Corpus iurisprudentiae Romanae

Repertorium zu den Quellen des römischen Rechts

Digesta Iustiniani Augusti

Recognovit Mommsen (1870) et retractavit Krüger (1928)
Convertit in Anglica lingua Scott (1932)
Dig. XXXV3,
Si cui plus, quam per legem Falcidiam licuerit, legatum esse dicetur
Liber trigesimus quintus
III.

Si cui plus, quam per legem Falcidiam licuerit, legatum esse dicetur

(Where More is Said to Have Been Bequeathed to Anyone Than is Permitted by the Falcidian Law.)

1Ul­pia­nus li­bro sep­tua­ge­si­mo no­no ad edic­tum. Si cui plus quam li­cue­rit le­ge­tur et du­bi­ta­ri ius­te pos­sit, utrum lex Fal­ci­dia lo­cum ha­bi­tu­ra est nec ne, sub­ve­nit prae­tor he­redi, ut ei le­ga­ta­rius sa­tis­det, ut, si ap­pa­rue­rit eum am­plius le­ga­to­rum no­mi­ne ce­pis­se quam e le­ge Fal­ci­dia ca­pe­re li­ce­bit, quan­ti ea res erit, tan­tam pe­cu­niam det do­lus­que ma­lus ab eo afu­tu­rus sit. 1Ne­que in­ter­est, utrum in pri­mis ta­bu­lis hoc fiat an in pu­pil­la­ri­bus an in utris­que: et­enim le­gem Fal­ci­diam se­mel es­se ad­mit­ten­dam, et­iam­si du­plex sit tes­ta­men­tum, iam con­ve­nit, con­tri­bu­tis le­ga­tis tam his, quae ab ip­so pu­pil­lo quam his, quae a sub­sti­tu­to im­pu­be­ri re­lic­ta sunt. 2Si non fuis­set in­ter­po­si­ta sti­pu­la­tio ex per­so­na pu­pil­li, tu­te­lae ac­tio he­redi pu­pil­li ad­ver­sus tu­to­rem com­pe­tit. sed ut Pom­po­nius ait, et ip­si pu­pil­lo et he­redi eius pot­erit com­mit­ti sti­pu­la­tio, ip­si quo ca­su vi­vo eo Fal­ci­dia in­ci­pit lo­cum ha­be­re. de tu­te­lae quo­que ac­tio­ne idem scri­bit. 3Mar­cel­lus ait: qui qua­drin­gen­ta in bo­nis ha­be­bat, in­pu­be­rem fi­lium he­redem in­sti­tuit ei­que sub­sti­tuit Ti­tium et Se­ium: ni­hil a pu­pil­lo tes­ta­tor le­ga­vit, sed a Ti­tio tre­cen­ta: utrum du­cen­ta, in­quit, prae­sta­bun­tur an cen­tum quin­qua­gin­ta? nam tre­cen­ta nul­lo mo­do eum prae­sta­re. mi­hi vi­de­tur ve­rius non am­plius eum par­te sua ero­ga­re com­pel­li, cer­te nec mi­nus: se­cun­dum quod eve­ni­ret, ut non so­li com­mit­ta­tur sti­pu­la­tio, sed om­ni­bus he­redi­bus in­ter­po­nen­da est, sed cau­sa co­gni­ta. 4Fal­ci­diam lo­cum ha­be­re et le­ga­to­rum mo­dus fa­cit et ae­ris alie­ni onus. et si qui­dem evi­dens aes alie­num est vel cer­tum, fa­ci­lis est com­pu­ta­tio: si au­tem ad­huc in­cer­tum est, quia for­te vel con­di­cio eius pen­det vel cre­di­tor li­tem con­tes­ta­tus est et nec­dum lis fi­ni­ta est, du­bi­ta­bi­tur, quan­tum le­ga­ta­riis de­bea­tur prop­ter in­cer­tum. 5Ho­die ta­men sub­si­mi­le ali­quid fit in fi­dei­com­mis­sis. 6Cum di­ci­tur lex Fal­ci­dia lo­cum ha­be­re, ar­bi­ter da­ri so­let ad in­eun­dam quan­ti­ta­tem bo­no­rum, tam­et­si unus ali­quid mo­di­cum fi­dei­com­mis­sum per­se­qua­tur: quae com­pu­ta­tio prae­iu­di­ca­re non de­bet ce­te­ris, qui ad ar­bi­trum mis­si non sunt. so­let ta­men ab he­rede et­iam ce­te­ris de­nun­tia­ri fi­dei­com­mis­sa­riis, ut ve­niant ad ar­bi­trum ibi­que cau­sam suam agant, ple­rum­que et cre­di­to­ri­bus, ut de ae­re alie­no pro­bent. ha­bet