De privatis delictis
(Concerning Private Offences.)
1Ulpianus, On Sabinus, Book XLV. The Civil Law prescribes that heirs shall not be liable to penal actions any more than other successors, and therefore they cannot be sued for theft. But although they are not liable in an action of theft, still they will be in one to compel them to produce the property in question, if they have possession of it, or if they have committed fraud to avoid being in possession; since when it is once produced, they will be liable to be sued for its recovery. A personal action will also lie against them. 1It is also established that an heir can bring an action of theft, as the prosecution of certain crimes is conceded to heirs. In like manner, an heir is entitled to the action granted by the Aquilian Law; but a suit for injury sustained will not lie in his favor. 2Not only in the action of theft, but also in other actions arising from criminal offences, whether they are civil or prætorian, it is decided that the crime follows the person.
2The Same, On Sabinus, Book XLIII. Where several criminal offences take place at the same time, this does not cause impunity to be granted for any of them, for one crime does not diminish the penalty for another. 1Therefore, where anyone robs a man and kills him, he is liable to an action of theft, for the reason that he robbed him, and to the Aquilian action, because he killed him; and neither one of these actions destroys the other. 2The same thing must be said if he robbed him by violence, and then killed him, for he will be liable to an action for robbery with violence, as well as under the Aquilian Law. 3Where a personal suit is brought for a slave who has committed theft, the question arose, whether one could also be brought under the Aquilian Law. Pomponius says that this can be done, because the action under the Aquilian Law calls for a different valuation than the one to recover property which has been stolen; as the Aquilian Law includes the greatest value of the stolen article during the year preceding the offence; but the personal action for recovery on account of theft does not go further back than the time of the joinder of issue. If, however, a slave has committed these offences, no matter under what noxal proceeding he may be surrendered, the other right of action will be extinguished. 4Likewise, if anyone beats a stolen slave with a scourge, he will be liable to two actions; that of theft and that of injury sustained; and if he should kill him, he will be liable to three actions. 5Again, if anyone has stolen a female slave belonging to another, and debauched her, he will be liable to two actions; for he can be sued for having corrupted the slave, as well as for having stolen her. 6Moreover, if anyone should wound a slave whom he has stolen, there will be ground for two actions against him; that authorized by the Aquilian Law, and the action of theft.
3The Same, On the Duties of Proconsul, Book II. Where anyone desires to bring an action based on a criminal offence, and intends to do so for his own pecuniary benefit, he must have recourse to the ordinary proceeding, and cannot be compelled to prosecute the culprit for the crime. If, however, he wishes to sue for the penalty under the extraordinary proceeding, he must then sign the accusation of the crime.