1Ulpianus, On the Edict, Book LXVII. 1This interdict is commonly called Quod legatorum. 2It is also for the purpose of obtaining possession. It has for its object the restoration to the heir of everything belonging to the estate of which a legatee, against the consent of the heir, has taken possession. For it seemed perfectly just to the Prætor that anyone should not define his rights himself, by taking possession of the legacy, but should first apply to the heir. Therefore the Prætor, by means of this interdict, places in the hands of the heir property which is in the possession of others as legacies, so that the legatees can sue the heir. 3This interdict, on the ground of public convenience, is said to extend to the heir of the heir, both civil and prætorian, as well as to other successors. 4But as it is sometimes uncertain whether anyone has possession of property as legatee, as heir, or as possessor under the Prætorian Edict, Arrian very properly says that proceedings should, be instituted to claim the estate, and that this interdict ought to be granted whether anyone in possession is liable under it as an heir, a possessor, or a legatee; just as we are accustomed to do when it is doubtful which of two actions should be brought; for we propose two actions, alleging that we can obtain what we are entitled to by one or the other of them. 5Ad Dig. 43,3,1,5Windscheid: Lehrbuch des Pandektenrechts, 7. Aufl. 1891, Bd. III, § 676, Note 22.When anyone has possession of property through a donation mortis causa, this interdict will not apply; because, of course, the Falcidian portion will remain in possession of the heir by operation of law, even though all the property has been actually transferred. 6Anyone who has received a preferred legacy is liable under this interdict, but only for what he is legally entitled to as a bequest, and not for that part of the estate which he holds in the capacity of heir. The same rule will apply to a legacy bequeathed to an heir in any other way, for, in this case, it must be decided that the interdict will not be applicable to that part of the estate to which he is entitled as heir. 7Where the Prætor says, “or has ceased to hold possession by fraud,” we must understand this to mean if he has ceased to have the power to make restitution. 8Hence the question arises, if the right of usufruct or use is bequeathed to anyone, and he takes possession of it, can he be compelled to restore it by the provisions of this interdict? The difficulty is that neither the usufruct nor the use can be actually possessed, but they are rather held. It can, however, be maintained that an interdict will lie. The same rule applies to the bequest of a servitude. 9The question arises, where anyone is placed in possession of an estate for the preservation of legacies, whether he can be compelled by this interdict to make restitution. The difficulty in the first place, is, that he who is placed in possession of the property for the purpose of insuring the payment of the legacies is not actually in possession, but rather has charge of the property; and in the second place, because this has been authorized by the Prætor. It will be safer to hold, however, that this interdict will lie; especially if security has already been given for the legacies, and the legatee does not withdraw, for then he is considered to have possession. 10We can not only say the legatee possesses the property by virtue of the legacies, but also that his heir and other successors can possess the same. 11Where the Prætor says, “with the consent of him to whom the property belongs,” this must be understood to signify that, if permission to take possession had been granted to the legatee after the estate has been entered. upon, or prætorian possession has been obtained, the interdict will not lie; because if this is done before the estate has been entered upon, or the consent to prætorian possession has been secured, it may properly be held that this will not prejudice him, if he desires to avail himself of the interdict. 12Where two articles are bequeathed, and one of them is taken with the consent of the heir, and the other without it, the result will be that one of them can be recovered, and the other cannot. The same rule should be adopted with reference to a single article, a part of which is taken with the consent of the heir, and a part without it, for he can only be deprived of a portion of the same by means of an interdict. 13It must be held that there will be ground for this interdict, if possession has begun to be taken by you, or by someone to whose place you have succeeded. We understand one person to have succeeded to the place of another when he succeeds to the entire property, or merely to part of it. 14Possession is always a benefit when it has been begun with the consent of him to whom the property belongs. If, however, the consent of the owner is not obtained until afterwards, it will still benefit the possessor. Therefore, if anyone begins to hold possession with the consent of him who has an interest in the property, and his consent is afterwards withdrawn, this will not prejudice him, because he began to hold possession with the consent of the party interested. 15If one of two heirs, or any other persons who have an interest in the property, gives his consent to possession of the same by the legatee, and the other does not, it is evident that an interdict will only lie against the one who refused his consent. 16Where the Prætor says, “unless security is furnished,” we should understand this to mean if the security continues to exist; for if it does not, the legatee will be placed in possession of the property of the estate for the purpose of insuring the payment of the legacies. 17I think that proper security should be furnished to the legatee either directly by operation of law, or in such a way that he can obtain it by an action on mandate, and then there will be ground for the interdict. 18If security is given for certain property, and not for some other, there will be no difficulty in instituting proceedings under the Edict with reference to the property for which security has been furnished, but this cannot be done to compel the return of the other.

2Paulus, On the Edict, Book LXIII. The case is different if anything has afterwards been added to the legacy, for, in this case, the sureties will be liable for the entire amount. 1Where the Prætor says, “if the prætorian possessor of the estate is not required to give security,” we must understand this to mean, if he is ready to give it. Hence, he should not offer to furnish security, but should not delay to do so if the legatee demands it. 2When anyone does not make restitution, judgment to the amount of his interest should be rendered against him under this interdict. 3If the legatee is satisfied with a mere promise, the interdict should be granted. The same must be said, if the legatee refused to be secured by pledges. 4If the legatee was to blame for security not having been given, even though none was furnished, he will be liable under the interdict. If, however, he was to blame for security not having been given, but, at the time that the interdict was issued, he was ready to accept security, the interdict will not lie, unless security was given. But if the possessor under the Prætorian Edict was responsible for security not having been given, but was afterwards ready to furnish it, the interdict will lie; for the time when it was issued is taken into consideration.