1Julianus, Digest, Book LII. When a slave stipulates, it makes no difference whether he does so for himself, or for his master; or indeed whether he agrees to make payment, without mentioning any of the parties interested. 1If your slave, who is serving me in good faith, should have a peculium which belongs to you, and I make a loan out of it to Titius, the money will still remain yours; and if the slave should stipulate that the same money shall be paid to me, he will not perform a valid act. Hence you can recover the money by an action. 2If a slave, who is owned in common by yourself and me, lends money out of his peculium, which belongs to you alone, he will acquire an obligation for you; and if he stipulates for the same money to be paid to me, he will not release the debtor, so far as you are concerned, but both of us will be entitled to actions; I, on account of the stipulation, and you, because your money has been lent; the debtor, however, cannot bar me, except by an exception on the ground of fraud. 3What my slave stipulates to be paid to my slave is considered to be the same as if he had stipulated for my benefit. Likewise, whatever he stipulates for your slave is the same as if he had stipulated for your benefit; so that the first stipulation creates an obligation, but the second is of no force or effect whatever. 4A slave owned in common sustains the part of two slaves; therefore, if my own slave stipulates for the benefit of another slave owned jointly by myself and you, the same rule will apply in a verbal contract of this kind, as if two stipulations had been made, one for my slave individually, and the other for yours in the same manner. And we should not think that only half is acquired for my benefit, and that the other half is not acquired at all, because the position of a slave owned in common is such that where one joint-owner can acquire by his agency, and the other cannot, it is just the same as if the former alone had the power of acquisition. 5Where a slave, subject to an usufruct, stipulates for the usufructuary, or the owner; for instance, if he only stipulates for the interest of the usufructuary, the stipulation will be void, because he would have been able to acquire a right of action for both parties through the property of the usufructuary. If, however, he stipulates for something else, the proprietor can bring the action, and if the promisor pays the usufructuary, he will be released from liability. 6When a slave, jointly owned by Titius and Mævius, stipulates as follows, “Do you promise to pay Titius ten aurei, on the kalends, and if you do not pay him ten aurei on the kalends, do you promise to pay twenty to Mævius?” there appear to be two stipulations. If the ten aurei should not be paid on the kalends, either of the joint-owners can bring suit under the stipulation; but, on account of the second obligation promised by Mævius, Titius will be barred by an exception on the ground of fraud.

2Ulpianus, On Sabinus, Book IV. A slave jointly owned by two persons cannot stipulate for himself, although it is well established that he can do so for his master, as he does not acquire directly for his master, but acquires an obligation through himself for his benefit.

3The Same, On Sabinus, Book V. If a slave belonging to the Roman people, to a municipality, or to a colony, stipulates, I think that the stipulation will be valid.

4The Same, On Sabinus, Book XXI. If a slave owned in common stipulates for himself and one of his masters, it is the same as if he stipulated for all his masters, and one of them; as, for example, if he stipulates for Titius and Mævius, and for Mævius, it may be held that three-fourths are due to Titius, and one-fourth to Mævius.

5The Same, On Sabinus, Book XLVIII. A slave owned in common is the property of all his masters, and does not, so to speak, entirely belong to any of them, but belongs to each in proportion to his undivided interest; so that they hold their shares rather by a mutual understanding than corporeally. Hence, if he stipulates for something, or makes an acquisition in some other way, he acquires for all his owners in proportion to their interest in him. He is, however, allowed to stipulate specifically for any one of his masters, or to receive the property delivered in order to acquire it for him alone. If, however, he does not stipulate specifically for one master, but, by the order of one of them, it is our practice to hold that he acquires the property for the one alone by whose order he made the stipulation.

6Pomponius, On Sabinus, Book XXVI. Ofilius very properly says that, in receiving by delivery, in depositing for safe-keeping, and in lending for use, acquisition is only made for the benefit of the person who directs this to be done. This opinion is also held by Cassius and Sabinus.

