Corpus iurisprudentiae Romanae

Repertorium zu den Quellen des römischen Rechts

Digesta Iustiniani Augusti

Recognovit Mommsen (1870) et retractavit Krüger (1928)
Convertit in Anglica lingua Scott (1932)
Dig. XXV3,
De agnoscendis et alendis liberis vel parentibus vel patronis vel libertis
Liber vicesimus quintus
III.

De agnoscendis et alendis liberis vel parentibus vel patronis vel libertis

(Concerning the Recognition and Maintenance of Children, Parents, Patrons, and Freedmen.)

1Ulpianus libro trigesimo quarto ad edictum. Senatus consultum, quod factum est de liberis agnoscendis, duas species complectitur, unam eorum qui agnoscunt, aliam earum quae falsum partum subiciunt. 1Permittit igitur mulieri parentive in cuius potestate est vel ei cui mandatum ab eis est, si se putet praegnatem, denuntiare intra dies triginta post divortium connumerandos ipsi marito vel parenti in cuius potestate est, aut domum denuntiare, si nullius eorum copiam habeat. 2Domum accipere debemus hospitium, si in civitate maneat: quod si non sit, sed in villa vel in municipio, illic ubi larem matrimonio collocarent: 3Denuntiare autem hoc tantum esse mulierem ex eo praegnantem. non ergo hoc denuntiat, ut mittat custodes maritus: sufficit enim mulieri hoc notum facere, quod sit praegnas. mariti est iam aut mittere custodes aut ei denuntiare, quod non sit ex se praegnas: hoc autem vel ipsi marito vel alii nomine eius facere permittitur. 4Poena autem mariti ea est, ut, nisi aut custodes praemiserit aut contra denuntiaverit non esse ex se praegnatem, cogatur maritus partum agnoscere: et, si non agnoverit, extra ordinem coercetur. debebit igitur respondere non esse ex se praegnatem aut nomine eius responderi: quod si factum fuerit, non alias necesse habebit agnoscere, nisi vere filius fuerit. 5Illud notandum est, quod denuntiatio a marito non incipit, sed a muliere: 6Sed si maritus ultro custodes offerat et ea non admittat, vel si non denuntiaverit mulier, aut si denuntiaverit quidem, custodes autem arbitrio iudicis non admiserit, liberum est marito parentive eius partum non agnoscere. 7Si mulier esse se praegnatem intra triginta dies non denuntiaverit, postea denuntians causa cognita audiri debebit. 8Quin immo et si in totum omiserit denuntiationem, Iulianus ait nihil hoc nocere ei quod editur. 9Dies autem triginta continuos accipere debemus ex die divortii, non utiles. 10Eleganter autem apud Iulianum libro nono decimo digestorum quaeritur, si intra dies triginta mulier marito non denuntiaverit et intra triginta partum ediderit, an senatus consulto locus sit. et ait Plancianum senatus consultum cessare, quia de eo partu non videtur sentire, qui intra diem trigesimum nascatur: quippe dies triginta ad denuntiandum praestituit senatus. sed hanc rem non facere praeiudicium partui arbitror. 11Quemadmodum per contrarium si maritus uxore denuntiante custodes miserit, nullum praeiudicium sibi facit. licebit igitur ei partum editum ex se negare nec ei nocebit, quod ventrem custodierit: et ita Marcellus libro septimo digestorum scripsit: ait enim, sive quis neget uxorem sive ex se praegnatem, sine praeiudicio recte mittet custodes, maxime si missurus id ipsum protestetur. 12Iulianus libro nono decimo digestorum scripsit: quod senatus consulto comprehensum est, si mulier viro denuntiaverit se ex eo concepisse et is cui denuntiatum erit custodes ad ventrem custodiendum inspiciendumque non misserit neque contestato dixerit eam ex se praegnatem non esse, ut ei id quod editum sit agnoscere sit necesse, non eo pertinet, ut, si quis agnoscere se filium diceret, suum heredem haberet, quamvis ex alio conceptus sit: quandoque enim, inquit, coepit causa agi, grande praeiudicium adfert pro filio confessio patris. 13Idem per contrarium quoque ait, si mulier divortio facto non fecerit ea, quae senatus consulto praecipiuntur, ut liceat patri non agnoscere, non eo pertinere, ut filius natus suum se dicere non possit, sed ad id tantum, ut ita pater alere eum cogatur, si constiterit eum filium esse. 14Idem Iulianus scribit, si uxore denuntiante se praegnatem maritus non negaverit, non utique suum illi partum effici, cogendum tamen alere: ceterum esse satis iniuriosum ait, si quis longo tempore afuerit et reversus uxorem praegnatem invenerit et idcirco reiecerit, si quid ex his, quae senatus consulto continentur, omiserit, suum heredem ei nasci. 15Ex his apparet, sive uxor omisserit, quae eam ex senatus consulto observare oportuit, nihil praeiudicare filio, si filius est, non tantum in iure sui, verum ne in alimentis quidem secundum divi Pii rescriptum: sive maritus neglexerit facere, quae ex senatus consulto debet, natum cogitur omnimodo alere, ceterum recusare poterit filium. 16Plane si denuntiante muliere negaverit ex se esse praegnatem, tametsi custodes non miserit, non evitabit, quo minus quaeratur, an ex eo mulier praegnas sit. quae causa si fuerit acta apud iudicem et pronuntiaverit, cum de hoc agetur quod ex eo praegnas fuerit nec ne, in ea causa esse, ut agnosci debeat: sive filius non fuit sive fuit, esse suum

