Corpus iurisprudentiae Romanae

Repertorium zu den Quellen des römischen Rechts

Digesta Iustiniani Augusti

Recognovit Mommsen (1870) et retractavit Krüger (1928)
Convertit in Anglica lingua Scott (1932)
Dig. XLVII1,
De privatis delictis
Liber quadragesimus septimus
I.

De privatis delictis

(Concerning Private Offences.)

1Ul­pia­nus li­bro qua­dra­gen­si­mo pri­mo ad Sa­binum. Ci­vi­lis con­sti­tu­tio est poe­na­li­bus ac­tio­ni­bus he­redes non te­ne­ri nec ce­te­ros qui­dem suc­ces­so­res: id­cir­co nec fur­ti con­ve­ni­ri pos­sunt. sed quam­vis fur­ti ac­tio­ne non te­nean­tur, at­ta­men ad ex­hi­ben­dum ac­tio­ne te­ne­ri eos opor­tet, si pos­si­deant aut do­lo fe­ce­rint quo mi­nus pos­si­deant: sed enim et vin­di­ca­tio­ne te­ne­bun­tur re ex­hi­bi­ta. item con­dic­tio ad­ver­sus eos com­pe­tit. 1He­redem au­tem fur­ti age­re pos­se ae­que con­stat: ex­se­cu­tio enim quo­run­dam de­lic­to­rum he­redi­bus da­ta est: ita et le­gis Aqui­liae ac­tio­nem he­res ha­bet. sed in­iu­ria­rum ac­tio he­redi non com­pe­tit. 2Non tan­tum in fur­ti, ve­rum in ce­te­ris quo­que ac­tio­ni­bus, quae ex de­lic­tis oriun­tur, si­ve ci­vi­les sunt si­ve ho­no­ra­riae, id pla­cet, ut no­xa ca­put se­qua­tur.

1Ulpianus, On Sabinus, Book XLV. The Civil Law prescribes that heirs shall not be liable to penal actions any more than other successors, and therefore they cannot be sued for theft. But although they are not liable in an action of theft, still they will be in one to compel them to produce the property in question, if they have possession of it, or if they have committed fraud to avoid being in possession; since when it is once produced, they will be liable to be sued for its recovery. A personal action will also lie against them. 1It is also established that an heir can bring an action of theft, as the prosecution of certain crimes is conceded to heirs. In like manner, an heir is entitled to the action granted by the Aquilian Law; but a suit for injury sustained will not lie in his favor. 2Not only in the action of theft, but also in other actions arising from criminal offences, whether they are civil or prætorian, it is decided that the crime follows the person.

2Idem li­bro qua­dra­gen­si­mo ter­tio ad Sa­binum. Num­quam plu­ra de­lic­ta con­cur­ren­tia fa­ciunt, ut ul­lius im­pu­ni­tas de­tur: ne­que enim de­lic­tum ob aliud de­lic­tum mi­nuit poe­nam. 1Qui igi­tur ho­mi­nem sub­ri­puit et oc­ci­dit, quia sub­ri­puit, fur­ti, quia oc­ci­dit, Aqui­lia te­ne­tur, ne­que al­te­ra ha­rum ac­tio­num al­te­ram con­su­mit. 2Idem di­cen­dum, si ra­puit et oc­ci­dit: nam et vi bo­no­rum rap­to­rum et Aqui­lia te­ne­bi­tur. 3Quae­si­tum est, si con­dic­tus fue­rit ex cau­sa fur­ti­va, an ni­hi­lo mi­nus le­ge Aqui­lia agi pos­sit. et scrip­sit Pom­po­nius agi pos­se, quia al­te­rius aes­ti­ma­tio­nis est le­gis Aqui­liae ac­tio, al­te­rius con­dic­tio ex cau­sa fur­ti­va: nam­que Aqui­lia eam aes­ti­ma­tio­nem com­plec­ti­tur, quan­ti eo an­no plu­ri­mi fuit, con­dic­tio au­tem ex cau­sa fur­ti­va non egre­di­tur re­tror­sum iu­di­cii ac­ci­pien­di tem­pus. sed si ser­vus sit, qui haec ad­mi­sit, ex qua­cum­que ac­tio­ne no­xae fue­rit de­di­tus, per­emp­ta est al­te­ra ac­tio. 4Item si quis sub­rep­tum fla­gel­lo ce­ci­de­rit, dua­bus ac­tio­ni­bus te­ne­tur fur­ti et in­iu­ria­rum: et si for­te hunc eun­dem oc­ci­de­rit, tri­bus ac­tio­ni­bus te­ne­bi­tur. 5Item si quis an­cil­lam alie­nam sub­ri­puit et fla­gi­ta­ve­rit, utra­que ac­tio­ne te­ne­bi­tur, nam et ser­vi cor­rup­ti agi pot­erit et fur­ti. 6Item si quis ser­vum vul­ne­ra­vit, quem sub­ri­pue­rat, ae­que duae ac­tio­nes lo­cum ha­be­bunt Aqui­liae et fur­ti.

2The Same, On Sabinus, Book XLIII. Where several criminal offences take place at the same time, this does not cause impunity to be granted for any of them, for one crime does not diminish the penalty for another. 1Therefore, where anyone robs a man and kills him, he is liable to an action of theft, for the reason that he robbed him, and to the Aquilian action, because he killed him; and neither one of these actions destroys the other. 2The same thing must be said if he robbed him by violence, and then killed him, for he will be liable to an action for robbery with violence, as well as under the Aquilian Law. 3Where a personal suit is brought for a slave who has committed theft, the question arose, whether one could also be brought under the Aquilian Law. Pomponius says that this can be done, because the action under the Aquilian Law calls for a different valuation than the one to recover property which has been stolen; as the Aquilian Law includes the greatest value of the stolen article during the year preceding the offence; but the personal action for recovery on account of theft does not go further back than the time of the joinder of issue. If, however, a slave has committed these offences, no matter under what noxal proceeding he may be surrendered, the other right of action will be extinguished. 4Likewise, if anyone beats a stolen slave with a scourge, he will be liable to two actions; that of theft and that of injury sustained; and if he should kill him, he will be liable to three actions. 5Again, if anyone has stolen a female slave belonging to another, and debauched her, he will be liable to two actions; for he can be sued for having corrupted the slave, as well as for having stolen her. 6Moreover, if anyone should wound a slave whom he has stolen, there will be ground for two actions against him; that authorized by the Aquilian Law, and the action of theft.

3Idem li­bro se­cun­do de of­fi­cio pro­con­su­lis. Si quis ac­tio­nem, quae ex ma­le­fi­ciis ori­tur, ve­lit ex­se­qui: si qui­dem pe­cu­nia­ri­ter age­re ve­lit, ad ius or­di­na­rium re­mit­ten­dus erit nec co­gen­dus erit in cri­men sub­scri­be­re: enim­ve­ro si ex­tra or­di­nem eius rei poe­nam ex­er­ce­ri ve­lit, tunc sub­scri­be­re eum in cri­men opor­te­bit.

3The Same, On the Duties of Proconsul, Book II. Where anyone desires to bring an action based on a criminal offence, and intends to do so for his own pecuniary benefit, he must have recourse to the ordinary proceeding, and cannot be compelled to prosecute the culprit for the crime. If, however, he wishes to sue for the penalty under the extraordinary proceeding, he must then sign the accusation of the crime.