7Ulpianus, On Sabinus, Book XLVIII. Hence, if a slave should happen to have four masters, and stipulates by the order of two of them, he will only acquire for the benefit of those who gave the order; and the better opinion is that he does not acquire for them equally, but in proportion to their ownership. I hold the same opinion, if it is stated that he stipulated for them by name. For if he did not stipulate by the order of all, or for each and all of them by name, we should entertain no doubt that he acquired for all in proportion to their ownership, and not in equal shares. 1Ad Dig. 45,3,7,1Windscheid: Lehrbuch des Pandektenrechts, 7. Aufl. 1891, Bd. II, § 352, Note 5.If a slave owned in common stipulates with one of two partners specifically for the benefit of the other, payment will be due to him alone. If, however, he stipulates absolutely, without adding anything, the slave will acquire the shares for the other partners, excepting the one of which the promisor is the owner. When he stipulates by order of one of the partners, the rule will be the same as if he had specifically stipulated that payment should be made to the said partner. Sometimes, although he may not stipulate specifically for the benefit of any one of his masters, or by his order, still, it is held by Julianus that he will acquire for him alone; just as where he stipulates for something which cannot be acquired by both, as, for instance, a servitude attaching to the Cornelian Estate which belongs to Sempronius, one of his two masters, he also acquires it for him alone.

8Gaius, On Cases. The same will apply, if one of his masters should marry, and is promised a dowry by this slave.

9Ulpianus, On Sabinus, Book XLVIII. Likewise, if the slave of two masters, Titius and Mævius, stipulates for a slave of Titius, he acquires him for the one alone to whom he does not belong. If, however, he stipulates for Stichus as follows, “Do you promise to deliver him to Mævius and Titius?” he acquires him entirely for Mævius, for what he cannot acquire for one of his masters, belongs entirely to the other who is interested in the obligation. 1If, when a slave has two masters, and stipulates for “one or the other” of them; the question arises whether the stipulation is valid. Cassius says that it is void, and Julianus adopts his opinion, which is our practice.

10Julianus, Digest, Book LII. Where, however, a stipulation is made as follows, “Do you pronv ise to pay Titius ten aurei, or transfer a tract of land to Mævius?” for the reason that it is uncertain for which one of them he acquires the right of action, the stipulation is considered to be void.

11Ulpianus, On Sabinus, Book XLVIII. If he stipulates for “himself,” or for “one or the other of his masters,” in this instance, the statement of Julianus that the stipulation is void, must be accepted. But is it the addition which is void, or is the entire stipulation of no force or effect? I think that the addition alone is void, for when he utters the words, “for me,” he acquires a right of action under the stipulation for all his masters; but can payment be made to others, for instance, to a stranger? I think that payment can be made to them, just as when I stipulate for myself, or for Titius. Therefore, when a stipulation is made for “one or the other of his masters,” why is it not valid, or why will not payment be valid? The reason for this is that we cannot ascertain the person to whom the stipulation refers, and who is entitled to payment.

12Paulus, Questions, Book X. For when both the parties are capable of assuming the obligation, we cannot find out which one was added, because there is no one who can bring suit.

13Ulpianus, On Sabinus, Book XLVIII. Where a slave stipulates for his master, or a stranger, both parts of the contract exist, the stipulation for the benefit of the master, and the payment with reference to the stranger; but, in this instance, the equality annuls both the stipulation and the payment.

14Julianus, On Urseius Ferox, Book III. My slave, being in the hands of a thief, stipulated that he should be given to him. Sabinus denies that he is due to the latter, because when he made the stipulation, he was not serving him as a slave. I, however, cannot bring suit by virtue of this agreement, because at the time that the slave made it, he was not serving me. But if he made a stipulation without mentioning the thief personally, the right of action will be acquired by me, but neither a suit on mandate, nor any other, should be granted the thief against me.

15Florentinus, Institutes, Book VIII. If my slave stipulates that property shall be given to me, to himself, or to a fellow-slave, or does not designate any particular person, he will acquire for my benefit.

16Paulus, Rules, Book IV. A slave belonging to an estate, who stipulates specifically that payment shall be made to a future heir, creates no obligation, because, at the time that the stipulation was entered into, the heir was not his owner.

17Pomponius, On Sabinus, Book IX. If a slave, owned in common by yourself and me, stipulates for a right of way of any description, without mentioning our names, and I alone have the adjoining land, he will acquire the right of way solely for me. If you, also, have a tract of land, the servitude will likewise be acquired for me in its entirety.

