Corpus iurisprudentiae Romanae

Repertorium zu den Quellen des römischen Rechts

Digesta Iustiniani Augusti

Recognovit Mommsen (1870) et retractavit Krüger (1928)
Convertit in Anglica lingua Scott (1932)
Dig. XXI1,
De aedilicio edicto et redhibitione et quanti minoris
Liber vicesimus primus
I.

De aedilicio edicto et redhibitione et quanti minoris

(Concerning the Edict of the Ædiles, and the Actions to Compel the Vendor to Take Back the Property Where He Has Received More Than It Was Worth.)

1Ul­pia­nus li­bro pri­mo ad edic­tum ae­di­lium cu­ru­lium. La­beo scri­bit edic­tum ae­di­lium cu­ru­lium de ven­di­tio­ni­bus re­rum es­se tam ea­rum quae so­li sint quam ea­rum quae mo­bi­les aut se mo­ven­tes. 1Aiunt ae­di­les: ‘Qui man­ci­pia ven­dunt cer­tio­res fa­ciant emp­to­res, quid mor­bi vi­tii­ve cui­que sit, quis fu­gi­ti­vus er­ro­ve sit no­xa­ve so­lu­tus non sit: ea­dem­que om­nia, cum ea man­ci­pia ven­ibunt, pa­lam rec­te pro­nun­tian­to. quod­si man­ci­pium ad­ver­sus ea venis­set, si­ve ad­ver­sus quod dic­tum pro­mis­sum­ve fue­rit cum veniret, fuis­set, quod eius prae­sta­ri opor­te­re di­ce­tur: emp­to­ri om­ni­bus­que ad quos ea res per­ti­net iu­di­cium da­bi­mus, ut id man­ci­pium red­hi­bea­tur. si quid au­tem post ven­di­tio­nem tra­di­tio­nem­que de­te­rius emp­to­ris ope­ra fa­mi­liae pro­cu­ra­to­ris­ve eius fac­tum erit, si­ve quid ex eo post ven­di­tio­nem na­tum ad­quisi­tum fue­rit, et si quid aliud in ven­di­tio­ne ei ac­ces­se­rit, si­ve quid ex ea re fruc­tus per­ve­ne­rit ad emp­to­rem, ut ea om­nia re­sti­tuat. item si quas ac­ces­sio­nes ip­se prae­sti­te­rit, ut re­ci­piat. item si quod man­ci­pium ca­pi­ta­lem frau­dem ad­mi­se­rit, mor­tis con­scis­cen­dae si­bi cau­sa quid fe­ce­rit, in­ve ha­re­nam de­pug­nan­di cau­sa ad bes­tias in­tro­mis­sus fue­rit, ea om­nia in ven­di­tio­ne pro­nun­tian­to: ex his enim cau­sis iu­di­cium da­bi­mus. hoc am­plius si quis ad­ver­sus ea sciens do­lo ma­lo ven­di­dis­se di­ce­tur, iu­di­cium da­bi­mus’. 2Cau­sa hu­ius edic­ti pro­po­nen­di est, ut oc­cur­ra­tur fal­la­ciis ven­den­tium et emp­to­ri­bus suc­cur­ra­tur, qui­cum­que de­cep­ti a ven­di­to­ri­bus fue­rint: dum­mo­do scia­mus ven­di­to­rem, et­iam­si igno­ra­vit ea quae ae­di­les prae­sta­ri iu­bent, ta­men te­ne­ri de­be­re. nec est hoc in­iquum: po­tuit enim ea no­ta ha­be­re ven­di­tor: ne­que enim in­ter­est emp­to­ris, cur fal­la­tur, igno­ran­tia ven­di­to­ris an cal­li­di­ta­te. 3Il­lud scien­dum est edic­tum hoc non per­ti­ne­re ad ven­di­tio­nes fis­ca­les. 4Si ta­men res pu­bli­ca ali­qua fa­ciat ven­di­tio­nem, edic­tum hoc lo­cum ha­be­bit. 5In pu­pil­la­ri­bus quo­que ven­di­tio­ni­bus erit edic­to lo­cus. 6Si in­tel­le­ga­tur vi­tium mor­bus­ve man­ci­pii (ut ple­rum­que sig­nis qui­bus­dam so­lent de­mons­tra­re vi­tia), pot­est di­ci edic­tum ces­sa­re: hoc enim tan­tum in­tuen­dum est, ne emp­tor de­ci­pia­tur. 7Sed scien­dum est mor­bum apud Sa­binum sic de­fi­ni­tum es­se ha­bi­tum cu­ius­que cor­po­ris con­tra na­tu­ram, qui usum eius ad id fa­cit de­te­rio­rem, cu­ius cau­sa na­tu­ra no­bis eius cor­po­ris sa­ni­ta­tem de­dit: id au­tem alias in to­to cor­po­re, alias in par­te ac­ci­de­re (nam­que to­tius cor­po­ris mor­bus est pu­ta φθίσις fe­bris, par­tis vel­uti cae­ci­tas, li­cet ho­mo ita­que na­tus sit): vi­tium­que a mor­bo mul­tum dif­fer­re, ut pu­ta si quis bal­bus sit, nam hunc vi­tio­sum ma­gis es­se quam mor­bosum. ego pu­to ae­di­les tol­len­dae du­bi­ta­tio­nis gra­tia bis κατὰ τοῦ αὐτοῦ idem di­xis­se, ne qua du­bi­ta­tio su­per­es­set. 8Pro­in­de si quid ta­le fue­rit vi­tii si­ve mor­bi, quod usum mi­nis­te­rium­que ho­mi­nis im­pe­diat, id da­bit red­hi­bitio­ni lo­cum, dum­mo­do me­mi­ne­ri­mus non uti­que quod­li­bet quam le­vis­si­mum ef­fi­ce­re, ut mor­bosus vi­tio­sus­ve ha­bea­tur. pro­in­de le­vis fe­bri­cu­la aut ve­tus quar­ta­na quae ta­men iam sper­ni pot­est vel vul­nus­cu­lum mo­di­cum nul­lum ha­bet in se de­lic­tum, qua­si pro­nun­tia­tum non sit: con­tem­ni enim haec po­tue­runt. ex­em­pli ita­que gra­tia re­fe­ra­mus, qui mor­bosi vi­tio­si­que sunt. 9Apud Vi­via­num quae­ri­tur, si ser­vus in­ter fa­na­ti­cos non sem­per ca­put iac­ta­ret et ali­qua pro­fa­tus es­set, an ni­hi­lo mi­nus sa­nus vi­de­re­tur. et ait Vi­via­nus ni­hi­lo mi­nus hunc sa­num es­se: ne­que enim nos, in­quit, mi­nus ani­mi vi­tiis ali­quos sa­nos es­se in­tel­le­ge­re de­be­re: alio­quin, in­quit, fu­tu­rum, ut in in­fi­ni­to hac ra­tio­ne mul­tos sa­nos es­se ne­ga­re­mus ut pu­ta le­vem su­per­sti­tio­sum ira­cun­dum con­tu­ma­cem et si qua si­mi­lia sunt ani­mi vi­tia: ma­gis enim de cor­po­ris sa­ni­ta­te, quam de ani­mi vi­tiis pro­mit­ti. in­ter­dum ta­men, in­quit, vi­tium cor­po­ra­le us­que ad ani­mum per­ve­ni­re et eum vi­tia­re: vel­uti con­tin­ge­ret φρενητικῷ, quia id ei ex fe­bri­bus ac­ci­de­rit. quid er­go est? si quid sit ani­mi vi­tium ta­le, ut id a ven­di­to­re ex­ci­pi opor­te­ret ne­que id ven­di­tor cum sci­ret pro­nun­tias­set, ex emp­to eum te­ne­ri. 10Idem Vi­via­nus ait, quam­vis ali­quan­do quis cir­ca fa­na bac­cha­tus sit et re­spon­sa red­di­de­rit, ta­men, si nunc hoc non fa­ciat, nul­lum vi­tium es­se: ne­que eo no­mi­ne, quod ali­quan­do id fe­cit, ac­tio est, sic­uti si ali­quan­do fe­brem ha­buit: ce­te­rum si ni­hi­lo mi­nus per­ma­ne­ret in eo vi­tio, ut cir­ca fa­na bac­cha­ri so­le­ret et qua­si demens re­spon­sa da­ret, et­iam­si per lu­xu­riam id fac­tum est, vi­tium ta­men es­se, sed vi­tium ani­mi, non cor­po­ris, id­eo­que red­hi­be­ri non pos­se, quon­iam ae­di­les de cor­po­ra­li­bus vi­tiis lo­quun­tur: at­ta­men ex emp­to ac­tio­nem ad­mit­tit. 11Idem di­cit et­iam in his, qui prae­ter mo­dum ti­mi­di cu­pi­di ava­ri­que sunt aut ira­cun­di

1Ulpianus, On the Edict of the Curule Ædiles, Book I. Labeo states that the Edict of the Curule Ædiles has reference to sales of property, whether it consists of land, portable articles, or of such as moves itself. 1Ad Dig. 21,1,1,1ROHGE, Bd. 10 (1874), S. 339: Die actio emti führt zur Auflösung des Geschäfts, wenn das Interesse eben in der Aufhebung des Vertrages besteht.The Ædiles say: “Those who sell slaves should notify the purchasers if they have any diseases or defects, if they have the habit of running away, or wandering, or have not been released from liability for damage which they have committed. All of these things must be publicly stated at the time that the slaves are sold. If a slave should be sold in violation of this provision, or contrary to what has been said and promised at the time the sale took place, on account of which it may be held that the purchaser and all the parties interested should be indemnified, we will grant an action to compel the vendor to take back the said slave. If, however, after the sale and delivery, the value of said slave shall have been diminished by the act of the slaves of the purchaser, or of his agent; or where a female slave has had a child after the sale; or, if any accession has been made to the property growing out of the sale; or if the purchaser has obtained any profit from said property, he must restore the whole of it. Moreover, if he himself made any additions to the property, he can recover the same from the vendor. Again, if the slave has committed an unlawful act punishable with death, if he has been guilty of any act against the life of some one, or if he has been introduced into the arena for the purpose of fighting wild beasts; all these things must be stated at the time of the sale; for in these instances we will grant an action for the return of the slave. Further, we will also grant an action where a party is proved to have knowingly, and in bad faith, sold a slave in violation of these provisions.” 2The reason for the promulgation of this Edict was to prevent the frauds of vendors, and to provide relief for such purchasers as have been deceived by vendors. We must, however, understand that the vendor, even if he was ignorant of those things which the Ædiles ordered to be observed, will still be liable; and this is not unjust, for a vendor can readily obtain knowledge of these matters, nor does it make any difference to the purchaser why he is deceived, whether through the ignorance, or the cunning of the vendor. 3It must be remembered that this Edict does not have reference to sales made by the Treasury. 4Where, however, the Government makes the sale, this Edict will apply. 5It is also applicable to the sale of property belonging to wards. 6Ad Dig. 21,1,1,6ROHGE, Bd. 10 (1874), S. 355: Der Verkäufer ist nicht bloß zur Vertretung der heimlichen, sondern schlechthin aller nicht angezeigten, nicht unerheblichen Mängel verbunden, sofern er nicht beweist, daß der Käufer sie gekannt hat oder kennen mußte.Where the defect, or the disease of a slave is apparent, as is very frequently the case, where defects are manifest from certain indications, it can be said that the Edict does not apply. Provision should only be made to prevent the purchaser from being deceived. 7It should be noted that disease is defined by Sabinus to be some condition of the body which renders it less able to perform the functions for which Nature has bestowed upon us corporeal health. In some cases, disease affects the entire body, in others only a portion of the same, for instance consumption, that is to say, a wasting; a fever is a malady of the entire body; blindness, for example, is the malady of a part, although a man may be born in this condition. There is a great difference between a defect and a disease, as where someone is a stammerer, for this is rather a blemish than a state of ill-health. I think that it is for the sake of removing all doubt on this subject, that the Ædiles have made use of the term “the same,” in order that no uncertainty may remain. 8Hence, if the defect or disease is such as to interfere with the use and services of the slave, it will afford ground for the action to compel him to be taken back; but we must remember that any very trifling affection or fault cannot cause the slave to be considered sickly or unsound. Therefore, a slight feverishness, or an old quartan fever, which at the time is about to disappear, or a trifling wound will not cause the vendor to be considered at fault, because he did not call attention to it; for things of this kind can be passed over. We will now give some examples of slaves who are diseased and unsound. 9It is asked by Vivianus, whether a slave who did not always manifest signs of insanity, and sometimes spoke rationally, should still be considered sane. Vivianus says that he is sane, nevertheless; for we should understand that some persons are of sound mind although they may sometimes exhibit mental defects; otherwise, he states that the result would be that we would deny an infinite number of persons to be sane in accordance with this principle, as, for instance, those who are giddy, superstitious, irascible, and insolent, as well as others who have similar mental defects. More, however, is guaranteed with reference to soundness of body than respecting mental defects. For he asserts that a corporeal defect will sometimes extend to and vitiate the mind, for example, where a man is said to have his mind affected as the result of fever. What must be done in a case of this kind? If the mental defect is such that attention should have been called to it by the vendor, and he did not do so when he was aware that it existed, he will be liable to an action on purchase. 10Vivianus also holds that although a slave may have run around temples in a distracted manner, and given oracular answers; still, if he was not accustomed to act in this manner at the time when he was sold, this is no defect; nor will an action lie because he occasionally conducted himself in this way; just as none will lie where he formerly had had a fever. But if he continues to be addicted to this vicious habit, and is accustomed to run distractedly around temples, and give oracular answers, as if demented; even if he does this through sport, it is a defect, but a defect of the mind, and not of the body, and therefore he cannot be returned; as the Ædiles only mention corporeal blemishes; nevertheless, an action on purchase can be brought against the vendor. 11He also says that the same rule applies with reference to slaves who are beyond measure timid, greedy, avaricious, or irascible,

2Pau­lus li­bro pri­mo ad edic­tum ae­di­lium cu­ru­lium. vel me­lan­cho­li­ci
3Gaius li­bro pri­mo ad edic­tum ae­di­lium cu­ru­lium. vel pro­ter­vi vel gib­be­ro­si vel cur­vi vel pruri­gi­no­si vel sca­biosi, item mu­ti et sur­di:

3Gaius, On the Edict of the Curule Ædiles, Book I. Or insolent, humpbacked, crooked, or affected with some skin disease, or with the itch, or dumb or deaf:

4Ul­pia­nus li­bro pri­mo ad edic­tum ae­di­lium cu­ru­lium. ob quae vi­tia ne­gat red­hi­bitio­nem es­se, ex emp­to dat ac­tio­nem. 1Sed si vi­tium cor­po­ris us­que ad ani­mum pe­ne­trat, for­te si prop­ter fe­brem lo­quan­tur alie­na vel qui per vi­cos mo­re in­sa­no­rum de­ri­den­da lo­quan­tur, in quos id ani­mi vi­tium ex cor­po­ris vi­tio ac­ci­dit, red­hi­be­ri pos­se. 2Item alea­to­res et vi­na­rios non con­ti­ne­ri edic­to quos­dam re­spon­dis­se Pom­po­nius ait, quem­ad­mo­dum nec gu­lo­sos nec im­pos­to­res aut men­da­ces aut liti­gio­sos. 3Idem Pom­po­nius ait, quam­vis non va­li­de sa­pien­tem ser­vum ven­di­tor prae­sta­re de­beat, ta­men, si ita fa­tuum vel mo­rio­nem ven­di­de­rit, ut in eo usus nul­lus sit, vi­de­ri vi­tium. et vi­de­mur hoc iu­re uti, ut vi­tii mor­bi­que ap­pel­la­tio non vi­dea­tur per­ti­ne­re ni­si ad cor­po­ra: ani­mi au­tem vi­tium ita de­mum prae­sta­bit ven­di­tor, si pro­mi­sit, si mi­nus, non. et id­eo no­mi­na­tim de er­ro­ne et fu­gi­ti­vo ex­ci­pi­tur: hoc enim ani­mi vi­tium est, non cor­po­ris. un­de qui­dam iu­men­ta pa­vi­da et cal­ci­tro­sa mor­bosis non es­se ad­nu­me­ran­da di­xe­runt: ani­mi enim, non cor­po­ris hoc vi­tium es­se. 4In sum­ma si qui­dem ani­mi tan­tum vi­tium est, red­hi­be­ri non pot­est, ni­si si dic­tum est hoc ab­es­se et non ab­est: ex emp­to ta­men agi pot­est, si sciens id vi­tium ani­mi re­ti­cuit: si au­tem cor­po­ris so­lius vi­tium est aut et cor­po­ris et ani­mi mix­tum vi­tium, red­hi­bitio lo­cum ha­be­bit. 5Il­lud erit ad­no­tan­dum, quod de mor­bo ge­ne­ra­li­ter scrip­tum est, non de son­ti­co mor­bo, nec mi­rum hoc vi­de­ri Pom­po­nius ait: ni­hil enim ibi agi­tur de ea re, cui hic ip­se mor­bus ob­stet. 6Idem ait non om­nem mor­bum da­re lo­cum red­hi­bitio­ni, ut pu­ta le­vis lip­pi­tu­do aut le­vis den­tis au­ri­cu­lae­ve do­lor aut me­dio­cre ul­cus: non de­ni­que fe­bri­cu­lam quan­tu­lam­li­bet ad cau­sam hu­ius edic­ti per­ti­ne­re.

4Ulpianus, On the Edict of the Curule Ædiles, Book I. And he denies that a slave can be returned on account of these defects, but he grants an action on purchase. 1If, however, a bodily defect influences the mind, for instance where a slave speaks disconnectedly on account of fever, or makes ridiculous speeches in public, like an insane person, where the mental defect is caused by a corporeal one, he can be returned. 2Pomponius says that certain authorities held that slaves who are gamblers and given to wine are not included in the Edict, just as those who are gluttons, impostors, liars, or quarrelsome, are not included. 3Pomponius also says that although the vendor is not compelled to guarantee that his slave is very intelligent, still, if when he sells him he is so stupid or foolish that no use can be made of him, this will be considered a defect. We see that the rule is adopted that the terms “defect” and “disease” are only applicable to the body, but the vendor is not required to guarantee a slave to be free from a mental defect, unless he specially stated the fact, otherwise, he will not be liable; and hence an express exception was made with reference to slaves who are wanderers, and accustomed to run away, for these are mental and not bodily defects. Wherefore, some authorities hold that animals that are timorous and in the habit of kicking should not be classed with such as are unsound, for these are mental and not physical defects. 4In a word, no matter how serious the mental defect may be, it will not afford ground for a return of the property, unless it was represented not to exist, when in fact it did. An action on sale, however, can be brought where the vendor knowingly concealed the mental defect, but where the defect is a corporeal one alone, or affects both the body and the mind, the property can be returned on this account. 5It should be noted that mention is made in general terms of disease, and not of any dangerous ailment. Pomponius says that this should not seem extraordinary, for nothing there has reference to matters to which a disease of this kind is a hindrance. 6He also says that it is not every disease which affords a ground for the return of property, as, for instance, an insignificant running of the eyes, or a trifling pain in the teeth or the ear, or a small sore, nor, in fact, does any slight fever come within the scope of this Edict.

5Pau­lus li­bro un­de­ci­mo ad Sa­binum. Et quan­tum in­ter­est in­ter haec vi­tia quae Grae­ci κακοήθειαν di­cunt, in­ter­que πάθος aut νόσον aut ἀρρωστίαν, tan­tum in­ter ta­lia vi­tia et eum mor­bum, ex quo quis mi­nus ap­tus usui sit, dif­fert.

5Paulus, On Sabinus, Book XI. There is as much difference between these blemishes which the Greeks call “defectiveness” and disorders, or diseases, or illness, as there is between such corporeal imperfections and ailments which render a slave incapable of service.

6Ul­pia­nus li­bro pri­mo ad edic­tum ae­di­lium cu­ru­lium. Pom­po­nius rec­te ait non tan­tum ad per­pe­tuos mor­bos, ve­rum ad tem­po­ra­rios quo­que hoc edic­tum per­ti­ne­re. 1Tre­ba­tius ait im­peti­gi­no­sum mor­bosum non es­se, si eo mem­bro, ubi im­pe­ti­go es­set, ae­que rec­te uta­tur: et mi­hi vi­de­tur ve­ra Tre­ba­tii sen­ten­tia. 2Spa­do­nem mor­bosum non es­se ne­que vi­tio­sum ve­rius mi­hi vi­de­tur, sed sa­num es­se, sic­uti il­lum, qui unum tes­ti­cu­lum ha­bet, qui et­iam ge­ne­ra­re pot­est.

6Ulpianus, On the Edict of the Curule Ædiles, Book I. Pomponius very properly says that this Edict has reference not only to chronic diseases, but also to such as are temporary in their character. 1Trebatius says that tetter is not a disease, if the slave can make use of the limb upon which it appears as well as he can of the other. This opinion of Trebatius appears to me to be correct. 2A slave who has been castrated is not, I think, diseased or defective, but sound; just as one who has but one testicle, who is still capable of reproduction.

7Pau­lus li­bro un­de­ci­mo ad Sa­binum. Sin au­tem quis ita spa­do est, ut tam ne­ces­sa­ria pars cor­po­ris et pe­ni­tus ab­sit, mor­bosus est.

7Ulpianus, On Sabinus, Book XI. Where, however, a slave has been castrated in such a way that any part of his body required for the purpose of generation is absolutely absent, he is considered to be diseased.

8Ul­pia­nus li­bro pri­mo ad edic­tum ae­di­lium cu­ru­lium. Si cui lin­gua abs­ci­sa sit, an sa­nus es­se vi­dea­tur, quae­ri­tur. et ex­stat haec quaes­tio apud Ofi­lium re­la­ta apud eum in equo: ait enim hunc vi­de­ri non es­se sa­num.

8Ulpianus, On the Edict of the Curule Ædiles, Book I. It has been asked whether a slave whose tongue has been cut off is to be considered sound. This inquiry is put by Ofilius with reference to a horse, and he says that the horse should not be held to be sound.

9Idem li­bro qua­dra­ge­si­mo quar­to ad Sa­binum. Mu­tum mor­bosum es­se Sa­b­inus ait: mor­bum enim es­se si­ne vo­ce es­se ap­pa­ret. sed qui gra­vi­ter lo­qui­tur, mor­bosus non est, nec qui ἀσαφῶσ·: pla­ne qui ἀσήμως lo­qui­tur, hic uti­que mor­bosus est.

9The Same, On Sabinus, Book XLIV. Sabinus says that a dumb person is diseased, for it is evident that to be deprived of speech is a disease. A person who speaks with difficulty, however, is not diseased, any more than one is whom it is hard to understand; and it is clear that one whose words are without any meaning is diseased.

