1Ulpianus, On the Edict, Book XXXVIII. If, through the fraud of a slave who was ordered to be free after the death of his master, and before the estate was entered upon, an act is said to have been committed with reference to the property of the person who directed him to be free, in order to prevent some of said property from coming into the hands of the heir, a suit for double damages will be granted against him within the available year. 1This action, however (as Labeo says), is founded rather on natural, than on civil equity. For, as a civil action is not applicable, it is but just, according to Natural Law, that the offender, emboldened by the hope of impunity, should not go unpunished; since, having the expectation of speedily obtaining his freedom, he believes that he cannot be chastised as a slave, nor be condemned as a freeman because he steals from the estate, that is to say from his owner; the master or the mistress cannot bring an action for theft against the slave, even though he should afterwards become free, or be alienated, unless he has also subsequently handled the property with the intention of stealing it. Therefore the Prætor thought that the cunning and impudence of those who despoil estates should be punished by an action for double damages. 2A freedman of this kind will not be liable unless he is alleged to have fraudulently wasted something. The fault and negligence of a slave after his freedom has been obtained is excused; but gross negligence very closely resembles fraud. Hence, if he committed some damage without fraud, this action will not lie; although otherwise, he would be liable under the Aquilian Law for having caused damage of any description whatsoever. Therefore this action has certain restrictions, so that the slave must be guilty of fraud not only after the death of his master, but before the estate has been entered upon. But if he does not commit fraud, or does so during the lifetime of his master, he will not be liable to this action. Nay more, the action will not lie even after the death of his master and the acceptance of the estate, for when the estate has once been entered upon, he can be sued as a freeman. 3What, however, should be done, if he received his freedom under a condition? In this instance, he will not yet be free, but can be punished as a slave; and therefore it must be said that this action will not lie. 4Where, however, his freedom is already obtained, it must be said that this action can and should immediately be granted against him who has become free. 5When a slave who is absolutely bequeathed commits some illegal act against the estate before it has been entered upon, it must be said that there will be ground for this action, for the reason that the ownership of the slave is changed. 6And, generally speaking, we say that, in a case where the ownership of the slave is either changed or lost, or he acquires his freedom within a short time after the estate has been entered upon, in this instance, this action should be granted. 7Where freedom is bestowed upon a slave under the terms of a trust, and he has committed some offence against the estate, can not the heir be prevented from manumitting him before he gives satisfaction? And, indeed, it has been frequently stated in Rescripts by the Divine Marcus, and by our Emperor together with his Father, that, under these circumstances, freedom granted unconditionally by a trust will not be prevented. The Divine Marcus, however, stated in a Rescript that an arbiter must be immediately appointed before whom the account should be rendered. This Rescript has reference to the account to be rendered for acts which the slave performed in the course of his administration. I think, then, that in this instance the action will lie. 8Before the estate is entered upon, we should understand to mean before it is accepted by one person alone, for as soon as one person does so, freedom is acquired. 9Where a ward is appointed an heir, and freedom is granted as soon as he has a substitute, and, in the meantime, some damage is committed, if this takes place during the lifetime of the minor, there will be no ground for this action. If, however, it should be committed after his death, and before anyone succeeds him, there will be ground for it. 10This action will not only lie with reference to property belonging to the estate of the testator, but also where it is to the interest of the heir that fraud should not be committed to prevent the property from coming into his hands. Therefore Scævola treats the question more fully, for if the slave has stolen property which the deceased received by way of pledge, this prætorian action can be brought; because we understand the case of the property in a broader sense as meaning utility. For if the Prætor, on account of the condition of servitude existing, substituted this action instead of the one for theft, it is probable that he should have substituted it in every case in which an action for theft could be brought. And, in a word, this action is understood to lie with reference to property pledged, as well as to such as is held by bona, fide possessors. The same rule applies to articles lent to the testator. 11Likewise, if this slave, who has the prospect of his freedom, should steal crops which have been gathered after the death of the testator, there will be ground for this action. When the children of slaves, or the increase of cattle born after the death of the testator are involved, the same opinion must be given. 12Moreover, if a child under the age of puberty, after the death of his father, obtains the ownership of property, and the estate of the minor is stolen before it has been entered upon, it must be said that there will be ground for this action. 13This action can also be brought with reference to any property which it was to the interest of the heir not to have appropriated. 14This action not only applies to thefts, but also to all cases involving damage which the slave has committed against the estate. 15Scævola says that theft of possession can take place, for if there is no possessor, theft cannot be committed; therefore theft cannot be committed against an estate, because the latter has no possession, which is, indeed, a matter of fact and intention. The heir does not have possession before he actually obtains control of the property, because the estate only transmits to him that of which it is constituted, and possession forms no part of it. 16It is true that if the heir can, in any other way, obtain that to which he is entitled, the Prætorian Action should not be granted, since the decision is based upon what the person has an interest in acquiring. 17Besides this action, it is established that a suit for recovery will also lie, as this proceeding resembles one for theft. 18It must be said that this action will also lie in favor of the heir and other successors. 19Where several slaves have received their freedom, and have maliciously caused some injury, each of them can be sued for the entire amount, that is to say, for double damages; and as they are prosecuted on account of the crime as in the case of theft, none of them will be released, even though one should make payment after he has been sued.

2Gaius, On the Provincial Edict, Book XIII. If, a short time before the freedom granted takes place, the slave should secretly remove some article, or spoil it, the ignorance of the owner does not authorize this action; and therefore, although the heir may have no information whatever that the slave is to be free under a condition, or any other master may not be aware that property has been appropriated or spoiled by his slave, he cannot avail himself of any action after the slave has once obtained his freedom, although in many other cases just ignorance may be alleged as an excuse.

3Ulpianus, On the Edict, Book XIII. Labeo thought that where a slave, who was manumitted under a condition, secretly removed some article, and the condition was soon fulfilled, he would be liable to this action.