18Papinianus, Questions, Book XXVII. Where a slave is jointly owned by Mævius and a peculium castrense, and the son under paternal control to whom the peculium belongs dies while in the army, and, before the appointed heir enters upon the estate, the said slave stipulates, the entire stipulation will enure to the benefit of the partner who in the meantime is the sole owner of the slave; because the estate, not yet being in existence, is not susceptible of division. For if anyone should venture to allege that the son under paternal control has an heir, the estate would not, in consequence, be considered already in existence, since the benefit of the Imperial Constitution permits a son under paternal control to dispose of his peculium by will. This privilege remains in suspense, before the will is confirmed by the acceptance of the estate. 1If the slave of Titius and Mævius should stipulate that the share of Mævius shall be given to him, the stipulation will be void; but if he stipulated that it should be given to Titius, it will be acquired by Titius. If the stipulation is formulated simply, for instance, “Do you promise to give the share which belongs to Mævius?” without adding the words “to me,” it is probably true that, as the stipulation was in no way defective, it will profit the person who is entitled to the benefit of the same. 2A slave, whose master was taken by the enemy, stipulated for something to be given to his master. Although what he simply stipulated for or received from another would belong to the heir of the captive, the rule is different with reference to the son personally, because he was not under paternal control at the time when he made the stipulation, and was not, like the slave, afterwards included among the property of the estate. Still, in the case stated, it may be asked whether, under this stipulation, he will be held to have acquired nothing for the heir, just as if a slave belonging to an estate had stipulated for the deceased, or even for his future heirs. But, in this instance, the slave will be on the same footing with the son, for if the latter should stipulate for him to be given to his father, who was a captive, the matter will remain in abeyance, and if the father should die while in the hands of the enemy, the stipulation will be considered to be of no force or effect, as the son stipulated for another, and not for himself. 3Where a slave, who is the subject of an usufruct, hires his own services, and for this reason stipulates for the payment of money every year, Julian says that, on the termination of the usufruct, the stipulation for the remainder of the time will be acquired by the owner of the property. This opinion seems to me to be supported by the very best of reasons. For, if the agreement for his services was made, for example, for five years; as it is uncertain how long the usufruct will continue to exist, then, at the beginning of each year, the money due at the time would belong to the usufructuary. Hence, the stipulation does not pass to another, but is only acquired for each person to the extent permitted by the law. For, if a slave should stipulate as follows, “Do you promise to pay me as much money as I have paid you up to that time?” it remains undetermined who will be entitled to an action under the stipulation, since if I should pay the money out of the property belonging to the usufructuary, or what was obtained by the labor of the slave, it would belong to the usufructuary; but if it was derived from some other source, it would be acquired for the benefit of the owner.

19Scævola, Questions, Book XIII. If the slave of another who is serving two masters in good faith makes an acquisition by means of the property of one of them, reason dictates that he acquires it entirely for the benefit of him whose property was employed, whether he was serving one or both of his masters at the time; for in the case of genuine masters, whenever anything is acquired for the benefit of both, it is acquired for each one in proportion to his share, but if it is not acquired for one of them alone the other will be entitled to all of it. Therefore, the same rule will apply to the case stated and the slave who belongs to another, and is serving yourself and me in good faith, will acquire for me alone whatever is obtained by the use of my property, and he cannot acquire for you, because the profit was not derived from anything that was yours.

20Paulus, Questions, Book XV. A freeman who is serving me in good faith makes a stipulation with reference to my property, or his own labor, for the benefit of Stichus, who belongs to him. The better opinion is that he acquires for me, because if he was my slave he would acquire for my benefit, and it should not be said that he is, as it were, included in his own peculium. If, however, he should stipulate for Stichus, who belongs to me, with reference to my property, he will acquire for himself. 1The following case was stated by Labeo. A father, dying intestate, left a son and a daughter who were under his control. The daughter had always supposed that she would obtain nothing from her father’s estate, and, afterwards, her brother had a daughter, and, dying, left her in infancy. The guardians ordered a slave who had belonged to her grandfather to stipulate with a man who had sold the property of the grandfather’s estate for all the money which would come into his hands. I ask you to give me your opinion in writing as to whether anything was acquired for the female ward under the terms of this stipulation. Paulus: It is true that a slave who is possessed in good faith and stipulates with reference to the property of the master whom he serves acquires for his possessor. If, however, the property derived from the estate of the grandfather was owned in common, and formed part of the estate which was sold, the slave will not be held to have stipulated for the entire amount of the property belonging to the ward, and therefore he will acquire for both owners.