10Idem li­bro pri­mo ad edic­tum ae­di­lium cu­ru­lium. Idem Ofi­lius ait, si ho­mi­ni digi­tus sit abs­ci­sus mem­bri­ve quid la­ce­ra­tum, quam­vis con­sa­na­ve­rit, si ta­men ob eam rem eo mi­nus uti pos­sit, non vi­de­ri sa­num es­se. 1Ca­to­nem quo­que scri­be­re le­go, cui digi­tus de ma­nu aut de pe­de prae­ci­sus sit, eum mor­bosum es­se: quod ve­rum est se­cun­dum su­pra scrip­tam di­stinc­tio­nem. 2Sed si quis plu­res digi­tos ha­beat si­ve in ma­ni­bus si­ve in pe­di­bus, si ni­hil im­pe­di­tur nu­me­ro eo­rum, non est in cau­sa red­hi­bitio­nis: prop­ter quod non il­lud spec­tan­dum est, quis nu­me­rus sit digi­to­rum, sed an si­ne im­pe­d­imen­to vel plu­ri­bus vel pau­cio­ri­bus uti pos­sit. 3De my­o­pe quae­si­tum est, an sa­nus es­set: et pu­to eum red­hi­be­ri pos­se. 4Sed et νυκτάλωπα mor­bosum es­se con­stat, id est ubi ho­mo ne­que ma­tu­ti­no tem­po­re vi­det ne­que ves­per­ti­no, quod ge­nus mor­bi Grae­ci vo­cant νυκτάλωπα. lus­ci­tio­nem eam es­se qui­dam pu­tant, ubi ho­mo lu­mi­ne ad­hi­bi­to ni­hil vi­det. 5Quae­si­tum est, an bal­bus et blae­sus et aty­pus is­que qui tar­dius lo­qui­tur et va­rus et va­tius sa­nus sit: et opi­nor eos sa­nos es­se.

10The Same, On the Edict of the Curule Ædiles, Book I. Ofilius also says that where a finger of the slave has been cut off, or any portion of one of his members lacerated, even though he should recover from the injury, still, if his services are less available on this account, he is not held to be sound. 1I read also that Cato said that: “Where a finger has been cut off from the hand, or a toe from the foot of a slave, he is diseased.” This is correct, according to the distinction above mentioned. 2Moreover, where a slave has more than the ordinary number of fingers or toes, and his movements are not impeded in any way by their number, there is no ground for his return; because the number of his fingers or toes should not be taken into account, but whether he is able to make use of a larger or smaller number without any difficulty. 3The question has been asked whether a near-sighted slave is sound, and I think that he should be returned. 4Partial blindness is held to be a disease, that is to say, where a slave cannot see either in the morning or evening, which species of ailment the Greeks call weakness of eyesight. Some persons think that this affection is the same as that where a man sees nothing when a light is brought near him. 5It has been asked whether a stammerer, one who lisps or speaks inarticulately, or very slowly, or who is knock-kneed or bow-legged is sound, and I think that he is.

11Pau­lus li­bro un­de­ci­mo ad Sa­binum. Cui dens ab­est, non est mor­bosus: mag­na enim pars ho­mi­num ali­quo den­te ca­ret ne­que id­eo mor­bosi sunt: prae­ser­tim cum si­ne den­ti­bus nas­ci­mur nec id­eo mi­nus sa­ni su­mus do­nec den­tes ha­bea­mus: alio­quin nul­lus se­nex sa­nus es­set.

11Paulus, On Sabinus, Book XI. He who has lost a tooth is not diseased, for the greater portion of mankind have lost some teeth, and are not for that reason considered diseased, especially since we are born without teeth, and are not less sound on that account, until we have them; otherwise no old man would be considered healthy.

12Ul­pia­nus li­bro pri­mo ad edic­tum ae­di­lium cu­ru­lium. Qui cla­vum ha­bet, mor­bosus est: sed et po­ly­po­sus. 1Eum, qui al­te­rum ocu­lum aut al­te­ram ma­xil­lam ma­io­rem ha­bet, si rec­te iis uta­tur, sa­num vi­de­ri Pe­dius scri­bit: ait enim in­ae­qua­li­ta­tem ma­xil­la­rum ocu­lo­rum bra­chio­rum, si ni­hil ex mi­nis­te­rio prae­stan­do sub­tra­hit, ex­tra red­hi­bitio­nem es­se. sed et la­tus vel crus bre­vius pot­est ad­fer­re im­pe­d­imen­tum: er­go et hic erit red­hi­ben­dus. 2Si quis na­tu­ra gut­tu­ro­sus sit aut ocu­los emi­nen­tes ha­beat, sa­nus vi­de­tur. 3Item scien­dum est scae­vam non es­se mor­bosum vel vi­tio­sum, prae­ter­quam si in­be­cil­li­ta­te dex­trae va­li­dius si­nis­tra uti­tur: sed hunc non scae­vam, sed man­cum es­se. 4Is cui os oleat an sa­nus sit quae­si­tum est: Tre­ba­tius ait non es­se mor­bosum os ali­cui ole­re, vel­uti hir­co­sum, stra­bo­nem: hoc enim ex il­lu­vie oris ac­ci­de­re so­le­re. si ta­men ex cor­po­ris vi­tio id ac­ci­dit, vel­uti quod ie­cur, quod pul­mo aut aliud quid si­mi­li­ter do­let, mor­bosus est.

12Ulpianus, On the Edict of the Curule Ædiles, Book I. Anyone who has a tumor is diseased, as well as one who has a polypus, 1Pedius says that a slave who has one eye or one cheek larger than the other, if he can use them just as well, is considered sound; for he states that any inequality of the cheeks, eyes, or arms, if they detract nothing from the services of the slave, do not afford ground for his return. But where one side is smaller, or one leg shorter, it may offer some impediment, and therefore, in this instance, the slave can be returned. 2Where a slave is born with a goiter, or has prominent eyes, he is considered sound. 3It also should be remembered that a left-handed slave is not diseased or defective, unless he uses his left hand more frequently on account of the weakness of his right, but he is then not left-handed, but crippled. 4The question arose whether a slave who has a bad breath is sound. Trebatius says that a person whose breath smells is not diseased any more than one who smells like a goat, or who squints; for this may happen to anyone on account of a filthy mouth. But, however, where this occurs through some bodily defect, for example, from the liver or the lungs, or from any other similar cause, the slave is diseased.

13Gaius li­bro pri­mo ad edic­tum ae­di­lium cu­ru­lium. Item clo­dus mor­bosus est.

13Gaius, On the Edict of the Curule Ædiles, Book I. A slave who is lame is also considered diseased.

14Ul­pia­nus li­bro pri­mo ad edic­tum ae­di­lium cu­ru­lium. Quae­ri­tur de ea mu­lie­re, quae sem­per mor­tuos pa­rit, an mor­bosa sit: et ait Sa­b­inus, si vul­vae vi­tio hoc con­tin­git, mor­bosam es­se. 1Si mu­lier prae­gnas ven­ie­rit, in­ter om­nes con­ve­nit sa­nam eam es­se: ma­xi­mum enim ac prae­ci­puum mu­nus fe­mi­na­rum est ac­ci­pe­re ac tue­ri con­cep­tum: 2Puer­pe­ram quo­que sa­nam es­se, si mo­do ni­hil ex­trin­se­cus ac­ci­dit, quod cor­pus eius in ali­quam va­le­tu­di­nem im­mit­te­ret. 3De ste­ri­li Cae­lius di­stin­gue­re Tre­ba­tium di­cit, ut, si na­tu­ra ste­ri­lis sit, sa­na sit, si vi­tio cor­po­ris, con­tra. 4Item de eo qui uri­nam fa­cit quae­ri­tur. et Pe­dius ait non ob eam rem sa­num non es­se, quod in lec­to som­no vi­no­que pres­sus aut et­iam pi­g­ri­tia sur­gen­di uri­nam fa­ciat: sin au­tem vi­tio ve­si­cae col­lec­tum umo­rem con­ti­ne­re non pot­est, non quia uri­nam in lec­to fa­cit, sed quia vi­tio­sam ve­si­cam ha­bet, red­hi­be­ri pos­se: et ve­rius est quod Pe­dius. 5Idem ait, si uva ali­cu­ius prae­ci­sa sit, tol­le­re ma­gis quam prae­sta­re red­hi­bitio­nem, quod mor­bus mi­nui­tur: ego pu­to, si mor­bus de­si­nit, non es­se red­hi­bitio­ni lo­cum, sin au­tem vi­tium per­se­ve­ret, red­hi­bitio­nem lo­cum ha­be­re. 6Si quis digi­tis con­iunc­tis nas­ca­tur, non vi­de­tur sa­nus es­se, sed ita de­mum, si in­com­mo­da­tur ad usum ma­nus. 7Mu­lie­rem ita ar­tam, ut mu­lier fie­ri non pos­sit, sa­nam non vi­de­ri con­stat. 8Si quis ἀντιάδας ha­beat, an red­hi­be­ri qua­si vi­tio­sus pos­sit, quae­ri­tur. et si ἀντιάδες hae sunt quas ex­is­ti­mo, id est in­ve­te­ra­tas, et qui iam dis­cu­ti non pos­sint fau­cium tu­mo­res, qui ἀντιάδας ha­bet vi­tio­sus est. 9Si ven­di­tor no­mi­na­tim ex­ce­pe­rit de ali­quo mor­bo et de ce­te­ro sa­num es­se di­xe­rit aut pro­mi­se­rit, stan­dum est eo quod con­ve­nit (re­mit­ten­ti­bus enim ac­tio­nes suas non est re­gres­sus dan­dus), ni­si sciens ven­di­tor mor­bum con­sul­to re­ti­cuit: tunc enim dan­dam es­se de do­lo ma­lo re­pli­ca­tio­nem. 10Si no­mi­na­tim mor­bus ex­cep­tus non sit, ta­lis ta­men mor­bus sit, qui om­ni­bus po­tuit ap­pa­re­re (ut pu­ta cae­cus ho­mo ven­ibat, aut qui ci­ca­tri­cem evi­den­tem et pe­ri­cu­lo­sam ha­be­bat vel in ca­pi­te vel in alia par­te cor­po­ris), eius no­mi­ne non te­ne­ri Cae­ci­lius ait, per­in­de ac si no­mi­na­tim mor­bus ex­cep­tus fuis­set: ad eos enim mor­bos vi­tia­que per­ti­ne­re edic­tum ae­di­lium pro­ban­dum est, quae quis igno­ra­vit vel igno­ra­re po­tuit.

14Ulpianus, On the Edict of the Curule Ædiles, Book I. The question was asked whether a female slave was diseased who always brought forth dead children. Sabinus says that if this was caused by an uterine affection, she must be so considered. 1Where a female slave, who is pregnant, is sold, it is held by all the authorities that she is sound, for it is the greatest and most important function of a woman to conceive and preserve a child. 2A woman in child-birth is also sound, provided nothing else happens which would cause her some bodily illness. 3Cælius says Trebatius makes a distinction in a case of sterility, for if a woman is sterile by nature, she is healthy, but if this occurs through some defect of the body she is not. 4The question also arises with reference to one who suffers from incontinence of urine, and Pedius says that a man is not less healthy on this account if he passes urine in bed, while overcome with sleep or wine, or where this occurs through sluggishness in rising. Where, however, he cannot hold back the collected fluid through some defect of his bladder, a slave can be returned, not because he passed his urine in bed, but for the reason that he has a defective bladder; and this opinion is correct. 5Pedius also says that if the uvula of anyone is amputated, it prevents rather than calls for the return of a slave, because the morbid condition is diminished. I think that if the morbid condition disappears, there will be no ground for the return, but if the defect remains, there will be ground for it. 6Where anyone is born with fingers that are united, he is not considered to be sound, if he is prevented from using his hands. 7Where the vagina of a female slave is so narrow that she cannot become a woman, it is settled that she should not be considered sound. 8Where a slave has enlarged tonsils, the question arises whether he can be returned as being unsound. If this is understood in the sense in which I think it is, that is, if the condition has existed for so long a time that the tumors of the throat which have been formed cannot now be removed, the slave is unsound. 9Ad Dig. 21,1,14,9ROHGE, Bd. 5 (1872), S. 324: Voraussetzung des Dolus: Täuschung und UebervortheilungWhere a vendor expressly states that the slave has a certain disease but is sound in other respects, the parties must abide by what was agreed upon, for where their rights of action have been relinquished they cannot be permitted to resume them, unless the vendor knowingly and deliberately concealed the disease; for, in this instance, a reply should be granted on the ground of fraud. 10Ad Dig. 21,1,14,10ROHGE, Bd. 10 (1874), S. 355: Der Verkäufer ist nicht bloß zur Vertretung der heimlichen, sondern schlechthin aller nicht angezeigten, nicht unerheblichen Mängel verbunden, sofern er nicht beweist, daß der Käufer sie gekannt hat oder kennen mußte.Where the existence of a blemish was not expressly mentioned by the vendor, but it was of such a character that it would be apparent to everyone; for example, if the slave was blind, or had a manifest and dangerous scar on his head, or on some other part of his body, Cæcilius says that the vendor will not be liable on this account, any more than if he had expressly mentioned the defect, for it is held that the Edict of the Ædiles has only reference to such diseases and defects as the purchaser was, or could be ignorant of.

15Pau­lus li­bro un­de­ci­mo ad Sa­binum. Quae bis in men­se pur­ga­tur, sa­na non est, item quae non pur­ga­tur, ni­si per ae­ta­tem ac­ci­dit.

15Paulus, On Sabinus, Book XI. A female slave who has her periods twice a month is not healthy. The same rule applies to one who has no such discharge, unless this is due to age.

16Pom­po­nius li­bro vi­ce­si­mo ter­tio ad Sa­binum. Quod ita sa­na­tum est, ut in pris­ti­num sta­tum re­sti­tue­re­tur, per­in­de ha­ben­dum est, qua­si num­quam mor­bosum es­set.

16Pomponius, On Sabinus, Book XXIII. Where a slave is thoroughly cured, so that he is restored to his former condition, he must be considered as having never been diseased.

17Ul­pia­nus li­bro pri­mo ad edic­tum ae­di­lium cu­ru­lium. Quid sit fu­gi­ti­vus, de­fi­nit Ofi­lius: fu­gi­ti­vus est, qui ex­tra do­mi­ni do­mum fu­gae cau­sa, quo se a do­mi­no ce­la­ret, man­sit. 1Cae­lius au­tem fu­gi­ti­vum es­se ait eum, qui ea men­te dis­ce­dat, ne ad do­mi­num red­eat, tam­et­si mu­ta­to con­si­lio ad eum re­ver­ta­tur: ne­mo enim ta­li pec­ca­to, in­quit, pae­ni­ten­tia sua no­cens es­se de­si­nit. 2Cas­sius quo­que scri­bit fu­gi­ti­vum es­se, qui cer­to pro­pos­i­to do­mi­num re­lin­quat. 3Item apud Vi­via­num re­la­tum est fu­gi­ti­vum fe­re ab af­fec­tu ani­mi in­tel­le­gen­dum es­se, non uti­que a fu­ga: nam eum qui hos­tem aut la­tro­nem, in­cen­dium rui­nam­ve fu­ge­ret, quam­vis fu­gis­se ve­rum est, non ta­men fu­gi­ti­vum es­se. item ne eum qui­dem, qui a prae­cep­to­re cui in dis­ci­pli­nam tra­di­tus erat au­fu­git, es­se fu­gi­ti­vum, si for­te id­eo fu­git, quia im­mo­de­ra­te eo ute­ba­tur. idem­que pro­bat et si ab eo fu­ge­rit cui erat com­mo­da­tus, si prop­ter ean­dem cau­sam fu­ge­rit. idem pro­bat Vi­via­nus et si sae­vius cum eo age­bat. haec ita, si eos fu­gis­set et ad do­mi­num venis­set: ce­te­rum si ad do­mi­num non venis­set, si­ne ul­la du­bi­ta­tio­ne fu­gi­ti­vum vi­de­ri ait. 4Idem ait: in­ter­ro­ga­tus Pro­cu­lus de eo, qui do­mi la­tuis­set in hoc sci­li­cet, ut fu­gae nac­tus oc­ca­sio­nem se sub­tra­he­ret, ait, tam­et­si fu­ge­re non pos­set vi­de­ri, qui do­mi man­sis­set, ta­men eum fu­gi­ti­vum fuis­se: sin au­tem in hoc tan­tum la­tuis­set, quo­ad ira­cun­dia do­mi­ni ef­fer­ves­ce­ret, fu­gi­ti­vum non es­se, sic­uti ne eum qui­dem, qui cum do­mi­num anim­ad­ver­te­ret ver­be­ri­bus se ad­fi­ce­re vel­le, prae­ri­puis­set se ad ami­cum, quem ad pre­can­dum per­du­ce­ret. ne eum qui­dem fu­gi­ti­vum es­se, qui in hoc pro­gres­sus est, ut se prae­ci­pi­ta­ret (ce­te­rum et­iam eum quis fu­gi­ti­vum di­ce­ret, qui do­mi in al­tum lo­cum ad prae­ci­pi­tan­dum se ascen­dis­set), ma­gis­que hunc mor­tem si­bi con­scis­ce­re vo­luis­se. il­lud enim, quod ple­rum­que ab im­pru­den­ti­bus, in­quit, di­ci so­let, eum es­se fu­gi­ti­vum, qui noc­te ali­qua si­ne vo­lun­ta­te do­mi­ni eman­sis­set, non es­se ve­rum, sed ab af­fec­tu ani­mi cu­ius­que aes­ti­man­dum 5Idem Vi­via­nus ait, si a ma­gis­tro puer re­ces­sit et rur­sus ad ma­trem per­ve­nit, cum quae­re­re­tur, num fu­gi­ti­vus es­set: si ce­lan­di cau­sa quo, ne ad do­mi­num re­ver­te­re­tur, fu­gis­set, fu­gi­ti­vum es­se: sin ve­ro ut per ma­trem fa­ci­lio­rem de­pre­ca­tio­nem ha­be­ret de­lic­ti ali­cu­ius, non es­se fu­gi­ti­vum. 6Cae­lius quo­que scri­bit, si ser­vum eme­ris, qui se in Ti­be­rim de­ie­cit, si mo­rien­di dum­ta­xat con­si­lio sus­cep­to a do­mi­no dis­ces­sis­set, non es­se fu­gi­ti­vum, sed si fu­gae prius con­si­lium ha­buit, de­in­de mu­ta­ta vo­lun­ta­te in Ti­be­rim se de­ie­cit, ma­ne­re fu­gi­ti­vum. ea­dem pro­bat et de eo, qui de pon­te se prae­ci­pi­ta­vit. haec om­nia ve­ra sunt, quae Cae­lius scri­bit. 7Idem ait, si ser­vus tuus fu­giens vi­ca­rium suum se­cum ab­du­xit: si vi­ca­rius in­vi­tus aut im­pru­dens se­cu­tus est ne­que oc­ca­sio­nem ad te red­eun­di nac­tus prae­ter­mi­sit, non vi­de­ri fu­gi­ti­vum fuis­se: sed si aut olim cum fu­ge­ret in­tel­le­xit quid age­re­tur aut post­ea co­gno­vit quid ac­ti es­set et red­ire ad te cum pos­set no­luit, con­tra es­se. idem pu­tat di­cen­dum de eo, quem pla­gia­rius ab­du­xit. 8Idem Cae­lius ait, si ser­vus, cum in fun­do es­set, ex­is­set de vil­la ea men­te, ut pro­fu­ge­ret et quis eum, prius­quam ex fun­do tuo ex­is­set com­pre­hen­dis­set, fu­gi­ti­vum vi­de­ri: ani­mum enim fu­gi­ti­vum fa­ce­re. 9Idem ait nec eum, qui ad fu­gam gra­dum unum al­te­rum­ve pro­mo­vit vel et­iam cur­re­re coe­pit, si do­mi­num se­quen­tem non pot­est eva­de­re, non es­se fu­gi­ti­vum. 10Idem rec­te ait li­ber­ta­tis cu­ius­dam spe­ciem es­se fu­gis­se, hoc est po­tes­ta­te do­mi­ni­ca in prae­sen­ti li­be­ra­tum es­se. 11Pig­no­ri da­tus ser­vus de­bi­to­rem qui­dem do­mi­num ha­bet, sed si, post­ea­quam ius suum ex­er­cuit cre­di­tor, ei se sub­tra­xit, pot­est fu­gi­ti­vus vi­de­ri. 12Apud La­beo­nem et Cae­lium quae­ri­tur, si quis in asylum con­fu­ge­rit aut eo se con­fe­rat, quo so­lent venire qui se ve­na­les pos­tu­lant, an fu­gi­ti­vus sit: ego pu­to non es­se eum fu­gi­ti­vum, qui id fa­cit quod pu­bli­ce fa­ce­re li­ce­re ar­bi­tra­tur. ne eum qui­dem, qui ad sta­tuam Cae­sa­ris con­fu­git, fu­gi­ti­vum ar­bi­tror: non enim fu­gien­di ani­mo hoc fa­cit. idem pu­to et in eum, qui in asylum vel quod aliud con­fu­git, quia non fu­gien­di ani­mo hoc fa­cit: si ta­men an­te fu­git et post­ea se con­tu­lit, non id­eo ma­gis fu­gi­ti­vus es­se de­si­nit. 13Item Cae­lius scri­bit pla­ce­re eum quo­que fu­gi­ti­vum11Die Großausgabe fügt es­se ein., qui eo se con­fe­rat, un­de eum do­mi­nus re­ci­pe­ra­re non pos­sit, mul­to­que ma­gis il­lum fu­gi­ti­vum es­se, qui eo se con­fe­rat, un­de ab­du­ci non pos­sit. 14Er­ro­nem ita de­fi­nit La­beo pu­sil­lum fu­gi­ti­vum es­se, et ex di­ver­so fu­gi­ti­vum mag­num er­ro­nem es­se. sed pro­prie er­ro­nem sic de­fi­ni­mus: qui non qui­dem fu­git, sed fre­quen­ter si­ne cau­sa va­ga­tur et tem­po­ri­bus in res nu­ga­to­rias con­sump­tis se­rius do­mum red­it. 15Apud Cae­lium scrip­tum est: li­ber­ti apud pa­tro­num ha­bi­tan­tis sic, ut sub una cla­ve to­ta eius ha­bi­ta­tio es­set, ser­vus ea men­te, ne red­iret ad eum, ex­tra ha­bi­ta­tio­nem li­ber­ti fuit, sed in­tra ae­des pa­tro­ni, et to­ta noc­te ob­li­tuit: vi­de­ri es­se fu­gi­ti­vum Cae­lius ait. pla­ne si ta­lem cus­to­diam ea ha­bi­ta­tio non ha­buit et in ea cel­la li­ber­tus ha­bi­ta­vit, cui com­mu­ne et pro­mis­cuum plu­rium cel­la­rum iter est, con­tra pla­ce­re de­be­re Cae­lius ait et La­beo pro­bat. 16Idem Cae­lius ait ser­vum in pro­vin­ciam mis­sum a do­mi­no, cum eum mor­tuum es­se et tes­ta­men­to se li­be­rum re­lic­tum au­dis­set et in eo­dem of­fi­cio per­man­sis­set tan­tum­que pro li­be­ro se ge­re­re coe­pis­set, hunc non es­se fu­gi­ti­vum: nec enim men­tien­do se li­be­rum, in­quit, fu­gi­ti­vus es­se coe­pit, quia si­ne fu­gae con­si­lio id fe­cit. 17Quod aiunt ae­di­les ‘no­xa so­lu­tus non sit’, sic in­tel­le­gen­dum est, ut non hoc de­beat pro­nun­tia­ri nul­lam eum no­xam com­mis­sis­se, sed il­lud no­xa so­lu­tum es­se, hoc est noxa­li iu­di­cio sub­iec­tum non es­se: er­go si no­xam com­mi­sit nec per­ma­net, no­xa so­lu­tus vi­de­tur. 18No­xas ac­ci­pe­re de­be­mus pri­va­tas, hoc est eas, quae­cum­que com­mit­tun­tur ex de­lic­tis, non pu­bli­cis cri­mi­ni­bus, ex qui­bus agi­tur iu­di­ciis noxa­li­bus: de­ni­que spe­cia­li­ter ca­ve­tur in­fra de ca­pi­ta­li­bus frau­di­bus. ex pri­va­tis au­tem no­xiis ori­tur dam­num pe­cu­nia­rium, si quis for­te no­xae de­de­re no­lue­rit, sed li­tis aes­ti­ma­tio­nem suf­fer­re. 19Si quis ta­lis sit ser­vus, qui om­ni­no ma­nu­mit­ti non pos­sit ex con­sti­tu­tio­ni­bus, vel si sub poe­na vin­cu­lo­rum dis­trac­tus sit a do­mi­no (vel ab ali­qua po­tes­ta­te dam­na­tus) vel si ex­por­tan­dus: ae­quis­si­mum erit et­iam hoc prae­di­ci. 20Si quis ad­fir­ma­ve­rit ali­quid ad­es­se ser­vo nec ad­sit, vel ab­es­se et ad­sit, ut pu­ta si di­xe­rit fu­rem non es­se et fur sit, si di­xe­rit ar­ti­fi­cem es­se et non sit: hi enim, quia quod ad­se­ve­ra­ve­runt non prae­stant, ad­ver­sus dic­tum pro­mis­sum­ve fa­ce­re vi­den­tur.