1Ulpianus, On the Edict, Book XXXIV. The Decree of the Senate enacted with reference to the recognition of children is in two parts, one of which has reference to the recognition of children by their parents, and the other to those who substitute spurious offspring. 1The Decree permits the woman herself, or her father under whose control she is, or anyone who is directed by either of them, in case she believes herself to be pregnant, to notify her husband, or her father under whose control she is, within thirty days after the divorce; or to leave the notice at his residence if there is no opportunity for personal service. 2We should understand the term “residence” to mean the lodging of the husband, if he lives in a city, but if he does not, but resides in a country house, or in a provincial town, the place where the parties have established their domicile during marriage. 3The wife should merely notify the husband that she is pregnant by him. She does not give this notice in order that her husband may send guards to watch her, for it is sufficient for her to inform him that she is pregnant. The husband should then either send persons to watch her, or should notify her that she is not pregnant by him; and it is permissible for this notification to be made by the husband himself, or by another party in his name. 4The penalty of the husband, if he does not send persons to watch, or does not notify the woman that she is not pregnant by him, is that he shall be compelled to recognize the child; and if he should not do so, to be punished with extraordinary severity. Therefore, he should answer the notice, or it should be answered in his name, that the woman is not pregnant by him. If this is done, it will not be necessary for him to recognize the child, unless it is really his own. 5It should be remembered that the notice does not proceed from the husband, but from the woman. 6If, however, the husband should offer guards to watch his wife, and she should not allow this; or if she does not give him notice of her condition; or if she should give him notice, but not consent to accept the guards appointed by the court, the husband or his father is at liberty to refuse to acknowledge the child. 7Where a woman does not give notice of her pregnancy within thirty days, but does so afterwards, she should be heard after proper cause is shown. 8If, however, she should entirely neglect to give the notice, Julianus says that this does not in any way prejudice the child. 9We should understand the thirty days subsequent to the divorce to be continuous, and not available days. 10In the Nineteenth Book of the Digest by Julianus, the following nice point is suggested. If the woman should not notify her husband of her condition within thirty days, but should be delivered of a child within that period, will the Decree of the Senate apply? He says that, in this instance, the Plautian Decree of the Senate will not be applicable, because it was not considered to have reference to a child who was born within thirty days, for the Senate appointed the thirty days for the notification of the pregnancy. I think, however, that this would not in any way prejudice the child. 11Just as, on the other hand, if the husband, after receiving notice from his wife, should send guards, this would not cause any prejudice to himself. He will, therefore, be permitted to deny that the child is his, nor will it prejudice him, because he placed a watch over the woman. This opinion is also stated by Marcellus in the Seventh Book of the Digest, for he says that if a party denies that a woman is his wife, or that she is pregnant by him, he can, without any prejudice to himself, very properly send persons to watch her, especially if he makes protest at the time that he does so. 12Julianus says in the Nineteenth Book of the Digest, that it is stated in the Decree of the Senate that if the woman should notify her husband that she had conceived by him, and he, after having been notified, should not send persons to watch or examine her, and does not declare in the presence of witnesses that she is not pregnant by him, he will be compelled to recognize the child when it is born; but it does not follow from this that if he says that the child is his, he must make it his heir if it was begotten by someone else. Still, he holds that when the case is heard in court, the admission of the father will establish a strong presumption in favor of the child. 13He also says that, on the other hand, where the woman, after a divorce has taken place, does not comply with what was prescribed by the Decree of the Senate, the father has the right not to acknowledge the child; and that it does not follow from this that, after the child is born, it cannot be declared to be his, but merely that the father will not be compelled to support it, if it should be proved to be his own offspring. 14Julianus also says that if a woman notifies her husband that she is pregnant, and he does not deny it, it must not be concluded from this that the child is his, although he can be compelled to support it. It would, however, be very unjust if, where a man has been absent for a long time, and having returned, finds his wife pregnant, and for this reason repudiates her, and he neglects to comply with any of the provisions of the Decree of the Senate, the child should be his heir. 15It is apparent from what has been said, that the child is in no way prejudiced, if the wife should fail to observe any of the provisions of the Decree of the Senate, when the child in fact belongs to her husband—and this not merely has reference to its rights, nor indeed to its maintenance, according to a Rescript of the Divine Pius; or if the husband has neglected to do what is prescribed by the Decree of the Senate, he can certainly be compelled to support the child, but he can repudiate it. 16It is clear that, if, after the woman has notified her husband, he should deny that she is pregnant by him, even though he may not send persons to watch her, he cannot prevent an examination being made to ascertain whether the woman is pregnant by him, or not. If this case is brought into court, and a decision be rendered on the point as to whether or not the woman is pregnant by her husband, the child must be recognized by the husband, whether it belongs to him, or not.

