Corpus iurisprudentiae Romanae

Repertorium zu den Quellen des römischen Rechts

Digesta Iustiniani Augusti

Recognovit Mommsen (1870) et retractavit Krüger (1928)
Convertit in Anglica lingua Scott (1932)
Dig. XLVI2,
De novationibus et delegationibus
Liber quadragesimus sextus
II.

De novationibus et delegationibus

(Concerning Novations and Delegations.)

1Ul­pia­nus li­bro qua­dra­gen­si­mo sex­to ad Sa­binum. No­va­tio est prio­ris de­bi­ti in aliam ob­li­ga­tio­nem vel ci­vi­lem vel na­tu­ra­lem trans­fu­sio at­que trans­la­tio, hoc est cum ex prae­ce­den­ti cau­sa ita no­va con­sti­tua­tur, ut prior per­ema­tur. no­va­tio enim a no­vo no­men ac­ce­pit et a no­va ob­li­ga­tio­ne. 1Il­lud non in­ter­est, qua­lis pro­ces­sit ob­li­ga­tio, utrum na­tu­ra­lis an ci­vi­lis an ho­no­ra­ria, et utrum ver­bis an re an con­sen­su: qua­lis­cum­que igi­tur ob­li­ga­tio sit, quae prae­ces­sit, no­va­ri ver­bis pot­est, dum­mo­do se­quens ob­li­ga­tio aut ci­vi­li­ter te­n­eat aut na­tu­ra­li­ter: ut pu­ta si pu­pil­lus si­ne tu­to­ris auc­to­ri­ta­te pro­mi­se­rit.

1Ulpianus, On Sabinus, Book XLVI. Novation is the transfer and transmission of a former debt into another civil or natural obligation; that is to say, when from the preceding liability a new one is created in such a way that the former is destroyed; for novation derives its name from the term “new,” and from a fresh obligation. 1It is of no importance what the character of the first obligation may be, whether it is natural, civil, or prætorian, or whether it is oral, real, or based on consent. Therefore, whatever it is, it can be verbally renewed, provided the following obligation is binding either civilly or naturally, for instance, where a ward promises without the authority of his guardian.

2Idem li­bro qua­dra­gen­si­mo oc­ta­vo ad Sa­binum. Om­nes res trans­ire in no­va­tio­nem pos­sunt: quod­cum­que enim si­ve ver­bis con­trac­tum est si­ve non ver­bis, no­va­ri pot­est et trans­ire in ver­bo­rum ob­li­ga­tio­nem ex qua­cum­que ob­li­ga­tio­ne, dum­mo­do scia­mus no­va­tio­nem ita de­mum fie­ri, si hoc aga­tur, ut no­ve­tur ob­li­ga­tio: ce­te­rum si non hoc aga­tur, duae erunt ob­li­ga­tio­nes.

2The Same, On Sabinus, Book XLVIII. All matters are susceptible of novation, for every contract, whether verbal or otherwise, can be substituted in this manner, and pass from any kind of an obligation whatsoever into an oral one, provided we know that this is done in such a way that the obligation is changed in this way. If, however, this is not the case, there will be two obligations.

3Pom­po­nius li­bro pri­mo ad Sa­binum. Cui bo­nis in­ter­dic­tum est, no­va­re ob­li­ga­tio­nem suam non pot­est, ni­si me­lio­rem suam con­di­cio­nem fe­ce­rit.

3Pomponius, On Sabinus, Book I. A person who has been deprived of the management of his property cannot renew his obligation, unless he renders his position better.

4Ul­pia­nus li­bro quin­to ad Sa­binum. Si usus fruc­tus de­bi­to­rem meum dele­ga­ve­ro ti­bi, non no­va­tur ob­li­ga­tio mea: quam­vis ex­cep­tio­ne do­li vel in fac­tum tu­tus de­beat es­se ad­ver­sus me is qui dele­ga­tus fue­rit, et non so­lum do­nec ma­net ei usus fruc­tus cui dele­ga­vi, sed et­iam post in­ter­itum eius: vi­de­bi­mus quia et­iam hoc in­com­mo­dum sen­tit, si post mor­tem meam ma­neat ei usus fruc­tus. et haec ea­dem di­cen­da sunt in qua­li­bet ob­li­ga­tio­ne per­so­nae co­hae­ren­ti.

4Ulpianus, On Sabinus, Book V. If I delegate to you someone who owes me an usufruct, my obligation is not altered by novation, although he who has been delegated can protect himself against me by an exception on the ground of bad faith, or by one in factum; not only while the usufruct is enjoyed by the person to whom I delegated him, but even after his death, because, after I die, he to whom the usufruct was delegated will continue to hold it to the disadvantage of the debtor. This also applies to all obligations attaching to the person.

5Idem li­bro tri­gen­si­mo quar­to ad Sa­binum. In diem ob­li­ga­tio no­va­ri pot­est et prius quam dies ad­ve­ne­rit. et ge­ne­ra­li­ter con­stat et sti­pu­la­tio­ne in diem fac­ta no­va­tio­nem con­tin­ge­re, sed non sta­tim ex ea sti­pu­la­tio­ne agi pos­se, an­te­quam dies ve­ne­rit.

5The Same, On Sabinus, Book XXXIV. An obligation can be subjected to novation at a prescribed time, and even before the time arrives. Generally speaking, it is settled that a stipulation made for a specified period can become a novation; but that suit cannot be brought under the stipulation before the time arrives.