17Ulpianus, On the Edict of the Curule Ædiles, Book I. Ofilius defines a fugitive slave to be one who remains outside the house of his master for the purpose of taking to flight, or to conceal himself. 1Cælius says that a fugitive slave is one who leaves his master with the intention of not returning to him, even though, having changed his mind, he does return; for he says that in an offence of this kind repentance does not remove guilt. 2Cassius, also, states that a fugitive slave is one who leaves his master with a deliberate intention not to return. 3It is also stated by Vivianus that a slave is understood to be a fugitive more on account of his intention than through the fact of his flight, for a slave who runs away to escape from an enemy or a robber, or to avoid a fire or the destruction of a house, although it is true that he is taken to flight, still he is not a fugitive. Again, a slave who has fled from a teacher to whom he has been delivered for the purpose of instruction is not a fugitive, if, perchance, he took to flight because he was badly treated by him. He holds the same opinion where a slave runs away from a party to whom he was lent, if he did so for the same reason. Vivianus holds the same opinion if the slave runs away because he has been treated with too much severity. This, however, only applies where he runs away from those persons and returns to his master, but if he does not return to his master he says that there is no doubt that he should be considered a fugitive. 4Proculus, having been interrogated with reference to a slave who had concealed himself in the house of his master for the purpose of finding an opportunity to escape, says that although one who remains in the house cannot be held to have run away, he is, nevertheless, a fugitive. If, however, he concealed himself only for the purpose of waiting until his master’s anger had subsided, he is not a fugitive; just as where one whom his master intends to whip betakes himself to a friend in order to induce him to intercede for him. Nor is he to be considered a fugitive who went away for the purpose of committing suicide; otherwise anyone could call a slave a fugitive who ascended to the top of the house for the purpose of throwing himself down therefrom, since he should rather be classed with those intending to commit suicide; for he says that the opinion held by many unreasoning persons, namely, that he is a fugitive slave who remains away for a night without his master’s consent, is not correct; as the offence must be determined by the intention of the slave. 5Vivianus also says that, where a young slave left the house of his master and returned to his mother, and the question is asked whether or not he is a fugitive; he is one if he went away for the purpose of concealing himself to avoid returning to his master; but if he did so in order the more readily to obtain pardon for some offence by means of his mother, he is not a fugitive. 6Cælius also stated that if you purchase a slave who had thrown himself into the Tiber, and who had only left his master with the intention of committing suicide, he is not a fugitive. If, however, he had the intention to run away in the first place, and afterwards, having changed his mind, he threw himself into the Tiber, he is a fugitive. He holds the same opinion in the case of a slave who hurled himself down from a bridge. All these opinions given by Cælius are correct. 7He also says that if your slave should run away and take with him his sub-slave, and the latter unwillingly, or being ignorant of his design, accompanies him, and having obtained an opportunity to return to you, neglects to do so, he is not considered to be a fugitive. Where, however, he understood what was taking place at the time he took to flight, or subsequently learned the intention of the slave, and could have returned to you, and was unwilling to do so, it is another thing. He also holds that the same rule should apply to the case of a slave stolen by a thief. 8Cælius also says that if a slave who was on the land of his master abandons the house with the intention of running away, and someone seizes him before he leaves your land, he is to be considered a fugitive; for it is the intention which renders a slave a fugitive. 9He also says that a slave who has only taken one or two steps in attempting to escape, or has even begun to run, is not a fugitive, if he cannot in his flight escape from his master who is in pursuit of him. 10He also very properly says that flight is a species of liberty, in other words, that, for the time, he is free from the power of his master. 11Where a slave is given in pledge, he still has the debtor as his master; but if, after the creditor has exercised his right to obtain possession of him, he runs away from him, he can be considered a fugitive. 12It is asked by Labeo and Cælius, if the slave flees to a place of asylum, or betakes himself to one where slaves are accustomed to be sold or exposed for sale, whether he is a fugitive. I think that one who acts in this way is not a fugitive, because it is held to be lawful to do so publicly. Nor, indeed, do I think that he is a fugitive who betakes himself to the statue of the Emperor for refuge, for he does not do this with the intention of running away. I also hold the same opinion with reference to one who takes refuge in some asylum or other place, because he does not do this with the intention of running away. If, however, he ran away in the beginning, and afterwards betook himself to the asylum, he is none the less a fugitive on this account. 13Cælius also says that it is settled that he is a fugitive who withdraws to some place from whence his master will not be able to recover him, and that he is still more a fugitive who betakes himself to some place from which he cannot be removed. 14Labeo defines a wandering slave as a little vagabond; and, oh the other hand, a fugitive as a great wanderer. We correctly define a wandering slave as one who, in fact, does not run away, but frequently roams about, without any reason, and, after having wasted his time in trifling matters, returns home late. 15It was stated by Cælius that a freedman lived with his patron, the entire house being occupied by both. The slave of the freedman went away with the intention of not returning to him, but remained concealed during the entire night in the lodging of the patron, and Cælius says that he is a fugitive. Cælius says it is evident that if the entire house was not in charge of both persons, and the freedman lived in an apartment which was used as a common and promiscuous passage for all the rooms, the contrary opinion should be held; and Labeo approves this. 16Cælius also states that where a slave was sent into a province by his master, and having heard that the latter was dead, and that he had been liberated by his will, remained in the same employment, and began to conduct himself as a freedman, he is not a fugitive; for he says he did not become a fugitive by falsely stating that he was free, because he did this without the intention of taking to flight. 17Where the Ædiles say: “When the slave has not been released from liability for damage committed,” this should be understood to mean that the vendor is not obliged to state that he has committed no damage, but merely that he is free from liability for damage committed; that is to say, that he is not subject to a noxal action. Hence, if the slave committed some damage which has been made good, he is held to have been released from liability for the same. 18We should understand that damages committed against individuals are such as result from offences which are not public crimes, and are those from which noxal actions arise, since provision is especially made for capital crimes by the Edict; but private injuries give rise to pecuniary damages, where a party refuses to surrender the slave by way of reparation, and prefers to pay the damages assessed by the court. 19Where the slave is one who cannot be manumitted in accordance with the Imperial Constitutions; or if he has been sold by his master under the condition that he shall be kept in chains; or where he has been condemned by someone in authority; or if he is to be sent out of the country; it is perfectly just that this should be stated at the time when he is sold. 20Where anyone asserts that a slave has some good traits which in fact he has not, or that he is free from bad habits and this is not the case; as, for instance, if he should say that he was not a thief, and he is one, or if he should say that he is a skilled workman, and he is not; for parties of this kind who do not furnish what they agree to do, are held to have acted contrary to their statements and promises.

18Gaius li­bro pri­mo ad edic­tum ae­di­lium cu­ru­lium. Si quid ven­di­tor de man­ci­pio ad­fir­ma­ve­rit id­que non ita es­se emp­tor que­ra­tur, aut red­hi­bi­to­rio aut aes­ti­ma­to­rio (id est quan­to mi­no­ris) iu­di­cio age­re pot­est: ver­bi gra­tia si con­stan­tem aut la­borio­sum aut cur­ra­cem vi­gi­la­cem es­se, aut ex fru­ga­li­ta­te sua pe­cu­lium ad­quiren­tem ad­fir­ma­ve­rit, et is ex di­ver­so le­vis pro­ter­vus de­si­dio­sus som­ni­cu­lo­sus pi­ger tar­dus com­esor in­ve­nia­tur. haec om­nia vi­den­tur eo per­ti­ne­re, ne id quod ad­fir­ma­ve­rit ven­di­tor ama­re ab eo ex­iga­tur, sed cum quo­dam tem­pe­ra­men­to, ut si for­te con­stan­tem es­se ad­fir­ma­ve­rit, non ex­ac­ta gra­vi­tas et con­stan­tia qua­si a phi­lo­so­pho de­si­de­re­tur, et si la­borio­sum et vi­gi­la­cem ad­fir­ma­ve­rit es­se, non con­ti­nuus la­bor per dies noc­tes­que ab eo ex­iga­tur, sed haec om­nia ex bo­no et ae­quo mo­di­ce de­si­de­ren­tur. idem et in ce­te­ris quae ven­di­tor ad­fir­ma­ve­rit in­tel­le­ge­mus. 1Ven­di­tor, qui op­ti­mum co­cum es­se di­xe­rit, op­ti­mum in eo ar­ti­fi­cio prae­sta­re de­bet: qui ve­ro sim­pli­ci­ter co­cum es­se di­xe­rit, sa­tis fa­ce­re vi­de­tur, et­iam­si me­dio­crem co­cum prae­stet. idem et in ce­te­ris ge­ne­ri­bus ar­ti­fi­cio­rum. 2Ae­que si quis sim­pli­ci­ter di­xe­rit pe­cu­lia­tum es­se ser­vum, suf­fi­cit, si is vel mi­ni­mum ha­beat pe­cu­lium.

18Gaius, On the Edict of the Curule Ædiles, Book I. Where a vendor asserts that a slave has some good quality, and the purchaser complains that this is not true, he will be entitled to an action for the return or the appraisement of the slave, in order to recover the deficiency in his value; for example, if he should say that the slave is steady and industrious, swift of foot, or vigilant, or that he had increased his peculium on account of his frugality; and he, on the contrary, is ascertained to be changeable, insolent, lazy, given to sleep, and a glutton. All these things are considered to signify that what the vendor had asserted cannot be rigorously exacted from him, but that he must be treated with some degree of moderation; so that, for instance, if he declared that the slave was steady, such gravity and constancy as would be shown by a philosopher ought not to be expected from him; and if he asserted that he was industrious and vigilant, constant labor by day and night should not be required of him; but all these qualities he should be expected to possess to a certain extent, according to what is proper and just. We understand the same rule to apply to any other statements which the vendor may make. 1Where the vendor says that the slave is an excellent cook, he must furnish one of the very best belonging to that calling. If, however, he should merely say that he was a cook, he is held to have complied with his statement if he furnishes a cook of moderate ability. The same rule applies to other skilled laborers. 2Again, if anyone should merely assert that the slave has a peculium, it is sufficient if he has only a very small peculium.

19Ul­pia­nus li­bro pri­mo ad edic­tum ae­di­lium cu­ru­lium. Scien­dum ta­men est quae­dam et si di­xe­rit prae­sta­re eum non de­be­re, sci­li­cet ea, quae ad nu­dam lau­dem ser­vi per­ti­nent: vel­uti si di­xe­rit fru­gi probum dic­to au­dien­tem. ut enim Pe­dius scri­bit, mul­tum in­ter­est, com­men­dan­di ser­vi cau­sa quid di­xe­rit, an ve­ro prae­sta­tu­rum se pro­mi­se­rit quod di­xit. 1Pla­ne si di­xe­rit alea­to­rem non es­se, fu­rem non es­se, ad sta­tuam num­quam con­fu­gis­se, opor­tet eum id prae­sta­re. 2Dic­tum a pro­mis­so sic dis­cer­ni­tur: dic­tum ac­ci­pi­mus, quod ver­bo te­nus pro­nun­tia­tum est nu­do­que ser­mo­ne fi­ni­tur: pro­mis­sum au­tem pot­est re­fer­ri et ad nu­dam pro­mis­sio­nem si­ve pol­li­ci­ta­tio­nem vel ad spon­sum. se­cun­dum quod in­ci­piet is, qui de hu­ius­mo­di cau­sa sti­pu­lan­ti spopon­dit, et ex sti­pu­la­tu pos­se con­ve­ni­ri et red­hi­bi­to­riis ac­tio­ni­bus: non no­vum, nam et qui ex emp­to pot­est con­ve­ni­ri, idem et­iam red­hi­bi­to­riis ac­tio­ni­bus con­ve­ni­ri pot­est. 3Ea au­tem so­la dic­ta si­ve pro­mis­sa ad­mit­ten­da sunt, quae­cum­que sic di­cun­tur, ut prae­sten­tur, non ut iac­ten­tur. 4Il­lud scien­dum est: si quis ar­ti­fi­cem pro­mi­se­rit vel di­xe­rit, non uti­que per­fec­tum eum prae­sta­re de­bet, sed ad ali­quem mo­dum peritum, ut ne­que con­sum­ma­tae scien­tiae ac­ci­pias, ne­que rur­sum in­doc­tum es­se in ar­ti­fi­cium: suf­fi­ciet igi­tur ta­lem es­se, qua­les vol­go ar­ti­fi­ces di­cun­tur. 5De­in­de aiunt ae­di­les: ‘emp­to­ri om­ni­bus­que ad quos ea res per­ti­net iu­di­cium da­bi­mus’. pol­li­cen­tur emp­to­ri ac­tio­nem et suc­ces­so­ri­bus eius qui in uni­ver­sum ius suc­ce­dunt. emp­to­rem ac­ci­pe­re de­be­mus eum qui pre­tio emit. sed si quis per­mu­ta­ve­rit, di­cen­dum est utrum­que emp­to­ris et ven­di­to­ris lo­co ha­be­ri et utrum­que pos­se ex hoc edic­to ex­per­i­ri. 6Tem­pus au­tem red­hi­bitio­nis sex men­ses uti­les ha­bet: si au­tem man­ci­pium non red­hi­bea­tur, sed quan­to mi­no­ris agi­tur, an­nus uti­lis est. sed tem­pus red­hi­bitio­nis ex die ven­di­tio­nis cur­rit aut, si dic­tum pro­mis­sum­ve quid est, ex eo ex quo dic­tum pro­mis­sum­ve quid est.

19Ulpianus, On the Edict of the Curule Ædiles, Book I. It must, however, be remembered that there are certain things that the vendor is not obliged to furnish, even though he may state that they exist, for example, such as relate to the mere commendation of the slave; for instance, if he should say that he is frugal, honest, and attentive; for, as Pedius says, there is a good deal of difference where the vendor makes a statement in praise of the slave, and where he promises that he will furnish what he said he would. 1It is evident that if he should say that the slave was not a gambler or a thief, and had never fled for refuge to the statue of the Emperor, he must make good these statements. 2Ad Dig. 21,1,19,2ROHGE, Bd. 10 (1874), S. 339: Die actio emti führt zur Auflösung des Geschäfts, wenn das Interesse eben in der Aufhebung des Vertrages besteht.There is this difference between a statement and a promise, for we understand a statement to be merely what is uttered in speech and terminated by the words themselves; a promise, however, may be either a bare assurance that something will be done, or one that can be exacted, or one based on an agreement. In accordance with this, he who promised anything to a party stipulating for it in a case of this kind can either be sued in an action on stipulation, or in one for the return of the property, which is not unusual; since a party who can be sued in an action on purchase can also be proceeded against by means of an action to recover the property. 3Those things are only to be considered as stated or promised which are spoken in order to form the basis of an obligation, and not by way of praise. 4It must be noted that where a party promises a slave who is a skilled workman, or states that the slave is such, he is by no means required to furnish one who is perfect, but one who is, to a certain extent dexterous; so that you will not be led to believe that he is either highly accomplished, or, on the other hand, that he has no knowledge of his trade. Therefore, it will be sufficient if the slave belongs to the class commonly called artisans. 5The Ædiles further say, “We will grant an action to the purchaser and to all those whom this matter concerns.” Thus they promise an action to the purchaser and to his successors who are entitled to all his rights. We should consider the purchaser to be the party who buys the property for a price; where, however, anyone makes an exchange, it must be said that he occupies the position of both purchaser and vendor, and both can proceed under this Edict. 6The time fixed for the return of the property is six available months. If, however, the slave is not returned, but an action is brought for the deficiency in his value, this can be done within a year. Moreover, the time allowed for the return begins to run from the day of the sale, or, where anything has been stated or promised, from the day on which the statement or promise was made.

20Gaius li­bro pri­mo ad edic­tum ae­di­lium cu­ru­lium. Si ve­ro an­te ven­di­tio­nis tem­pus dic­tum in­ter­ces­se­rit, de­in­de post ali­quot dies in­ter­po­si­ta fue­rit sti­pu­la­tio, Cae­lius Sa­b­inus scri­bit ex prio­re cau­sa, quae sta­tim, in­quit, ut ven­iit id man­ci­pium, eo no­mi­ne pos­se age­re coe­pit.

20Gaius, On the Edict of the Curule Ædiles, Book I. If, however, the statement was made some time before the sale, and then a stipulation was entered into several days afterwards, Cælius Sabinus says that the purchaser can institute proceedings on this ground from the day when the slave was sold.

21Ul­pia­nus li­bro pri­mo ad edic­tum ae­di­lium cu­ru­lium. Red­hi­be­re est fa­ce­re, ut rur­sus ha­beat ven­di­tor quod ha­bue­rit, et quia red­den­do id fie­bat, id­cir­co red­hi­bitio est ap­pel­la­ta qua­si red­di­tio. 1Cum red­di­tur ab emp­to­re man­ci­pium ven­di­to­ri, de do­lo ma­lo pro­mit­ti opor­te­re ei Pom­po­nius ait et id­eo cau­tio­nes ne­ces­sa­rias es­se, ne for­te aut pig­no­ri da­tus sit ser­vus ab emp­to­re aut ius­su eius fur­tum si­ve dam­num cui da­tum sit. 2Idem Pom­po­nius ait in­ter­dum et­iam du­pli­ci­ter cau­tio­nes in­ter­po­ni de­be­re, alias in prae­ter­itum, alias in fu­tu­rum, ut pu­ta si eius ser­vi no­mi­ne qui red­hi­be­tur emp­tor pro­cu­ra­tor­ve eius iu­di­cium ac­ce­pit, vel quod cum eo age­re­tur vel quod ip­se eius no­mi­ne age­ret. ca­ven­dum au­tem es­se ait, si quid si­ne do­lo ma­lo emp­tor con­dem­na­tus fue­rit aut de­de­rit, his re­bus rec­te prae­sta­ri, vel si quid ex eo quod ege­rit ad eum per­ve­ne­rit do­lo­ve ma­lo vel cul­pa eius fac­tum sit, quo mi­nus per­ve­ni­ret is­dem die­bus, red­di. 3Idem ait fu­tu­ri tem­po­ris no­mi­ne cau­tio­nem ei, qui sciens ven­di­dit, fie­ri so­le­re, si in fu­ga est ho­mo si­ne cul­pa emp­to­ris et ni­hi­lo mi­nus con­dem­na­tur ven­di­tor: tum enim ca­ve­re opor­te­re, ut emp­tor ho­mi­nem per­se­qua­tur et in sua po­tes­ta­te red­ac­tum ven­di­to­ri red­dat,

21Ulpianus, On the Edict of the Curule Ædiles, Book I. To return property is to cause the vendor to take back what he had in the first place, and because this is effected by giving it up, this is called a surrender, or restitution of the property, so to speak. 1Pomponius says that where a slave is returned to the vendor by the purchaser, the latter must promise to make good any loss resulting from his bad faith; and therefore security is necessary to provide against the slave having been given in pledge by the purchaser, or his having been ordered to commit theft from, or cause some injury to, him to whom he was given up. 2Pomponius also says that security should sometimes be given on both sides, not only for the past but also for the future; as, for example, where the purchaser, or his agent, joins issue on behalf of the slave who is returned; or where proceedings are instituted against the slave; or where he himself brings suit in his own name. He says, moreover, that security must be given where the purchaser has judgment rendered against him without any bad faith on his part, or makes payment, as, in these instances, it is no more than proper for him to furnish a guarantee; or where he acquires anything from the legal proceedings which he instituted; or where he has been guilty of fraud or negligence to prevent property from coming into his hands, this should be delivered to the vendor at the same time. 3He also says that the purchaser should give security for the future to him who knowingly sold him a slave who was accustomed to run away, if the slave took to flight without the fault of the purchaser, and the vendor, notwithstanding, had judgment rendered against him, for the purchaser must then give security that he will pursue the slave, and, if he recovers him, return him to the vendor:

22Gaius li­bro pri­mo ad edic­tum ae­di­lium cu­ru­lium. et ne­que per se ne­que per he­redem suum fu­tu­rum, quo mi­nus eum ho­mi­nem ven­di­tor ha­beat.

22Gaius, On the Edict of the Curule Ædiles, Book I. And that neither he nor his heir will do anything to prevent the vendor from recovering his slave.