ta­men ra­tio­nem in le­ga­ta­riis, item in fi­dei­com­mis­sa­riis, ut, si of­fe­rat in­te­grum quod re­lic­tum est he­res de­si­de­rans ca­ve­re si­bi hac sti­pu­la­tio­ne, au­dia­tur. 7Si le­ga­ta quae­dam prae­sen­ti die re­lic­ta sint, quae­dam sub con­di­cio­ne, in­ter­po­nen­da erit is­ta sti­pu­la­tio prop­ter le­ga­ta con­di­cio­na­lia, dum­mo­do ea le­ga­ta, quae prae­sen­ti sint, in­te­gra sol­van­tur. Iu­lia­nus de­ni­que scri­bit, si pu­re et sub con­di­cio­ne le­ga­ta fue­rint ne ex­sis­ten­te con­di­cio­ne lex Fal­ci­dia lo­cum ha­beat, non ali­ter le­ga­to­rum, quae pu­re da­ta sunt, ac­tio­nem da­ri de­be­re, quam si cau­tum fue­rit he­redi ‘quan­to am­plius, quam per le­gem Fal­ci­diam li­cue­rit, ce­pe­rit’. 8Idem Iu­lia­nus scri­bit eum, cui qua­drans sub con­di­cio­ne et do­drans pu­re le­ga­tus est, ca­ve­re de­be­re ‘quan­to am­plius, quam per le­gem Fal­ci­diam li­ceat, ce­pe­rit, red­di’. 9Haec sti­pu­la­tio id­eo lo­cum ha­bet, quia, et­si re­pe­ti pot­est id quod so­lu­tum est, ta­men fie­ri pot­est, ut non sit sol­ven­do is cui so­lu­tum est ac per hoc per­eat quod da­tum est. 10In mor­tis cau­sa quo­que do­na­tio­ni­bus pot­est di­ci hanc sti­pu­la­tio­nem es­se in­ter­po­nen­dam. 11Haec ver­ba sti­pu­la­tio­nis ‘quod am­plius le­ga­to­rum no­mi­ne ce­pe­ris, quam e le­ge Fal­ci­dia ca­pe­re li­ce­bit’ non tan­tum eum com­pre­hen­dunt, qui am­plius ac­ce­pit, quam ei Fal­ci­dia per­mis­sit, ut red­dat par­tem, ha­beat par­tem, ve­rum et­iam eum qui to­tum de­bet re­sti­tue­re. et­enim scien­dum est le­gem Fal­ci­diam in­ter­dum par­tem eius quod da­tum est, in­ter­dum to­tum re­vo­ca­re. cum enim ha­bi­ta ra­tio­ne ae­ris alie­ni Fal­ci­dia in­ea­tur, ple­rum­que eve­nit, ut emer­gen­te de­bi­to vel con­di­cio­ne ae­ris alie­ni ex­sis­ten­te to­tum quod le­ga­tum est ex­hau­ria­tur. sed et li­ber­ta­tium con­di­cio in­ter­dum ex­sis­tens ef­fi­ciet le­ga­tum om­ni­no non de­be­ri, quip­pe cum ha­bi­ta ra­tio­ne li­ber­ta­tium et de­duc­tis pre­tiis eo­rum tunc de­mum le­ga­to­rum in­ea­tur ra­tio. 12In qui­bus­dam au­tem tes­ta­men­tis Fal­ci­dia qui­dem lo­cum non ha­bet, ve­rum­ta­men ita ob­ser­va­tur, ut, li­cet qua­dran­tem he­res non re­ti­neat, ta­men hac­te­nus le­ga­ta de­bean­tur, qua­te­nus pa­tri­mo­nii vi­res suf­fi­ciunt, uti­que de­duc­to ae­re alie­no, item de­duc­tis pre­tiis eo­rum, qui li­ber­ta­tem in tes­ta­men­to vel di­rec­tam vel fi­dei­com­mis­sa­riam ac­ce­pe­runt. 13Sed et le­ga­ta­rio ca­ven­dum est, a quo fi­dei­com­mis­sum re­lin­qui­tur. 14In­ter­dum non le­gis Fal­ci­diae, sed et­iam al­te­rius le­gis in hac sti­pu­la­tio­ne ra­tio fa­cien­da est, ut pu­ta si pa­tro­nus ex as­se he­res in­sti­tu­tus sit et pu­re quinc­unx le­ga­tus sit et sub con­di­cio­ne ali­quid su­pra de­bi­tam pa­tro­no par­tem: nam in hunc ca­sum ra­tio fa­cien­da est il­lius le­gis, quae pa­tro­nos vo­cat, non le­gis Fal­ci­diae. 15Si res, quae le­ga­ta sit, apud le­ga­ta­rium in­ter­ie­rit, pro­ban­dum est ex­cep­tio­ne suc­cur­ri ei qui pro­mi­sit,