2Iulianus libro nono decimo digestorum. in omnibus causis (quare et fratribus consanguineus erit):

2Julianus, Digest, Book XIX. This applies to all cases, and therefore the child will be related by blood to its brothers.

3Ulpianus libro trigesimo quarto ad edictum. sive contra pronuntiaverit, non fore suum, quamvis suus fuerit: placet enim eius rei iudicem ius facere. et ita Marcellus libro septimo digestorum probat, eoque iure utimur. 1Quia Plancianum senatus consultum ad eos partus pertinet qui post divortium eduntur, aliud senatus consultum temporibus divi Hadriani factum est, ut, etiamsi constante matrimonio partus sit editus, de agnoscendo eo agatur. 2Quid ergo, si quis post mortem patris nascatur avo superstite, in cuius potestate recasurus est, ut si ex filio eius susceptus probetur? videndum quid dici debeat. et certe probandum est cum avo praeiudicium de partu agnoscendo similiter agendum. 3Quid si hoc ipsum in quaestionem veniat, utrum in matrimonio an postea editus sit? dicendum est et super hoc ex senatus consultis agendum. 4Et quid sit, si an uxor fuerit disceptetur? et Iulianus Sexto Caecilio Africano respondit locum esse praeiudicio. 5Illud tenendum haec senatus consulta post mortem parentis cessare, si is supersit, in cuius potestate recasuri non sunt. quid ergo est? in petitione hereditatis, quam filius intendit, quaeretur, utrum ex eo natus sit cuius hereditatem petit an non. adeo hoc verum est, ut Iulianus libro nono decimo digestorum scribat, si vivo patre redditum sit praeiudicium et antequam sententia feratur, pater decesserit, transeundum ad Carbonianum edictum. 6Item haec senatus consulta pertinent ad eos, qui sui heredes adgnascantur: ceterum si forte non sint in potestatem recasuri, verius est senatus consulta cessare.

