Corpus iurisprudentiae Romanae

Repertorium zu den Quellen des römischen Rechts

Digesta Iustiniani Augusti

Recognovit Mommsen (1870) et retractavit Krüger (1928)
Convertit in Anglica lingua Scott (1932)
Dig. II1,
De iurisdictione
Liber secundus
I.

De iurisdictione

(Concerning Jurisdiction.)

1Ul­pia­nus li­bro pri­mo re­gu­la­rum. Ius di­cen­tis of­fi­cium la­tis­si­mum est: nam et bo­no­rum pos­ses­sio­nem da­re pot­est et in pos­ses­sio­nem mit­te­re, pu­pil­lis non ha­ben­ti­bus tu­to­res con­sti­tue­re, iu­di­ces li­ti­gan­ti­bus da­re.

1Ulpianus, Rules, Book I. The duties of him who has the right of dispensing justice are very extensive; for he can grant the possession of estates, place the parties in possession, appoint guardians for minors who have none, and designate judges for litigants.

2Ia­vo­le­nus li­bro sex­to ex Cas­sio. Cui iu­ris­dic­tio da­ta est, ea quo­que con­ces­sa es­se vi­den­tur, si­ne qui­bus iu­ris­dic­tio ex­pli­ca­ri non po­tuit.

2Javolenus, On Cassius, Book VI. He to whom legal jurisdiction is given is also held to be invested with all the powers necessary for its exercise.

3Ul­pia­nus li­bro se­cun­do de of­fi­cio quaes­to­ris. Im­pe­rium aut me­rum aut mix­tum est. me­rum est im­pe­rium ha­be­re gla­dii po­tes­ta­tem ad anim­ad­ver­ten­dum fa­ci­no­ro­sos ho­mi­nes, quod et­iam po­tes­tas ap­pel­la­tur. mix­tum est im­pe­rium, cui et­iam iu­ris­dic­tio in­est, quod in dan­da bo­no­rum pos­ses­sio­ne con­sis­tit. iu­ris­dic­tio est et­iam iu­di­cis dan­di li­cen­tia.

3Ulpianus, On the Duties of Quæstor, Book II. Official authority is either simple or mixed. Simple authority invests the magistrate with the right of inflicting the death penalty upon persons who are violators of the law, which is also designated “power”. Mixed authority, which embraces legal jurisdiction, consists of the right of granting possession of property. Jurisdiction includes the power of appointing a judge.

4Idem li­bro pri­mo ad edic­tum. Iu­be­re ca­ve­ri prae­to­ria sti­pu­la­tio­ne et in pos­ses­sio­nem mit­te­re im­pe­rii ma­gis est quam iu­ris­dic­tio­nis.

4The Same, On the Edict, Book I. The right to order a bond to be executed by a prætorian stipulation, and to place a party in possession, rather belong to authority than to jurisdiction.

5Iu­lia­nus li­bro pri­mo di­ges­to­rum. Mo­re ma­io­rum ita com­pa­ra­tum est, ut is de­mum iu­ris­dic­tio­nem man­da­re pos­sit, qui eam suo iu­re, non alie­no be­ne­fi­cio ha­bet:

5Julianus, Digest, Book I. It was established by the custom of our ancestors that he only can delegate jurisdiction who possesses it in his own right, and not through delegation by another.

6Pau­lus li­bro se­cun­do ad edic­tum. et quia nec prin­ci­pa­li­ter ei iu­ris­dic­tio da­ta est nec ip­sa lex de­fert, sed con­fir­mat man­da­tam iu­ris­dic­tio­nem. id­eo­que si is, qui man­da­vit iu­ris­dic­tio­nem, de­ces­se­rit, an­te­quam res ab eo, cui man­da­ta est iu­ris­dic­tio, ge­ri coe­pe­rit, sol­vi man­da­tum La­beo ait, sic­ut in re­li­quis cau­sis.

6Paulus, On the Edict, Book II. And this is because jurisdiction is not given to him in the first place, and has not been conferred upon him by law, which only confirms that which has already been delegated; and therefore, if anyone who has delegated his jurisdiction should die before the business over which jurisdiction has been delegated to him had begun to be transacted; Labeo says that the delegated authority is abrogated, just as it is in other cases.