1Ulpianus, On the Edict, Book LXXIX. Where more property is bequeathed to anyone than is permitted by law, and there is good reason to doubt whether the Falcidian Law is applicable or not, the Prætor will come to the relief of the heir, and compel the legatee to furnish him with security that, if it should become apparent that he has received a larger legacy than he is entitled to under the Falcidian Law, he will refund to him an amount equal to the excess, and that no attempt will be made to defraud him. 1It makes no difference whether this occurs in the first will, in the pupillary substitution, or in both, for it has already been decided that the Falcidian Law applies but once, even where there are two wills, and that all the legacies will be subject to contribution, not only those with which the minor himself is charged, but also those which his substitute is obliged to pay. 2Where no stipulation has been entered into with reference to the ward, the heir will be entitled to an action on guardianship against the guardian of the former. But, as Pomponius says, the stipulation can take effect with reference to both the ward himself and his heir, in which case the Falcidian Law will begin to become operative during his lifetime. He also lays down the same rule with reference to the action on guardianship. 3Marcellus says that a man whose estate amounted to four hundred aurei appointed as his heir his son, who had not yet reached the age of puberty, substituted Titius and Seius for him, and did not charge the minor with any legacy, but charged Titius with the payment of three hundred aurei. Marcellus asks whether two hundred or a hundred and fifty aurei should be paid by the substitute, as, under no circumstances, he should be compelled to pay three hundred. It seems to me to be the better opinion that he ought not to be obliged to pay the legatees more than his share, and certainly he ought not to pay them less. It follows, according to this, that the stipulation does not take effect, so far as he alone is concerned, but it should be carried out for the benefit of all the heirs, since the Falcidian Law becomes applicable after proper cause has been shown, and is determined by the amount of the legacies and the debts of the estate. 4If the indebtedness of the estate is evident, or certain, the calculation is easily made. If, however, the indebtedness is still uncertain, either because it is dependent upon some condition, or the creditor has brought an action to collect his claim, and the litigation has not yet been terminated, it will be doubtful how much is payable to the legatee on account of the uncertainty. 5At the present day something very similar to this occurs with reference to trusts. 6When it is said that the Falcidian Law is applicable, an arbiter is usually appointed to appraise the amount of the estate, even though there may be only one person demanding the execution of a very moderate trust. An appraisement of this kind should not prejudice others who have not been summoned before the arbiter. Still, it is usual for the other beneficiaries of the trust to be notified by the heir to appear before the arbiter and state their cases there. The creditors, frequently, are also notified to prove their claims before the arbiter. It is but reasonable that the heir should be heard against the claims of the legatees and beneficiaries of the trust, if he should offer to pay all that is left, and desires to protect himself by a stipulation of this kind. 7Where certain legacies are bequeathed that are payable immediately, and others that are payable under a condition, this stipulation should be entered into with reference to the conditional legacies, provided those which are immediately due are fully paid. Finally, Julianus says that where legacies are bequeathed absolutely and conditionally, in order to prevent the Falcidian Law from taking effect if the condition is complied with, an action will not be granted for the collection of the legacies which have been absolutely bequeathed, unless security is given to the heir to refund anything which has been received in excess of what is permitted by the Falcidian Law. 8Julianus also says that where a fourth of an estate is left to a person under a condition, and three-fourths of it is bequeathed absolutely, security must be given to refund all that has been received above the amount authorized by the Falcidian Law. 9Hence this stipulation also can be exacted, because, although the heir can recover any excess which he has paid, still, the party to whom payment was made may not prove to be solvent, and for this reason what has been paid will be lost. 10It can be said that this stipulation should also be entered into with reference to donations mortis causa. 11These words of the stipulation, “What you may have received as legacies in excess of what is authorized by the Falcidian Law,” not only refer to one who has received more than is permitted by the Falcidian Law, and who must refund a part, and can retain a part of the same, but they also have reference to a person who is obliged to refund his entire legacy, for it should be understood that sometimes the Falcidian Law revokes a portion of the legacy which has been paid, and sometimes revokes all of it. For, as the calculation of the Falcidian portion is made after an account of the indebtedness has been taken, it frequently happens that other indebtedness is discovered, or a condition is fulfilled upon which the payment of a debt depended, and the entire amount of the legacy is exhausted; sometimes, however, a condition is fulfilled upon which the freedom of slaves depends, which renders a legacy not due under any circumstances, since the calculation of the amount of the legacies is not made until that of the slave has been completed, and their value deducted from the assets of the estate. 12Moreover, the Falcidian Law does not apply to certain wills; still, with reference to them, the rule is observed that although the heir may not be entitled to reserve his fourth, yet the legacies would only be payable in case the assets of the estate should be sufficient, of course, after deducting the indebtedness, as well as the value of the slaves who have received their freedom by the will either directly, or under the terms of a trust. 13Security should also be given by the beneficiary of a trust to the legatee who is charged with the execution of the same. 14Sometimes, the agreement set forth in this stipulation has reference not to the Falcidian, but to some other law; as, for instance, where a patron is appointed heir to an entire estate, and is charged absolutely with a legacy of five-twelfths of the same, and is afterwards charged conditionally with another bequest in excess of the amount to which he is entitled as patron; for in this instance recourse must be had to that law which provides for patrons, and not to the Falcidian Law. 15Where property which has been bequeathed is lost while in the hands of the legatee, the better opinion is that relief should be granted, by means of an exception, to the party who made the promise,