3Ulpianus, On the Edict, Book XXXIV. If, on the other hand, the judge should decide that the child does not belong to the husband, even though it is really his, it is settled that a decision of this kind is equivalent to law. This opinion Marcellus approves in the Seventh Book of the Digest, and we make use of it at the present time. 1For the reason that the Plautian Decree of the Senate has reference to children born after a divorce, another Decree of the Senate was enacted during the reign of the Divine Hadrian, which prescribed that children born during marriage must be recognized by their parents. 2But what if a child should be born after the death of its father, and during the lifetime of its grandfather, under whose control it would be placed, if it should be proved that the said child is the issue of the son of the grandfather? It should be considered what must be held in this instance. The opinion should be adopted that the question of its recognition should be left to its grandfather. 3But what if, in this case, the question should arise whether the child was born during marriage, or subsequently? It must be said that proceedings should be taken in accordance with the Decree of the Senate for the determination of this point. 4And what should be done if it was denied that the woman was the wife of the alleged husband? Julianus informed Sextus Cæcilius Africanus that there was ground for a preliminary inquiry. 5It must be held that these Decrees of the Senate are not applicable after the death of the father, if there is no relative under whose control the child can be placed. What claim to the estate could a child in this instance assert? Could he make such a claim, whether he was begotten by the person whose estate he demands, or not? What Julianus wrote in the Nineteenth Book of the Digest is true to the extent that, if proceedings for the recognition of the child had been begun during the lifetime of the father, and the latter should die before a decision was rendered, recourse must be had to the Carbonian Edict. 6These decrees of the Senate also have reference to children who are born their own heirs. The better opinion is, however, that they are not applicable where the child, whose recognition is in question, was not under the control of the party instituting the proceedings.

4Paulus libro secundo sententiarum. Necare videtur non tantum is qui partum praefocat, sed et is qui abicit et qui alimonia denegat et is qui publicis locis misericordiae causa exponit, quam ipse non habet.

4Paulus, Opinions, Book II. Not only he who smothers a child is hold to kill it, but also he who abandons it, or denies it food, as well as he who exposes it in a public place for the purpose of exciting pity, which he himself does not feel.