6Idem li­bro qua­dra­gen­si­mo sex­to ad Sa­binum. Si ita fue­ro sti­pu­la­tus: ‘quan­to mi­nus a Ti­tio de­bi­to­re ex­egis­sem, tan­tum fi­de­iu­bes?’, non fit no­va­tio, quia non hoc agi­tur, ut no­ve­tur. 1Cum pe­cu­niam mu­tuam de­dit quis si­ne sti­pu­la­tio­ne et ex con­ti­nen­ti fe­cit sti­pu­la­tio­nem, unus con­trac­tus est. idem erit di­cen­dum et si an­te sti­pu­la­tio fac­ta est, mox pe­cu­nia nu­me­ra­ta sit.

6The Same, On Sabinus, Book XLVI. If I should stipulate as follows: “Will you be responsible for any amount which I may not be able to collect from Titius, my debtor?” a novation is not created, because the transaction is not for that purpose. 1When anyone has lent money without a stipulation and immediately makes one, there is but one contract. The same thing must be said where the stipulation was made first, and the money counted afterwards.

7Pom­po­nius li­bro vi­cen­si­mo quar­to ad Sa­binum. Cum enim pe­cu­nia mu­tua da­ta sti­pu­la­mur, non pu­to ob­li­ga­tio­nem nu­me­ra­tio­ne nas­ci et de­in­de eam sti­pu­la­tio­ne no­va­ri, quia id agi­tur, ut so­la sti­pu­la­tio te­n­eat, et ma­gis im­plen­dae sti­pu­la­tio­nis gra­tia nu­me­ra­tio in­tel­le­gen­da est fie­ri.

7Pomponius, On Sabinus, Book XXIV. For, when we stipulate for a loan, I do not think that the obligation arises from the counting of the money, and that afterwards the novation is created by the stipulation; because the intention is that there should be but one stipulation, and the counting of the money is understood to be done merely for the purpose of completing the contract.

8Ul­pia­nus li­bro qua­dra­gen­si­mo sex­to ad Sa­binum. Si Sti­chum da­ri sti­pu­la­tus fue­rim et, cum in mo­ra pro­mis­sor es­set, quo mi­nus da­ret, rur­sus eun­dem sti­pu­la­tus fue­ro, de­si­nit pe­ri­cu­lum ad pro­mis­so­rem per­ti­ne­re qua­si mo­ra pur­ga­ta. 1Le­ga­ta vel fi­dei­com­mis­sa si in sti­pu­la­tio­nem fue­rint de­duc­ta et hoc ac­tum, ut no­ve­tur, fiet no­va­tio, si qui­dem pu­re vel in diem fue­rint re­lic­ta, sta­tim, si ve­ro sub con­di­cio­ne, non sta­tim, sed ubi con­di­cio ex­ti­te­rit. nam et alias qui in diem sti­pu­la­tur, sta­tim no­vat, si hoc ac­tum est, cum cer­tum sit diem quan­do­que ven­tu­rum: at qui sub con­di­cio­ne sti­pu­la­tur, non sta­tim no­vat, ni­si con­di­cio ex­ti­te­rit. 2Si quis ita sti­pu­la­tus a Se­io sit: ‘quod a Ti­tio sti­pu­la­tus fue­ro, da­re spon­des?’, an, si post­ea a Ti­tio sti­pu­la­tus sim, fiat no­va­tio so­lus­que te­n­ea­tur Se­ius? et ait Cel­sus no­va­tio­nem fie­ri, si mo­do id ac­tum sit, ut no­ve­tur, id est ut Se­ius de­beat quod Ti­tius pro­mi­sit: nam eo­dem tem­po­re et im­ple­ri prio­ris sti­pu­la­tio­nis con­di­cio­nem et no­va­ri ait, eo­que iu­re uti­mur. 3Idem Cel­sus ait iu­di­ca­tum sol­vi sti­pu­la­tio­ne ac­tio­nem iu­di­ca­ti non no­va­ri, me­ri­to, quia hoc so­lum agi­tur ea sti­pu­la­tio­ne, ut fi­de­ius­so­ri­bus cau­tum sit, non ut ab ob­li­ga­tio­ne iu­di­ca­ti dis­ce­da­tur. 4Si de­cem, quae mi­hi Ti­tius de­bet, aut de­cem, quae Se­ius de­bet, a ter­tio sti­pu­la­tus fue­ro, pu­tat Mar­cel­lus ne­utrum li­be­ra­ri, sed ter­tium eli­ge­re pos­se, pro quo de­cem sol­ve­re ve­lit. 5Si ab alio pro­mis­sam si­bi do­tem ma­ri­tus ab uxo­re do­tis no­mi­ne sti­pu­la­tus sit, non du­pla­ri do­tem, sed fie­ri no­va­tio­nem pla­cet, si hoc ac­tum est: quid enim in­ter­est, ip­sa an alius qui­li­bet pro­mit­tat? quod enim ego de­beo si alius pro­mit­tat, li­be­ra­re me pot­est, si no­va­tio­nis cau­sa hoc fiat: si au­tem non no­van­di ani­mo hoc in­ter­ve­nit, uter­que qui­dem te­ne­tur, sed al­te­ro sol­ven­te al­ter li­be­ra­tur. non ta­men si quis sti­pu­le­tur quod mi­hi de­be­tur, au­fert mi­hi ac­tio­nem, ni­si ex vo­lun­ta­te mea sti­pu­le­tur: li­be­rat au­tem me is qui quod de­beo pro­mit­tit, et­iam­si no­lim.