23Ul­pia­nus li­bro pri­mo ad edic­tum ae­di­lium cu­ru­lium. Cum au­tem red­hi­bitio fit, si de­te­rius man­ci­pium si­ve ani­mo si­ve cor­po­re ab emp­to­re fac­tum est, prae­sta­bit emp­tor ven­di­to­ri, ut pu­ta si stu­pra­tum sit aut sae­vi­tia emp­to­ris fu­gi­ti­vum es­se coe­pe­rit: et id­eo, in­quit Pom­po­nius, ut ex qua­cum­que cau­sa de­te­rius fac­tum sit, id ar­bi­trio iu­di­cis aes­ti­me­tur et ven­di­to­ri prae­ste­tur. quod si si­ne iu­di­ce ho­mo red­hi­bi­tus sit, re­li­qua au­tem quae di­xi­mus no­lit emp­tor red­de­re, suf­fi­ciat ven­di­to­ri ex ven­di­to ac­tio. 1Iu­bent ae­di­les re­sti­tui et quod ven­di­tio­ni ac­ces­sit et si quas ac­ces­sio­nes ip­se prae­sti­te­rit, ut uter­que reso­lu­ta emp­tio­ne ni­hil am­plius con­se­qua­tur, quam non ha­be­ret, si ven­di­tio fac­ta non es­set. 2Ex­ci­pi­tur et­iam il­le, qui ca­pi­ta­lem frau­dem ad­mi­sit. ca­pi­ta­lem frau­dem ad­mit­te­re est ta­le ali­quid de­lin­que­re, prop­ter quod ca­pi­te pu­nien­dus sit: ve­te­res enim frau­dem pro poe­na po­ne­re so­le­bant. ca­pi­ta­lem frau­dem ad­mi­sis­se ac­ci­pie­mus do­lo ma­lo et per ne­qui­tiam: ce­te­rum si quis er­ro­re, si quis ca­su fe­ce­rit, ces­sa­bit edic­tum. un­de Pom­po­nius ait ne­que im­pu­be­rem ne­que fu­rio­sum ca­pi­ta­lem frau­dem vi­de­ri ad­mi­sis­se. 3Ex­ci­pi­tur et il­le, qui mor­tis con­scis­cen­dae cau­sa quid fe­ce­rit. ma­lus ser­vus cre­di­tus est, qui ali­quid fa­cit, quo ma­gis se re­bus hu­ma­nis ex­tra­hat, ut pu­ta la­queum tor­sit si­ve me­di­ca­men­tum pro ve­ne­no bi­bit prae­ci­pi­tem­ve se ex al­to mi­se­rit aliud­ve quid fe­ce­rit, quo fac­to spe­ra­vit mor­tem per­ven­tu­ram, tam­quam non ni­hil in alium au­su­rus, qui hoc ad­ver­sus se au­sus est. 4Si ser­vus sit qui ven­di­dit vel fi­lius fa­mi­lias in do­mi­num vel pa­trem de pe­cu­lio ae­di­li­cia ac­tio com­pe­tit: quam­vis enim poe­na­les vi­dean­tur ac­tio­nes, ta­men quon­iam ex con­trac­tu ve­niunt, di­cen­dum est eo­rum quo­que no­mi­ne qui in alie­na po­tes­ta­te sunt com­pe­te­re. pro­in­de et si fi­lia fa­mi­lias vel an­cil­la dis­tra­xit, ae­que di­cen­dum est ac­tio­nes ae­di­li­cias lo­cum ha­be­re. 5Hae ac­tio­nes quae ex hoc edic­to oriun­tur et­iam ad­ver­sus he­redes om­nes com­pe­tunt. 6Et si bo­na fi­de no­bis ser­vient li­be­ri for­te ho­mi­nes vel ser­vi alie­ni qui ven­di­de­runt, pot­est di­ci et­iam hos hoc edic­to con­ti­ne­ri. 7Iu­lia­nus ait iu­di­cium red­hi­bi­to­riae ac­tio­nis utrum­que, id est ven­di­to­rem et emp­to­rem quo­dam­mo­do in in­te­grum re­sti­tue­re de­be­re. 8Qua­re si­ve emp­to­ri ser­vus fur­tum fe­ce­rit si­ve alii cui­li­bet, ob quod fur­tum emp­tor ali­quid prae­sti­te­rit, non ali­ter ho­mi­nem ven­di­to­ri re­sti­tue­re iu­be­tur, quam si in­dem­nem eum prae­sti­te­rit. quid er­go, in­quit Iu­lia­nus, si no­lue­rit ven­di­tor ho­mi­nem re­ci­pe­re? non es­se co­gen­dum ait quic­quam prae­sta­re, nec am­plius quam pre­tio con­dem­na­bi­tur: et hoc de­tri­men­tum sua cul­pa emp­to­rem pas­su­rum, qui cum pos­set ho­mi­nem no­xae de­de­re, ma­lue­rit li­tis aes­ti­ma­tio­nem suf­fer­re: et vi­de­tur mi­hi Iu­lia­ni sen­ten­tia hu­ma­nior es­se. 9Cum red­hi­be­tur man­ci­pium, si quid ad emp­to­rem per­ve­nit vel cul­pa eius non per­ve­nit, re­sti­tui opor­tet, non so­lum si ip­se fruc­tus per­ce­pit mer­ce­des­ve a ser­vo vel con­duc­to­re ser­vi ac­ce­pit, sed et­iam si a ven­di­to­re fue­rit id­cir­co con­se­cu­tus, quod tar­dius ei ho­mi­nem re­sti­tuit: sed et si a quo­vis alio pos­ses­so­re fruc­tus ac­ce­pit emp­tor, re­sti­tue­re eos de­be­bit: sed et si quid fruc­tuum no­mi­ne con­se­cu­tus est, id prae­stet: item si le­ga­tum vel he­redi­tas ser­vo ob­ve­ne­rit. ne­que re­fert, po­tue­rit haec con­se­qui ven­di­tor an non po­tue­rit, si ser­vum non ven­di­dis­set: po­na­mus enim ta­lem es­se, qui ca­pe­re ali­quid ex tes­ta­men­to non po­tue­rat: ni­hil haec res no­ce­bit. Pe­dius qui­dem et­iam il­lud non pu­tat es­se spec­tan­dum, cu­ius con­tem­pla­tio­ne tes­ta­tor ser­vum he­redem scribse­rit vel ei le­ga­ve­rit, quia et si ven­di­tio re­man­sis­set, ni­hil haec res emp­to­ri prod­erat: et per con­tra­rium, in­quit, si con­tem­pla­tio­ne ven­di­to­ris in­sti­tu­tus pro­po­ne­re­tur, ta­men di­ce­re­mus re­sti­tue­re emp­to­rem non de­be­re ven­di­to­ri, si nol­let eum red­hi­be­re.

23Ulpianus, On the Edict of the Curule Ædiles, Book I. Moreover, when the return is made of the slave, if the latter has been injured in mind or body by the purchaser, he must make good the damage to the vendor; as, for example, if the slave has been corrupted, or has become a fugitive through the cruel treatment of the purchaser. Therefore, as Pomponius says, it must be determined by the judge to what extent the slave has been depreciated in value, and the amount must be made good to the vendor. If, however, the slave was returned without resorting to judicial proceedings, and the purchaser refuses to give up the other property which we have mentioned, an action on sale will be sufficient to secure the rights of the vendor. 1Ad Dig. 21,1,23,1ROHGE, Bd. 11 (1874), Nr. 67, S. 202: Verlust der Redhibitionsbefugnis durch Veräußerung, Verbrauch, Verfügung über die gekaufte Sache.ROHGE, Bd. 16 (1875), Nr. 81, S. 321: Folgen der Verarbeitung bezw. Umgestaltung eines Theils der gekauften Waare mit erkennbarem Fehler bezüglich der Redhibitionsbefugnis.Windscheid: Lehrbuch des Pandektenrechts, 7. Aufl. 1891, Bd. II, § 394, Note 2.The Ædiles direct all accessions to the sale also to be returned, and any additions which the vendor himself has furnished must likewise be made good; so that neither party, if the sale is rescinded, will obtain anything more than he would have had if the sale had not been made. 2Where a slave has committed a capital crime, this also must be mentioned. To commit a capital crime is to be guilty of an offence which is punishable with death, for the ancients were accustomed to put the crime for the penalty. We understand a capital crime to be one perpetrated through fraud and malicious intent, but where anyone commits an offence by mistake or accident, the Edict does not apply. Wherefore, Pomponius says that a person who has not reached puberty, or one who is insane, cannot be held to have committed a capital crime. 3Where a slave has made an attempt to put an end to his own life, this also must be mentioned. He is considered a bad slave who has committed some act for the purpose of terminating his existence; as, for example, one who has made a noose out of a rope, or taken some poisonous drug, or thrown himself down from a high place, or does something else by which he expects his death will be caused; since he is one who will probably try to do to another what he attempted against himself. 4Where the party who sold an unsound slave is either himself a slave, or a son under paternal control, an action de peculio, based upon the Edict of the Ædiles, will lie against the master or the father, for although these actions seem to be penal ones, still, as they arise out of a contract, it must be said that they can be brought in the name of those who are under the control of others. Hence, where a son subject to paternal authority, or a female slave, made the sale, it must also be held that the actions established by the Edict of the Ædiles will be available. 5The actions arising from this Edict can also be brought against all kinds of heirs. 6Although men who are free may be serving us in good faith as slaves, or slaves belonging to another may have made the sale, it can be stated that they also are included in this Edict. 7Ad Dig. 21,1,23,7ROHGE, Bd. 11 (1874), Nr. 67, S. 202: Verlust der Redhibitionsbefugnis durch Veräußerung, Verbrauch, Verfügung über die gekaufte Sache.ROHGE, Bd. 16 (1875), Nr. 81, S. 321: Folgen der Verarbeitung bezw. Umgestaltung eines Theils der gekauften Waare mit erkennbarem Fehler bezüglich der Redhibitionsbefugnis.Julianus says that the judgment in a case involving the return of property restores both parties, that is to say the vendor, as well as the purchaser, completely to their former condition. 8Wherefore, where the slave steals something either from the purchaser or from someone else on account of which theft the purchaser may be compelled to make restitution, he will not be ordered to return the slave to the vendor unless the latter indemnifies him. But what, said Julianus, if the vendor should refuse to receive the slave? He holds that he would not be forced to indemnify him to any extent, any more than to have judgment rendered against him for the price; and that the purchaser must suffer this loss through his own negligence, because when he could have delivered up the slave by way of reparation, he preferred to pay the damages assessed by the court. It seems to me that the opinion of Julianus is the more equitable one. 9If, where the slave is returned, anything has come into the hands of the purchaser by means of said slave, or did not come into his hands through his own fault, it must be returned; and this includes not only profits which he may have obtained, or any wages he may have received from the slave, or from anyone to whom the latter has been hired, but also whatever he may have acquired from the vendor himself, because he was slow in delivering him the slave; but also if the purchaser has received any profits from any other possessor whatsoever he must surrender them all. Moreover, he must give up what he may have obtained by way of profit, as well as any legacy or estate which may have fallen to the slave; and it is not taken into account whether the vendor could or could not have acquired these things if he had not sold the slave; for if we suppose that the vendor was such a person as could not receive anything by will, this fact will in no way prejudice him. Pedius, indeed, thinks that it should not be considered whether the testator, when he appointed the slave his heir or bequeathed him a legacy, had this fact in view; because the sale itself will stand, and this fact will not benefit the purchaser. On the other hand, he says that if the heir had been appointed in consideration of the vendor, we will still hold that the purchaser should not restore the estate to the latter, if he was unwilling to return the slave.

24Gaius li­bro pri­mo ad edic­tum ae­di­lium cu­ru­lium. Et ge­ne­ra­li­ter di­cen­dum est, quid­quid ex­tra rem emp­to­ris per eum ser­vum ad­quisi­tum est, id ius­tum vi­de­ri red­di opor­te­re.

24Gaius, On the Edict of the Curule Ædiles, Book I. Generally speaking, it must be held that whatever the slave has acquired from the purchaser otherwise than in managing his property, it seems to be just should be returned.

25Ul­pia­nus li­bro pri­mo ad edic­tum ae­di­lium cu­ru­lium. Ae­di­les et­iam hoc prae­sta­re emp­to­rem vo­lunt, si in ali­quo de­te­rior fac­tus sit ser­vus, sed ita de­mum, si post ven­di­tio­nem tra­di­tio­nem­que fac­tus sit: ce­te­rum si an­te fuit, non per­ti­net ad hoc iu­di­cium quod an­te fac­tum est. 1Si­ve er­go ip­se de­te­rio­rem eum fe­cit si­ve fa­mi­lia eius si­ve pro­cu­ra­tor, te­ne­bit ac­tio. 2Fa­mi­liae ap­pel­la­tio­ne om­nes qui in ser­vi­tio sunt con­ti­nen­tur, et­iam li­be­ri ho­mi­nes, qui ei bo­na fi­de ser­viunt, vel alie­ni: ac­ci­pe eos quo­que qui in po­tes­ta­te eius sunt. 3Pro­cu­ra­to­ris fit men­tio in hac ac­tio­ne: sed Ne­ra­tius pro­cu­ra­to­rem hic eum ac­ci­pien­dum ait, non quem­li­bet, sed cui uni­ver­sa neg­otia aut id ip­sum, prop­ter quod de­te­rius fac­tum sit, man­da­tum est. 4Pe­dius ait ae­quum fuis­se id dum­ta­xat im­pu­ta­ri emp­to­ri ex fac­to pro­cu­ra­to­ris et fa­mi­liae, quod non fuit pas­su­rus ser­vus ni­si venis­set: quod au­tem pas­su­rus erat et­iam, si non venis­set, in eo con­ce­di emp­to­ri ser­vi sui no­xae de­di­tio­nem et ex eo, in­quit, quod pro­cu­ra­tor com­mi­sit, so­lum ac­tio­num prae­stan­da­rum ne­ces­si­ta­tem ei in­iun­gi. 5Quid er­go, si cul­pa, non et­iam do­lo emp­to­ris ser­vus de­te­rior fac­tus sit? ae­que con­dem­na­bi­tur. 6Hoc au­tem, quod de­te­rior fac­tus est ser­vus, non so­lum ad cor­pus, sed et­iam ad ani­mi vi­tia re­fe­ren­dum est, ut pu­ta si imi­ta­tio­ne con­ser­vo­rum apud emp­to­rem ta­lis fac­tus est, alea­tor for­te vel vi­na­rius vel er­ro eva­sit. 7Sed no­tan­dum est, quod non per­mit­ti­tur emp­to­ri ex hu­ius­mo­di cau­sis no­xae de­de­re ser­vum suum: nec enim fac­tum ser­vo­rum suo­rum item­que pro­cu­ra­to­ris prae­stat. 8Item scien­dum est haec om­nia, quae ex­pri­mun­tur edic­to ae­di­lium, prae­sta­re eum de­be­re, si an­te iu­di­cium ac­cep­tum fac­ta sint: id­cir­co enim ne­ces­se ha­buis­se ea enu­me­ra­ri, ut, si quid eo­rum an­te li­tem con­tes­ta­tam con­ti­gis­set, prae­sta­re­tur. ce­te­rum post iu­di­cium ac­cep­tum to­ta cau­sa ad ho­mi­nem re­sti­tuen­dum in iu­di­cio ver­sa­tur, et tam fruc­tus ve­niunt quam id quo de­te­rior fac­tus est ce­te­ra­que ve­niunt: iu­di­ci enim sta­tim at­que iu­dex fac­tus est om­nium re­rum of­fi­cium in­cum­bit, quae­cum­que in iu­di­cio ver­san­tur: ea au­tem quae an­te iu­di­cium con­tin­gunt non val­de ad eum per­ti­nent, ni­si fue­rint ei no­mi­na­tim in­iunc­ta. 9Prae­ter­ea in edic­to ad­ici­tur sic: ‘et quan­ta pe­cu­nia pro eo ho­mi­ne so­lu­ta ac­ces­sio­nis­ve no­mi­ne da­ta erit, non red­de­tur: cu­ius­ve pe­cu­niae quis eo no­mi­ne ob­li­ga­tus erit, non li­be­ra­bi­tur’. 10Or­di­ne fe­ce­runt ae­di­les, ut an­te ven­di­to­ri emp­tor ea om­nia, quae su­pra scrip­ta sunt, prae­stet, sic de­in­de pre­tium con­se­qua­tur.

25Ulpianus, On the Edict of the Curule Ædiles, Book I. The Ædiles also desire that the purchaser should indemnify the vendor for any depreciation of the value of the slave, but only where this took place after sale and delivery. But if it happened before this, it would not come under this proceeding. 1Therefore, if the purchaser himself, or a member of his household, or his agent, was responsible for the deterioration, he will be liable to the action. 2All who are in servitude are embraced in the term “household,” not only freemen who are serving in good faith as slaves, but also the slaves of others; those persons who are under the control of the purchaser we understand also to be included in this definition. 3Mention is made in this action of an agent. Neratius, however, says that in this instance not every kind of an agent is to be understood, but one who has charge of the entire business of the purchaser, or who has the management of that branch of it through which the deterioration of the slave was caused. 4Pedius states that it is but just that the purchaser should be responsible for the act of his agent and household only where the slave could not have suffered the damage if he had not been sold to him. But where he would have suffered it even if he had not been sold, in this instance the purchaser had the right to deliver up the slave by way of reparation for the damage committed, and he says that, with reference to the injury committed by the agent, the purchaser is only compelled to assign to the vendor the rights of action which he has against his agent. 5But what if the slave had been deteriorated through the negligence, but not through the fraud of the purchaser? He will have judgment rendered against him also in this case. 6The deterioration sustained by the slave has reference not only to his body but also to the debasement of his mind; as, for instance, where he has become corrupted by the example of his fellow-slaves of the household of the purchaser, and has become a gambler, a drunkard, or a vagabond. 7It must, however, be noted that the purchaser is not permitted for reasons of this kind to surrender the slave by way of reparation, for he is not personally liable for the acts of his slave or for those of his agent. 8It also should be remembered that he must make good all those things which are mentioned in the Edict of the Ædiles, if they have taken place before issue has been joined, for it is necessary for them to be enumerated, in order that they may be taken into account, if any of them occurred before issue was joined in the case. After issue has been joined, however, the entire question of the restitution of the slave must be determined in court, and any profits which have accrued, as well as the fact of the deterioration of the slave, and all other matters, will be included. For just as soon as the judge obtains jurisdiction of the case it becomes his duty to decide everything relating to it. Those questions, however, which have arisen before issue was joined do not properly come under his jurisdiction, unless they were expressly assigned to him for his decision. 9It is also added in the Edict: “The money paid for the slave to the vendor and whatever was surrendered on the ground of accessories shall not be returned, and the party who is liable for the payment of said money shall not be released.” 10The Ædiles established the regulation that the purchaser should deliver to the vendor all those things which have been mentioned above, and that then he must refund him the purchase-money.

26Gaius li­bro pri­mo ad edic­tum ae­di­lium cu­ru­lium. Vi­dea­mus ta­men, ne in­iquum sit emp­to­rem com­pel­li di­mit­te­re cor­pus et ad ac­tio­nem iu­di­ca­ti mit­ti, si in­ter­dum ni­hil prae­sta­tur prop­ter in­opiam ven­di­to­ris, po­tius­que res ita or­di­nan­da sit, ut emp­tor ca­veat, si in­tra cer­tum tem­pus pe­cu­nia si­bi so­lu­ta sit, se man­ci­pium re­sti­tu­tu­rum.

26Gaius, On the Edict of the Curule Ædiles, Book I. Let us see whether it is not unjust for the purchaser to be compelled to surrender the property, and have recourse to the action on judgment, if he could not recover anything on account of the property of the vendor; and should not matters be so arranged that the purchaser can give security to restore the slave if the purchase-money is refunded to him within a certain time?

27Ul­pia­nus li­bro pri­mo ad edic­tum ae­di­lium cu­ru­lium. De­bet au­tem re­ci­pe­re pe­cu­niam, quam de­dit pro eo ho­mi­ne, vel si quid ac­ces­sio­nis no­mi­ne. da­ri au­tem non id so­lum ac­ci­pie­mus, quod nu­me­ra­tur ven­di­to­ri, ut pu­ta pre­tium et usu­ras eius, sed et si quid emp­tio­nis cau­sa ero­ga­tum est. hoc au­tem ita de­mum de­du­ci­tur, si ex vo­lun­ta­te ven­di­to­ris da­tur: ce­te­rum si quid sua spon­te da­tum es­se pro­po­na­tur, non im­pu­ta­bi­tur: ne­que enim de­bet quod quis suo ar­bi­trio de­dit a ven­di­to­re ex­ige­re. quid er­go, si for­te vec­ti­ga­lis no­mi­ne da­tum est, quod emp­to­rem for­te se­que­re­tur? di­ce­mus hoc quo­que re­sti­tuen­dum: in­dem­nis enim emp­tor de­bet dis­ce­de­re.

27Ulpianus, On the Edict of the Curule Ædiles, Book I. The purchaser should receive the money which he paid for the slave, as well as everything else under the head of accessories. We should understand by this not only the price which was paid to the vendor, as, for instance, the purchase-money and the interest on the same, but also whatever has been expended on account of the sale. This, however, should only be paid where the expense was incurred with the consent of the vendor, but where anything was given voluntarily, the purchaser will not be entitled to credit for it, for he should not exact from the vendor what he gave of his own free will. But what if money had been paid by way of tax, which in fact follows the purchaser? We hold that this also should be returned, for the purchaser should depart indemnified.

28Gaius li­bro pri­mo ad edic­tum ae­di­lium cu­ru­lium. Si ven­di­tor de his quae edic­to ae­di­lium con­ti­nen­tur non ca­veat, pol­li­cen­tur ad­ver­sus eum red­hi­ben­di iu­di­cium in­tra duos men­ses vel quan­ti emp­to­ris in­ter­sit in­tra sex men­ses.

28Gaius, On the Edict of the Curule Ædiles, Book I. Where a vendor does not furnish security with reference to the matters mentioned in the Edict of the Ædiles, they promise an action against him for the return of the property within two months; or one to the extent of the interest of the purchaser, within six months.

29Ul­pia­nus li­bro pri­mo ad edic­tum ae­di­lium cu­ru­lium. Il­lud scien­dum est, si emp­tor ven­di­to­ri haec non prae­stat, quae de­si­de­ran­tur in hac ac­tio­ne, non pos­se ei ven­di­to­rem con­dem­na­ri: si au­tem emp­to­ri ven­di­tor is­ta non prae­stat, con­dem­na­bi­tur ei. 1Item emp­to­ri prae­stan­dum est, ut pe­cu­niae, cu­ius no­mi­ne ob­li­ga­tus erit, li­be­re­tur, si­ve ip­si ven­di­to­ri ob­li­ga­tus sit si­ve et­iam alii. 2Con­dem­na­tio au­tem fit, quan­ti ea res erit: er­go ex­ce­det pre­tium an non, vi­dea­mus. et qui­dem con­ti­net con­dem­na­tio pre­tium ac­ces­sio­nes­que. an et usu­ras pre­tii con­se­qua­tur, qua­si quod sua in­ter­sit de­beat ac­ci­pe­re, ma­xi­me cum fruc­tus quo­que ip­se re­sti­tuat? et pla­cet con­se­cu­tu­rum. 3Si quid ta­men dam­ni sen­sit vel si quid pro ser­vo im­pen­dit, con­se­que­tur ar­bi­trio iu­di­cis, sic ta­men, non ut ei ho­rum no­mi­ne ven­di­tor con­dem­ne­tur, ut ait Iu­lia­nus, sed ne alias com­pel­la­tur ho­mi­nem ven­di­to­ri re­sti­tue­re, quam si eum in­dem­nem prae­stet.