5Ulpianus libro secundo de officio consulis. Si quis a liberis ali desideret vel si liberi, ut a parente exhibeantur, iudex de ea re cognoscet. 1Sed utrum eos tantum liberos qui sunt in potestate cogatur quis exhibere, an vero etiam emancipatos vel ex alia causa sui iuris constitutos, videndum est. et magis puto, etiamsi non sunt liberi in potestate, alendos a parentibus et vice mutua alere parentes debere. 2Utrum autem tantum patrem avumve paternum proavumve paterni avi patrem ceterosque virilis sexus parentes alere cogamur, an vero etiam matrem ceterosque parentes et per illum sexum contingentes cogamur alere, videndum. et magis est, ut utrubique se iudex interponat, quorundam necessitatibus facilius succursurus, quorundam aegritudini: et cum ex aequitate haec res descendat caritateque sanguinis, singulorum desideria perpendere iudicem oportet. 3Idem in liberis quoque exhibendis a parentibus dicendum est. 4Ergo et matrem cogemus praesertim volgo quaesitos liberos alere nec non ipsos eam. 5Item divus Pius significat, quasi avus quoque maternus alere compellatur. 6Idem rescripsit, ut filiam suam pater exhibeat, si constiterit apud iudicium iuste eam procreatam. 7Sed si filius possit se exhibere, aestimare iudices debent, ne non debeant ei alimenta decernere. denique idem Pius ita rescripsit: ‘Aditi a te competentes iudices ali te a patre tuo iubebunt pro modo facultatium eius, si modo, cum opificem te esse dicas, in ea valetudine es, ut operis sufficere non possis’. 8Si vel parens neget filium idcircoque alere se non debere contendat, vel filius neget parentem, summatim iudices oportet super ea re cognoscere. si constiterit filium vel parentem esse, tunc ali iubebunt: ceterum si non constiterit, nec decernent alimenta. 9Meminisse autem oportet, etsi pronuntiaverint ali oportere, attamen eam rem praeiudicium non facere veritati: nec enim hoc pronuntiatur filium esse, sed ali debere: et ita divus Marcus rescripsit. 10Si quis ex his alere detrectet, pro modo facultatium alimenta constituentur: quod si non praestentur, pignoribus captis et distractis cogetur sententiae satisfacere. 11Idem iudex aestimare debet, num habeat aliquid parens vel an pater quod merito filios suos nolit alere: Trebatio denique Marino rescriptum est merito patrem eum nolle alere, quod eum detulerat. 12Non tantum alimenta, verum etiam cetera quoque onera liberorum patrem ab iudice cogi praebere rescriptis continetur. 13Si impubes sit filius emancipatus, patrem inopem alere cogetur: iniquissimum enim quis merito dixerit patrem egere, cum filius sit in facultatibus. 14Si mater alimenta, quae fecit in filium, a patre repetat, cum modo eam audiendam. ita divus Marcus rescripsit Antoniae montanae in haec verba: ‘Sed et quantum tibi alimentorum nomine, quibus necessario filiam tuam exhibuisti, a patre eius praestari oporteat, iudices aestimabunt, nec impetrare debes ea, quae exigente materno affectu in filiam tuam erogatura esses, etiamsi a patre suo educaretur’. 15A milite quoque filio, qui in facultatibus sit, exhibendos parentes esse pietatis exigit ratio. 16Parens quamvis ali a filio ratione naturali debeat, tamen aes alienum eius non esse cogendum exsolvere filium rescriptum est. 17Item rescriptum est heredes filii ad ea praestanda, quae vivus filius ex officio pietatis suae dabit, invitos cogi non oportere, nisi in summam egestatem pater deductus est. 18Solent iudices cognoscere et inter patronos et libertos, si alendis his agatur: itaque si negent se esse libertos, cognoscere eos oportebit: quod si libertos constiterit, tunc demum decernere, ut alant: nec tamen alimentorum decretum tollet liberto facultatem, quo minus praeiudicio certare possit, si libertum se neget. 19Alimenta autem pro modo facultatium erunt praebenda, egentibus scilicet patronis: ceterum si sit unde se exhibeant, cessabunt partes iudicis. 20Utrum autem tantum patroni alendi sint an etiam patronorum liberi, tractari potest. et puto causa cognita iudices et liberos quoque patronorum alendos decernere, non quidem tam facile ut patronos, sed nonnumquam et ipsos: nam et obsequium non solum patronis, verum etiam liberis eorum debere praestari. 21Sed et libertus maternus alere cogitur. 22Si quis a liberti liberto ali se desideret vel ab eo, quem ex causa fideicommissi manumisit quemque suis nummis redemit, non debet audiri, ut et Marcellus scribit, exaequatque eum, qui mercedes exigendo ius libertorum amisit. 23Sed et patroni filium, qui capitis accusavit libertum paternum, negat exhibendum. 24Sed et liberta cogitur patronum alere. 25De alimentis patroni arbiter solet dari arbitraturus, quantum sit in facultatibus, ut perinde possint alimenta moderari, quae tamdiu praestabuntur, quamdiu liberto supersit, patrono desit. 26Patrem et matrem patroni, cum patronus et filii eius minime supersint, alere egentes, ipsi si idonei facultatibus sunt, coguntur.