21Venuleius, Stipulations, Book I. If a slave owned in common stipulates as follows, “Do you promise to pay on the Kalends of January ten aurei to either Titius or Mævius, whichever one of them may be living at the time?” Julianus says that the agreement is void, because a stipulation cannot remain in suspense, and it does not appear by which of the two persons the money will be acquired.

22Neratius, Opinions, Book II. A slave, subject to an usufruct, cannot, by employing the property of his master, make a valid stipulation for the benefit of the usufructuary, but he can make a valid one for the benefit of his owner, by employing property belonging to the usufructuary.

23Paulus, On Plautius, Book IX. The same rule applies to a case where the use of property has been bequeathed to someone.

24Neratius, Opinions, Book II. If the usufruct belongs to two persons, and the slave stipulates for his services with one of them, the latter will acquire only to the extent of his share in the usufruct.

25Venuleius, Stipulations, Book XII. Where a slave forming part of an estate stipulates and receives sureties, and after the estate has been entered upon, a doubt arises whether the time begins to run from the date when the stipulation was made, or from the time when the estate was accepted, just as where a slave whose master is in the hands of the enemy has received sureties, Cassius thinks that the time should be computed from the date when proceedings can be instituted against the parties; that is to say, after the estate has been entered upon, or the master returns from captivity under the right of postliminium.

26Paulus, Manuals, Book I. An usufruct cannot exist without a person, and therefore a slave belonging to an estate cannot legally stipulate for an usufruct. It, however, is said that an usufruct can be bequeathed to him, for the reason that its time does not begin immediately, while an unconditional stipulation cannot remain in abeyance. But what if the stipulation was made under a condition? It will not be valid, even in this instance, because a stipulation receives its power from the present time, although the right of action to which it gives rise may remain in suspense.

27The Same, Manuals, Book II. A slave owned in common, whether he makes a purchase or stipulates, even though he may pay the money out of his peculium which belongs to one of his masters, will, nevertheless, acquire for both of them. The case of a slave subject to an usufruct is, however, different.

28Gaius, On Oral Obligations, Book III. If a slave stipulates for his master, or for his usufructuary, with reference to property belonging to his master, Julianus says that he acquires the obligation for the benefit of his master, and that the usufructuary can be paid just as anyone who has been joined. 1If a slave owned in common should stipulate with reference to property belonging to one of his masters, the better opinion is that the stipulation is acquired for both of them; but he whose property was made use of in making the stipulation can properly avail himself of an action in partition, or the action on partnership, in order to recover his share. The same rule applies, if a slave acquires for one of his masters by means of his labor. 2If each one of his two masters stipulates that the same ten aurei shall be given to a slave, jointly owned by them, and but one answer was made, there will be two joint stipulators, as it is established that a master can stipulate for payment to his slave. 3Just as a slave acquires for one of his masters alone, if he stipulates for him by name, so it is decided that if he purchases property in the name of one of his masters, he will acquire it for him alone. In like manner, if he lends money to be paid to one of his masters, or transacts any other business whatever, he can expressly provide that the property shall be restored, or payment be made to one of them alone. 4The question arose whether a slave forming part of an estate can stipulate for the benefit of the future heir. Proculus says that he cannot, because at that time he was a stranger. Cassius is of the opinion that he can, as he who afterwards becomes the heir is held to have succeeded to the deceased at the time of his death. This reason is supported by the fact that the entire body of slaves is understood to represent the deceased at the time of his death, although the heir may not appear for some time. Hence it is clear that the benefit of the slave’s stipulation is acquired for the heir.

29Paulus, On the Edict, Book LXXII. If a slave owned in common stipulates as follows, “Do you promise to pay ten aurei to my master and the same ten to another?” we say that there are two joint-stipulators.

30The Same, On Plautius, Book I. The slave of another, by expressly stipulating for a third party, does not acquire for his master.

31The Same, On Plautius, Book VIII. If a slave stipulates by order of an usufructuary, or a bona fide possessor, under such circumstances that he cannot acquire for them, he will acquire for his master. The same rule does not apply if their names are inserted in the stipulation.