8Ulpianus, On Sabinus, Book XLVI. If I stipulate for the delivery of Stichus to me, and when the promisor fails to deliver him, I again stipulate for him, the promisor is no longer responsible for the risk, as liability for the default has been released. 1Ad Dig. 46,2,8,1Windscheid: Lehrbuch des Pandektenrechts, 7. Aufl. 1891, Bd. II, § 355, Note 3.Where legacies or trusts are included in the stipulation, and the intention was that it should be subjected to novation, this will take place; and if they were bequeathed absolutely, or to take effect at a certain time, novation occurs immediately. When, however, they were conditional, it will not take place at once, but when the condition is complied with; for, otherwise, where anyone stipulates for a prescribed time, he immediately creates a novation, if such was the intention, as it is certain that the date will arrive at some time or other. But where anyone stipulates under a condition, novation does not become operative immediately unless the condition is fulfilled. 2Where anyone stipulates with Seius, as follows, “Do you promise to pay whatever I stipulate for with Titius?” and I afterwards stipulate with Titius, does a novation take place so that Seius alone will liable? Celsus says that a novation does take place, provided this was the intention, that is to say that Seius should owe what Titius promised to pay. For he asserts that the condition of the first stipulation is complied with and novation occurs at the same time. This is our practice. 3Celsus also says that by the stipulation of paying the judgment, the action to enforce judgment is not subjected to novation; and this is reasonable, because in this stipulation the only thing involved is that a surety shall be provided, and that there shall be no departure from the obligation of the judgment. 4If I stipulate with a third party for the ten aurei which Titius owes me, or the ten which Seius owes me, Marcellus thinks that neither one of them is released, but that the third party can select him for whom he wishes to pay the ten aurei. 5When a husband stipulates with his wife for a dowry which was promised to her by a stranger, the dowry will not be doubled, but it has been decided that a novation will take place, if this was the intention. For what difference does it make whether she or someone else makes the promise? For if another person promises to pay what I owe, he can free me from liability, if this is done for the purpose of novation. If, however, he did not intervene in order to make a novation, both parties will, in fact, be liable; but if one of them pays, the other will be released. Still, if anyone stipulates for what is due to me, he does not deprive me of my right of action, unless he stipulates with my consent; but he who promises what I owe releases me from liability, even if I am unwilling that this shall be done.

9Idem li­bro qua­dra­gen­si­mo sep­ti­mo ad Sa­binum. Si pu­pil­lus si­ne tu­to­ris auc­to­ri­ta­te rem sal­vam fo­re sti­pu­la­tus pu­bes fac­tus ra­tam sti­pu­la­tio­nem ha­bue­rit no­van­di cau­sa, tol­li­tur tu­te­lae ac­tio. si non ha­bue­rit ra­tum, li­cet tu­te­lae egis­set, ha­bet ta­men ad­huc ex sti­pu­la­tu ac­tio­nem: sed iu­dex tu­te­lae non ali­ter con­dem­na­re de­bet, quam si ex sti­pu­la­tio­ne li­be­ra­tio fie­ret. 1Qui sub con­di­cio­ne sti­pu­la­tur, quae om­ni­mo­do ex­sta­tu­ra est, pu­re vi­de­tur sti­pu­la­ri. 2Qui ac­tum sti­pu­la­tur, de­in­de iter, ni­hil agit: item usum fruc­tum sti­pu­la­tus si usum sti­pu­le­tur, ni­hil agit. sed qui iter sti­pu­la­tus ac­tum post­ea sti­pu­le­tur, aliud ma­gis sti­pu­la­tur: aliud est enim iter, aliud ac­tus.

9The Same, On Sabinus, Book XLVII. Ad Dig. 46,2,9 pr.Windscheid: Lehrbuch des Pandektenrechts, 7. Aufl. 1891, Bd. II, § 355, Noten 4, 5.If a ward, having stipulated without the authority of his guardian, arrives at puberty, and ratifies the stipulation for the purpose of making a novation, the right of action on guardianship will be extinguished. If he does not ratify it, even though he brings suit on guardianship, he will also be entitled to one under the stipulation; but the judge, who has jurisdiction of the action on guardianship, ought not to render a decision against the guardian, without releasing him from the stipulation. 1Anyone who stipulates under a condition which is certain to be fulfilled is considered to have stipulated absolutely. 2Where anyone stipulates for a driveway, and afterwards for a right of passage, his act is void. Again, where anyone stipulates for an usufruct, and also for an use, his act will be void. Where, however, he stipulates for a right of passage, and afterwards for a driveway, he stipulates for something in addition, for a right of passage is one thing and the right to drive is another.

10Pau­lus li­bro un­de­ci­mo ad Sa­binum. Cui rec­te sol­vi­tur, is et­iam no­va­re pot­est, ex­cep­to eo, si mi­hi aut Ti­tio sti­pu­la­tus sim: nam Ti­tius no­va­re non pot­est, li­cet rec­te ei sol­vi­tur.

10Paulus, On Sabinus, Book XI. He to whom payment can legally be made can also make a novation, except in the case where I stipulate for myself, or for Titius; for Titius cannot make a novation, although payment can be legally made to him.

11Ul­pia­nus li­bro vi­cen­si­mo sep­ti­mo ad edic­tum. Dele­ga­re est vi­ce sua alium reum da­re cre­di­to­ri vel cui ius­se­rit. 1Fit au­tem dele­ga­tio vel per sti­pu­la­tio­nem vel per li­tis con­tes­ta­tio­nem.

11Ulpianus, On the Edict, Book XXVII. To delegate is to give another debtor to a creditor, or to one whom he may direct, instead of one’s self. 1Delegation takes place either by stipulation, or by joinder of issue in court.

12Pau­lus li­bro tri­gen­si­mo pri­mo ad edic­tum. Si quis dele­ga­ve­rit de­bi­to­rem, qui do­li ma­li ex­cep­tio­ne tue­ri se pos­se scie­bat, si­mi­lis vi­de­bi­tur ei qui do­nat, quon­iam re­mit­te­re ex­cep­tio­nem vi­de­tur. sed si per igno­ran­tiam pro­mi­se­rit cre­di­to­ri, nul­la qui­dem ex­cep­tio­ne ad­ver­sus cre­di­to­rem uti pot­erit, quia il­le suum re­ce­pit: sed is qui dele­ga­vit te­ne­tur con­dic­tio­ne vel in­cer­ti, si non pe­cu­nia so­lu­ta es­set, vel cer­ti, si so­lu­ta es­set, et id­eo, cum ip­se prae­sti­te­rit pe­cu­niam, aget man­da­ti iu­di­cio.

