De in ius vocando
(Concerning Citations Before a Court of Justice.)
1Paulus, On the Edict, Book IV. To cite anyone before a court of justice is to summon him for the purpose of trying a case.
2Ulpianus, On the Edict, Book V. Neither a Consul, a Prefect, a Proconsul, nor any other magistrate who exercises authority, and has the power of restraining others and ordering them to be confined in prison, can be summoned to court; nor can a pontiff be summoned while performing a religious ceremony; nor can those be summoned either, who on account of the sacred character of the place cannot leave it; nor anyone employed in the service of the State who is riding along the public highway upon a horse belonging to the government. Moreover, a man cannot be summoned who is being married, nor can the woman to whom he is being united, nor a judge while in the exercise of his judicial functions, nor any person who is trying his own case before the Prætor, nor anyone while conducting the funeral rites of a member of his household.
3Callistratus, Judicial Inquiries, Book I. Nor can those who are attending a funeral be summoned, which appears to be established by a Rescript of the Divine Brothers.
4Ulpianus, On the Edict, Book V. The same rule applies to those who are obliged to be present in court in some certain place for the purpose of litigation, as well as to insane persons, and infants. 1The Prætor says: “That no one without my permission can summon to court his parents, his patron or patroness, or the children or parents of his patron or patroness”. 2By the word “parent” one must here understand those of both sexes. The question, however, arises whether this term may be indefinitely extended? Some hold that it only applies as far back as the great-great-grandfather, and that other ascendants are called “ancestors”. Pomponius stated that this was the opinion of the ancient authorities; but Gaius Cassius says that the term applies to all ascendants without exception; which makes it more honorable, and this rule has very justly been adopted. 3Labeo held that those also should be considered parents who have become such in slavery, and not, as Severus said, that the term should only apply to instances where children are legitimate; so that where a son has been begotten in promiscuous intercourse, he cannot bring his mother into court.
5Paulus, On the Edict, Book IV. This is for the reason that the mother is always certain, although she may have been given to promiscuous intercourse; but the father is he whom the marriage indicates as such.
7The Same, On the Edict, Book IV. A man can summon with impunity the parents of his adoptive father, as they are not really his parents, since he is only cognate to those to whom he is also agnate.
8Ulpianus, On the Edict, Book V. A man cannot summon his adoptive father to court as long as he is under his control, which results rather from the right of paternal authority than from the order of the Prætor; unless the son has castrense peculium, and in this instance he can be permitted to do so where proper cause is shown, but he cannot summon his natural father while he is a member of an adoptive family. 1The Edict mentions the “patron” or the “patroness”. Those are to be considered patrons who have manumitted a slave, or who have detected collusion; as for instance, where someone in a preliminary judicial proceeding had been declared to be a freedman, when in fact he was not; or where I have sworn that the party in question is my freedman; just as, on the other hand, I am not to be considered a patron if judgment is rendered against me; or where, if I tender the oath, the party swears that he is not my freedman. 2If, however, I have compelled my freedman or freedwoman to swear not to marry, I can be brought into court; and Celsus indeed says that no right over such a freedman passes to my son during my lifetime. Julianus, however, holds the contrary, and many adopt his opinion; so that in an instance of this kind it may happen that a patron can be summoned, but his son, being innocent, cannot be.
9Paulus, On the Edict, Book IV. He, also, who has manumitted a slave under the terms of a trust cannot be brought into court, although he may be summoned to force him to manumit a slave.