29Ulpianus, On the Edict of the Curule Ædiles, Book I. It must be understood that if the purchaser does not furnish the vendor with all that is required by this action, he cannot have judgment rendered against the vendor in his favor. If, however, the vendor does not furnish the purchaser with what is required, judgment shall be rendered against him. 1Again, the purchaser must be released from liability for the money which was due to him, whether he was responsible to the vendor himself or to someone else. 2Moreover, judgment is rendered against the vendor to the extent of the interest of the purchaser. Therefore, let us see whether this may exceed the price or not. And, in fact, the judgment includes the purchase-money as well as the accessories; but should the purchaser also recover the interest on the price on the ground that he is entitled to it as a portion of what is due to him, especially as he restores any profits which he may have acquired? It is settled that he is entitled to it. 3Where the purchaser has sustained any damage, or has expended any money on account of the slave, he can recover it by the decision of the court in such a way, however (as Julianus says), that the vendor shall not have judgment rendered against him on account of these things; but the purchaser shall not be compelled to surrender the slave to the vendor, unless he indemnifies him.

30Pau­lus li­bro pri­mo ad edic­tum ae­di­lium cu­ru­lium. Item si ser­vi red­hi­ben­di no­mi­ne emp­tor iu­di­cium ac­ce­pit vel ip­se eius no­mi­ne dic­ta­vit, ca­ven­dum ex utra­que par­te erit, ut, si quid si­ne do­lo ma­lo con­dem­na­tus sit vel si quid ex eo quod ege­rit ad eum per­ve­ne­rit do­lo­ve ma­lo eius fac­tum sit quo mi­nus per­ve­ni­ret, id red­dat. 1Quas im­pen­sas ne­ces­sa­rio in cu­ran­dum ser­vum post li­tem con­tes­ta­tam emp­tor fe­ce­rit, im­pu­ta­bit: prae­ce­den­tes im­pen­sas no­mi­na­tim com­pre­hen­den­das Pe­dius: sed ci­ba­ria ser­vo da­ta non es­se im­pu­tan­da Aris­to, nam nec ab ip­so ex­igi, quod in mi­nis­te­rio eius fuit.

30Paulus, On the Edict of the Curule Ædiles, Book I. Moreover, if the purchaser, in an action for the return of a slave, joins issue, or he himself brings suit in his own name, security must be furnished by both parties that the vendor will pay the amount of the judgment rendered against him, where there is no bad faith on his part, and that the purchaser will deliver to the vendor anything that comes into his hands or which on account of his bad faith he has been unable to obtain by means of the action which he has brought in behalf of the slave. 1Ad Dig. 21,1,30,1ROHGE, Bd. 3 (1872), S. 100: Anspruch auf Fütterungskosten im Falle der Auflösung des Kaufs eines Pferdes wegen Mängeln desselben.The purchaser shall be entitled to any necessary expenses incurred by him on account of the illness of the slave after issue has been joined, and Pedius says that expenses previously incurred should be specifically mentioned; but Aristo holds that food for the slave should not be taken into account, for the reason that nothing is demanded for the time that the slave was in service.

31Ul­pia­nus li­bro pri­mo ad edic­tum ae­di­lium cu­ru­lium. Quod­si no­lit ven­di­tor ho­mi­nem re­ci­pe­re, non in ma­io­rem sum­mam, in­quit, quam in pre­tium ei con­dem­nan­dum. ob haec er­go, quae prop­ter ser­vum dam­na sen­sit, so­lam da­bi­mus ei cor­po­ris re­ten­tio­nem: ce­te­rum pot­erit evi­ta­re prae­sta­tio­nem ven­di­tor, si no­lit ho­mi­nem re­ci­pe­re, quo fac­to pre­tii prae­sta­tio­nem eo­rum­que quae pre­tium se­quun­tur so­lam non evi­ta­bit. 1Si ven­di­tor pro­nun­tia­ve­rit vel pro­mi­se­rit fu­rem non es­se, te­ne­tur ex sua pro­mis­sio­ne, si fur­tum ser­vus fe­cit: es­se enim hoc ca­su fu­rem non tan­tum eum, qui ex­tra­neo, sed et eum, qui do­mi­no suo res sub­tra­xit, in­tel­le­gen­dum est. 2Si an­cil­la red­hi­bea­tur, et quod ex ea post ven­di­tio­nem na­tum erit red­de­tur, si­ve unus par­tus sit si­ve plu­res. 3Sed et si for­te usus fruc­tus pro­prie­ta­ti ad­cre­ve­rit, in­du­bi­ta­te hic quo­que re­sti­tue­tur. 4Si pe­cu­lium quae­siit apud emp­to­rem, quid de hoc di­ce­mus? et si qui­dem ex re emp­to­ris ac­ces­sit, di­cen­dum est apud ip­sum re­lin­quen­dum, si ali­un­de cre­vit, ven­di­to­ri re­sti­tuen­dum est. 5Si plu­res he­redes sint emp­to­ris, an om­nes ad red­hi­ben­dum con­sen­ti­re de­beant, vi­dea­mus. et ait Pom­po­nius om­nes con­sen­ti­re de­be­re ad red­hi­ben­dum da­re­que unum pro­cu­ra­to­rem, ne for­te ven­di­tor in­iu­riam pa­tia­tur, dum ab alio par­tem re­ci­pit ho­mi­nis, alii in par­tem pre­tii con­dem­na­tur, quan­ti mi­no­ris is ho­mo sit. 6Idem ait ho­mi­ne mor­tuo vel et­iam red­hi­bi­to sin­gu­los pro suis por­tio­ni­bus rec­te age­re. pre­tium au­tem et ac­ces­sio­nes pro par­te re­ci­pient: sed et fruc­tus ac­ces­sio­nis et si quo de­te­rior ho­mo fac­tus est pro par­te prae­sta­bi­tur ab ip­sis, ni­si for­te ta­le sit, quod di­vi­sio­nem non re­ci­piat, ut pu­ta an­cil­lae par­tus: in hoc enim idem ser­van­dum est, quod in ip­sa ma­tre ven­di­ta, quam pro par­te red­hi­be­ri pos­se ne­ga­vi­mus. 7Mar­cel­lus quo­que scri­bit, si ser­vus com­mu­nis ser­vum eme­rit et sit in cau­sa red­hi­bitio­nis, unum ex do­mi­nis pro par­te sua red­hi­be­re ser­vum non pos­se: non ma­gis, in­quit, quam cum emp­to­ri plu­res he­redes ex­sti­te­runt nec om­nes ad red­hi­ben­dum con­sen­tiunt. 8Idem Mar­cel­lus ait non pos­se al­te­rum ex do­mi­nis con­se­qui ac­tio­ne ex emp­to, ut si­bi pro par­te ven­di­tor tra­dat, si pro por­tio­ne pre­tium da­bit: et hoc in emp­to­ri­bus ser­va­ri opor­te­re ait: nam ven­di­tor pig­no­ris lo­co quod ven­di­dit re­ti­net, quo­ad emp­tor sa­tis­fa­ciat. 9Pom­po­nius ait, si unus ex he­redi­bus vel fa­mi­lia eius vel pro­cu­ra­tor cul­pa vel do­lo fe­ce­rit rem de­te­rio­rem, ae­quum es­se in so­li­dum eum te­ne­ri ar­bi­trio iu­di­cis: hoc au­tem ex­pe­di­tius es­se, si om­nes he­redes unum pro­cu­ra­to­rem ad agen­dum de­de­runt. tunc et si quo de­te­rior ser­vus cul­pa unius he­redum fac­tus est et hoc so­lu­tum est, ce­te­ri fa­mi­liae er­cis­cun­dae iu­di­cium ad­ver­sus eum ha­bent, quia prop­ter ip­sum dam­num sen­tiunt im­pe­diun­tur­que red­hi­be­re. 10Si ven­di­to­ri plu­res he­redes ex­sti­te­rint, sin­gu­lis pro por­tio­ne he­redi­ta­ria pot­erit ser­vus red­hi­be­ri. et si ser­vus plu­rium ven­ie­rit, idem erit di­cen­dum: nam si unus a plu­ri­bus vel plu­res ab uno vel plu­ra man­ci­pia ab uno eman­tur, ve­rius est di­ce­re, si qua­si plu­res rei fue­runt ven­di­to­res, sin­gu­lis in so­li­dum red­hi­ben­dum: si ta­men par­tes emp­tae sint a sin­gu­lis, rec­te di­ce­tur al­te­ri qui­dem pos­se red­hi­be­ri, cum al­te­ro au­tem agi quan­to mi­no­ris. item si plu­res sin­gu­li par­tes ab uno emant, tunc pro par­te quis­que eo­rum ex­pe­rie­tur: sed si in so­li­dum emant, unus­quis­que in so­li­dum red­hi­be­bit. 11Si man­ci­pium quod red­hi­be­ri opor­tet mor­tuum erit, hoc quae­re­tur, num­quid cul­pa emp­to­ris vel fa­mi­liae eius vel pro­cu­ra­to­ris ho­mo de­mor­tuus sit: nam si cul­pa eius de­ces­sit, pro vi­vo ha­ben­dus est, et prae­sten­tur ea om­nia, quae prae­sta­ren­tur, si vi­ve­ret. 12Cul­pam om­nem ac­ci­pie­mus, non uti­que la­tam: prop­ter quod di­cen­dum est, quam­cum­que oc­ca­sio­nem mor­ti emp­tor prae­sti­tit, de­be­re eum: et­iam si non ad­hi­buit me­di­cum, ut sa­na­ri pos­sit, vel ma­lum ad­hi­buit, sed cul­pa sua. 13Sed hoc di­ce­mus, si an­te iu­di­cium ac­cep­tum de­ces­sit: ce­te­rum si post iu­di­cium ac­cep­tum de­ces­sis­se pro­po­na­tur, tunc in ar­bi­trium iu­di­cis ve­niet, qua­li­ter mor­tuus sit: ut enim et Pe­dio vi­de­tur, ea, quae­cum­que post li­tis con­tes­ta­tio­nem con­tin­gunt, ar­bi­trium iu­di­cis de­si­de­rant. 14Quod in pro­cu­ra­to­re di­xi­mus, idem et in tu­to­re et cu­ra­to­re di­cen­dum erit ce­te­ris­que, qui ex of­fi­cio pro aliis in­ter­ve­niunt: et ita Pe­dius ait, et ad­icit, qui­bus ad­mi­nis­tra­tio re­rum, cul­pam ab­es­se prae­sta­re non in­ique do­mi­num co­gi. 15Idem Pe­dius ait fa­mi­liae ap­pel­la­tio­ne et fi­lios fa­mi­lias de­mons­tra­ri: fac­ta enim do­mes­ti­co­rum red­hi­bi­to­ria agen­tem prae­sta­re vo­luit. 16Si quis ege­rit quan­to mi­no­ris prop­ter ser­vi fu­gam, de­in­de agat prop­ter mor­bum, quan­ti fie­ri con­dem­na­tio de­beat? et qui­dem sae­pius agi pos­se quan­to mi­no­ris du­bium non est, sed ait Iu­lia­nus id agen­dum es­se, ne lu­crum emp­tor fa­ciat et bis eius­dem rei aes­ti­ma­tio­nem con­se­qua­tur. 17In fac­tum ac­tio com­pe­tit ad pre­tium re­ci­pe­ran­dum, si man­ci­pium red­hi­bi­tum fue­rit: in qua non hoc quae­ri­tur, an man­ci­pium in cau­sa red­hi­bitio­nis fue­rit, sed hoc tan­tum, an sit red­hi­bi­tum, nec im­me­ri­to: in­iquum est enim, post­ea­quam ven­di­tor agno­vit re­ci­pien­do man­ci­pium es­se id in cau­sa red­hi­bitio­nis, tunc quae­ri, utrum de­bue­rit red­hi­be­ri an non de­bue­rit: nec de tem­po­re quae­re­tur, an in­tra tem­po­ra red­hi­bi­tus es­se vi­dea­tur. 18Il­lud pla­ne haec ac­tio ex­igit, ut sit red­hi­bi­tus: ce­te­rum ni­si fue­rit red­hi­bi­tus, de­fi­cit is­ta ac­tio, et­iam­si nu­do con­sen­su plac­ue­rit, ut red­hi­bea­tur. con­ven­tio er­go de red­hi­ben­do non fa­cit lo­cum huic ac­tio­ni, sed ip­sa red­hi­bitio. 19Re­sti­tui au­tem de­bet per hanc ac­tio­nem et­iam quod ei ser­vo in ven­di­tio­ne ac­ces­sit. 20Quia ad­si­dua est du­plae sti­pu­la­tio, id­cir­co pla­cuit et­iam ex emp­to agi pos­se, si du­plam ven­di­tor man­ci­pii non ca­veat: ea enim, quae sunt mo­ris et con­sue­tu­di­nis, in bo­nae fi­dei iu­di­ciis de­bent venire. 21Qui man­ci­pia ven­dunt, na­tio­nem cu­ius­que in ven­di­tio­ne pro­nun­tia­re de­bent: ple­rum­que enim na­tio ser­vi aut pro­vo­cat aut de­ter­ret emp­to­rem: id­cir­co in­ter­est nos­tra sci­re na­tio­nem: prae­sump­tum et­enim est quos­dam ser­vos bo­nos es­se, quia na­tio­ne sunt non in­fa­ma­ta, quos­dam ma­los vi­de­ri, quia ea na­tio­ne sunt, quae ma­gis in­fa­mis est. quod si de na­tio­ne ita pro­nun­tia­tum non erit, iu­di­cium emp­to­ri om­ni­bus­que ad quos ea res per­ti­ne­bit da­bi­tur, per quod emp­tor red­hi­bet man­ci­pium. 22Si quid ita ven­ie­rit, ut, ni­si plac­ue­rit, in­tra prae­fi­ni­tum tem­pus red­hi­bea­tur, ea con­ven­tio ra­ta ha­be­tur: si au­tem de tem­po­re ni­hil con­ve­ne­rit, in fac­tum ac­tio in­tra se­xa­gin­ta dies uti­les ac­com­mo­da­tur emp­to­ri ad red­hi­ben­dum, ul­tra non. si ve­ro con­ve­ne­rit, ut in per­pe­tuum red­hi­bitio fiat, pu­to hanc con­ven­tio­nem va­le­re. 23Item si tem­pus se­xa­gin­ta die­rum prae­fi­ni­tum red­hi­bitio­ni prae­ter­iit, cau­sa co­gni­ta iu­di­cium da­bi­tur: in cau­sae au­tem co­gni­tio­ne hoc ver­sa­bi­tur, si aut mo­ra fuit per ven­di­to­rem, aut non fuit prae­sens cui red­de­re­tur, aut ali­qua ius­ta cau­sa in­ter­ces­sit, cur in­tra diem red­hi­bi­tum man­ci­pium non est, quod ei ma­gis dis­pli­cue­rat. 24In his au­tem ac­tio­ni­bus ea­dem erunt ob­ser­van­da, quae de par­tu fruc­ti­bus ac­ces­sio­ni­bus quae­que de mor­tuo red­hi­ben­do dic­ta sunt. 25Quod emp­tio­ni ac­ce­dit, par­tem es­se ven­di­tio­nis pru­den­ti­bus vi­sum est.

31Ulpianus, On the Edict of the Curule Ædiles, Book I. If the vendor refuses to take back the slave, he should not have judgment rendered against him for a larger amount than the price; hence, with reference to the damage which the purchaser has sustained on account of the slave, we only grant the right to retain his person, and the vendor will be able to avoid liability for this if he refuses to accept the slave, but by doing so he will not escape liability for the purchase-money, as well as the accessories of the same. 1Where the vendor either stated or guaranteed that the slave was not a thief, he will be liable on his guarantee if the slave commits a theft; for, in this case, he must be understood to be a thief, not only if he steals from a stranger, but also if he appropriates the property of his master. 2If a female slave is returned, any children which have been born to her after the sale must also be given up, whether there is one, or more of them. 3Where, however, the usufruct has been added to the mere ownership of the property, it undoubtedly must also be returned. 4Where the slave has acquired a peculium while in the possession of the purchaser, what shall we say with reference to it? If, indeed, it was obtained by managing the property of the purchaser, it must be held that it shall remain with the latter, but if it was obtained from some other source, it must be surrendered to the vendor. 5Where the purchaser leaves several heirs, let us see whether all of them must consent to the return of the slave. Pomponius says that the consent of all is not required, and that they can appoint an agent to act for them, in order that the vendor may not sustain any injury if he receives the share of the slave owned by one party, and have judgment rendered against him for the shares of the others to the amount of the deficiency in value of the slave. 6Ad Dig. 21,1,31,6ROHGE, Bd. 10 (1874), S. 275: Actio redhibitoria. Zurückgabe der fehlerhaften Sache. Untergang derselben ohne Verschulden des Empfängers nach erklärtem Rücktritte.He also says that if the slave is dead, or has been taken back by the vendor, each one of the heirs can properly bring an action for his respective share. Moreover, they will receive their proportionate shares of the purchase-money and accessories as well as the profits of the crops and their accessories; and in case the slave should be deteriorated, each one of them will be liable pro rata unless it may happen that a division cannot be made; as, for instance, in the case of the offspring of a female slave; for then the same rule will be observed which applies where the mother herself is sold, since we have denied that she herself can be partially returned. 7Marcellus also states that if a slave held in common himself purchases a slave, and, in case he is to be returned, one of his masters can not bring suit to compel the vendor to take back his share of the slave, any more than where a purchaser leaves several heirs, and all of them do not give their consent for the return of a slave. 8Marcellus also says that one of two joint-owners of a slave cannot bring an action on purchase to compel the vendor to surrender to him his half of the slave, if he pays him his share of the price; and he adds this rule must be observed in the case of purchasers, for the vendor who sells property which is pledged has a right to retain the same until the buyer pays for it. 9Pomponius holds that if an heir of the purchaser, or his family, or his agent, either through neglect or malicious intent, commits any act which diminishes the value of the property, it is but just that he should be liable for the entire amount by a decision of court. Moreover, it is more advantageous for all the heirs to appoint a single agent to bring suit for them; for if the slave is deteriorated by the fault of one of said heirs, this will be made good by all, and the others will be entitled to an action in partition against him, because they sustained the loss on his account, and were prevented from returning the slave. 10Where the vendor leaves several heirs, the slave can be returned to each one, in proportion to his share in the estate. The same rule applies where the slave is sold to several parties. For if an individual has purchased a slave from several owners or several have purchased from one, or several slaves have been bought from a single owner, the better opinion is that if there are several vendors, each one of them is absolutely bound to take back the slave; but where different shares in the slave are purchased from the individual holders, it may properly be held that one of them can be compelled to take back his share, and an action can be brought against another to recover the excess of value paid for the slave. Again, where several persons purchase a slave from one vendor, then each one of them can institute proceedings for his respective share; but if they purchase the slave conjointly, each can bring an action for the return of the slave as a whole. 11Ad Dig. 21,1,31,11ROHGE, Bd. 10 (1874), S. 275: Actio redhibitoria. Zurückgabe der fehlerhaften Sache. Untergang derselben ohne Verschulden des Empfängers nach erklärtem Rücktritte.If the slave who is to be returned should die, the question arises whether he lost his life through the fault of the purchaser, or his family, or his agent; as, if this was the case, he is considered to be still alive, and everything must be transferred to the vendor which would have been required if the slave had lived. 12Ad Dig. 21,1,31,12ROHGE, Bd. 10 (1874), S. 275: Actio redhibitoria. Zurückgabe der fehlerhaften Sache. Untergang derselben ohne Verschulden des Empfängers nach erklärtem Rücktritte.We understand negligence to mean not only that which is gross, but also that on account of which it must be held that the purchaser was responsible for having, in any way, occasioned the death of the slave; as, for instance, if he did not provide a physician in order that the slave might be cured, or if, through his own fault, he provided one who was incompetent. 13Ad Dig. 21,1,31,13ROHGE, Bd. 10 (1874), S. 275: Actio redhibitoria. Zurückgabe der fehlerhaften Sache. Untergang derselben ohne Verschulden des Empfängers nach erklärtem Rücktritte.We hold this rule to be applicable where the slave dies before issue has been joined, but if his decease took place after issue had been joined, then the judge must decide how the slave died; for, in the opinion of Pedius, everything that happens after issue has been joined in an action must be determined by the wisdom of the judge. 14Ad Dig. 21,1,31,14ROHGE, Bd. 10 (1874), S. 275: Actio redhibitoria. Zurückgabe der fehlerhaften Sache. Untergang derselben ohne Verschulden des Empfängers nach erklärtem Rücktritte.What we have stated with reference to an agent also applies to the case of guardians, curators, and others whose duty it is to appear for others. This is also the opinion of Pedius, and he adds that it is not unjust to make the principal responsible for the negligence of those to whom the management of his business has been entrusted. 15Ad Dig. 21,1,31,15ROHGE, Bd. 10 (1874), S. 275: Actio redhibitoria. Zurückgabe der fehlerhaften Sache. Untergang derselben ohne Verschulden des Empfängers nach erklärtem Rücktritte.Pedius also says that children subject to paternal control are also included in the term “household,” since the action for the return of property renders all members of the household responsible for their acts. 16Where anyone brings an action to recover damages for the diminished value of a slave, on account of his having taken to flight, and afterwards sues because the slave is unsound; for what amount should judgment be rendered? There is no doubt that the action for damages because of the flight of the slave can be brought several times. Julianus, however, says that care must be taken to prevent the purchaser from making a profit, and recovering the appraisement of the same property twice. 17Ad Dig. 21,1,31,17Windscheid: Lehrbuch des Pandektenrechts, 7. Aufl. 1891, Bd. II, § 426, Note 19.An action in factum for the recovery of the price will lie in case the slave is returned; in which instance inquiry is not made whether there was good reason for the return of the slave, but merely where he has been returned. This is not unreasonable, as it would be unjust, after the vendor by taking back the slave had acknowledged that there was cause for doing so, for the question to be asked is whether he should or should not have been returned, nor is any inquiry made as to whether the return took place within the time established by law. 18It is evident that this action requires the slave to be taken back. Otherwise, if he was not taken back, the action would fail, even though it was agreed by the mere consent of the parties that he should be returned. Hence, it is not the agreement to take him back which establishes the ground for this proceeding, but the return itself. 19Everything which went with the slave at the time of the sale should also be restored by means of this action. 20Ad Dig. 21,1,31,20ROHGE, Bd. 7 (1873), S. 1: Contractsauslegung. Sprachgebrauch des Contracts- und Erfüllungsortes.As the stipulation for double damages is perpetual, it is therefore held that an action on sale can be brought, even if the vendor has not given security for double the value of the slave; for matters of usage and custom should always be included in bona fide actions. 21Persons who sell slaves should always state their nationality, at the time of the sale, for very frequently the place of the nativity of a slave either attracts or deters the purchaser, and hence it is to our interest to know in what country he was born; for it is presumed that some slaves are good because they are sprung from a nation which has not an evil reputation, and others are considered to be bad because they are derived from a nation which is rather disreputable than otherwise. If the origin of the slave was not mentioned, an action on this ground will be granted to the purchaser and to all those interested in the matter, by means of which the purchaser can compel a slave to be taken back. 22Ad Dig. 21,1,31,22Windscheid: Lehrbuch des Pandektenrechts, 7. Aufl. 1891, Bd. II, § 323, Note 14; Bd. II, § 387, Note 22.Where property is sold with the understanding that if it does not suit it may be returned within a specified time, this agreement is held to be valid. Where, however, nothing was agreed upon with reference to the time, an action in factum will be granted to the purchaser within sixty available days, to compel the property to be taken back; but not beyond that period. But, if it should be agreed that the property can be returned without reference to time, I think that this contract will be valid. Again where the period of sixty days fixed for the return of the article has elapsed, an action will be granted to the purchaser if proper cause be shown. 23In this investigation of cause it should be ascertained whether the vendor was responsible for the delay, or whether he was not present, so that the slave could be returned to him; or whether there was any other good reason for not delivering the slave within the time designated because he was not satisfactory. 24The same rule must be observed in these actions as in the case of the offspring of a female slave, as well as in that of profits, and other accessories which have been mentioned where a slave to be returned dies before this is done. 25It is held by those learned in the law that any accession to the purchase is a part of the sale.