7Ul­pia­nus li­bro ter­tio ad edic­tum. Si quis id, quod iu­ris­dic­tio­nis per­pe­tuae cau­sa, non quod pro­ut res in­ci­dit, in al­bo vel in char­ta vel in alia ma­te­ria pro­pos­i­tum erit, do­lo ma­lo cor­ru­pe­rit: da­tur in eum quin­gen­to­rum au­reo­rum iu­di­cium, quod po­pu­la­re est. 1Ser­vi quo­que et fi­lii fa­mi­lias ver­bis edic­ti con­ti­nen­tur: sed et utrum­que se­xum prae­tor com­ple­xus est. 2Quod si dum pro­po­ni­tur vel an­te pro­pos­i­tio­nem quis cor­ru­pe­rit, edic­ti qui­dem ver­ba ces­sa­bunt, Pom­po­nius au­tem ait sen­ten­tiam edic­ti por­ri­gen­dam es­se ad haec. 3In ser­vos au­tem, si non de­fen­dun­tur a do­mi­nis, et eos qui in­opia la­bo­rant cor­pus tor­quen­dum est. 4Do­li ma­li au­tem id­eo in ver­bis edic­ti fit men­tio, quod, si per im­pe­ritiam vel rus­ti­ci­ta­tem vel ab ip­so prae­to­re ius­sus vel ca­su ali­quis fe­ce­rit, non te­ne­tur. 5Hoc ve­ro edic­to te­ne­tur et qui tol­lit, quam­vis non cor­ru­pe­rit: item et qui suis ma­ni­bus fa­cit et qui alii man­dat. sed si alius si­ne do­lo ma­lo fe­cit, alius do­lo ma­lo man­da­vit, qui man­da­vit te­ne­bi­tur: si uter­que do­lo ma­lo fe­ce­rit, am­bo te­ne­bun­tur: nam et si plu­res fe­ce­rint vel cor­ru­pe­rint vel man­da­ve­rint, om­nes te­ne­bun­tur:

7Ulpianus, On the Edict, Book III. “If a person maliciously destroys a notice which has been entered in the register of an official, or written on papyrus, or any other substance, and which has reference to the general jurisdiction of the said official and not to any special matter; judgment should be rendered against him for fifty aurei, and anyone may bring suit for the same.” 1Slaves and sons of families also are affected by the terms of this edict; and the Prætor includes both sexes. 2If anyone should cause this damage before the notice has been published or while it is being published, the words of the Edict will be without effect; but Pomponius holds that the principle of the Edict is applicable to such a case. 3If the offence has been committed by slaves who are not defended by their masters, or by persons who are in poverty, corporeal punishment shall be inflicted. 4Malice is mentioned in the words of the Edict, because if anyone should commit such an act through ignorance or stupidity, or by the order of the Prætor himself, or through accident, he will not be liable. 5He who removes the document, even though he may not destroy it, is also liable under this Edict which includes both him who performs the act himself and him who orders another to perform it; but if anyone performs it without malice by the direction of another who was actuated by malice, the latter will be liable; and if both of them act maliciously both will be liable; and if several persons commit the act, whether they destroy documents, or order this to be done, all will be liable.

8Gaius li­bro pri­mo ad edic­tum pro­vin­cia­le. ad­eo qui­dem, ut non suf­fi­ciat unum eo­rum poe­nam lue­re.

8Gaius, On the Provincial Edict, Book I. And this applies to such an extent that it will not be sufficient for only one of them to pay the penalty.