5Ulpianus, On the Duties of Consul, Book II. Where anyone asks support of his children, or where children can be supported by their father, a judge should take cognizance of the matter. 1Should a father be compelled to support only such children as are under his control, or should he support those who are already emancipated, or who, for any other reason, have become independent, is a question for consideration. I think the better opinion is that even where the children are not under paternal control, they must be supported by their parents, and that, on the other hand, their parents should also be supported by them. 2Let us see whether we are obliged to support only our fathers, our paternal grandfathers, our paternal great-grandfathers and other relatives of the male sex; or whether we are obliged to support our mothers, and our other ascendants in the maternal line. The better opinion is, that in every instance, the judge should interpose for the purpose of giving relief to the necessities of some and the infirmities of others; and since this obligation is derived from justice, and from the attachment due to blood, the judge should carefully weigh the claims of each of the parties. 3It must be said that the same rule applies to the maintenance of children by their parents. 4Therefore we compel a mother to support her illegitimate children, and them to support her. 5The Divine Pius also intimates that a maternal grandfather is obliged to support his grandchildren. 6He also stated in a Rescript that a father must support his daughter, if it should be proved in court that he had actually begotten her. 7Where a son can support himself, the court should decide not to compel maintenance to be furnished him. Hence the Emperor Pius stated in a Rescript: “The competent judges and before whom you will appear, must order that you shall be supported by your father in proportion to his means; provided that you allege that you are an artisan, and that by reason of ill health, you cannot maintain yourself by your own labor.” 8Where a father denies that a party asking for support is his son, and therefore contends that he should not furnish it; or where a son denies that an applicant for maintenance is his father, the judges must decide the case summarily, and if it is established that the petitioner is a son, or a father, they must then order him to be supported. If, however, this should not be proved, they shall not decide that maintenance shall be furnished. 9But it must be remembered that if the judges hold that support should be furnished, still, this does not prejudice the truth, for they do not decide that the party is a son, but merely that he should be supported. This the Divine Marcus also stated in a Rescript. 10If anyone should refuse to provide support, the judges must determine the amount to be furnished in proportion to his means, and if he still fails to provide it, he can be compelled to comply with the judgment by taking his property in execution and selling the same. 11The judge must also determine whether a relative or a father has any good reason for refusing to support his children. There is a rescript addressed to Trebatius Marinus which states that a father can properly refuse to support his son if the latter has informed against him. 12It is stated in certain rescripts that a father can be compelled by a judge not only to furnish provisions, but also all other necessaries to his children. 13Where a son has been emancipated before arriving at puberty, he can be compelled to support his father, if the latter is in poverty; for anyone would say with reason that it is most unjust for a father to remain in want, while his son was in prosperous circumstances. 14Where a mother who furnished provisions to her child, brings suit against its father, she should be heard under certain conditions; for the Divine Marcus stated in a Rescript addressed to Antonia Montana: “The judges will estimate how much shall be paid to you by the father of your daughter in proportion to the amount of necessary provisions which you have furnished her for her support; but you cannot obtain as much as you would have expended for your daughter through maternal affection, even if she had been driven away by her father.” 15Filial affection requires that parents should be supported by a son who is in the military service, provided he has the means to do so. 16It is stated in a rescript that, although a parent should, according to the dictates of nature, be supported by his son, still the latter ought not to be required to pay his debts. 17Ad Dig. 25,3,5,17Windscheid: Lehrbuch des Pandektenrechts, 7. Aufl. 1891, Bd. II, § 475, Note 13.There is also a rescript which states that the heirs of the son, if unwilling, are not compelled to furnish such assistance to their father that a son while living would provide him with through motives of filial duty, unless the father is in the greatest poverty. 18Judges are also accustomed to decide between patrons and freedmen, where the question of their maintenance arises. Therefore, if the patrons deny that the claimants are their freedmen, the judges must make inquiry, and if it is proved that they are their freedmen, then they must order them to be supported. The decree for support does not, however, prevent the freedman (if he denies that he is such) from contending for his rights against his patron. 19Support must be furnished by freedmen to their patrons who are in poverty in proportion to their means. If, however, the latter are able to support themselves, the authority of the judge need not be interposed. 20The question may be asked whether only patrons are to be supported, or whether their children must also be maintained. I think that, upon proper cause being shown, judges should decree that the children of patrons should also be supported, not indeed as readily as patrons, but sometimes; for freedmen should show reverence not only to their patrons but also to the children of the latter. 21The freedman of a woman is compelled to support her children. 22If anyone should desire to be supported by a freedman of his freedman, or by a slave whom he has manumitted by reason of a trust, or by one whom he has redeemed from slavery with his own money, he should not be heard. For, as Marcellus says, he should be compared with one who, by exacting a reward, loses thereby the rights he has in a freedman. 23If the son of his patron has accused the freedman of his father of a capital crime, he denies that the latter is required to support him. 24A freedwoman is also obliged to support her patron. 25An arbiter is usually appointed to decide with reference to the support of a patron, and he must ascertain the value of the resources of the freedman, in order that the amount of the maintenance may be determined, and this must be provided as long as the freedman is able to do so, and the patron requires it. 26Freedmen are compelled to furnish support for the father and mother of their patron, where the patron and his children are no longer living, if they are in need, and the freedmen have the means to do so.