12Paulus, On the Edict, Book XXXI. If anyone should delegate a debtor whom he knew could protect himself by an exception on the ground of fraud, he will resemble a person who makes a gift under such circumstances, as he is considered to rely upon an exception to annul his act. If, however, he promises his creditor through ignorance, he cannot have recourse to an exception against him because the latter receives what is his own; but he who delegated him will be liable in a personal action for recovery, or one for an uncertain amount, if the money was not paid, or for a certain amount if it was paid; and therefore, when he has paid it, he can bring an action on mandate.

13Ul­pia­nus li­bro tri­gen­si­mo oc­ta­vo ad edic­tum. Si non de­bi­to­rem qua­si de­bi­to­rem dele­ga­ve­ro cre­di­to­ri meo, ex­cep­tio lo­cum non ha­be­bit, sed con­dic­tio ad­ver­sus eum qui dele­ga­vit com­pe­tit.

13Ulpianus, On the Edict, Book XXXVIII. If I delegate to my creditor, as my debtor, someone who does not owe me, there will be no ground for an exception, but a personal action will lie against the person who delegated him.

14Idem li­bro sep­ti­mo dis­pu­ta­tio­num. Quo­tiens quod pu­re de­be­tur, no­van­di cau­sa sub con­di­cio­ne pro­mit­ti­tur, non sta­tim fit no­va­tio, sed tunc de­mum, cum con­di­cio ex­ti­te­rit. et id­eo si for­te Sti­chus fue­rit in ob­li­ga­tio­ne et pen­den­te con­di­cio­ne de­ces­se­rit, nec no­va­tio con­tin­get, quia non sub­est res eo tem­po­re, quo con­di­cio im­ple­tur. un­de Mar­cel­lus et si post mo­ram Sti­chus in con­di­cio­na­lem ob­li­ga­tio­nem de­duc­tus sit, pur­ga­ri mo­ram nec in se­quen­tem de­du­ci ob­li­ga­tio­nem pu­tat. 1Sed si quod sub con­di­cio­ne de­be­tur, pu­re quis no­van­di cau­sa sti­pu­le­tur, nec nunc qui­dem sta­tim no­vat, li­cet pu­ra sti­pu­la­tio ali­quid egis­se vi­dea­tur, sed tunc no­va­bit, cum ex­sti­te­rit con­di­cio: et­enim ex­is­tens con­di­cio pri­mam sti­pu­la­tio­nem com­mit­tit com­mis­sam­que in se­cun­dam trans­fert. et id­eo si for­te per­so­na pro­mis­so­ris pen­den­te con­di­cio­ne fue­rit de­por­ta­ta, Mar­cel­lus scri­bit ne qui­dem ex­is­ten­te con­di­cio­ne ul­lam con­tin­ge­re no­va­tio­nem, quon­iam nunc, cum ex­ti­tit con­di­cio, non est per­so­na quae ob­li­ge­tur.

14The Same, Disputations, Book VII. Whenever anything which is absolutely due is promised conditionally, for the purpose of creating a novation, the novation does not take place immediately, but only after the condition has been complied with. Therefore, if Stichus should happen to be the subject of the obligation, and should die while the condition is pending, the novation will occur, because the property, which was the object of the stipulation, was not in existence at the time when the condition was fulfilled. Hence Marcellus thinks that, even if Stichus was included in the conditional obligation, after he who promised him was in default, the default will be purged, and Stichus will not be included in the ensuing obligation. 1Ad Dig. 46,2,14,1Windscheid: Lehrbuch des Pandektenrechts, 7. Aufl. 1891, Bd. II, § 355, Note 3.But where anyone, for the purpose of making a novation, stipulates absolutely for something which is due under a condition, he does not immediately create the novation, although an absolute stipulation seems to produce some effect, but the novation takes place when the condition is fulfilled. For a condition, once having been complied with, renders the first stipulation operative, and transfers it to the second. Therefore, if the promisor should be deported while the condition is pending, Marcellus says that novation will not take place, even if the condition is fulfilled, because there is no one who will be liable when this occurs.

15Iu­lia­nus li­bro ter­tio de­ci­mo di­ges­to­rum. Si cre­di­tor poe­nam sti­pu­la­tus fue­rat, si ad diem pe­cu­nia so­lu­ta non es­set, no­va­tio­ne fac­ta non com­mit­ti­tur sti­pu­la­tio.

15Julianus, Digest, Book XIII. Where a creditor stipulates for a penalty if payment should not be made at the designated time, and a novation takes place, the stipulation does not become operative.

16Flo­ren­ti­nus li­bro oc­ta­vo in­sti­tu­tio­num. Ser­vus nec pe­cu­lia­rem qui­dem ob­li­ga­tio­nem ci­tra vo­lun­ta­tem do­mi­ni no­va­re pot­est, sed ad­icit po­tius ob­li­ga­tio­nem quam pris­ti­nam no­vat.

16Ad Dig. 46,2,16Windscheid: Lehrbuch des Pandektenrechts, 7. Aufl. 1891, Bd. II, § 355, Noten 4, 5.Florentinus, Institutes, Book VIII. A slave cannot make a novation without the consent of his master, even where the obligation involves his peculium, but he rather creates a new obligation than renews the former one.

17Ul­pia­nus li­bro oc­ta­vo ad edic­tum. Dele­ga­re scrip­tu­ra vel nu­tu, ubi fa­ri non pot­est, de­bi­to­rem suum quis pot­est.