2Pau­lus li­bro sep­tua­ge­si­mo quin­to ad edic­tum. Et­iam­si quan­ti ea res sit pro­mi­sit,

2Paulus, On the Edict, Book LXXV. Even if he consented to pay the value of the property,

3Ul­pia­nus li­bro sep­tua­ge­si­mo no­no ad edic­tum. ni­si si do­lo ip­sius ali­quid fac­tum sit: tunc enim et­iam ex do­li clau­su­la, quae in is­ta sti­pu­la­tio­ne con­ti­ne­tur, te­ne­bi­tur et re­pli­ca­tio­ne re­pel­li pot­erit. 1Haec cau­tio, quae prop­ter le­gem Fal­ci­diam in­ter­po­ni­tur, fi­de­ius­so­rum ha­bet prae­sta­tio­nem. 2Si in plu­res dies pe­cu­nia le­ga­ta est, cum cer­tum sit le­gem Fal­ci­diam lo­cum ha­be­re, non sti­pu­la­tio­ni, sed com­pu­ta­tio­ni lo­cum es­se Pe­dius ait, ut aes­ti­me­tur, quan­ti sit quod in diem le­ga­tum est et tan­tum cre­da­tur es­se le­ga­tum, quan­tum ef­fi­cit aes­ti­ma­tio, ut pro mo­do eius ex om­ni­bus le­ga­tis sta­tim le­gis Fal­ci­diae ra­tio ha­bea­tur. 3Quo­tiens fu­tu­rum est, ut pa­lam sit et an­te diem ve­nien­tem iam Fal­ci­diam lo­cum ha­be­re, to­tiens com­pu­ta­tio eius fit. nam si con­di­cio in mo­ra est, ex­spec­ta­bi­mus con­di­cio­nem, quo­ad ex­sis­tat: si au­tem dies su­per­est, iam hic in­ter­ca­pe­di­nis tem­po­ris ha­bi­ta ra­tio­ne at­que aes­ti­ma­tio­ne sic de Fal­ci­dia dis­pu­ta­bi­mus et com­mit­ti sti­pu­la­tio­nem di­ce­mus. 4Quam­vis au­tem om­nes le­ga­ta­rii et fi­dei­com­mis­sa­rii ne­ces­se ha­beant hac sti­pu­la­tio­ne ca­ve­re, ta­men qui­bus­dam re­mit­ti di­vi fra­tres re­scrip­se­runt, ut pu­ta his, qui­bus mi­nu­ta ali­men­ta sunt re­lic­ta. Pom­peiae enim Faus­ti­nae re­scribse­runt sic: ‘non ean­dem cau­sam es­se de­cem au­reo­rum, quos an­nuos ti­bi tes­ta­men­to Pom­peiae Cris­pia­nae pa­tro­nae tuae re­lic­tos pro­po­nis, at­que fuit ali­men­to­rum et ves­tia­rii li­ber­tis re­lic­to­rum, qui­bus prop­ter­ea cau­tio­nis onus re­mit­ten­dum ex­is­ti­ma­vi­mus’. 