6Modestinus libro singulari de manumissionibus. Alimenta liberto petente non praestando patronus amissione libertatis causa impositorum et hereditatis liberti punietur: non autem necesse habebit praestare, etiamsi potest. 1Imperatoris Commodi constitutio talis profertur: ‘Cum probatum sit contumeliis patronos a libertis esse violatos vel illata manu atroci esse pulsatos aut etiam paupertate vel corporis valetudine laborantes relictos, primum eos in potestate patronorum redigi et ministerium dominis praebere cogi: sin autem nec hoc modo admoneantur, vel a praeside emptori addicentur et pretium patronis tribuetur’.

6Modestinus, Concerning Manumissions. The patron, by refusing to furnish support at the request of his freedman, forfeits the privileges imposed in his favor upon the latter on account of his manumission, and he is punished by the loss of the estate of the freedman; but he is not required to furnish support, even if he is able to do so. 1A Constitution of the Emperor Commodus contains the following: “Where it is proved that a patron has been rudely treated by his freedman, or severely beaten by him, or abandoned while in poverty or while suffering from bodily illness; he must first be brought again under the control of his patron, and compelled to render services to him as his master, and if he does not take warning by this proceeding, he shall be sold to a purchaser under the authority of a magistrate, and his price given to his patron”.

7Idem libro quinto responsorum. Si neget qui maritus fuisse dicitur matrimonium esse contractum eo, quod eam quae se uxorem fuisse dicit ancillam esse probare paratus sit, alimenta quidem liberis praestare interim compellendum, sin autem constiterit eam servam fuisse, nihil ei, qui pascendos curavit, ex hoc praeiudicium generare respondi.

7The Same, Opinions, Book V. If he who is alleged to have been the husband of a woman denies that the marriage was contracted, for the reason that he is ready to prove that she who claims to be his wife is a slave, he shall be compelled to support her children in the meantime; but if it should be established that she was a slave, he who was charged with their support will not be prejudiced on this account.

8Marcellus libro primo ad legem Iuliam et Papiam. Non quemadmodum masculorum liberorum nostrorum liberi ad onus nostrum pertinent, ita et in feminis est: nam manifestum est id quod filia parit non avo, sed patri suo esse oneri, nisi pater aut non sit superstes aut egens est.

8Ad Dig. 25,3,8Windscheid: Lehrbuch des Pandektenrechts, 7. Aufl. 1891, Bd. II, § 475, Note 5.Marcellus, On the Lex Julia et Papia, Book I. The children of our male children are under our care, but this is not the case with those descended from females; for it is evident that a child whom a daughter brings forth is under the care of her father, and not of her grandfather, unless the father is not living, or is in want.

9Paulus libro singulari de iure patronatus. In bonis superstitum libertorum nullum omnino ius patroni liberive patronorum habent, nisi si tam esse infirmos tamque pauperes praesidibus probaverint, ut merito menstruis alimentis a libertis suis adiuvari debeant. idque ius ita plurimis principum constitutionibus manifestatur.

9Paulus, On the Right of Patronage. Patrons and their children have no right to the property of their surviving freedmen, unless they prove to the court that they are so weak or poor that they should be assisted with monthly contributions of food by their freedmen. This rule has been established by many Imperial Constitutions.