17Ulpianus, On the Edict, Book VIII. Anyone can delegate his debtor, either by writing or by a gesture, when he is unable to speak.

18Pau­lus li­bro quin­qua­gen­si­mo sep­ti­mo ad edic­tum. No­va­tio­ne le­gi­ti­me fac­ta li­be­ran­tur hy­po­the­cae et pig­nus, usu­rae non cur­runt.

18Paulus, On the Edict, Book LVII. When novation is properly made, all liens and pledges are released, and interest ceases to be due.

19Idem li­bro se­xa­gen­si­mo no­no ad edic­tum. Do­li ex­cep­tio, quae pot­erat dele­gan­ti op­po­ni, ces­sat in per­so­na cre­di­to­ris, cui quis dele­ga­tus est. idem­que est et in ce­te­ris si­mi­li­bus ex­cep­tio­ni­bus, im­mo et in ea, quae ex se­na­tus con­sul­to fi­lio fa­mi­lias da­tur: nam ad­ver­sus cre­di­to­rem, cui dele­ga­tus est ab eo, qui mu­tuam pe­cu­niam con­tra se­na­tus con­sul­tum de­de­rat, non ute­tur ex­cep­tio­ne, quia ni­hil in ea pro­mis­sio­ne con­tra se­na­tus con­sul­tum fit: tan­to ma­gis, quod hic nec so­lu­tum re­pe­te­re pot­est. di­ver­sum est in mu­lie­re, quae con­tra se­na­tus con­sul­tum pro­mi­sit: nam et in se­cun­da pro­mis­sio­ne in­ter­ces­sio est. idem­que est in mi­no­re, qui cir­cum­scrip­tus dele­ga­tur, quia, si et­iam­nunc mi­nor est, rur­sum cir­cum­ve­ni­tur: di­ver­sum, si iam ex­ces­sit ae­ta­tem vi­gin­ti quin­que an­no­rum, quam­vis ad­huc pos­sit re­sti­tui ad­ver­sus prio­rem cre­di­to­rem. id­eo au­tem de­ne­gan­tur ex­cep­tio­nes ad­ver­sus se­cun­dum cre­di­to­rem, quia in pri­va­tis con­trac­ti­bus et pac­tio­ni­bus non fa­ci­le sci­re pe­ti­tor pot­est, quid in­ter eum qui dele­ga­tus est et de­bi­to­rem ac­tum est aut, et­iam­si sciat, dis­si­mu­la­re de­bet, ne cu­rio­sus vi­dea­tur: et id­eo me­ri­to de­ne­gan­dum est ad­ver­sus eum ex­cep­tio­nem ex per­so­na de­bi­to­ris.

19Ad Dig. 46,2,19Windscheid: Lehrbuch des Pandektenrechts, 7. Aufl. 1891, Bd. II, § 485, Note 18; Bd. II, § 487, Note 3.The Same, On the Edict, Book LXIX. The exception on the ground of fraud, which can be opposed to anyone who delegates his debtor, does not affect the creditor to whom the debtor is delegated. The same rule applies to all similar exceptions, and, indeed, even to that which is granted a son under paternal control by the Decree of the Senate. For he cannot make use of the exception against the creditor to whom he has been delegated by one who lent money contrary to the Decree of the Senate, because, making this promise, nothing is done in violation of the Decree of the Senate, and therefore he cannot recover what he has paid, any more than he can recover what he has paid in court. The case is different where a woman has promised to pay contrary to the Decree of the Senate, for security is included in the second promise. The same rule applies to a minor who, having been deceived, is delegated; for, if he is still a minor, he is deceived a second time. It is otherwise if he has passed the age of twenty-five years, although he still can obtain restitution against his first creditor. Therefore, exceptions against his second creditor are refused him; because in private contracts and agreements the claimant cannot readily ascertain what transactions have taken place between the person delegated and his original debtor; or, even if he does know, he should simulate in order not to appear too inquisitive; and hence it is but reasonable that the exception against the original debtor should be refused him.

20Idem li­bro sep­tua­gen­si­mo se­cun­do ad edic­tum. No­va­re pos­su­mus aut ip­si, si sui iu­ris su­mus, aut per alios, qui vo­lun­ta­te nos­tra sti­pu­lan­tur. 1Pu­pil­lus si­ne tu­to­ris auc­to­ri­ta­te non pot­est no­va­re: tu­tor pot­est, si hoc pu­pil­lo ex­pe­diat: item pro­cu­ra­tor om­nium bo­no­rum.

20The Same, On the Edict, Book LXXII. We can make a novation ourselves, if we are our own masters, or by others who stipulate with our consent. 1A ward cannot make a novation without the authority of his guardian; a guardian can do so, if it is to the interest of his ward, and as agent likewise, if he has charge of all the property of his principal.

21Pom­po­nius li­bro pri­mo ex Plau­tio. Si de­bi­to­rem meum ius­se­ro ti­bi sol­ve­re, non sta­tim tu et­iam sti­pu­lan­do id no­va­re pos­sis, quam­vis de­bi­tor sol­ven­do ti­bi li­be­ra­re­tur.

21Pomponius, On Plautius, Book I. If I order my debtor to pay you, you cannot immediately, while you are stipulating, make a novation, although the debtor, by paying you, will be released.

22Pau­lus li­bro quar­to de­ci­mo ad Plau­tium. Si quis ab­sen­te me a de­bi­to­re meo sti­pu­la­tus est no­van­di ani­mo, ego post­ea ra­tum ha­bue­ro, no­vo ob­li­ga­tio­nem.

22Paulus, On Plautius, Book XIV. If anyone, during my absence, stipulates with my debtor for the purpose of making a novation, and I afterwards ratify his act, I renew the obligation.