32Gaius li­bro se­cun­do ad edic­tum ae­di­lium cu­ru­lium. Ita­que sic­ut su­pe­rius ven­di­tor de mor­bo vi­tio­ve et ce­te­ris quae ibi com­pre­hen­sa sunt prae­di­ce­re iu­be­tur, et prae­ter­ea in his cau­sis non es­se man­ci­pium ut pro­mit­tat prae­ci­pi­tur: ita et cum ac­ce­dat alii rei ho­mo, ea­dem et prae­di­ce­re et pro­mit­te­re com­pel­li­tur. quod non so­lum hoc ca­su in­tel­le­gen­dum est, quo no­mi­na­tim ad­ici­tur ac­ces­su­rum fun­do ho­mi­nem Sti­chum, sed et­iam si ge­ne­ra­li­ter om­nia man­ci­pia quae in fun­do sint ac­ce­dant ven­di­tio­ni.

32Gaius, On the Edict of the Curule Ædiles, Book II. Therefore, as has been stated above, the vendor is required to notify the purchaser of any disease, defect, or other fault, included in the Edict; and as it is therein set forth that he must guarantee that the slave has none of these defects, so also, when a slave is transferred to another party as an accessory to property, the vendor is compelled to make the same declaration and guarantee. This should be understood to be necessary, not only where it has been expressly stated that the slave Stichus is an accessory to the land conveyed, but also where, in general terms, all the slaves on the land constitute an accessory to the sale.

33Ul­pia­nus li­bro pri­mo ad edic­tum ae­di­lium cu­ru­lium. Pro­in­de Pom­po­nius ait ius­tam cau­sam es­se, ut quod in ven­di­tio­ne ac­ces­su­rum es­se dic­tum est tam in­te­grum prae­ste­tur, quam il­lud prae­sta­ri de­buit quod prin­ci­pa­li­ter ven­iit: nam iu­re ci­vi­li, ut in­te­gra sint quae ac­ces­su­ra dic­tum fue­rit, ex emp­to ac­tio est, vel­uti si do­lia ac­ces­su­ra fun­do dic­ta fue­rint. sed hoc ita, si cer­tum cor­pus ac­ces­su­rum fue­rit dic­tum: nam si ser­vus cum pe­cu­lio ven­ie­rit, ea man­ci­pia quae in pe­cu­lio fue­rint sa­na es­se prae­sta­re ven­di­tor non de­bet, quia non di­xit cer­tum cor­pus ac­ces­su­rum, sed pe­cu­lium ta­le prae­sta­re opor­te­re, et quem­ad­mo­dum cer­tam quan­ti­ta­tem pe­cu­lii prae­sta­re non de­bet, ita nec hoc. ean­dem ra­tio­nem fa­ce­re Pom­po­nius ait, ut et­iam, si he­redi­tas aut pe­cu­lium ser­vi ven­ie­rit, lo­cus edic­to ae­di­lium non sit cir­ca ea cor­po­ra, quae sunt in he­redi­ta­te aut in pe­cu­lio. idem pro­bat et si fun­dus cum in­stru­men­to ven­ie­rit et in in­stru­men­to man­ci­pia sint. pu­to hanc sen­ten­tiam ve­ram, ni­si si aliud spe­cia­li­ter ac­tum es­se pro­po­na­tur. 1Si ven­di­ta res red­hi­bea­tur, ser­vus quo­que qui rei ac­ces­sit, li­cet nul­lum in eo vi­tium sit, red­hi­be­tur.

33Ulpianus, On the Edict of the Curule Ædiles, Book I. Hence Pomponius says that it is but just that where anything is alleged to be accessory to a sale, it must be furnished in as perfect a condition as should have been done if it had been the principal object sold; for, according to the Civil Law, an action on purchase will lie to compel property said to be accessory to be furnished in good condition; for example, where certain casks are mentioned as accessory to land. This rule, however, only applies where anything is expressly set forth as being accessory; for if a slave is sold together with his peculium, the vendor will not be compelled to guarantee the soundness of the slaves forming part of said peculium, because he did not specify any certain property as being accessory, and it was only necessary to furnish the peculium in whatever condition it might be; and just as he was not obliged to furnish a certain amount of peculium, so likewise, he was not compelled to give this guarantee. Pomponius says that the same rule should be observed where either an estate or the peculium of a slave is sold; for the Edict of the Ædiles does not apply to property belonging to an estate or a peculium. He is of the same opinion where a tract of land is sold with all the means of cultivating it, and slaves are included in this designation. I think that this opinion is correct, unless it is stated that the parties had some other express intention. 1Where property which has been sold is returned, a slave who is an accessory to the same must also be returned; even though he had no defect.

34Afri­ca­nus li­bro sex­to quaes­tio­num. Cum eius­dem ge­ne­ris plu­res res si­mul ven­eant, vel­uti co­moe­di vel cho­rus, re­fer­re ait, in uni­ver­sos an in sin­gu­los pre­tium con­sti­tua­tur, ut sci­li­cet in­ter­dum una, in­ter­dum plu­res ven­di­tio­nes con­trac­tae in­tel­le­gan­tur: quod vel eo quae­ri per­ti­ne­re, ut, si quis eo­rum for­te mor­bosus vel vi­tio­sus sit, vel om­nes si­mul red­hi­bean­tur. 1In­ter­dum et­si in sin­gu­la ca­pi­ta pre­tium con­sti­tu­tum sit, ta­men una emp­tio est, ut prop­ter unius vi­tium om­nes red­hi­be­ri pos­sint vel de­beant, sci­li­cet cum ma­ni­fes­tum erit non ni­si om­nes quem emp­tu­rum vel ven­di­tu­rum fuis­se, ut ple­rum­que cir­ca co­moe­dos vel qua­dri­gas vel mu­las pa­res ac­ci­de­re so­let, ut ne­utri non ni­si om­nes ha­be­re ex­pe­diat.

34Ad Dig. 21,1,34ROHGE, Bd. 16 (1875), Nr. 44, S. 155: Mehrheit von Gegenständen. Mehrheit von Rechtsgeschäften.Africanus, Questions, Book VI. Where several things of the same kind are sold at the same time, as, for instance, slaves, comedians, or singers, it is held that it must be ascertained whether one price was paid for all of them, or whether payment was made for each individually, since sometimes one sale, and then again, several, are understood to have been made. It is important for this to be asked, so that if any of said slaves happens to be diseased or unsound, it may be determined whether all of them should be returned at the same time. 1Sometimes, although prices have been fixed for each head, there is still but one purchase, so that all of them can be, or should be returned on account of the defect of a single one; for instance, where it is evident that the intention was to purchase or to sell them all together, as frequently occurs where slaves are actors; or where four-horse teams, or a pair of mules, are sold; so that it may be advantageous for the parties to have all, or none of them.

35Ul­pia­nus li­bro pri­mo ad edic­tum ae­di­lium cu­ru­lium. Ple­rum­que prop­ter mor­bosa man­ci­pia et­iam non mor­bosa red­hi­ben­tur, si se­pa­ra­ri non pos­sint si­ne mag­no in­com­mo­do vel ad pie­ta­tis ra­tio­nem of­fen­sam. quid enim, si fi­lio re­ten­to pa­ren­tes red­hi­be­re ma­lue­rint vel con­tra? quod et in fra­tri­bus et in per­so­nas con­tu­ber­nio si­bi con­iunc­tas ob­ser­va­ri opor­tet.

35Ulpianus, On the Edict of the Curule Ædiles, Book I. It frequently happens that slaves who are sound are returned with others that are diseased, where they cannot be separated without being inconvenienced, or without doing violence to natural affection; for what if the purchaser preferred to retain a son and return his parents, or vice versa? It is necessary to observe the same rule with reference to brothers, and to slaves united in marriage.

36Pom­po­nius li­bro vi­ce­si­mo ter­tio ad Sa­binum. Si plu­ra man­ci­pia uno pre­tio ven­ie­rint et de uno eo­rum ae­di­li­cia ac­tio­ne uta­mur, ita de­mum pro bo­ni­ta­te eius aes­ti­ma­tio fiet, si con­fu­se uni­ver­sis man­ci­piis con­sti­tu­tum pre­tium fue­rit: quod si sin­gu­lo­rum man­ci­pio­rum con­sti­tu­to pre­tio uni­ver­sa tan­ti ven­ie­runt, quan­tum ex con­sum­ma­tio­ne sin­gu­lo­rum fie­bat, tunc cu­ius­que man­ci­pii pre­tium, seu plu­ris seu mi­no­ris id es­set, se­qui de­be­mus.

36Pomponius, On Sabinus, Book XXIII. Where several slaves are sold for one price, and we bring the action under the Edict of the Ædiles with reference to one of them, an estimate of the value of said slave is only made where the price was fixed for the entire number indiscriminately. But if, after the price had been fixed for each one of the slaves, all of them were sold for an amount equal to the combined prices of the different individuals, we must then adopt the combined price made for each slave, whether he is worth more or less.

37Ul­pia­nus li­bro pri­mo ad edic­tum ae­di­lium cu­ru­lium. Prae­ci­piunt ae­di­les, ne ve­te­ra­tor pro no­vi­cio ven­eat. et hoc edic­tum fal­la­ciis ven­di­to­rum oc­cur­rit: ubi­que enim cu­rant ae­di­les, ne emp­to­res a ven­di­to­ri­bus cir­cum­ve­nian­tur. ut ec­ce ple­ri­que so­lent man­ci­pia, quae no­vi­cia non sunt, qua­si no­vi­cia dis­tra­he­re ad hoc, ut plu­ris ven­dant: prae­sump­tum est enim ea man­ci­pia, quae ru­dia sunt, sim­pli­cio­ra es­se et ad mi­nis­te­ria ap­tio­ra et do­ci­lio­ra et ad om­ne mi­nis­te­rium ha­bi­lia: tri­ta ve­ro man­ci­pia et ve­te­ra­na dif­fi­ci­le est re­for­ma­re et ad suos mo­res for­ma­re. quia igi­tur ve­na­li­cia­rii sciunt fa­ci­le de­cur­ri ad no­vi­cio­rum emp­tio­nem, id­cir­co in­ter­po­lant ve­te­ra­to­res et pro no­vi­ciis ven­dunt. quod ne fiat, hoc edic­to ae­di­les de­nun­tiant: et id­eo si quid igno­ran­te emp­to­re ita ven­ie­rit, red­hi­be­bi­tur.

37Ulpianus, On the Edict of the Curule Ædiles, Book I. The Ædiles direct that a slave who has grown old in service shall not be sold as one unaccustomed to servitude. This provision of the Edict was framed to avoid the tricks of vendors, for, in every instance, they take care that purchasers shall not be deceived by vendors. For example, as many vendors are accustomed to sell slaves as novices, who are not such, in order that they may dispose of them for more money, since it is presumed that slaves who are inexperienced will be more straightforward, better adapted to service, more tractable and skillful for every kind of work, while those that are experienced and have grown old in servitude are hard to change, and adapt to one’s customs. Hence, because slave-dealers know that persons are rather inclined to the purchase of slaves who are novices, they, for this reason, mingle those who are experienced with them and sell them all for the novices. The Ædiles provide by this Edict that this shall not be done; and, therefore, where a slave is sold in this manner to a purchaser who is ignorant of the facts, he can be returned.

38Idem li­bro se­cun­do ad edic­tum ae­di­lium cu­ru­lium. Ae­di­les aiunt: ‘Qui iu­men­ta ven­dunt, pa­lam rec­te di­cun­to, quid in quo­que eo­rum mor­bi vi­tii­que sit, uti­que op­ti­me or­na­ta ven­den­di cau­sa fue­rint, ita emp­to­ri­bus tra­den­tur. si quid ita fac­tum non erit, de or­na­men­tis re­sti­tuen­dis iu­men­tis­ve or­na­men­to­rum no­mi­ne red­hi­ben­dis in die­bus se­xa­gin­ta, mor­bi au­tem vi­tii­ve cau­sa in­emp­tis fa­cien­dis in sex men­si­bus, vel quo mi­no­ris cum venirent fue­rint, in an­no iu­di­cium da­bi­mus. si iu­men­ta pa­ria si­mul ven­ie­rint et al­te­rum in ea cau­sa fue­rit, ut red­hi­be­ri de­beat, iu­di­cium da­bi­mus, quo utrum­que red­hi­bea­tur’. 1Lo­quun­tur ae­di­les in hoc edic­to de iu­men­tis red­hi­ben­dis. 2Cau­sa au­tem hu­ius edic­ti ea­dem est, quae man­ci­pio­rum red­hi­ben­do­rum. 3Et fe­re ea­dem sunt in his, quae in man­ci­piis, quod ad mor­bum vi­tium­ve at­ti­net: quid­quid igi­tur hic di­xi­mus, huc erit trans­fe­ren­dum. et si mor­tuum fue­rit iu­men­tum, pa­ri mo­do red­hi­be­ri pot­erit, quem­ad­mo­dum man­ci­pium pot­est. 4Iu­men­to­rum au­tem ap­pel­la­tio­ne an om­ne pe­cus con­ti­nea­tur, vi­dea­mus. et dif­fi­ci­le est, ut con­ti­nea­tur: nam aliud sig­ni­fi­cant iu­men­ta, aliud sig­ni­fi­ca­tur pe­co­ris ap­pel­la­tio­ne. 5Id­cir­co elo­gium huic edic­to sub­iec­tum est, cu­ius ver­ba haec sunt: ‘quae de iu­men­to­rum sa­ni­ta­te di­xi­mus, de ce­te­ro quo­que pe­co­re om­ni ven­di­to­res fa­ciun­to’. 6Un­de du­bi­ta­ri de­siit, an hoc edic­to bo­ves quo­que con­ti­nean­tur: et­enim iu­men­to­rum ap­pel­la­tio­ne non con­ti­ne­ri eos ve­rius est, sed pe­co­ris ap­pel­la­tio­ne con­ti­ne­bun­tur. 7Sed enim sunt quae­dam, quae in ho­mi­ni­bus qui­dem mor­bum fa­ciunt, in iu­men­tis non ad­eo: ut pu­ta si mu­lus cas­tra­tus est, ne­que mor­bi ne­que vi­tii quid ha­be­re vi­de­tur, quia ne­que de for­ti­tu­di­ne quid eius de­tra­hi­tur ne­que de uti­li­ta­te, cum ad ge­ne­ran­dum num­quam sit ha­bi­lis. Cae­lius quo­que scri­bit non om­nia ani­ma­lia cas­tra­ta ob id ip­sum vi­tio­sa es­se, ni­si prop­ter ip­sam cas­tra­tio­nem fac­ta sunt in­be­cil­lio­ra: et id­eo mu­lum non es­se vi­tio­sum. idem re­fert Ofi­lium ex­is­ti­mas­se equum cas­tra­tum sa­num es­se, sic­uti spa­do quo­que sa­nus est, sed si emp­tor igno­ra­vit, ven­di­tor scit, ex emp­to es­se ac­tio­nem: et ve­rum est quod Ofi­lius. 8Quae­si­tum est, si mu­la ta­lis sit, ut trans­iun­gi non pos­sit, an sa­na sit. et ait Pom­po­nius sa­nam es­se: ple­ras­que de­ni­que car­ru­ca­rias11Die Großausgabe liest car­ru­cha­rias statt car­ru­ca­rias. ta­les es­se, ut non pos­sint trans­iun­gi. 9Idem ait, si na­ta sit eo in­ge­nio aut cor­po­re, ut al­te­rum iu­gum non pa­tia­tur, sa­nam non es­se. 10Non tan­tum au­tem ob mor­bum vi­tium­ve red­hi­bitio lo­cum ha­be­bit in iu­men­tis, ve­rum et­iam si con­tra dic­tum pro­mis­sum­ve, erit lo­cus red­hi­bitio­ni ex­em­plo man­ci­pio­rum. 11Ven­den­di au­tem cau­sa or­na­tum iu­men­tum vi­de­ri Cae­lius ait non, si sub tem­pus ven­di­tio­nis, hoc est bi­duo an­te ven­di­tio­nem or­na­tum sit, sed si in ip­sa ven­di­tio­ne or­na­tum sit, aut id­eo, in­quit, ve­na­le cum es­set sic or­na­tum in­spi­ce­re­tur: sem­per­que cum de or­na­men­tis agi­tur, et in ac­tio­ne et in edic­to ad­iec­tum est: ‘ven­den­di cau­sa or­na­ta duc­ta es­se’: pot­erit enim iu­men­tum or­na­tum iti­ne­ris cau­sa du­ci, de­in­de venire. 12Si plu­ra iu­men­ta ven­ie­rint, non om­nia erunt red­hi­ben­da prop­ter unius or­na­men­tum: nam et si vi­tio­sum sit unum iu­gum, non ta­men prop­ter hoc ce­te­ra iu­ga red­hi­be­bun­tur. 13Si for­te iu­gum mu­la­rum sit, qua­rum al­te­ra vi­tio­sa est, non ex pre­tio tan­tum vi­tio­sae, sed ex utrius­que erit com­po­nen­dum, quan­ti mi­no­ris sit: cum enim uno pre­tio utrae­que ven­ie­rint, non est se­pa­ran­dum pre­tium, sed quan­to mi­no­ris cum veniret utrum­que fuit, non al­te­rum quod erat vi­tio­sum. 14Cum au­tem iu­men­ta pa­ria ven­eunt, edic­to ex­pres­sum est, ut, cum al­te­rum in ea cau­sa sit, ut red­hi­be­ri de­beat, utrum­que red­hi­bea­tur: in qua re tam emp­to­ri quam ven­di­to­ri con­su­li­tur, dum iu­men­ta non se­pa­ran­tur. si­mi­li mo­do et si tri­ga ven­ie­rit, red­hi­ben­da erit to­ta, et si qua­dri­ga, red­hi­bea­tur. sed si duo pa­ria mu­la­rum sint et una mu­la vi­tio­sa sit vel par, so­lum par red­hi­be­bi­tur, al­te­rum non: si ta­men non­dum sint pa­ria con­sti­tu­ta, sed sim­pli­ci­ter quat­tuor mu­lae uno pre­tio ven­ie­rint, unius erit mu­lae red­hi­bitio, non om­nium: nam et si po­lia ven­ie­rit, di­ce­mus unum equum qui vi­tio­sus est, non om­nem po­liam red­hi­be­ri opor­te­re. haec et in ho­mi­ni­bus di­ce­mus plu­ri­bus uno pre­tio dis­trac­tis, ni­si si se­pa­ra­ri non pos­sint, ut pu­ta si tra­goe­di vel mi­mi.

38The Same, On the Edict of the Curule Ædiles, Book II. The Ædiles say: “Those who sell beasts of burden shall state openly and fairly if they have any disease or defect; and if they have been splendidly caparisoned for the purpose of selling them, they shall be delivered to the purchasers in this condition. If this has not been done, we will grant an action for the return of the ornaments, or for the return of the animals on account of the ornaments, within sixty days; or where the sale should be rescinded by reason of any disease or defect, within six months; or for the return of the purchase-money where the animals were worth less than they were sold for within a year. If a pair of beasts of burden are sold at the time, and one of them is in such a condition that he should be returned, we will grant an action to enable both of them to be returned.” 1The Ædiles mention the return of beasts of burden in this Edict. 2The reason for the promulgation of this Edict is the same as the one which prompted that for the return of slaves. 3Ad Dig. 21,1,38,3ROHGE, Bd. 10 (1874), S. 275: Actio redhibitoria. Zurückgabe der fehlerhaften Sache. Untergang derselben ohne Verschulden des Empfängers nach erklärtem Rücktritte.Substantially the same rules are to be observed with reference to them as with respect to slaves, so far as diseases and defects are concerned. Therefore what we have already said on this point is also applicable here, and if the animal should die, he can be returned in the same way as is done in the case of a slave. 4But let us see whether all kinds of cattle are included under the head of beasts of burden. It is difficult to include them all, for the term “beasts of burden” means one thing, and that of cattle means another. 5Hence a clause has been added to this Edict, the words of which are as follows: “In the case of all kinds of cattle, vendors must observe the same rules which we have laid down with reference to the soundness of beasts of burden.” 6Wherefore a doubt can no longer exist whether oxen are included in the terms of this Edict, for although they are not embraced in the designation of beasts of burden, it is certain that they are included in the term cattle. 7There are certain things which are classed as diseases in men which are not considered such in animals; as, for example, where a horse is castrated, it is neither considered a disease nor a defect; because this does not detract either from his strength or his usefulness, although he will never be fit for reproduction. Cælius also stated that all animals which have been castrated are not defective on this account, unless they have become weaker through the operation, and therefore a mule is not unsound. He says that Ofilius entertained the same opinion, namely, that a castrated horse is sound, just as an eunuch is also sound; but if the buyer was ignorant of this and the vendor knew it, an action on purchase will lie. What Ofilius states is correct. 8The question arose, if a mule is such that it cannot be changed when harnessed, whether it is sound. Pomponius says that it is, for very many carriage animals are such that their position in harness cannot be changed. 9He also says that if an animal is born with such a disposition or form of body that it cannot be harnessed with another, it is not sound. 10An animal can be returned not only on account of some disease, but also where there is ground for doing so because it does not conform to the representations or guarantee of the vendor; just as in the case of slaves. 11Cælius says that the rule with reference to the adornment of horses for the purpose of making a better sale does not apply where this has been done before the time of the sale, that is to say, two days before; but at the very time the sale was made, or, when offered for sale, it is exhibited caparisoned in this manner to those to whom it is expected to sell it. And every time that such decoration takes place, it is stated both in the action and in the Edict that the animals have been produced, caparisoned for the purpose of selling them, as an animal can be produced, caparisoned for the purpose of making a journey, and afterwards be sold. 12Where several animals have been sold, all of them will not be subject to return on account of the trappings of one of them; for although one team may be defective, the other should not be returned on this account. 13Where a pair of mules is disposed of, one of which is unsound, the value of the latter is not to be taken into consideration in estimating the difference; but the value of the team should be taken into account; for where both were sold for the same price this must not be divided in two, but the loss of value of both of them together must be considered, and not merely the deterioration of the one which is blemished. 14Where a pair of match-horses is sold, it is stated in the Edict that if there is cause for the return of one of them both should be returned; in which instance the interest of the purchaser as well as that of the vendor should be considered, since the animals are not separated. Likewise, where a team of three horses, or one of four is sold, all of them should be returned. Where, however, there are two pairs of mules, and one mule is unsound, only the pair to which it belongs shall be returned, and not the others. But if they are not divided into pairs, but four mules are merely sold for one price, there will be the return of one mule, and not of all, as, where a number of horses are sold for breeding purposes, we hold that if one of them should be unsound, it is not necessary for all of them to be returned. We hold the same opinion where several slaves are sold for one price, unless they cannot be separated; as, for instance, where they are actors, or buffoons.

