1Ulpianus, On the Duties of Proconsul, Book I. Those who are more than twenty years of age cannot demand their freedom, if any of the price for which they have been sold should come into their hands. Where anyone has suffered himself to be sold for any other reason, even though he may be over twenty years of age, he can demand his freedom. 1The right to demand his freedom should not be refused a minor under twenty years of age, for the above-mentioned reason, unless he remained in slavery after reaching the age of twenty years; for then, if he had shared in the price, it must be said that the right to demand his freedom will be refused him.

2Marcellus, Digest, Book XXIV. A certain man extorted a slave from Titius by violence, and directed him to be free by his will. The slave will not become free, even if the testator died solvent; for otherwise, Titius will be defrauded, as he can bring an action against the heir of the deceased on the ground that the bequest of freedom was void; but if the slave should obtain his freedom, Titius will not be entitled to an action, because the heir will not be held to have gained anything by the fraud of the deceased.

3Pomponius, Letters and Various Passages, Book XI. Permission to demand their freedom is denied those who have suffered themselves to be sold. I ask whether these decrees of the Senate also apply to children born of women who have suffered themselves to be sold. There can be no doubt that a woman of over twenty years of age, who has suffered herself to be sold, will be refused permission to demand her freedom. Nor should it be granted to those children born to her during the time of her servitude.

4Paulus, Questions, Book XII. “Licinnius Rufinus, to Julius Paulus: A slave who was entitled to freedom under the terms of a trust, permitted himself to be sold after having reached his twentieth year. I ask whether he shall be forbidden to demand his freedom.” The example of a man who is free causes me some difficulty; for if the slave should have permitted himself to be sold after having obtained his freedom, he would be refused permission to demand it; nor should he be understood to be in a better position when, being in slavery, he permitted himself to be sold, than if he had done so after having obtained his freedom. On the other hand, however, a difficulty arises, because in the case in question the sale is valid and the man can be sold, but in the case of a freeman the sale is void, and there is nothing to be sold. Therefore, I ask that you give me the most complete information on this point. The answer was that the sale of a slave as well as that of a man who is free can be contracted for, and a stipulation providing against eviction can be entered into. For, in this instance, we do not refer to anyone who knowingly purchases a man who is free, as a right to demand his freedom is not refused him as against the purchaser. He, however, who is still a slave, can be sold even against his own consent, although he is acting fraudulently when he conceals his condition, as it is in his power immediately to obtain his freedom, but he cannot be blamed when he is not yet entitled to be free. Suppose that a slave, who is to be free conditionally, suffers himself to be sold; no one will say that he has not the right to demand his freedom, in case the condition, which is not in his power, should be fulfilled; and, indeed, I think that the same rule will apply if it was in his power to comply with it. In the case proposed, it will be better to adopt the opinion that he should not be permitted to demand his freedom, if he could have done so, and preferred to let himself be sold; because he is unworthy of the aid of the Prætor having jurisdiction over trusts.

No translation given.