23Pom­po­nius li­bro ter­tio ex Plau­tio. Fi­lius pa­tris ac­tio­nem igno­ran­te eo no­va­re non pot­est.

23Pomponius, On Plautius, Book III. A son under paternal control cannot make a novation of the action of his father, without the knowledge of the latter.

24Idem li­bro quin­to ex Plau­tio. No­va­tio non pot­est con­tin­ge­re ea sti­pu­la­tio­ne, quae non com­mit­ti­tur. nec huic con­tra­rium est, quod, si sti­pu­la­tus a Ti­tio fue­ro no­van­di ani­mo sub con­di­cio­ne, quod mi­hi Sem­pro­nius de­bet, et pen­den­te con­di­cio­ne Ti­tius de­ces­se­rit, quam­vis an­te ad­itam he­redi­ta­tem con­di­cio ex­sti­te­rit, no­va­tio fie­ret: hic enim mor­te pro­mis­so­ris non ex­tin­gui­tur sti­pu­la­tio, sed trans­it ad he­redem cu­ius per­so­nam in­ter­im he­redi­tas sus­ti­net.

24The Same, On Plautius, Book V. A novation cannot arise from a stipulation which does not become operative. Nor can it be stated, in opposition to this, that if I stipulate with Titius, with the intention of renewing the debt which Sempronius owes me, under a condition, and while the condition is pending Titius should die, although the condition may have been fulfilled before the estate was entered upon, novation will take place; for, in this instance, the stipulation is not extinguished by the death of the promisor, but passes to the heir who, in the meantime, represents the estate.

25Cel­sus li­bro pri­mo di­ges­to­rum. Non id­eo no­va­re ve­te­rem ob­li­ga­tio­nem quis­quam rec­te pot­est, quod in­ter­dum rec­te ei sol­vi­tur: nam et his, qui in nos­tra po­tes­ta­te sunt, quod ab his cre­di­tum est rec­te in­ter­dum sol­vi­tur, cum ne­mo eo­rum per se no­va­re prio­rem ob­li­ga­tio­nem iu­re pos­sit.

25Celsus, Digest, Book I. No one has a right to renew an old debt by novation, solely because payment can sometimes legally be made to him. For payment can sometimes properly be made to those who are under our control, when none of them can, by himself, in accordance with law, substitute a new obligation for the old one.

26Idem li­bro ter­tio di­ges­to­rum. Si is, cui de­cem Ti­tius, quin­de­cim Se­ius de­be­bat, ab At­tio sti­pu­la­tus est quod il­le aut quod il­le de­beat, da­ri si­bi, no­va­tum utrum­que non est, sed in po­tes­ta­te At­tii est, pro quo ve­lit sol­ve­re et eum li­be­ra­re. fin­ga­mus au­tem ita ac­tum, ut al­ter­utrum da­ret: nam alio­quin utrum­que sti­pu­la­tus vi­de­tur et utrum­que no­va­tum, si no­van­di ani­mo hoc fiat.

26The Same, Digest, Book III. Where a man to whom Titius owes ten aurei, and Seius fifteen, stipulates with Attius that he shall pay him what one or the other of them owes, both the obligations are not subjected to novation; but it is in the power of Attius to pay for whichever one he wishes, and release him. Suppose, however, that it had been agreed that he should pay one or the other of the claims; for otherwise, he would be considered to have stipulated for both, and both would have been subjected to novation, if this had been intended.

27Pa­pi­nia­nus li­bro ter­tio re­spon­so­rum. Emp­tor cum dele­gan­te ven­di­to­re pe­cu­niam ita pro­mit­tit: ‘quid­quid ex ven­di­to da­re fa­ce­re opor­tet’, no­va­tio­ne se­cu­ta usu­ras ne­utri post in­se­cu­ti tem­po­ris de­bet.

27Papinianus, Opinions, Book III. When a purchaser, having been delegated by the vendor, promises money as follows, “Whatever it is necessary to pay, or to do, on account of the sale,” novation takes place; and he does not owe to anyone interest for the following time.

28Idem li­bro se­cun­do de­fi­ni­tio­num. Fun­dum Cor­ne­lia­num sti­pu­la­tus quan­ti fun­dus est post­ea sti­pu­lor: si non no­van­di ani­mo se­cun­da sti­pu­la­tio fac­ta est, ces­sat no­va­tio: se­cun­da ve­ro sti­pu­la­tio te­net, ex qua non fun­dus, sed pe­cu­nia de­be­tur. ita­que si reus pro­mit­ten­di fun­dum sol­vat, se­cun­da sti­pu­la­tio iu­re non tol­li­tur, nec si li­tem ac­tor ex pri­ma con­tes­te­tur. de­ni­que me­lio­re vel de­te­rio­re fac­to si­ne cul­pa de­bi­to­ris post­ea fun­do prae­sens aes­ti­ma­tio fun­do pe­ti­to rec­te con­si­de­re­tur, in al­te­ra ve­ro ea aes­ti­ma­tio venit, quae se­cun­dae sti­pu­la­tio­nis tem­po­re fuit.

28The Same, Definitions, Book II. Having stipulated for the Cornelian Estate, I afterwards stipulated for the value of the land. If the second stipulation was not made with the intention of creating a novation, the novation will not take place; but the second stipulation, by the terms of which not the land, but the money is due, will stand. Therefore, if the promisor should convey the land, the second stipulation will not be extinguished by operation of law, not even when the plaintiff institutes proceedings under the terms of the first one. Finally, if the land, being improved, or having subsequently deteriorated without the fault of the debtor, is claimed, the present estimate may properly be considered; and if, on the other hand, its value is demanded, the appraisement at the time of the second stipulation should be accepted.

