­sent, ta­men et rem ean­dem et iu­di­cium idem quod ant­ea fuis­set per­ma­ne­re: ne­que in hoc so­lum eve­ni­re, ut par­ti­bus com­mu­ta­tis ea­dem res es­se ex­is­ti­ma­re­tur, sed et in mul­tis ce­te­ris re­bus: nam et le­gio­nem ean­dem ha­be­ri, ex qua mul­ti de­ces­sis­sent, quo­rum in lo­cum alii sub­iec­ti es­sent: et po­pu­lum eun­dem hoc tem­po­re pu­ta­ri qui ab­hinc cen­tum an­nis fuis­sent, cum ex il­lis ne­mo nunc vi­ve­ret: item­que na­vem, si ad­eo sae­pe re­fec­ta es­set, ut nul­la ta­bu­la ea­dem per­ma­ne­ret quae non no­va fuis­set, ni­hi­lo mi­nus ean­dem na­vem es­se ex­is­ti­ma­ri. quod si quis pu­ta­ret par­ti­bus com­mu­ta­tis aliam rem fie­ri, fo­re ut ex eius ra­tio­ne nos ip­si non idem es­se­mus qui ab­hinc an­no fuis­se­mus, prop­ter­ea quod, ut phi­lo­so­phi di­ce­rent, ex qui­bus par­ti­cu­lis mi­ni­mis con­sis­te­re­mus11Die Großausgabe liest con­sti­te­re­mus statt con­sis­te­re­mus., hae cot­ti­die ex nos­tro cor­po­re de­ce­de­rent aliae­que ex­trin­se­cus in ea­rum lo­cum ac­ce­de­rent. qua­prop­ter cu­ius rei spe­cies ea­dem con­sis­te­ret, rem quo­que ean­dem es­se ex­is­ti­ma­ri.

76Alfenus, Digest, Book VI. The following case was suggested. Certain judges were appointed to hear the same action, some of them having been excused after it was tried, others were appointed in their stead; and the question arose whether the change of some individual judges left the case in the same condition, or placed it in a different one? I answered that not only one or two might be changed, but all of them as well, and that the action would continue to be the same that it was previously, and in fact this was not the only case in which it happened that though the parts were changed, still the thing itself was considered to be the same, but this occurred in many other instances. For a legion is considered to be the same, even though many of those belonging to it may have been killed, and others put in their places; and the people are deemed to be the same now as they were a hundred years ago, although not one of them may at present be living; and also, where a ship has been so frequently repaired that not even a single plank remains which is not new, she is still considered to be the same ship. And if anyone should think that if its parts are changed, an article would become a different thing, the result would be that, according to this rule, we ourselves would not be the same persons that we were a year ago, because, as the philosophers inform us, the very smallest particles of which we consist are daily detached from our bodies, and others from outside are being substituted for them. Therefore, where the outward appearance of anything remains unaltered, the thing itself is considered to be the same.

77Afri­ca­nus li­bro ter­tio quaes­tio­num. In pri­va­tis neg­otiis pa­ter fi­lium vel fi­lius pa­trem iu­di­cem ha­be­re pot­est:

77Africanus, Questions, Book III. In private business, a father may act as judge where his son is interested, and vice versa:

78Pau­lus li­bro sex­to de­ci­mo ad Plau­tium. quip­pe iu­di­ca­re mu­nus pu­bli­cum est.

78Paulus, On Plautius, Book XVI. Since judging is a public employment.

79Ul­pia­nus li­bro quin­to de of­fi­cio pro­con­su­lis. Eum, quem te­me­re ad­ver­sa­rium suum in iu­di­cium vo­cas­se con­sti­tit, via­ti­ca li­tis­que sump­tus ad­ver­sa­rio suo red­de­re opor­te­bit. 1Iu­di­ci­bus de iu­re du­bi­tan­ti­bus prae­si­des re­spon­de­re so­lent: de fac­to con­su­len­ti­bus non de­bent prae­si­des con­si­lium im­per­ti­re, ve­rum iu­be­re eos pro­ut re­li­gio sug­ge­rit sen­ten­tiam pro­fer­re: haec enim res non­num­quam in­fa­mat et ma­te­riam gra­tiae vel amb­itio­nis tri­buit.

79Ulpianus, On the Office of Proconsul, Book V. Where a party is proved to have summoned his adversary to court without a good cause, he will be obliged to refund him his traveling expenses, as well as the costs of the suit. 1Where judges are perplexed with reference to the law, it is customary for the Governors to state their opinions, but where the latter are consulted on a question of fact, they are not compelled to do so, and they must order the judges to render a decision, as their consciences may dictate; as, where opinions are given under such circumstances, it sometimes causes scandal, and furnishes an opportunity for partiality or corrupt solicitation.

80Pom­po­nius li­bro se­cun­do ad Sa­binum. Si in iu­di­cis no­mi­ne prae­no­mi­ne er­ra­tum est, Ser­vius re­spon­dit, si ex con­ven­tio­ne li­ti­ga­to­rum is iu­dex ad­dic­tus es­set, eum es­se iu­di­cem, de quo li­ti­ga­to­res sen­sis­sent.

80Pomponius, On Sabinus, Book II. Where a mistake is made in the name or surname of a judge, it was the opinion of Servius that if the judge was appointed by an agreement of the litigants, he must act as judge whom both litigants had in view.

81Ul­pia­nus li­bro quin­to opi­nio­num. Qui ne­que iu­ris­dic­tio­ni prae­est ne­que a prin­ci­pe po­tes­ta­te ali­qua prae­di­tus est ne­que ab eo qui ius dan­do­rum iu­di­cum ha­bet da­tus est nec ex com­pro­mis­so sump­tus vel ex ali­qua le­ge con­fir­ma­tus est, iu­dex es­se non po­tuit.

81Ulpianus, Opinions, Book V. Anyone who is not invested with jurisdiction, or is not granted authority by the Emperor, nor appointed by an official who has the right to appoint judges, or not selected by agreement for arbitration, or not confirmed by some law, cannot act as judge.

82Idem li­bro pri­mo de of­fi­cio con­su­lis. Non­num­quam so­lent ma­gis­tra­tus po­pu­li Ro­ma­ni via­to­rem no­mi­na­tim vi­ce ar­bi­tri da­re: quod ra­ro et non ni­si re ur­guen­te fa­cien­dum est.

82The Same, On the Office of Proconsul, Book I. Sometimes the magistrates of the Roman people are accustomed to expressly appoint court attendants arbiters, which should be done very rarely, and only where the case is urgent.