5Item scien­dum est fis­cum hanc cau­tio­nem non pa­ti, sed per­in­de con­ve­ni­ri pos­se, ac si ca­vis­set. ce­te­ros au­tem, cu­ius­cum­que dig­ni­ta­tis sint, li­cet iam le­ga­ta per­ce­pe­rint, com­pel­li de­be­re ad ca­ven­dum di­vus Pius re­scribsit: ex quo re­scrip­to et­iam il­lud ac­ci­pi­mus, quod et­iam post so­lu­ta le­ga­ta vo­luit sti­pu­la­tio­nem in­ter­po­ni. 6Si le­ga­ta­rius he­redi, qui con­tro­ver­siam he­redi­ta­tis pa­ti­tur iam vel spe­rat, de re­sti­tuen­do le­ga­to si­bi prae­sti­to ca­ve­rit et evic­ta he­redi­tas sit, sed neg­le­gen­tia vel do­lo eius qui le­ga­tum prae­sti­tit, di­ce­mus non com­mit­ti sti­pu­la­tio­nem prop­ter vi­ri bo­ni ar­bi­trium, quod in­est huic sti­pu­la­tio­ni. 7Item si ip­se, qui prae­sti­tit le­ga­tum, ex alia cau­sa si­bi evi­ce­rit, ut pu­ta quia in­ve­ni­tur se­quen­ti tes­ta­men­to he­res scrip­tus, in quo le­ga­tum is­te le­ga­ta­rius non ac­ce­pe­rat, di­ce­mus com­mit­ti sti­pu­la­tio­nem prop­ter vi­ri bo­ni ar­bi­trium. 8Et ge­ne­ra­li­ter ubi­cum­que he­redi­ta­tem vel quan­ti­ta­tem vel emo­lu­men­tum prae­sti­tit is, qui hac sti­pu­la­tio­ne si­bi pro­spe­xe­rat, di­cen­dum est ibi com­mit­ti eam, si mo­do cul­pa ab­est ab eo, qui sti­pu­la­tus est. 9Quae­si­tum est, an sae­pius com­mit­ta­tur. et pla­cet et­iam sae­pius eam com­mit­ti, si per par­tes ab­la­ta est he­redi­tas. 10Si le­ga­tum fue­rit prae­sti­tum an­te in­ter­po­si­tam hanc sti­pu­la­tio­nem, an con­di­ci pos­sit, ut cau­tio is­ta in­ter­po­na­tur? mo­vet quaes­tio­nem, quod ea, quae per er­ro­rem omis­sa vel so­lu­ta sunt, con­di­ci pos­sunt et hic er­go qua­si plus so­lu­tum vi­de­tur ex eo, quod cau­tio in­ter­mis­sa est. et ait Pom­po­nius con­dic­tio­nem in­ter­po­nen­dae sa­tis­da­tio­nis gra­tia com­pe­te­re et pu­to hoc pro­ban­dum quod Pom­po­nius, uti­li­ta­tis gra­tia.