29Pau­lus li­bro vi­ce­si­mo quar­to quaes­tio­num. Aliam cau­sam es­se no­va­tio­nis vo­lun­ta­riae, aliam iu­di­cii ac­cep­ti mul­ta ex­em­pla os­ten­dunt. per­it pri­vi­le­gium do­tis et tu­te­lae, si post di­vor­tium dos in sti­pu­la­tio­nem de­du­ca­tur vel post pu­ber­ta­tem tu­te­lae ac­tio no­ve­tur, si id spe­cia­li­ter ac­tum est: quod ne­mo di­xit li­te con­tes­ta­ta: ne­que enim de­te­rio­rem cau­sam nos­tram fa­ci­mus ac­tio­nem ex­er­cen­tes, sed me­lio­rem, ut so­let di­ci in his ac­tio­ni­bus, quae tem­po­re vel mor­te fi­ni­ri pos­sunt.

29Ad Dig. 46,2,29ROHGE, Bd. 11 (1874), Nr. 27, S. 69: Natur der Judicatsklage.Windscheid: Lehrbuch des Pandektenrechts, 7. Aufl. 1891, Bd. II, § 354, Note 15.Paulus, Questions, Book XXIV. There are many examples which show the distinction existing between” a voluntary novation, and one derived from a judgment. The privileges of dowry and guardianship are lost, if the dowry is included in the stipulation after a divorce has taken place, or the action of guardianship is renewed by novation after puberty; if this was the express intention which was not referred to by anyone when issue was joined. For, in bringing suit, we do not render our position worse but better, as is usually said with reference to actions which can be terminated by lapse of time, or by death.

30Idem li­bro quin­to re­spon­so­rum. Pau­lus re­spon­dit, si cre­di­tor a Sem­pro­nio no­van­di ani­mo sti­pu­la­tus es­set ita, ut a pri­ma ob­li­ga­tio­ne in uni­ver­sum dis­ce­de­re­tur, rur­sum eas­dem res a pos­te­rio­re de­bi­to­re si­ne con­sen­su prio­ris ob­li­ga­ri non pos­se.

30Ad Dig. 46,2,30Windscheid: Lehrbuch des Pandektenrechts, 7. Aufl. 1891, Bd. I, § 233b, Note 2.The Same, Opinions, Book V. Paulus gave it as his opinion that if a creditor, with the intention of making a novation, should stipulate with Sempronius in such a way as to entirely abandon the first obligation, the same property could not be encumbered by the second debtor without the consent of the first.

31Ve­nu­leius li­bro ter­tio sti­pu­la­tio­num. Si rem ali­quam da­ri sti­pu­la­tus sum, de­in­de ean­dem sub con­di­cio­ne no­van­di ani­mo ab eo­dem sti­pu­ler, ma­ne­re opor­tet rem in re­bus hu­ma­nis, ut no­va­tio­ni lo­cus sit, ni­si si per pro­mis­so­rem ste­te­rit, quo mi­nus da­ret. id­eo­que si ho­mi­nem mi­hi da­re te opor­teat et in mo­ra fue­ris, quo mi­nus da­res, et­iam de­func­to eo te­ne­ris: et si, prius­quam de­ce­de­ret, cum iam mo­ra fac­ta sit, eun­dem a te sub con­di­cio­ne sti­pu­la­tus fue­ro et ser­vus post­ea de­ces­se­rit, de­in­de con­di­cio ex­sti­te­rit, cum iam ex sti­pu­la­tu ob­li­ga­tus es mi­hi, no­va­tio quo­que fiet. 1Si duo rei sti­pu­lan­di sint, an al­ter ius no­van­di ha­beat, quae­ri­tur et quid iu­ris unus­quis­que si­bi ad­quisie­rit. fe­re au­tem con­ve­nit et uni rec­te sol­vi et unum iu­di­cium pe­ten­tem to­tam rem in li­tem de­du­ce­re, item unius ac­cep­ti­la­tio­ne per­emi utris­que ob­li­ga­tio­nem: ex qui­bus col­li­gi­tur unum­quem­que per­in­de si­bi ad­quisis­se, ac si so­lus sti­pu­la­tus es­set, ex­cep­to eo quod et­iam fac­to eius, cum quo com­mu­ne ius sti­pu­lan­tis est, amit­te­re de­bi­to­rem pot­est. se­cun­dum quae si unus ab ali­quo sti­pu­le­tur, no­va­tio­ne quo­que li­be­ra­re eum ab al­te­ro pot­erit, cum id spe­cia­li­ter agit, eo ma­gis cum eam sti­pu­la­tio­nem si­mi­lem es­se so­lu­tio­ni ex­is­ti­me­mus. alio­quin quid di­ce­mus, si unus dele­ga­ve­rit cre­di­to­ri suo com­mu­nem de­bi­to­rem is­que ab eo sti­pu­la­tus fue­rit? aut mu­lier fun­dum ius­se­rit do­ti pro­mit­te­re vi­ro, vel nup­tu­ra ip­si do­ti eum pro­mi­se­rit? nam de­bi­tor ab utro­que li­be­ra­bi­tur.