9Pau­lus li­bro ter­tio ad edic­tum. Si fa­mi­lia ali­cu­ius al­bum cor­ru­pe­rit, non si­mi­li­ter hic edi­ci­tur ut in fur­to, ne in re­li­quos ac­tio de­tur, si tan­tum do­mi­nus, cum de­fen­de­re vo­luit, unius no­mi­ne prae­sti­te­rit, quan­tum li­ber prae­sta­ret: for­tas­se quia hic et con­temp­ta ma­ies­tas prae­to­ris vin­di­ca­tur et plu­ra fac­ta in­tel­le­gun­tur: quem­ad­mo­dum cum plu­res ser­vi in­iu­riam fe­ce­runt vel dam­num de­de­runt, quia plu­ra fac­ta sunt, non ut in fur­to unum. Oc­ta­ve­nus hic quo­que do­mi­no suc­cur­ren­dum ait: sed hoc pot­est di­ci, si do­lo ma­lo cu­ra­ve­rint, ut ab alio al­bum cor­rum­pe­re­tur, quia tunc unum con­si­lium sit, non plu­ra fac­ta. idem Pom­po­nius li­bro de­ci­mo no­tat.

9Paulus, On the Edict, Book III. If the entire body of slaves belonging to anyone should deface a register, the Edict does not treat this offence as it would a case of theft, where the master who wishes to defend the action pays as much in the name of one slave as a freeman would be compelled to pay, for then no action will lie against the others; the reason for which is perhaps that, in this instance, the offended dignity of the Prætor must be vindicated, and several acts are understood to have been committed; in the same manner as when several slaves have perpetrated a wrong, or have caused damage, because several acts have taken place, and not merely one, as in the case of theft. Octavenus says that in this instance relief ought to be granted to the master, but this can only be maintained where the slave maliciously brings it about that the register shall be destroyed by another, because then there is only one conspiracy, and not several acts. Pomponius states the same thing in the Tenth Book.

10Ul­pia­nus li­bro ter­tio ad edic­tum. Qui iu­ris­dic­tio­ni prae­est, ne­que si­bi ius di­ce­re de­bet ne­que uxo­ri vel li­be­ris suis ne­que li­ber­tis vel ce­te­ris, quos se­cum ha­bet.

10Ad Dig. 2,1,10ROHGE, Bd. 21 (1877), Nr. 31, S. 86: Rechtsweg gegen einen Beschluß der Gesellschafter über Ausschließung eines Socius.Ulpianus, On the Edict, Book III. He who presides over the administration of justice ought not to render judgment in his own case, or in that of his wife or children, or of his freedmen, or of any others whom he has with him.

11Gaius li­bro pri­mo ad edic­tum pro­vin­cia­le. Si idem cum eo­dem plu­ri­bus ac­tio­ni­bus agat, qua­rum sin­gu­la­rum quan­ti­tas in­tra iu­ris­dic­tio­nem iu­di­can­tis sit, co­acer­va­tio ve­ro om­nium ex­ce­dat mo­dum iu­ris­dic­tio­nis eius: apud eum agi pos­se Sa­b­ino Cas­sio Pro­cu­lo pla­cuit: quae sen­ten­tia re­scrip­to im­pe­ra­to­ris An­to­ni­ni con­fir­ma­ta est. 1Sed et si mu­tuae sunt ac­tio­nes et al­ter mi­no­rem quan­ti­ta­tem, al­ter ma­io­rem pe­tat, apud eun­dem iu­di­cem agen­dum est ei qui quan­ti­ta­tem mi­no­rem pe­tit, ne in po­tes­ta­te ca­lum­nio­sa ad­ver­sa­rii mei sit, an apud eum li­ti­ga­re pos­sim. 2Si una ac­tio com­mu­nis sit plu­rium per­so­na­rum, vel­uti fa­mi­liae er­cis­cun­dae11Die Großausgabe liest her­cis­cun­dae statt er­cis­cun­dae., com­mu­ni di­vi­dun­do, fi­nium re­gun­do­rum, utrum sin­gu­lae par­tes spec­tan­dae sunt cir­ca iu­ris­dic­tio­nem eius qui co­gnos­cit, quod Ofi­lio et Pro­cu­lo pla­cet, quia unus­quis­que de par­te sua li­ti­gat: an po­tius to­ta res, quia et to­ta res in iu­di­cium venit et vel uni ad­iu­di­ca­ri pot­est, quod Cas­sio et Pe­ga­so pla­cet: et sa­ne eo­rum sen­ten­tia pro­ba­bi­lis est.