3Ulpianus, On the Edict, Book LXXIX. Unless some fraudulent act was committed by the legatee himself, for then he will also be liable under the clause relating to bad faith, which is included in this stipulation, and can be opposed by a reply. 1This bond, which is executed on account of the Falcidian Law, has reference to the furnishing of sureties. 2Where legacies are bequeathed which are payable at different times, as it is certain that the Falcidian Law will be applicable, Pedius says that there is no ground for a stipulation, but there is one for a calculation, and that an estimate should be made of the sum payable at different times, and in this way the total amount of the legacies will be established. The result of the estimate is that the amount due under the Falcidian Law will be fixed in proportion to what is to be deducted from all the legacies. 3Whenever it is clear that a legacy will be due and payable even before the time the Falcidian Law will begin to apply, the calculation of the legacy must be made. If, however, fulfillment of the condition upon which it depends is delayed, we must wait until it is complied with. But where the time for its fulfillment has not yet arrived, in this instance, an account should be taken of the profits received during the intermediate time, and an estimate made, so that we can determine the amount under the Falcidian Law, and can say that the stipulation has become operative. 4Although all legatees and beneficiaries of a trust may by means of this stipulation be obliged to give security, still, the Divine Brothers stated in a Rescript that some of them are excused from doing so, as, for instance, those to whom small allowances for support have been bequeathed. For they stated in a Rescript, addressed to Pompeius Faustina: “The bequest of the ten aurei payable annually under the will of Pompeia Crispiana, your patroness, which you allege have been left to you, is different from that by which food and clothing were left to her other freedwomen, for which reason we think that a bond should not be required.” 5Moreover, it should be noted that the Treasury ought not to be required to furnish security, but an action can be brought against it, just as if it had done so. Still, the Divine Pius stated in a Rescript that others, no matter what their rank, and though they may have already received their legacies, should be compelled to give security. We also learn from this Rescript that the Emperor intended that a stipulation should be entered into, even after the legacies have been paid. 6When a legatee has given security to an heir with reference to the return of the legacy which has been paid to him, and the heir is already involved in a controversy on account of the estate, or expects to be, and the estate is evicted, either on account of the negligence or fraud of him who paid the legacy, we hold that the stipulation will not take effect, so far as the judgment of a good citizen is concerned, because it contains the element of good faith. 7Likewise, if he who paid the legacy should, for some other reason, deprive himself of the estate (for instance, because he is appointed heir by a second will, under which the said legatee did not receive the legacy), we say that, in accordance with the judgment of a good citizen, the stipulation will become operative. 8And, generally speaking, where he who provided for himself by a stipulation of this kind, and has transferred an estate, or a sum of money, or some advantage, it must be said that the stipulation will take effect; provided he who entered into it was not guilty of bad faith. 9The question arose whether the stipulation can take effect more than once. And it is established that it can take effect repeatedly, if the heir is deprived of different parts of the estate at different times. 10If the legacy should be paid before the stipulation is entered into, and legal proceedings are instituted to compel security to be furnished, this suggests the point that proceedings can be instituted where anything has been omitted, or paid through mistake. Therefore, in this instance, as no security was given, more is considered to have been paid than is due. Pomponius says that an action to compel security to be furnished will lie, and I think that his opinion should be adopted on account of the benefit to be derived from it.

4Pau­lus li­bro sep­tua­ge­si­mo quin­to ad edic­tum. Haec au­tem sa­tis­da­tio lo­cum ha­bet, si ius­ta cau­sa es­se vi­de­bi­tur: nam in­iquum erat om­ni­mo­do ca­ve­ri non­dum il­la­ta con­tro­ver­sia li­tis, cum pos­sint ei lu­so­riae mi­nae fie­ri: id­eo­que eam rem prae­tor ad co­gni­tio­nem suam re­vo­cat. 1Si duo ex tes­ta­men­to he­redi­ta­tem in so­li­dum si­bi vin­di­cent, for­te quod eius­dem no­mi­nis sint, tam in pos­ses­so­rem quam in pe­ti­to­rem com­pe­tunt ac­tio­nes et cre­di­to­ri­bus et le­ga­ta­riis. 2Haec cau­tio uti­que ne­ces­sa­ria est, si quis pe­cu­niam suam sol­vat vel rem tra­dat: si ve­ro pe­cu­niam he­redi­ta­riam sol­vat vel rem tra­dat, qui­dam non pu­tant ca­ven­dum, quia nec te­ne­ri pot­est eo no­mi­ne vic­tus, cum non pos­si­deat vel do­lo fe­ce­rit, quo mi­nus pos­si­deat. hoc si an­te mo­tam con­tro­ver­siam sol­vat: quod si post­ea, te­ne­bi­tur cul­pae no­mi­ne. 3Sed cum de no­mi­ne in­ter duos quaes­tio est, num­quid non sit ca­ven­dum ei, qui he­redi­ta­riam rem tra­dat, quia om­ni­mo­do unus li­be­ra­tur: quem­ad­mo­dum si aes alie­num he­redi­ta­rium sol­va­tur? sed si pe­ti­tor suam pe­cu­niam sol­vet aut rem suam tra­dat, non ha­bet un­de re­ti­neat et id­eo ne­ces­sa­ria est ei cau­tio.