32The Same, On Plautius, Book IX. If two persons have an usufruct of a slave, and the said slave stipulates expressly for one of them, with reference to property belonging to both, Sabinus says that although he is only liable to one, it should be considered how the other usufructuary can obtain the share to which he is entitled, as no community of right exists between them. The better opinion is, to hold that a prætorian action in partition can be brought.

33The Same, On Plautius, Book XIV. If a man who is free, or a slave who belongs to another and is serving in good faith, stipulates with reference to the property of a third party, by the order of the person who has him in possession, Julianus says that the freeman will acquire for himself, but the slave will acquire for his master, because the right to order is only vested in his master. 1If two joint-stipulators have an usufruct in a slave, or he is serving them in good faith, and by the order of one of them he makes a stipulation with his debtor, he will acquire for the benefit of that master alone.

34Javolenus, On Plautius, Book II. If a slave who has been manumitted by will, but is not aware that he is free, remains as part of the estate, and stipulates for money for the heir, the heirs will not be entitled to anything, provided they knew that he had been manumitted by the will, because his servitude cannot be considered lawful where he serves those who knew that he was free. This case differs from that of a freeman who, having been purchased, serves in good faith as a slave; because, in this instance, the opinion of himself and the purchaser agree as to his condition. He, however, who knows a man to be free, although he may be ignorant of his condition, cannot be held to possess him.

35Modestinus, Rules, Book VII. A slave belonging to an estate can legally stipulate for the benefit of the future heir, as well as for the benefit of the estate.

36Javolenus, Epistles, Book XIV. Where a slave, whom his master has considered as abandoned by him, stipulates for something, his act is void; because anyone who looks upon property as abandoned rejects it altogether, and cannot make use of the services of anyone whom he is unwilling shall belong to him. If, however, he has been seized by another, he can acquire for his benefit by means of a stipulation, for this is a kind of donation. A great difference exists between a slave forming a part of an estate and one who is considered as abandoned; for one of them is retained by hereditary right, and he cannot be considered as abandoned who is subject to the entire right of inheritance, while the other having been intentionally abandoned by his master, cannot be held to be available for the use of him by whom he was rejected.

37Pomponius, On Quintus Mucius, Book III. When a slave owned in common stipulates as follows, “Do you promise to pay Lucius Titius, and Gaius Seius?” (who are his masters), they will be entitled to equal shares under the terms of the agreement. If, however, he should stipulate as follows, “Do you promise to pay my master?” they will be entitled to share in proportion to their respective ownership. But when he stipulates as follows, “Do you promise to pay Lucius Titius, and Gaius Seius?” it may be doubted whether they will be entitled to equal shares, or only in proportion to the amount of the interest of each. It is also important to ascertain what was added merely for the purpose of explanation, and what the other part of the stipulation, which is the principal one, provides. But as the names are first mentioned, it seems to be more reasonable that the stipulation was acquired for their benefit equally, because the names of the masters are given for the purpose of designation.

38The Same, On Quintus Mucius, Book V. If my slave stipulates with my freedman for “services to be rendered him,” Celsus says that the stipulation is void. It would, however, be otherwise if he had stipulated without adding the word “him.”

39The Same, On Quintus Mucius, Book XXII. When a slave in whom we have the usufruct stipulates expressly for the benefit of the owner, for something to be derived from the property of the usufructuary, or from his own services, it is acquired for the benefit of the owner of the property. Means should, however, be taken to ascertain by what action the usufructuary can recover it from the owner of the property. Again, if a slave serves us in good faith, and stipulates expressly for the benefit of his master for something which he can acquire for us, he will acquire it for him. We must examine by what action we can recover it from him, and what our Gaius has stated on this point is not unreasonable, namely: that, in both cases, the property can be recovered from the owner by a personal action.

40The Same, On Quintus Mucius, Book XXXIII. Any obligation which a slave has contracted while in our service, although the effect of the stipulation may have been deferred until the time of his alienation or manumission, he will still acquire for our benefit; because when he made the contract his power to do so was ours. The same rule applies where a son under paternal control enters into an agreement, for even if he should postpone its accomplishment until the time of his emancipation, we shall be entitled to the benefit of the same; provided, however, that he acted fraudulently.