11Gaius, On the Provincial Edict, Book I. Where one person brings several actions against another and the amounts of the different claims demanded therein, if taken separately, are within the jurisdiction of the judge, but the entire sum exceeds it, it was the opinion of Sabinus, Cassius, and Proculus that the actions could be tried before him; and this opinion was confirmed by a Rescript of the Emperor Antoninus. 1Where, however, the rights of actions are reciprocal in their character, and one party claims an amount under the limit, and another one over it, he who claims the smaller sum can proceed before the same judge; so that it may not be in the power of my adversary, if he wishes to annoy me, to prevent me from trying the case before the same judge. 2Where an action is brought by a number of persons at the same time, as for instance for the partition of an estate, the division of common property, or the establishment of boundaries, should we in order to ascertain the jurisdiction of the judge who has cognizance of the case, consider the value of the separate shares, which is the opinion of Ofilius and Proculus for the reason that each party is bringing suit for his own share; or should the entire value of the property rather be considered because the whole of it is in court and may perhaps be adjudged to one person? This is the opinion of both Cassius and Pegasus, and in fact it seems the more reasonable one.

12Ul­pia­nus li­bro oc­ta­vo de­ci­mo ad edic­tum. Ma­gis­tra­ti­bus mu­ni­ci­pa­li­bus sup­pli­cium a ser­vo su­me­re non li­cet, mo­di­ca au­tem cas­ti­ga­tio eis non est de­ne­gan­da.

12Ulpianus, On the Edict, Book XVIII. Municipal magistrates have no authority to inflict severe punishment upon a slave; the right of moderate castigation cannot, however, be denied them.

13Idem li­bro quin­qua­gen­si­mo pri­mo ad Sa­binum. Eum qui iu­di­ca­re iu­bet ma­gis­tra­tum es­se opor­tet. 1Ma­gis­tra­tus au­tem vel is qui in po­tes­ta­te ali­qua sit, ut pu­ta pro­con­sul vel prae­tor vel alii qui pro­vin­cias re­gunt, iu­di­ca­re iu­be­re eo die, quo pri­va­ti fu­tu­ri es­sent, non pos­sunt.

13The Same, On Sabinus, Book LI. He who orders anyone to act as judge must be a magistrate. 1A magistrate, or he who is invested with any authority, (as for instance, a Proconsul, a Prætor, or any other official who governs a province) cannot appoint a judge on the day on which he becomes a private person.

14Idem li­bro tri­gen­si­mo no­no ad edic­tum. Est re­cep­tum eo­que iu­re uti­mur, ut si quis ma­ior vel ae­qua­lis sub­iciat se iu­ris­dic­tio­ni al­te­rius, pos­sit ei et ad­ver­sus eum ius di­ci.

14The Same, On the Edict, Book XXXIX. It is an accepted rule which we make use of in law, that if anyone of higher, or of equal rank, submits himself to the jurisdiction of another, the latter can administer justice for and against him.

15Idem li­bro se­cun­do de om­ni­bus tri­bu­na­li­bus. Si per er­ro­rem alius pro alio prae­tor fue­rit ad­itus, ni­hil va­le­bit quod ac­tum est. nec enim fe­ren­dus est qui di­cat con­sen­sis­se eos in prae­si­dem, cum, ut Iu­lia­nus scri­bit, non con­sen­tiant qui er­rent: quid enim tam con­tra­rium con­sen­sui est quam er­ror, qui im­pe­ritiam de­te­git?

15Ad Dig. 2,1,15ROHGE, Bd. 10 (1874), S. 328: Voraussetzung der stillschweigenden Prorogation des Gerichtsstandes.The Same, On All Tribunals, Book II. If, through error, anyone appears before one Prætor while intending to appear before another, none of the proceedings which have been instituted will be valid, for no one is permitted to say that they agreed upon the judge; since, as Julianus stated, those who are in error do not agree. For what is so contrary to agreement as error, which always reveals ignorance?