40Ul­pia­nus li­bro se­cun­do ad edic­tum ae­di­lium cu­ru­lium. hi enim non erunt se­pa­ran­di. 1De­in­de aiunt ae­di­les: ‘ne quis ca­nem, ver­rem vel mi­no­rem aprum, lu­pum, ur­sum, pan­the­ram, leo­nem’,

40Ultpianus, On the Edict of the Curule Ædiles, Book II. For these should not be separated. 1Next, the Ædiles say, “That a dog, a hog, a small wild boar, a wolf, a bear, a panther, a lion,”

41Pau­lus li­bro se­cun­do ad edic­tum ae­di­lium cu­ru­lium. et ge­ne­ra­li­ter ‘aliud­ve quod no­ce­ret ani­mal, si­ve so­lu­ta sint, si­ve al­li­ga­ta, ut con­ti­ne­ri vin­cu­lis, quo mi­nus dam­num in­fe­rant, non pos­sint,

41Paulus, On the Edict of the Curule Ædiles, Book II. And, generally speaking, “Or any other animal likely to commit injury, whether it be at large or tied, but incapable of being restrained so as not to cause damage,”

42Ul­pia­nus li­bro se­cun­do ad edic­tum ae­di­lium cu­ru­lium. ‘qua vul­go iter fiet, ita ha­buis­se ve­lit, ut cui­quam no­ce­re dam­num­ve da­re pos­sit. si ad­ver­sus ea fac­tum erit et ho­mo li­ber ex ea re per­ie­rit, so­li­di du­cen­ti, si no­ci­tum ho­mi­ni li­be­ro es­se di­ce­tur, quan­ti bo­num ae­quum iu­di­ci vi­de­bi­tur, con­dem­ne­tur, ce­te­ra­rum re­rum, quan­ti dam­num da­tum fac­tum­ve sit, du­pli’.

42Ulpianus, On the Edict of the Curule Ædiles, Book II. Cannot be kept in a place where people are constantly passing, and where the said animal may injure anyone, or cause any damage. If these provisions should be violated, and a freeman lose his life in consequence, two hundred solidi shall be paid; and if a freeman should be injured, the party responsible shall have judgment rendered against him for a sum which may seem in the wisdom and justice of the judge to be proper; and where any other person or any property is injured, the said party shall be compelled to pay double the amount of the damage caused.

43Pau­lus li­bro pri­mo ad edic­tum ae­di­lium cu­ru­lium. Bo­vem qui cor­nu pe­tit vi­tio­sum es­se ple­ri­que di­cunt, item mu­las quae ces­sum dant: ea quo­que iu­men­ta, quae si­ne cau­sa tur­ban­tur et se­met ip­sa eri­piunt, vi­tio­sa es­se di­cun­tur. 1Qui ad ami­cum do­mi­ni de­pre­ca­tu­rus con­fu­git, non est fu­gi­ti­vus: im­mo et­iam­si ea men­te sit, ut non im­pe­tra­to au­xi­lio do­mum non re­ver­ta­tur, non­dum fu­gi­ti­vus est, quia non so­lum con­si­lii, sed et fac­ti fu­gae no­men est. 2Qui per­sua­su al­te­rius a do­mi­no re­ces­sit, fu­gi­ti­vus est, li­cet id non fue­rit fac­tu­rus ci­tra con­si­lium eius qui per­sua­sit. 3Si ser­vus meus bo­na fi­de ti­bi ser­viens fu­ge­rit vel sciens se meum es­se vel igno­rans, fu­gi­ti­vus est, ni­si ani­mo ad me re­ver­ten­di id fe­cit. 4Mor­tis con­scis­cen­dae cau­sa si­bi fa­cit, qui prop­ter ne­qui­tiam ma­los­que mo­res fla­gi­tium­ve ali­quod ad­mis­sum mor­tem si­bi con­scis­ce­re vo­luit, non si do­lo­rem cor­po­ris non sus­ti­nen­do id fe­ce­rit. 5Si quis ser­vum eme­rit et rap­to eo vi bo­no­rum rap­to­rum ac­tio­ne qua­dru­plum con­se­cu­tus est, de­in­de ser­vum red­hi­beat, red­de­re de­be­bit quod ac­ce­pit: sed si per eum ser­vum in­iu­riam pas­sus in­iu­riae no­mi­ne ege­rit, non red­det ven­di­to­ri: ali­ter for­si­tan at­que si lo­ris ab ali­quo cae­so aut quaes­tio­ne de eo ha­bi­ta emp­tor ege­rit. 6Ali­quan­do et­iam red­hi­be­ri man­ci­pium de­be­bit, li­cet aes­ti­ma­to­ria, id est quan­to mi­no­ris, aga­mus: nam si ad­eo nul­lius sit pre­tii, ut ne ex­pe­diat qui­dem ta­le man­ci­pium do­mi­ni ha­be­re, vel­uti si fu­rio­sum aut lu­na­ti­cum sit, li­cet aes­ti­ma­to­ria ac­tum fue­rit, of­fi­cio ta­men iu­di­cis con­ti­ne­bi­tur, ut red­di­to man­ci­pio pre­tium re­ci­pia­tur. 7Si quis, cum con­si­lium in­is­set frau­dan­do­rum cre­di­to­rum, red­hi­bue­rit non red­hi­bi­tu­rus alias, ni­si vel­let eos frau­da­re, te­ne­tur cre­di­to­ri­bus prop­ter man­ci­pium ven­di­tor. 8Pig­nus ma­ne­bit ob­li­ga­tum, et­iam­si red­hi­bi­tus fue­rit ser­vus: quem­ad­mo­dum, si eum alie­nas­set aut usum fruc­tum eius, non rec­te red­hi­be­tur ni­si red­emp­tum, sic et pig­no­re li­be­ra­tum red­hi­be­tur. 9Si sub con­di­cio­ne ho­mo emp­tus sit, red­hi­bi­to­ria ac­tio an­te con­di­cio­nem ex­sis­ten­tem in­uti­li­ter agi­tur, quia non­dum per­fec­ta emp­tio ar­bi­trio iu­di­cis im­per­fec­ta fie­ri non pot­est: et id­eo et­si ex emp­to vel ven­di­to vel red­hi­bi­to­ria an­te ac­tum fue­rit, ex­ple­ta con­di­cio­ne ite­rum agi pot­erit. 10In­ter­dum et­iam­si pu­ra sit ven­di­tio, prop­ter iu­ris con­di­cio­nem in sus­pen­so est, vel­uti si ser­vus, in quo al­te­rius usus fruc­tus, al­te­rius pro­prie­tas est, ali­quid eme­rit: nam dum in­cer­tum est, ex cu­ius re pre­tium sol­vat, pen­det, cui sit ad­quisi­tum, et id­eo ne­utri eo­rum red­hi­bi­to­ria com­pe­tit.

43Paulus, On the Edict of the Curule Ædiles, Book I. Most authorities say that an ox which strikes with its horns is vicious, just as is the case with mules that kick. Horses, also, which are frightened without any cause and run away, are also said to be vicious. 1A slave who takes refuge with a friend of his master, in order to obtain his intercession with the latter, is not a fugitive; not even if he has the intention of not returning home if he does not obtain pardon. He is not yet a fugitive, for the reason that the term “flight” does not merely apply to design but also to the act itself. 2Where a slave, through being instigated by another to leave his master, takes to flight, he is a fugitive; even though he would not have run away if it had not been for the advice of the person who persuaded him. 3If a slave of mine who was serving you in good faith runs away, he is a fugitive, whether he knows that he belongs to me or is ignorant of the fact, unless he did so with the intention of returning to me. 4A slave attempts suicide who does so on account of wickedness, bad habits, or some crime which he has committed; but not where he takes such a step because he is unable to endure bodily suffering. 5Where anyone purchases a slave, and is deprived of him by force, he can recover fourfold damages on the ground of robbery, and he can afterwards return the slave, and the vendor must refund the price which he received. Where, however, he suffered injury through his slave, and has instituted proceedings on that account, he cannot return him to the vendor, unless the purchaser should bring an action against the party who has beaten the slave with a whip, or subjected him to torture. 6Ad Dig. 21,1,43,6ROHGE, Bd. 10 (1874), S. 347: Actio quanti minoris auf Restitution des ganzen Kaufpreises, wenn die Waare durch den Fehler völlig entwerthet ist.A slave should sometimes be returned, even though we may have brought an action for his appraisement, that is to say, the estimate of the excess of the price above his true value. For if he is worthless, so that it is not to the advantage of his master to have such a slave, as, for instance, where he is subject to fits of rage, or is insane, even though an action for his appraisement may have been instituted, it is, nevertheless, the duty of the judge to cause the purchase-money to be repaid after the slave has been returned. 7If anyone should cause the return of a slave with the intention of defrauding his creditors, and would not have returned him unless he had intended to defraud them; the vendor will be liable to the creditors for the value of the slave. 8When a slave is pledged, he will remain bound even though he be returned; just as where he, or the usufruct in him, has been disposed of, he cannot lawfully be returned unless he is redeemed and restored free from the liability contracted under the pledge. 9Where a slave is purchased under a condition, and proceedings with a view to his return are instituted before the condition has been fulfilled, they will be void, because the purchase is not yet complete, and cannot be set aside by the decision of a judge; and therefore if an action on purchase or sale, or one for the return of property is filed before the condition has been fulfilled, suit can afterwards be brought a second time. 10In some instances even where an absolute sale has taken place, it remains in abeyance on account of a condition of law; as for example, where a slave in whom one party has the usufruct and the other the ownership, buys something; for as long as it is uncertain out of whose property he pays the price, the title to the property will be in suspense, and therefore neither of the parties can bring an action for the return of the slave.

44Idem li­bro se­cun­do ad edic­tum ae­di­lium cu­ru­lium. Ius­tis­si­me ae­di­les no­lue­runt ho­mi­nem ei rei quae mi­no­ris es­set ac­ce­de­re, ne qua fraus aut edic­to aut iu­re ci­vi­li fie­ret: ut ait Pe­dius, prop­ter dig­ni­ta­tem ho­mi­num: alio­quin ean­dem ra­tio­nem fuis­se et in ce­te­ris re­bus: rid­icu­lum nam­que es­se tu­ni­cae fun­dum ac­ce­de­re. ce­te­rum ho­mi­nis ven­di­tio­ni quid­vis ad­ice­re li­cet: nam et ple­rum­que plus in pe­cu­lio est quam in ser­vo, et non­num­quam vi­ca­rius qui ac­ce­dit plu­ris est quam is ser­vus qui venit. 1Pro­po­ni­tur ac­tio ex hoc edic­to in eum cu­ius ma­xi­ma pars in ven­di­tio­ne fue­rit, quia ple­rum­que ve­na­li­cia­rii ita so­cie­ta­tem co­eunt, ut quid­quid agunt in com­mu­ne vi­dean­tur age­re: ae­quum enim ae­di­li­bus vi­sum est vel in unum ex his, cu­ius ma­ior pars aut nul­la par­te mi­nor es­set, ae­di­li­cias ac­tio­nes com­pe­te­re, ne co­ge­re­tur emp­tor cum mul­tis li­ti­ga­re, quam­vis ac­tio ex emp­to cum sin­gu­lis sit pro por­tio­ne, qua so­cii fue­runt: nam id ge­nus ho­mi­num ad lu­crum po­tius vel tur­pi­ter fa­cien­dum pro­nius est. 2In red­hi­bi­to­ria vel aes­ti­ma­to­ria pot­est du­bi­ta­ri, an, quia alie­num ser­vum ven­di­dit, et ob evic­tio­nem et prop­ter mor­bum for­te vel fu­gam si­mul te­ne­ri pot­est: nam pot­est di­ci ni­hil in­ter­es­se emp­to­ris sa­num es­se, fu­gi­ti­vum non es­se eum, qui evic­tus sit. sed in­ter­fuit emp­to­ris sa­num pos­se­dis­se prop­ter ope­ras, ne­que ex post­fac­to de­cres­cat ob­li­ga­tio: sta­tim enim ut ser­vus tra­di­tus est com­mit­ti­tur sti­pu­la­tio quan­ti in­ter­est emp­to­ris.

44The Same, On the Edict of the Curule Ædiles, Book II. The Ædiles, with great justice, refuse to permit a slave to be accessory to property of less value than himself, in order to avoid fraud being committed either against the Edict or against the Civil Law, and also, as Pedius says, against the dignity of mankind; otherwise the same rule would apply as in the other matters, since it would be ridiculous for a tract of land to be considered accessory to a tunic. Anything, however, may be permitted to be accessory to the sale of a slave, for very frequently the peculium is more valuable than the slave himself, and sometimes a sub-slave, classed as an accessory, is worth more than the principal slave who is sold. 1An action is granted under this Edict against the party who had the greatest interest in the sale of the slave, because dealers in slaves generally form partnerships, so that whatever they do is held to be transacted in common; for it seemed just to the Ædiles that the actions which they established should be brought either against the party who owned the greater share of the property—or at least who did not own less than the others—in order that the buyer might not be compelled to engage in litigation with many persons; although an action on purchase can be brought against each individual partner in proportion to his share; for this kind of men are much inclined to gain, as well as to the commission of dishonorable acts. 2Ad Dig. 21,1,44,2ROHGE, Bd. 10 (1874), S. 275: Actio redhibitoria. Zurückgabe der fehlerhaften Sache. Untergang derselben ohne Verschulden des Empfängers nach erklärtem Rücktritte.In an action for the return of property, or for its appraisement, a doubt arises whether a party who has sold a slave belonging to another will be liable, at the same time, on the ground of eviction, or because of unsoundness, or on account of the flight of the slave. For it may be said that the purchaser has no further interest where he has been deprived of the possession of the slave by a better title, whether he is sound or a fugitive; but it is to the interest of the purchaser that he should have been sound when he possessed him on account of his services, and the obligation does not increase because of what may have subsequently happened, for just as soon as the slave is delivered, the stipulation relating to the interest of the purchaser becomes operative.

45Gaius li­bro pri­mo ad edic­tum ae­di­lium cu­ru­lium. Red­hi­bi­to­ria ac­tio du­pli­cem ha­bet con­dem­na­tio­nem: mo­do enim in du­plum, mo­do in sim­plum con­dem­na­tur ven­di­tor. nam si ne­que pre­tium ne­que ac­ces­sio­nem sol­vat ne­que eum qui eo no­mi­ne ob­li­ga­tus erit li­be­ret, du­pli pre­tii et ac­ces­sio­nis con­dem­na­ri iu­be­tur: si ve­ro red­dat pre­tium et ac­ces­sio­nem vel eum qui eo no­mi­ne ob­li­ga­tus est li­be­ret, sim­pli vi­de­tur con­dem­na­ri.

45Ad Dig. 21,1,45Windscheid: Lehrbuch des Pandektenrechts, 7. Aufl. 1891, Bd. II, § 394, Note 2.Gaius, On the Edict of the Curule Ædiles, Book I. An action for the return of a slave has a twofold effect, for sometimes the vendor will have judgment rendered against him for double damages, and sometimes merely for simple damages. For if he refuses to refund either the price of the slave or any accessories attaching to him, and will not release him from the liability incurred on his account, he will be ordered to pay double the amount of the price and the accessories. Where, however, he returns the price and the accessories or releases the slave from the obligation incurred for his benefit, judgment for simple damages should be rendered against him.

46Pom­po­nius li­bro oc­ta­vo de­ci­mo ad Sa­binum. Cum mi­hi red­hi­beas, fur­tis no­xis­que so­lu­tum es­se pro­mit­te­re non de­bes, prae­ter­quam quod ius­su tuo fe­ce­rat aut eius cui tu eum alie­na­ve­ris.

46Pomponius, On Sabinus, Book XVIII. When you return a slave to me, you are not obliged to guarantee that he is not liable for any thefts or damages, except where he has committed them by your order, or by that of the party to whom you may have sold him.

47Pau­lus li­bro un­de­ci­mo ad Sa­binum. Si ho­mi­nem emp­tum ma­nu­mi­sis­ti, et red­hi­bi­to­riam et quan­ti mi­no­ris de­ne­gan­dam ti­bi La­beo ait, sic­ut du­plae ac­tio per­iret: er­go et quod ad­ver­sus dic­tum pro­mis­sum­ve sit, ac­tio per­ibit. 1Post mor­tem au­tem ho­mi­nis ae­di­li­ciae ac­tio­nes ma­nent,

47Ad Dig. 21,1,47ROHGE, Bd. 11 (1874), Nr. 67, S. 202: Verlust der Redhibitionsbefugnis durch Veräußerung, Verbrauch, Verfügung über die gekaufte Sache.ROHGE, Bd. 16 (1875), Nr. 81, S. 321: Folgen der Verarbeitung bezw. Umgestaltung eines Theils der gekauften Waare mit erkennbarem Fehler bezüglich der Redhibitionsbefugnis.Paulus, On Sabinus, Book XI. If you manumit a slave whom you have purchased, Labeo says that you will neither be granted an action to return him, nor one to recover the amount of the excess of his value which you have paid; just as the right of action for double damages is extinguished. Therefore the right of action founded on something which has been represented or guaranteed will also be lost. 1Ad Dig. 21,1,47,1ROHGE, Bd. 10 (1874), S. 275: Actio redhibitoria. Zurückgabe der fehlerhaften Sache. Untergang derselben ohne Verschulden des Empfängers nach erklärtem Rücktritte.The actions arising from the Edict of the Ædiles continue to exist even after the death of the slave;

48Pom­po­nius li­bro vi­ce­si­mo ter­tio ad Sa­binum. si ta­men si­ne cul­pa ac­to­ris fa­mi­liae­ve eius vel pro­cu­ra­to­ris mor­tuus sit. 1Au­dien­dus est is, qui de vi­tio vel mor­bo ser­vi que­rens re­ti­ne­re eum ve­lit. 2Non no­ce­bit emp­to­ri, si sex men­sum ex­cep­tio­ne red­hi­bi­to­ria ex­clu­sus ve­lit in­tra an­num aes­ti­ma­to­ria age­re. 3Ei, qui ser­vum vinc­tum ven­di­de­rit, ae­di­li­cium edic­tum re­mit­ti ae­quum est: mul­to enim am­plius est id fa­ce­re, quam pro­nun­tia­re in vin­cu­lis fuis­se. 4In ae­di­li­ciis ac­tio­ni­bus ex­cep­tio­nem op­po­ni ae­quum est, si emp­tor sci­ret de fu­ga aut vin­cu­lis aut ce­te­ris re­bus si­mi­li­bus, ut ven­di­tor ab­sol­va­tur. 5Ae­di­li­ciae ac­tio­nes et he­redi et in he­redem com­pe­tunt, ut ta­men et fac­ta he­redum quae post­ea ac­ces­se­rint et quod ex­per­i­ri po­tue­rint, quae­ran­tur. 6Non so­lum de man­ci­piis, sed de om­ni ani­ma­li hae ac­tio­nes com­pe­tunt, ita ut et­iam, si usum fruc­tum in ho­mi­ne eme­rim, com­pe­te­re de­beant. 7Cum red­hi­bi­to­ria ac­tio­ne de sa­ni­ta­te agi­tur, per­mit­ten­dum est de uno vi­tio age­re et prae­di­ce­re, ut, si quid aliud post­ea ap­pa­ruis­set, de eo ite­rum age­re­tur. 8Sim­pla­ria­rum ven­di­tio­num cau­sa ne sit red­hi­bitio, in usu est.

48Pomponius, On Sabinus, Book XXIII. Ad Dig. 21,1,48 pr.ROHGE, Bd. 10 (1874), S. 275: Actio redhibitoria. Zurückgabe der fehlerhaften Sache. Untergang derselben ohne Verschulden des Empfängers nach erklärtem Rücktritte.Provided the slave dies without the fault of the purchaser, or of his family, or of his agent. 1He who complains of unsoundness or disease in a slave that he has purchased, and wishes to retain him until satisfaction is given him, should be heard. 2The rights of the purchaser shall not be prejudiced where, having been barred from bringing an action for the return of the slave within six months, he desires to institute proceedings for the appraisement of his value within a year. 3Ad Dig. 21,1,48,3ROHGE, Bd. 10 (1874), S. 355: Der Verkäufer ist nicht bloß zur Vertretung der heimlichen, sondern schlechthin aller nicht angezeigten, nicht unerheblichen Mängel verbunden, sofern er nicht beweist, daß der Käufer sie gekannt hat oder kennen mußte.It is just that the Edict of the Ædiles should not apply to anyone who has sold a slave in chains, for it is far more effective to do this than merely to state that he has been in chains. 4Ad Dig. 21,1,48,4ROHGE, Bd. 10 (1874), S. 355: Der Verkäufer ist nicht bloß zur Vertretung der heimlichen, sondern schlechthin aller nicht angezeigten, nicht unerheblichen Mängel verbunden, sofern er nicht beweist, daß der Käufer sie gekannt hat oder kennen mußte.In actions founded on the Edict of the Ædiles, it is no more than proper that the vendor should be permitted to plead an exception if the purchaser was aware that the slave was in the habit of running away, or had been in chains, or had any other similar faults which would entitle the vendor to be released. 5The action founded on the Edict of the Ædiles will lie both in favor of an heir and against him; but inquiry should, nevertheless, be made as to any acts subsequently committed by the heirs, and as to whether they had a right to institute such proceedings. 6These actions can be brought not only with reference to slaves, but also concerning every kind of animals, so that they will lie against me, even if I had only purchased the usufruct of a slave. 7When suit for the return of a slave because of his soundness is brought, it is permitted to proceed and make allegations as to one defect, and if any other should afterwards appear, a second action with reference to it can be instituted. 8It is not customary, in the case of simple sales, to make use of the action for the return of property.

