De calumniatoribus
(Concerning Persons Who Bring Vexatious Actions.)
1Ulpianus, On the Edict, Book X. “Where anyone is said to have received money for the purpose of causing annoyance, or to abstain from doing so, a right of action in factum will lie against him for a year to recover fourfold the amount which he is said to have received; and after a year one will lie for the actual amount.” 1Pomponius states that this action is not only applicable to cases where money is involved, but also to public prosecutions, and especially as the party is liable under the Lex Repetundarum who receives money in consideration of doing something to cause annoyance or for refraining from doing so. 2Anyone who receives money before issue is joined in a case or who receives it afterwards, is equally liable. 3A Constitution of our Emperor directed to Cassius Sabinus, prohibits the giving of money to a judge or an adversary in public or private cases, or in those in which the Treasury is interested; and where this is done it orders the right of action to be lost. For it may be asked, if the adversary, not with vexatious intent but for the purpose of compromise, accepted the money; does the constitution apply? It is my opinion that it does not, since the right of action has ceased; for compromises are not forbidden but only base acts of extortion. 4Again, a party is also said to have received money where he has received something else instead of money.
2Paulus, On the Edict, Book X. Moreover, where anyone is released from an obligation this may be considered as receiving money; and also where money is loaned him to be used gratuitously, or property is sold or leased for less than its value. It makes no difference whether the party himself received the money, or ordered it to be paid to someone else, or ratified it after it had been accepted in his behalf by another.
3Ulpianus, On the Edict, Book X. In general, this rule also applies where a party obtains any benefit for such a consideration, whether he gets it from his adversary or from anyone else. 1Wherefore, if a party receives money for the purpose of causing some annoyance, he is liable whether he did so or not; and where he received it not to cause annoyance, if he does cause it, he is liable. 2He also is liable under this Edict who is depectus, which means one who has entered into a disgraceful contract. 3It should be observed that he who has paid money in order that some party might suffer annoyance, has himself no right of recovery, for he has acted dishonorably; but the right of action is granted to him on whose account the money was paid for the purpose of annoying him; for which reason if anyone receives money from you in consideration of causing me annoyance, and from me to prevent my being annoyed, he will be liable to me in two actions.
4Gaius, On the Provincial Edict, Book IV. An heir, however, is not entitled to this action, because it should be sufficient for him that he has a right of action to recover the money which was paid by the deceased:
5Ulpianus, On the Edict, Book X. But this action is granted against an heir for whatever has come into his hands; as it has been established that this dishonorable profit can be recovered from heirs, although criminal actions are extinguished; as, for instance, where money is given for falsification, or to a judge for a favorable decree, and is recovered from the heir, as anything else may be recovered which has been obtained in an unlawful manner. 1Also, in addition to this action, one to recover the money also lies, where the only base conduct is that of the party who received it; for if this also applies to the giver then he who possessed it is in a better position. If a suit for the money should be brought, would this right of action be lost, or should a suit for threefold the amount be granted? In a case of a thief we grant an action for fourfold the amount, as well as one for the recovery of the property. I am of the opinion that either of the actions alone is sufficient, for where an action for the recovery of the money will lie, then it is not necessary to grant an action in factum after the lapse of a year.
6Gaius, On the Provincial Edict, Book IV. The year when a person is paid money to prevent suit being brought against him begins at the time when the payment was made, if he then had power to bring suit to recover it. But in the case of a person with reference to whom another paid money to have suit brought against him, it may be doubted whether the year should be reckoned from the day when the money was paid, or from the day when the party knew that it had been paid; for where he does not know that there is reason for suit to be brought against him, he is held not to have the power of bringing one, and the better opinion is that the year should be reckoned from the time when he did know.
7Paulus, On the Edict, Book X. Where anyone has received money from another in order to prevent me from being subjected to annoyance, then, if it was given through my direction, or by my agent who had charge of all my business, or by a party who voluntarily acted in my behalf, and whose act I ratified, I am considered to have paid the money myself. But if another party did not pay it on my order, even though he did it through consideration for me in order that the act should not be committed, and I did not ratify what he did; then the party who paid the money can recover it, and I have a right of action for fourfold the amount. 1If the money was paid for the purpose of having a vexatious suit brought against the son of a family, the father also is granted this action. In like manner, if the son of a family should accept money to induce him to bring a vexatious suit against anyone, or not to bring it; an action will be granted against his father. If another party paid him money not to bring the action without any direction from me, he can then recover it, and I will have a right to bring suit for quadruple the amount. 2Where a farmer of the revenue retains a person’s slaves, and money was paid to him which was not due, he, also, is liable in an action in factum by this section of the Edict.
8Ulpianus, Opinions, Book IV. When a competent judge is informed by an innocent man that he has paid money on account of a crime which was not proved against him; he must order what has been unlawfully extorted to be refunded, according to the terms of the Edict which treat of persons who are said to have received money either to cause annoyance, or to refrain from doing so; and he must inflict punishment in proportion to the crime upon the party who committed it.
9Papinianus, On Adultery, Book II. Where a slave is accused he shall be put to torture, if this is demanded; and if he is acquitted, the accuser shall be condemned to pay his master double his value; and, in addition to double his value, an inquiry shall be made as to whether the prosecution was instituted for the purpose of annoyance, as the crime of illegal prosecution is separate from any loss which has been sustained by the master through the torture of the slave.