4Paulus, On the Edict, Book LXXIII. Again, this security must be given where there appears to be good reason for it, as it would be unjust for it to be required where no controversy has as yet arisen with reference to the estate, and where only idle threats have been made, and therefore the Prætor must decide the question after proper investigation. 1Where each of two parties claims the entire estate for himself, under the will, for example, where they are both of the same name, actions can be brought by the creditors as well as the legatees against both the party in possession, and the one who demands the estate. 2This security is necessary where anyone pays his own money or delivers his own property. If he pays money or delivers property belonging to the estate, some authorities hold that security need not be furnished, for if he loses his case he will not be liable, since he was not in possession and did not commit fraud to avoid having possession. If he should make payment before any controversy has arisen, this rule will apply; because if he made payment afterwards he would be liable on the ground of negligence. 3In the case of two persons having the same name, the question arises whether security must be furnished by him who transfers the property of the estate, for the reason that one of them is absolutely released from liability, just as if he had paid a debt due from the estate. If the party claiming the estate paid his own money, or delivered his own property, he will not have anything to retain, and therefore a bond must be given him.

5Mar­cel­lus li­bro vi­ce­si­mo pri­mo di­ges­to­rum. Vi­dea­mus, an sti­pu­la­tio ‘qua am­plius per Fal­ci­diam ce­pe­ris li­cue­rit da­ri’ ad­ver­sus eum non suf­fi­ciat, qui le­ga­tum alii re­sti­tue­re ex fi­dei­com­mis­si cau­sa de­bet. suf­fi­ciet au­tem di­ci ni­hil eius fi­dei com­mis­sum es­se: ca­ve­bit sci­li­cet le­ga­ta­rio et is, qui fi­dei­com­mis­sum ac­ci­piet, ni­si for­te ma­let le­ga­ta­rius cir­cui­tu sub­la­to he­redi ca­ve­ri. sed et le­ga­ta­rio prae­ter­ea ca­ven­dum est, si (ut ple­rum­que ae­quum est) pro ra­ta ex fi­dei­com­mis­so re­ti­ne­re ei con­ce­den­dum est, quam­vis tan­tum ex le­ga­to apud eum erit re­man­su­rum, ut suf­fi­ce­re pos­sit ad prae­stan­dum fi­dei­com­mis­sum.

5Marcellus, Digest, Book XXI. Let us see whether this stipulation, namely, “Do you promise to return whatever you may have received above what is allowed by the Falcidian Law?” will not be sufficient as against the party who is obliged to pay a legacy to another under the terms of a trust. It will be sufficient for the heir to say that there is nothing to be done by him under the trust. For, in this case also, he who receives the benefit of the trust must furnish security to indemnify the legatee, unless the latter should prefer to give security to the heir in order to avoid circumlocution. Moreover, security must be given to the legatee if (as is perfectly proper), he should be permitted to retain a proportionate sum out of what was paid under the trust, even though enough of the legacy may remain in his hands to discharge the entire fiduciary obligation.

6Cal­lis­tra­tus li­bro quar­to de co­gni­tio­ni­bus. Cum non fa­ci­le sa­tis­da­tio­nem of­fer­re le­ga­ta­rius vel fi­dei­com­mis­sa­rius pos­sit et fu­tu­rum sit, ut prop­ter hoc a pe­ti­tio­ne li­be­ra­li­ta­tis ex tes­ta­men­to sub­mo­vean­tur, num­quid onus sa­tis­da­tio­nis eis re­mit­ten­dum erit? quod vi­de­tur ad­iu­va­ri re­scrip­to di­vi Com­mo­di in haec ver­ba: ‘is, cu­ius de ea re no­tio est, ad­itus si com­pe­re­rit id­eo cau­tio­nem a te ex­igi, ut a fi­dei­com­mis­si pe­ti­tio­ne aver­ta­ris, onus sa­tis­da­tio­nis ti­bi re­mit­ti cu­ra­bit’.