49Ul­pia­nus li­bro oc­ta­vo dis­pu­ta­tio­num. Et­iam in fun­do ven­di­to red­hi­bitio­nem pro­ce­de­re ne­qua­quam in­cer­tum est, vel­uti si pes­ti­lens fun­dus dis­trac­tus sit: nam red­hi­ben­dus erit. et be­ni­gnum est di­ce­re vec­ti­ga­lis ex­ac­tio­nem fu­tu­ri tem­po­ris post red­hi­bitio­nem ad­ver­sus emp­to­rem ces­sa­re.

49Ulpiamis, Disputations, Book VIII. There is no doubt that proceedings for the return of property can also be brought in the case of the sale of a tract of land, as, for example, where land is sold which is injurious to health; for it should be returned. And it is but equitable to hold that the purchaser is not liable for the taxes at any time after the return of the property.

50Iu­lia­nus li­bro quar­to ex Mi­n­icio. Va­ri­co­sus sa­nus non est.

50Julianus, On Minicius, Book IV. A slave with varicose veins is not sound.

51Afri­ca­nus li­bro oc­ta­vo quaes­tio­num. Cum man­ci­pium mor­bosum vel vi­tio­sum ser­vus emat et red­hi­bi­to­ria vel ex emp­to do­mi­nus ex­pe­ria­tur, om­ni­mo­do scien­tiam ser­vi, non do­mi­ni spec­tan­dam es­se ait, ut ni­hil in­ter­sit, pe­cu­lia­ri an do­mi­ni no­mi­ne eme­rit et cer­tum in­cer­tum­ve man­dan­te eo eme­rit, quia tunc et il­lud ex bo­na fi­de est ser­vum, cum quo neg­otium sit ges­tum, de­cep­tum non es­se, et rur­sus de­lic­tum eius­dem, quod in con­tra­hen­do ad­mi­se­rit, do­mi­no no­ce­re de­bet. sed si ser­vus man­da­tu do­mi­ni ho­mi­nem eme­rit, quem do­mi­nus vi­tio­sum es­se sci­ret, non te­ne­tur ven­di­tor. 1Cir­ca pro­cu­ra­to­ris per­so­nam, cum qui­dem ip­se scie­rit mor­bosum vi­tio­sum es­se, non du­bi­tan­dum, quin, quam­vis ip­se do­mi­no man­da­ti vel neg­otio­rum ges­to­rum ac­tio­ne sit ob­stric­tus, ni­hi­lo ma­gis eo no­mi­ne age­re pos­sit: at cum ip­se igno­rans es­se vi­tio­sum man­da­tu do­mi­ni qui id sci­ret eme­rit et red­hi­bi­to­ria agat, ex per­so­na do­mi­ni uti­lem ex­cep­tio­nem ei non pu­ta­bat op­po­nen­dam.

51Africanus, Questions, Book VIII. Where one slave buys another who is diseased or unsound, and his master brings an action on purchase, or one for the return of the slave; it should be ascertained, not whether the master, but whether the slave was aware of these defects, so that it makes no difference whether he purchased the slave to be added to his peculium, or acquired him in the name of his master; or whether he purchased any particular slave, or one in general, by the order of his master; for then it becomes a question of good faith, whether the slave has not been deceived by the party with whom he transacted the business; and, on the other hand, whether the offence which the slave committed in making the contract should prejudice his master. If, however, the slave purchased the sub-slave by the order of his master, and the latter knew that he was unsound, the vendor will not be liable. 1Ad Dig. 21,1,51,1ROHGE, Bd. 6 (1872), S. 403: Recht des durch den Procuristen Betrogenen, die ganze Contractsobligation gegen den Geschäftsführer oder gegen den Principal geltend zu machen.Windscheid: Lehrbuch des Pandektenrechts, 7. Aufl. 1891, Bd. I, § 73, Note 21.Where such a transaction is made with an agent, there is no doubt that if the latter knew the slave to be diseased or unsound, he cannot bring an action on this account; although he himself will, nevertheless, be liable to an action based on voluntary agency. Where, however, the agent himself did not know that the slave was unsound, and purchased him by the direction of his principal, who was aware of it; and he brings an action before the return of the slave in the name of his principal, it is held that a valid exception cannot be interposed against him.

52Mar­cia­nus li­bro quar­to re­gu­la­rum. Si fur­tum do­mi­no ser­vus fe­ce­rit, non est ne­ces­se hoc in ven­di­tio­ne ser­vi prae­di­ce­re nec ex hac cau­sa red­hi­bitio est: sed si di­xe­rit hunc fu­rem non es­se, ex il­la par­te te­ne­bi­tur, quod di­xit pro­mi­sit­ve.

52Marcianus, Rules, Book IV. If a slave should commit a theft against his master, it is not necessary to state this at the time of the sale of the slave, for a return will not be granted for this reason. But if he said that this slave was not a thief, he will be liable on the ground of making such a representation and guarantee.

53Ia­vo­le­nus li­bro pri­mo ex pos­te­rio­ri­bus La­beo­nis. Qui ter­tia­na aut quar­ta­na fe­bri aut pod­agra ve­xa­ren­tur qui­ve com­itia­lem mor­bum ha­be­rent, ne qui­dem his die­bus, qui­bus mor­bus va­ca­ret, rec­te sa­ni di­cen­tur.

53Javolenus, On the Last Works of Labeo, Book I. Where a slave has tertian or quartan fever, or gout or epilepsy, he it not held to be legally sound, even on days when he is free from these diseases.

54Pa­pi­nia­nus li­bro quar­to re­spon­so­rum. Ac­tio­ni red­hi­bi­to­riae non est lo­cus, si man­ci­pium bo­nis con­di­cio­ni­bus emp­tum fu­ge­rit, quod an­te non fu­ge­rat.

54Papinianus, Opinions, Book IV. There is no ground for an action for the return of a slave where one has been purchased for a good consideration, and runs away, if he had not done so previously.

55Idem li­bro duo­de­ci­mo re­spon­so­rum. Cum sex men­ses uti­les, qui­bus ex­per­i­un­di po­tes­tas fuit, red­hi­bi­to­riae ac­tio­ni prae­stan­tur, non vi­de­bi­tur po­tes­ta­tem ex­per­i­un­di ha­buis­se, qui vi­tium fu­gi­ti­vi la­tens igno­ra­vit: non id­cir­co ta­men dis­so­lu­tam igno­ra­tio­nem emp­to­ris ex­cu­sa­ri opor­te­bit.

55The Same, Opinions, Book XII. Six available months from the time that proceedings should have been instituted are granted in which to file an action for the return of a slave, and the power to proceed will not be held to have existed where the party was ignorant that he was in the habit of running away, and this fault had been concealed. Still, the gross ignorance of the purchaser on this point must not be excused.

56Pau­lus li­bro pri­mo quaes­tio­num. La­ti­nus Lar­gus: quae­ro, an fi­de­ius­so­ri emp­tio­nis red­hi­be­ri man­ci­pium pos­sit. re­spon­di, si in uni­ver­sam cau­sam fi­de­ius­sor sit ac­cep­tus, pu­tat Mar­cel­lus pos­se ei fi­de­ius­so­ri red­hi­be­ri.

56Paulus, Questions, Book I. Latinus Largus: “I ask whether a slave can be returned to a surety of the vendor.” I answered that if the surety was taken with reference to everything connected with the sale, Marcellus thinks that the slave can be returned to the surety.

57Idem li­bro quin­to quaes­tio­num. Si ser­vus man­ci­pium emit et do­mi­nus red­hi­bi­to­ria agat, non ali­ter ei ven­di­tor da­tu­rus est, quam si om­nia prae­sti­te­rit quae huic ac­tio­ni con­ti­nen­tur et qui­dem so­li­da, non pe­cu­lio te­nus: nam et si ex emp­to do­mi­nus agat, ni­si pre­tium to­tum sol­ve­rit, ni­hil con­se­qui­tur. 1Quod si ser­vus vel fi­lius ven­di­de­rit, red­hi­bi­to­ria in pe­cu­lium com­pe­tit. in pe­cu­lio au­tem et cau­sa red­hi­bitio­nis con­ti­ne­bi­tur: nec nos mo­veat, quod an­te­quam red­da­tur ser­vus non est in pe­cu­lio (non enim pot­est es­se in pe­cu­lio ser­vus, qui ad­huc emp­to­ris est): sed cau­sa ip­sius red­hi­bitio­nis in pe­cu­lio com­pu­ta­tur: igi­tur si ser­vus de­cem mi­li­bus emp­tus quin­que mi­li­bus sit, haec quo­que in pe­cu­lio es­se di­ce­mus. hoc ita, si ni­hil do­mi­no de­beat aut ad­emp­tum pe­cu­lium non est: quod si plus do­mi­no de­beat, eve­niet, ut ho­mi­nem prae­stet et ni­hil con­se­qua­tur.

57The Same, Questions, Book V. Where one slave purchases another, and his master brings an action for his return, the vendor is not obliged to pay him, unless he delivers to him everything included in this action, the whole amount in fact, and not merely what has reference to the peculium; for if the master brings an action on sale, unless he pays the entire purchase-money, he will not accomplish anything. 1Where, however, a slave or a son makes a sale, an action for the return of the slave will involve his peculium, and the ground for the return is also included in the peculium. Nor does it concern us that the slave was not part of the peculium before he was returned, for a slave cannot belong to the peculium who is still the property of the purchaser, but the ground for the return itself is considered to be part of the peculium. Therefore, if a slave purchased for ten thousand sesterces is only worth five thousand, we say that the latter sum belongs to the peculium. This is the case if he owes his master nothing, or has not been deprived of the peculium. If, however, he owes his master more, the result will be that he must surrender the slave, and will not recover anything.

58Idem li­bro quin­to re­spon­so­rum. Quae­ro, an, si ser­vus apud emp­to­rem fu­git et in cau­sa red­hi­bitio­nis es­se pro­nun­tia­tus fue­rit, non prius ven­di­to­ri re­sti­tui de­beat, quam re­rum ab­la­ta­rum a ser­vo aes­ti­ma­tio­nem prae­sti­te­rit. Pau­lus re­spon­dit ven­di­to­rem co­gen­dum non tan­tum pre­tium ser­vi re­sti­tue­re, sed et­iam re­rum ab­la­ta­rum aes­ti­ma­tio­nem, ni­si si pro his pa­ra­tus sit ser­vum no­xae no­mi­ne re­lin­que­re. 1Item quae­ro, si no­lit aes­ti­ma­tio­nem et pre­tia re­rum re­sti­tue­re, an ser­vus re­ti­nen­dus sit et dan­da sit ac­tio de pe­cu­lio vel de pre­tio red­hi­bi­ti ser­vi ex du­plae sti­pu­la­tio­ne. Pau­lus re­spon­dit de pre­tio ser­vi re­pe­ten­do com­pe­te­re ac­tio­nem et­iam ex du­plae sti­pu­la­tio­ne: de re­bus per fur­tum ab­la­tis iam re­spon­sum est. 2Ser­vum du­pla emi, qui re­bus ab­la­tis fu­git: mox in­ven­tus prae­sen­ti­bus ho­nes­tis vi­ris in­ter­ro­ga­tus, an et in do­mo ven­di­to­ris fu­gis­set, re­spon­dit fu­gis­se: quae­ro, an stan­dum sit re­spon­so ser­vi. Pau­lus re­spon­dit: si ei11Die Großausgabe liest et statt ei. alia in­di­cia prio­ris fu­gae non de­fi­ciunt, tunc et­iam ser­vi re­spon­so cre­den­dum22Die Großausgabe fügt est ein..

58The Same, Opinions, Book V. I ask, if a slave has fled from the purchaser, and it has been decided that good cause for his return exists, whether the vendor should not pay the appraised value of the property carried away by the slave, before the latter is returned to him. Paulus answered that the vendor should be compelled not only to pay the price of the slave, but also the appraised value of what was stolen by him, unless he is ready to deliver up the slave by way of reparation for the property taken. 1I also ask if the vendor refuses to pay the appraised value of the property and the purchase-money, whether the slave should be retained, and an action on the peculium granted, or whether double the price of the slave sought to be returned should be demanded on the ground of a stipulation. Paulus answered that an action will lie for the recovery of the price of the slave, and also for double his value on account of the stipulation. An opinion has already been given with reference to the property stolen by the slave. 2I purchased a slave under the stipulation of double his value if he was returned, and he then ran away with some of my property. Having afterwards been found, and interrogated in the presence of respectable men as to whether he had previously run away from the house of the vendor, he answered that he had. I ask whether this answer of the slave is entitled to consideration. Paulus replied that if other proofs of his former flight are not lacking, then the answer of the slave should be believed.

59Ul­pia­nus li­bro sep­tua­ge­si­mo quar­to ad edic­tum. Cum in ea cau­sa est ven­di­tum man­ci­pium, ut red­hi­be­ri de­beat, in­iquum est ven­di­to­rem pre­tium red­hi­ben­dae rei con­se­qui. 1Si quis duos ho­mi­nes uno pre­tio eme­rit et al­ter in ea cau­sa est, ut red­hi­bea­tur, de­in­de pe­ta­tur pre­tium to­tum, ex­cep­tio erit ob­icien­da: si ta­men pars pre­tii pe­ta­tur, ma­gis di­ce­tur non no­ce­re ex­cep­tio­nem, ni­si for­te ea sit cau­sa, in qua prop­ter al­te­rius vi­tium utrum­que man­ci­pium red­hi­ben­dum sit.

59Ulpianus, On the Edict, Book LXXIV. Where a slave is sold in such a condition that he should be returned, it is unjust that the vendor should receive his price. 1Where anyone purchases two slaves for one price, and one of them is in such a condition that he ought to be returned, and the vendor then brings an action for the entire amount, an exception should be filed by way of defence. Where, however, suit is brought for a portion of the price, the better opinion is that an exception will not be a bar, unless the facts are such that both slaves should be returned on account of the unsoundness of one of them.

60Pau­lus li­bro se­xa­ge­si­mo no­no ad edic­tum. Fac­ta red­hi­bitio­ne om­nia in in­te­grum re­sti­tuun­tur, per­in­de ac si ne­que emp­tio ne­que ven­di­tio in­ter­ces­sit.

60Ad Dig. 21,1,60ROHGE, Bd. 16 (1875), Nr. 81, S. 321: Folgen der Verarbeitung bezw. Umgestaltung eines Theils der gekauften Waare mit erkennbarem Fehler bezüglich der Redhibitionsbefugnis.Paulus, On the Edict, Book LXIX. After the return of the slave has been made, everything should be placed in its former condition just as if there had been no sale.

61Ul­pia­nus li­bro octage­si­mo ad edic­tum. Quo­tiens de ser­vi­tu­te agi­tur, vic­tus tan­tum de­bet prae­sta­re, quan­ti mi­no­ris emis­set emp­tor, si scis­set hanc ser­vi­tu­tem im­po­si­tam.

61Ad Dig. 21,1,61ROHGE, Bd. 15 (1875), Nr. 93, S. 328: Berechnung des Minderwerths im Falle der exceptio quanti minoris.Ulpianus, On the Edict, Book LXXX. Whenever a servitude is in question, and the vendor is defeated, he should refund to the purchaser the amount of the excess paid by the latter, if he was aware that the said servitude had been imposed upon the property.

62Mo­des­ti­nus li­bro oc­ta­vo dif­fe­ren­tia­rum. Ad res do­na­tas edic­tum ae­di­lium cu­ru­lium non per­ti­ne­re di­cen­dum est: et­enim quid se re­sti­tu­tu­rum do­na­tor re­pro­mit­tit, quan­do nul­lum pre­tium in­ter­ve­niat? quid er­go si res ab eo cui do­na­ta est me­lior fac­ta sit, num­quid quan­ti eius qui me­lio­rem fe­cit in­ter­est do­na­tor con­ve­nia­tur? quod mi­ni­me di­cen­dum est, ne eo ca­su li­be­ra­li­ta­tis suae do­na­tor poe­nam pa­tia­tur. ita­que si qua res do­ne­tur, ne­ces­se non erit ea re­pro­mit­te­re, quae in re­bus ve­na­li­bus ae­di­les re­pro­mit­ti iu­bent. sa­ne de do­lo do­na­tor ob­li­ga­re se et de­bet et so­let, ne quod be­ni­gne con­tu­le­rit frau­dis con­si­lio re­vo­cet.

62Modestinus, Differences, Book VIII. It must be held that the Edict of the Curule Ædiles has no reference to property which is donated. For why should the donor bind himself to take back anything when no price is involved in the transaction? But what if the property has been improved by the party to whom it was given? Can the donor be sued for the value of the improvements? It must be said that this is by no means the case, for the donor should not suffer a penalty on account of his liberality. Therefore, where anything is given away, it will not be necessary for those guarantees to be given which the Ædiles require where property is sold. It is clear that the donor ought to bind himself (and he usually does so) with reference to fraud, in order that he may not, with fraudulent intent, revoke what he bestowed by way of kindness.

63Ul­pia­nus li­bro pri­mo ad edic­tum ae­di­lium cu­ru­lium. Scien­dum est ad ven­di­tio­nes so­las hoc edic­tum per­ti­ne­re non tan­tum man­ci­pio­rum, ve­rum ce­te­ra­rum quo­que re­rum. cur au­tem de lo­ca­tio­ni­bus ni­hil edi­ca­tur, mi­rum vi­de­ba­tur: haec ta­men ra­tio red­di­tur vel quia num­quam is­to­rum de hac re fue­rat iu­ris­dic­tio vel quia non si­mi­li­ter lo­ca­tio­nes ut ven­di­tio­nes fiunt.

63Ulpianus, On the Edict of the Curule Ædiles, Book I. It should be noted that this Edict has reference solely to sales, not only those of slaves, but also those of every other kind of property. It seems strange that nothing was stated with reference to leases. The reason given for this is that they were never included in the jurisdiction of the Ædiles, or because leases and sales are not contracted under the same circumstances.

64Pom­po­nius li­bro sep­ti­mo de­ci­mo epis­tu­la­rum. La­beo scri­bit, si uno pre­tio plu­res ser­vos emis­ti et de uno age­re ve­lis, in­ter­aes­ti­ma­tio­nem ser­vo­rum pro­in­de fie­ri de­be­re, at­que ut fie­ret in aes­ti­ma­tio­nem bo­ni­ta­tis agri, cum ob evic­tam par­tem fun­di aga­tur. 1Idem ait, si uno pre­tio plu­res ser­vos ven­di­dis­ti sa­nos­que es­se pro­mi­sis­ti et pars dum­ta­xat eo­rum mi­nus sa­na sit, de om­ni­bus ‘ad­ver­sus dic­tum pro­mis­sum’ rec­te agi. 2Ibi­dem ait er­ra­re et fu­ge­re iu­men­tum pos­se, nec ta­men er­ro­nem aut fu­gi­ti­vum es­se agi pos­se.

64Pomponius, Epistles, Book XVII. Labeo says that if you purchase several slaves for one price, and you wish to bring an action with reference to one of them, an appraisement of all the slaves should be made, just as is done in appraising land when suit is brought because of the loss of a portion of said land by eviction. 1He also says that if you sold several slaves for one price, and guaranteed them to be sound, and only a part of them are sound, an action can properly be brought with reference to all, because of the representation and guarantee. 2He also says that a beast of burden can wander away and escape, but proceedings cannot be instituted on the ground that it is a wanderer or a fugitive.

65Ve­nu­leius li­bro quin­to ac­tio­num. Ani­mi po­tius quam cor­po­ris vi­tium est, vel­uti si lu­dos ad­si­due ve­lit spec­ta­re aut ta­bu­las pic­tas stu­dio­se in­tuea­tur, si­ve et­iam men­dax aut si­mi­li­bus vi­tiis te­n­ea­tur. 1Quo­tiens mor­bus son­ti­cus no­mi­na­tur, eum sig­ni­fi­ca­ri Cas­sius ait, qui no­ceat: no­ce­re au­tem in­tel­le­gi, qui per­pe­tuus est, non qui tem­po­re fi­nia­tur: sed mor­bum son­ti­cum eum vi­de­ri, qui in­ci­de­rit in ho­mi­nem post­quam is na­tus sit: son­tes enim no­cen­tes di­ci. 2Ser­vus tam ve­te­ra­tor quam no­vi­cius di­ci pot­est. sed ve­te­ra­to­rem non spa­tio ser­vien­di, sed ge­ne­re et cau­sa aes­ti­man­dum Cae­lius ait: nam qui­cum­que ex ve­na­li­cio no­vi­cio­rum emp­tus ali­cui mi­nis­te­rio prae­po­si­tus sit, sta­tim eum ve­te­ra­to­rum nu­me­ro es­se: no­vi­cium au­tem non ti­ro­ci­nio ani­mi, sed con­di­cio­ne ser­vi­tu­tis in­tel­le­gi. nec ad rem per­ti­ne­re, La­ti­ne sciat nec ne: nam ob id ve­te­ra­to­rem es­se, si li­be­ra­li­bus stu­diis eru­di­tus sit.

65Venuleius, Actions, Book V. It is a mental rather than a physical defect, for a slave to wish to constantly be present at exhibitions, or to carefully examine paintings, or even to be untruthful, or to have similar faults. 1Whenever a chronic disease is mentioned, Cassius says this means one which is harmful. The word, however, should be understood to signify an affection which is constant, and not ended by time. A chronic disease is held to be one which attacks a man after his birth, for the word chronic means continuous. 2A slave can be styled experienced, or a novice. Cælius says that an experienced slave should be valued, not on account of the time he has been in servitude, but because of his ability and qualifications; for where anyone, at a sale, purchases a slave who is a novice and employs him in some service, he is immediately included in the number of those who are experienced, since inexperience is understood to be dependent, not upon the undeveloped state of the mind, but upon the condition of servitude. It makes no difference whether he understands Latin or not, for a slave is not held to be experienced merely because he happens to be learned in the liberal arts and sciences.