31Venuleius, Stipulations, Book III. If I stipulate for something to be given me, and I afterwards stipulate for the same thing with the same person under a condition, with the intention of making a novation, the property must remain in existence in order for there to be ground for the novation, unless the promisor was required to give it. Therefore, if you are obliged to deliver me a slave, and you are in default in doing so, you will be liable even if the slave should die, and if, before he dies, you are already in default, and I stipulate with you for the same slave under a condition, and the slave afterwards dies, and then the condition is fulfilled, as you are already liable to me under the stipulation, novation will alscr take place. 1Ad Dig. 46,2,31,1ROHGE, Bd. 4 (1872), S. 217: Liberation eines Schuldners ohne dessen Wissen durch Zahlung bez. Angabe an Zahlungsstatt, Novation eines Dritten.ROHGE, Bd. 16 (1875), Nr. 82, S. 328: Ersatzanspruch aus der Tilgung bezw. Uebernahme der Schuld eines Andern.Windscheid: Lehrbuch des Pandektenrechts, 7. Aufl. 1891, Bd. II, § 295, Note 5; Bd. II, § 354, Note 15.Where there are two joint-stipulators, the question arises whether one of them has the right to make a novation, and what right each acquires for himself. Generally speaking, it is established that payment may properly be made to one, and that if one institutes proceedings he brings the entire matter into court, just as where one is released, the obligation of both is extinguished. From this it may be gathered that each of them acquires for himself, just as if he alone had stipulated; except that each of them, by the act of him with whom the stipulation was jointly made, can lose his debtor. According to this, if one of the joint-stipulators enters into another agreement with a third party, he can, by novation, release him from liability to the other joint-stipulator, if such was his express intention; and there is all the more reason for this, as we think that the stipulation resembles payment. Otherwise, what shall we say if one of them delegates the common debtor to his creditor, and the latter stipulates with him; or a woman orders a tract of land to be promised to her husband by way of dowry; or, if she was about to marry him, she should promise him the land as dowry? The debtor would be released, so far as both parties are concerned.

32Pau­lus li­bro pri­mo ad Ne­ra­tium. Te ho­mi­nem et Se­ium de­cem mi­hi da­re opor­tet: sti­pu­lor ab al­te­ro no­van­di cau­sa ita: ‘quod te aut Se­ium da­re opor­tet’: utrum­que no­va­tur. Pau­lus: me­ri­to, quia utrum­que in pos­te­rio­rem de­du­ci­tur sti­pu­la­tio­nem.

32Paulus, On Neratius, Book I. You are obliged to deliver me a slave, and Seius must pay me ten aurei. I stipulate for the purpose of making a novation with one of you, as follows, “What you, or Seius must give.” Both obligations are subjected to novation. Paulus: This is reasonable, because both of them are included in the last stipulation.

33Try­pho­ni­nus li­bro sep­ti­mo dis­pu­ta­tio­num. Si Ti­tius do­na­re mi­hi vo­lens dele­ga­tus a me cre­di­to­ri meo sti­pu­lan­ti spopon­dit, non ha­be­bit ad­ver­sus eum il­lam ex­cep­tio­nem, ut qua­te­nus fa­ce­re pot­est con­dem­ne­tur: nam ad­ver­sus me ta­li de­fen­sio­ne me­ri­to ute­ba­tur, quia do­na­tum ab eo pe­te­bam, cre­di­tor au­tem de­bi­tum per­se­qui­tur.

33Tryphoninus, Disputations, Book VII. If Titius, desiring to make a donation to me, and having been delegated by me, promises my creditor, who is the stipulator, he will not be entitled to use the exception against him in such a way as to have judgment rendered against him to the extent of his means; but he can properly make such a defence against me, because I demanded what he had already given him. The creditor, however, can collect the debt.

34Gaius li­bro ter­tio de ver­bo­rum ob­li­ga­tio­ni­bus. Du­bi­ta­ri non de­bet, quin fi­lius ser­vus­ve, cui ad­mi­nis­tra­tio pe­cu­lii per­mis­sa est, no­van­di quo­que pe­cu­lia­ria de­bi­ta ius ha­beat, uti­que si ip­si sti­pu­len­tur, ma­xi­me si et­iam me­lio­rem suam con­di­cio­nem eo mo­do fa­ciunt. nam si alium iu­beant sti­pu­la­ri, in­ter­est, utrum do­nan­di ani­mo alium iu­beant sti­pu­la­ri an ut ip­si fi­lio ser­vo­ve neg­otium ge­rat: quo no­mi­ne et­iam man­da­ti ac­tio pe­cu­lio ad­quiri­tur. 1Ad­gna­tum fu­rio­si aut prod­igi cu­ra­to­rem no­van­di ius ha­be­re mi­ni­me du­bi­tan­dum est, si hoc fu­rio­so vel prod­igo ex­pe­diat. 2In sum­ma ad­mo­nen­di su­mus ni­hil ve­ta­re una sti­pu­la­tio­ne plu­res ob­li­ga­tio­nes no­va­ri, vel­uti si ita sti­pu­le­mur: ‘quod Ti­tium et Se­ium mi­hi da­re opor­tet, id da­ri spon­des?’ li­cet enim ex di­ver­sis cau­sis sin­gu­li fue­rant ob­li­ga­ti, utri­que ta­men no­va­tio­nis iu­re li­be­ran­tur, cum utrius­que ob­li­ga­tio in hu­ius per­so­nam, a quo nunc sti­pu­le­mur, con­fluat.

34Gaius, On Oral Obligations, Book III. It cannot be doubted that a son under paternal control or a slave who is permitted to manage his own peculium has also the right to make the debts of the peculium the subject of novation, if the parties stipulate; and this is by all means the case if his condition will be improved by doing so. For if he directs a third party to stipulate, it makes a difference whether this is done with the intention of making a donation, or in order that he may transact the business of the son or the slave, and on this ground the action on mandate with reference to the peculium is acquired by them. 1There is no doubt whatever that the relative of an insane person, or the curator of a spendthrift, has the right of novation, if this is to the advantage of the said insane person or spendthrift. 2In a word, we should remember that there is nothing to prevent the novation of several obligations by one agreement, as for instance, if we stipulate as follows, “Do you promise to pay what Titius and Seius are obliged to pay me?” for although they are liable for different reasons, still both are released by the right of novation, as the liability of both is united in the person of him with whom we now stipulate.