10Ulpianus, On the Edict, Book V. If, under this rule, I purchase a slave upon the condition that I will manumit him, and he obtains his liberty by the Constitution of the Divine Marcus, I cannot be cited, as I am his patron; but if I purchase him with his own money, and have broken faith with him, I shall not be considered his patron. 1Where a female slave is forced to prostitute herself against the condition of her sale, she will have the vendor as her patron if she was sold under the condition that, “She would become free if she were forced to prostitute herself”. But if the vendor, who reserved the right to take possession of her by seizing her, himself prostitutes her, since she still obtains her freedom, she does so through him who sold her, but it is not proper that any honor should be shown him, as Marcellus holds in the Sixth Book of the Digest. 2We also consider a man a patron, even though he may have forfeited his civil rights, or where his freedman has lost his; as for instance where arrogation took place in a clandestine manner, since, as he must have concealed his status from him by whom he was arrogated, his act does not seem to be such as to entitle him to be considered freeborn. 3If, however, he has acquired the right of wearing gold rings, I think he should never fail to manifest respect for his patron, even though he may be qualified to exercise all the functions of a freeborn person. The case is different if he is restored to all the privileges of birth, for the Emperor can make a man free born. 4Anyone who is manumitted by an organized body, a corporation, or a city, can summon any member of the same to court, for he is not the freedman of any of them in particular. He must, however, show respect to all collectively; and if he wishes to bring an action against a municipality or a corporation, he must ask permission to do so under the Edict, although he may intend to summon one who has been appointed the agent of the others. 5By the terms “the children and parents of the patron and patroness”, we must understand persons of both sexes. 6Where a patron has been reduced to the condition of a foreigner through the penalty of deportation, Pomponius is of the opinion that his privilege is forfeited; but if he should be reinstated, he will again enjoy the benefit of the Edict. 7The adoptive parents of a patron are also excepted, but only so long as the adoption lasts. 8If my son has been given in adoption, he cannot be brought into court by my freedman; nor can my grandson, who is born in an adoptive family. But where my emancipated son adopts a son, a grandson of this kind can be summoned, for he is a stranger to me. 9According to Cassius, we. may understand that the term “children”, like that of “parents”, extends beyond the great-great-grandson. 10If a freedwoman has a child by her patron, neither she nor her son can bring the other into court. 11If the children of a patron have brought a capital accusation against a freedman of their father, or have claimed him as a slave, no honor is due to them. 12The Prætor says that, “No one can summon them without my permission”. It is permitted, however, if the action brought against the patron or his parents is not one involving infamy or shame, for in every instance good cause should be established; as sometimes in an action involving infamy, as Pedius holds, a freedman ought to be allowed to summon his patron, if he has done the former a serious injury; for example, scourged him. 13This respect should always be shown to a patron, even if he appears as the guardian, curator, defender, or agent of another; but where the guardian or curator is interested, he can be summoned with impunity, as Pomponius says, and this opinion is the better one.
11Paulus, On the Edict, Book IV. Although the Prætor does not state that he will render judgment for a penalty where proper cause is shown, still Labeo says that his authority must be exercised with moderation; as for instance, if the freedman changes his mind and abandons his suit; or if the patron having been summoned does not appear; or if he has been summoned with his own consent; even though the terms of the Edict do not concede this.
12Ulpianus, On the Edict, Book LVII. If a freedman, in opposition to the Edict of the Prætor, should summon to court the son of his patron whom the patron himself has under his control, it should be held that, if the father is absent, relief should be granted to his son who is under his control, and that a penal action, that is to say one for fifty aurei, will lie against the freedman.
13Modestinus, Pandects, Book X. As, generally speaking, we cannot summon persons to whom respect should be shown, without an order of the Prætor.
14Papinianus, Opinions, Book I. Where a freedman is accused by his patron, and he, being ready to defend himself, has frequently urged the Governor of the province to hear his case; it is not considered that, by so doing, he has summoned his patron who accused him.
15Paulus, Questions, Book I. A freedman presented a petition against his patron without concealing the fact that he was his freedman; and the question arose whether, if he obtained an Imperial Rescript in accordance with his wishes, the penalty of the Edict would be remitted? I have answered that I do not think that the Edict of the Prætor is applicable in this instance, for the reason that he who presents a petition to the Emperor or to a Governor, is not considered to have summoned his patron to court.
17The Same, Sentences, Book I. Where anyone has given a bond in court for the appearance of another he is obliged to produce him. Again, where he has promised in an instrument which has been recorded that he will produce the party in question, even though he may not have given a bond in court, he will, nevertheless, be forced to produce him.
18Gaius, On the Law of the Twelve Tables, Book I. Many authorities have held that it was not lawful to summon anyone to court from his own house; because the house of every individual should be for him a perfectly secure refuge and shelter, and that he who summons a person therefrom, must be considered as having employed violence.
19Paulus, On the Edict, Book I. It is certain that a party is sufficiently punished if he does not defend his case, and keeps himself concealed, for the reason that his adversary is placed in possession of his property. But Julianus says that if he shows himself, or appears in public, he can be legally summoned.
20Gaius, On the Law of the Twelve Tables, Book I. There is no doubt that a man can be lawfully summoned from his vineyard, the bath, or the theatre.
21Paulus, On the Edict, Book I. Although a man who is in his own house may sometimes be summoned to court, still, no one should be forcibly removed from his residence.
22Gaius, On the Law of the Twelve Tables, Book I. It is not permitted to summon girls who have not arrived at puberty, and who are subject to the control of another. 1A man who is summoned should be dismissed in two instances; first, when anyone undertakes his defence; and second, when the controversy has been settled before the parties have come into court.
23Marcianus, Institutes, Book III. Where a freedman is common, that is to say, has several patrons, he should petition the Prætor to permit him to summon anyone of his patrons, or he will be liable under the Prætorian Edict.
24Ulpianus, On the Edict, Book V. An action for fifty aurei can be brought against him who violates these provisions, but it cannot be brought for, or against an heir, nor after a year has elapsed.
25Modestinus, On Punishments, Book I. Where a freedman has summoned his patron to court without permission being granted under the Edict, on complaint of the patron he will be liable for the above-mentioned penalty, that is to say, for fifty aurei; or he may be chastised by the Prefect of the City, as lacking in respect, if it is ascertained that he has no property.