6Callistratus, On Judicial Inquiries, Book IV. If the legatee or the beneficiary of the trust cannot readily furnish security, and for this reason runs the risk of being deprived of the benefit conferred by the will, shall he be released from the necessity of giving security? This opinion seems to be adopted in a Rescript of the Divine Commodus, which is in the following words: “If the court having jurisdiction of the case should ascertain that application has been made to him to compel you to give security in order to prevent you from claiming the benefit of the trust, he must see that you are released from the requirement of furnishing it.”

7Pau­lus li­bro sep­ti­mo ad le­gem Iu­liam et Pa­piam. Di­vus Pius ab eo, qui an­nua le­ga­ta prae­ci­pe­re ad dis­tri­buen­dum ius­sus erat, ve­tuit cau­tio­nem ex­igi ces­san­tium par­tes red­di, ni­si aper­te ca­ve­re ius­sus es­set.

7Paulus, On the Lex Julia et Papia, Book VII. The Divine Pius forbade security from being exacted from a person who was directed to oversee the distribution of certain annual legacies, requiring him to return to the heir the shares of those who failed to accept them, unless he was expressly ordered to do so by the testator.

8Mae­cia­nus li­bro de­ci­mo fi­dei­com­mis­so­rum. Si he­res par­tem bo­no­rum vel et­iam uni­ver­sa bo­na de­la­ta ad fis­cum di­ce­ret, con­sta­ret au­tem de fi­dei­com­mis­so, de­cre­tum est, ut pe­ti­to­ri ca­ven­ti ‘evic­ta he­redi­ta­te re­sti­tu­tu iri’ sol­ve­re­tur.

8Marcianus, Trusts, Book X. Where an heir alleges that part of an estate, or even all of it, is forfeited to the Treasury, and it should be established that he was also charged with a trust, it was decided that if the beneficiary should give security to restore the estate in case it should be evicted, he must be paid.

9Idem li­bro duo­de­ci­mo fi­dei­com­mis­so­rum. Si non in con­tro­ver­sia sit pro­prie­tas, sed usus fruc­tus (pot­est enim rei, cu­ius pro­prie­tas Ti­tio le­ga­ta est, usus fruc­tus alii le­ga­ri), tunc de eo re­sti­tuen­do non he­redi, sed Ti­tio ca­ve­ri de­beat. in­ter­dum et si ab he­rede le­ge­tur usus fruc­tus, Ti­tio ca­ven­dum est: vel­uti si de­trac­to usu fruc­tu pro­prie­tas ei le­ge­tur, usus fruc­tus Se­io: quid enim at­ti­ne­bit hoc ca­su he­redi ca­ve­ri, ad quem emo­lu­men­tum in­ter­ci­den­tis usus fruc­tus non sit spec­tan­dum? ve­rum si usu fruc­tu Se­io le­ga­to pro­prie­tas Ti­tio ita le­ge­tur, ut, cum ad Se­ium per­ti­ne­re de­sie­rit, ha­beat pro­prie­ta­tem, tunc he­redi ca­ve­ri opor­te­bit a fruc­tua­rio, ab he­rede au­tem Ti­tio, quia non sit cer­tum usu fruc­tu in­ter­cep­to ad Ti­tium pro­prie­ta­tem re­ver­su­ram.

9The Same, Trusts, Book XII. When the ownership of property is not in controversy, but the usufruct of the same is (for it may happen that the ownership is bequeathed to Titius, and the usufruct to someone else), then security to restore it should not be given to the heir, but to Titius. Sometimes, even if the heir is charged with the transfer of the usufruct, security should be given to Titius; for instance, if the usufruct, having been reserved, the ownership is left to him, and the usufruct to Seius; for, in this instance, what advantage would it be for security to be given to the heir, since no benefit will accrue to him if the usufruct should be extinguished? If, however, the usufruct, having been bequeathed to Seius, and the ownership is left to Titius in such a way that when the usufruct ceases to belong to Seius, he will be entitled to the ownership, then security must be furnished to the heir by the usufructuary, and also by the heir to Titius, because it is not certain that, if the usufruct should be extinguished, the ownership will be acquired by Titius.