16Idem li­bro ter­tio de om­ni­bus tri­bu­na­li­bus. So­let prae­tor iu­ris­dic­tio­nem man­da­re: et aut om­nem man­dat aut spe­ciem unam: et is cui man­da­ta iu­ris­dic­tio est fun­ge­tur vi­ce eius qui man­da­vit, non sua.

16The Same, On All Tribunals, Book III. The Prætor is accustomed to delegate his jurisdiction, and either delegate all or a portion of the same; while he to whom the right of dispensing justice has been delegated, exercises it in the name of him who appointed him, and not in his own.

17Idem li­bro pri­mo opi­nio­num. Prae­tor sic­ut uni­ver­sam iu­ris­dic­tio­nem man­da­re alii pot­est, ita et in per­so­nas cer­tas vel de una spe­cie pot­est, ma­xi­me cum ius­tam cau­sam sus­cep­tae an­te ma­gis­tra­tum ad­vo­ca­tio­nis al­te­rius par­tis ha­bue­rat.

17The Same, Opinions, Book I. As the Prætor can delegate his entire jurisdiction to one person, he can also delegate it to several, or he can do this with reference to a particular case; and especially where he has a good reason, for example, because he appeared as the advocate of one of the parties before becoming a magistrate.

18Afri­ca­nus li­bro sep­ti­mo quaes­tio­num. Si con­ve­ne­rit, ut alius prae­tor, quam cu­ius iu­ris­dic­tio es­set, ius di­ce­ret et prius­quam ad­ire­tur mu­ta­ta vo­lun­tas fue­rit, pro­cul du­bio ne­mo com­pel­le­tur eius­mo­di con­ven­tio­ni sta­re.

18Africanus, Questions, Book VII. If it is agreed upon by the parties that another Prætor than the one who had jurisdiction of the case should hear it, and before applying to him one of them should change his mind, there is no doubt that he cannot be compelled to abide by an agreement of this kind.

19Ul­pia­nus li­bro sex­to fi­dei­com­mis­so­rum. Cum quae­dam puel­la apud com­pe­ten­tem iu­di­cem li­tem sus­ce­pe­rat, de­in­de con­dem­na­ta erat, post­ea­que ad vi­ri ma­tri­mo­nium alii iu­ris­dic­tio­ni sub­iec­ti per­ve­ne­rat, quae­re­ba­tur, an prio­ris iu­di­cis sen­ten­tia ex­se­qui pos­sit. di­xi pos­se, quia an­te fue­rat sen­ten­tia dic­ta: sed et si post sus­cep­tam co­gni­tio­nem an­te sen­ten­tiam hoc eve­niet, idem pu­ta­rem, sen­ten­tia­que a prio­re iu­di­ce rec­te fer­tur. quod ge­ne­ra­li­ter et in om­ni­bus hu­ius­ce­mo­di ca­si­bus ob­ser­van­dum est. 1Quo­tiens de quan­ti­ta­te ad iu­ris­dic­tio­nem per­ti­nen­te quae­ri­tur, sem­per quan­tum pe­ta­tur quae­ren­dum est, non quan­tum de­bea­tur.

19Ulpianus, Trusts, Book VI. In a case where an unmarried woman had undertaken a defence before a competent judge and was defeated, and afterwards married a man who was subject to a different jurisdiction, the question arose whether the judgment of the former court could be executed? I have said that it could, because judgment had been rendered before her marriage; but if this had occurred after the judge had taken cognizance of the case, and before judgment, I hold the same opinion, namely that the decision of the first judge was properly rendered. This rule should be observed generally in all cases of this description. 1When the amount is made the subject of inquiry with reference to jurisdiction, the sum claimed must always be considered, and not that which is due.

20Pau­lus li­bro pri­mo ad edic­tum. Ex­tra ter­ri­to­rium ius di­cen­ti im­pu­ne non pa­re­tur. idem est et si su­pra iu­ris­dic­tio­nem suam ve­lit ius di­ce­re.

20Paulus, On the Edict, Book I. A judge who administers justice beyond his jurisdiction may be disobeyed with impunity. The same rule applies if he wishes to dispense justice where the amount is beyond his jurisdiction.