Corpus iurisprudentiae Romanae

Repertorium zu den Quellen des römischen Rechts

Digesta Iustiniani Augusti

Recognovit Mommsen (1870) et retractavit Krüger (1928)
Convertit in Anglica lingua Scott (1932)
Dig. II15,
De transactionibus
Liber secundus
XV.

De transactionibus

(Concerning Compromises.)

1Ul­pia­nus li­bro quin­qua­gen­si­mo ad edic­tum. Qui trans­igit, qua­si de re du­bia et li­te in­cer­ta ne­que fi­ni­ta trans­igit. qui ve­ro pa­cis­ci­tur, do­na­tio­nis cau­sa rem cer­tam et in­du­bi­ta­tam li­be­ra­li­ta­te re­mit­tit.

1Ulpianus, On the Edict, Book L. When a man makes a compromise with reference to something which is in doubt, and the issue of the trial is uncertain, the compromise is not brought to a termination; but he who makes an agreement surrenders by way of donation through liberality, something which is certain and undisputed.

2Idem li­bro sep­tua­gen­si­mo quar­to ad edic­tum. Trans­ac­tum ac­ci­pe­re quis pot­est non so­lum, si Aqui­lia­na sti­pu­la­tio fue­rit sub­iec­ta, sed et si pac­tum con­ven­tum fue­rit fac­tum.

2The Same, On the Edict, Book LXXIV. Anyone can accept a compromise, not only where the Aquilian stipulation is inserted, but also where an agreement is entered into.

3Scae­vo­la li­bro pri­mo di­ges­to­rum. Im­pe­ra­to­res An­to­ni­nus et Ve­rus ita re­scrip­se­runt: ‘Pri­va­tis pac­tio­ni­bus non du­bium est non lae­di ius ce­te­ro­rum. qua­re trans­ac­tio­ne, quae in­ter he­redem et ma­trem de­func­ti fac­ta est, ne­que tes­ta­men­tum re­scis­sum vi­de­ri pos­se ne­que ma­nu­mis­sis vel le­ga­ta­riis ac­tio­nes suae ad­emp­tae. qua­re quid­quid ex tes­ta­men­to pe­tunt, scrip­tum he­redem con­ve­ni­re de­bent: qui in trans­ac­tio­ne he­redi­ta­tis aut ca­vit si­bi pro one­ri­bus he­redi­ta­tis, aut si non ca­vit, non de­bet neg­le­gen­tiam suam ad alie­nam in­iu­riam re­fer­re.’ 1Cum trans­ac­tio prop­ter fi­dei­com­mis­sum fac­ta es­set et post­ea co­di­cil­li re­per­ti sunt: quae­ro, an quan­to mi­nus ex trans­ac­tio­ne con­se­cu­ta ma­ter de­func­ti fue­rit quam pro par­te sua est, id ex fi­dei­com­mis­si cau­sa con­se­qui de­beat. re­spon­dit de­be­re. 2De­bi­tor, cu­ius pig­nus cre­di­tor dis­tra­xit, cum Mae­vio, qui se le­gi­ti­mum cre­di­to­ris he­redem es­se iac­ta­bat, mi­ni­mo trans­egit: post­ea tes­ta­men­to pro­la­to Sep­ti­cium he­redem es­se ap­pa­ruit. quae­si­tum est, si agat pig­ne­ra­ti­cia de­bi­tor cum Sep­ti­cio, an is uti pos­sit ex­cep­tio­ne trans­ac­tio­nis fac­tae cum Mae­vio, qui he­res eo tem­po­re non fue­rit: pos­sit­que Sep­ti­cius pe­cu­niam, quae Mae­vio ut he­redi a de­bi­to­re nu­me­ra­ta est, con­dic­tio­ne re­pe­te­re, qua­si sub prae­tex­tu he­redi­ta­tis ac­cep­tam. re­spon­dit se­cun­dum ea quae pro­po­ne­ren­tur non pos­se, quia ne­que cum eo ip­se trans­egit nec neg­otium Sep­ti­cii Mae­vius ge­rens ac­ce­pit.

3Scævola, Digest, Book I. The Emperors Antoninus and Verus stated in a Rescript, “That there is no doubt that private agreements which have been entered into do not prejudice the rights of others”; therefore, where a compromise has been made between the heir and the mother of the deceased, the will cannot be held to be rescinded by it, nor are manumitted slaves or legatees deprived of their rights of action thereby. Hence, when they bring suit for anything under the will, they must sue the heir mentioned therein; who, when he compromised matters connected with the estate, whether he provided for himself with reference to the burdens attached to it, or whether he did not do so, he has no right to permit his own negligence to injure others. 1Ad Dig. 2,15,3,1Windscheid: Lehrbuch des Pandektenrechts, 7. Aufl. 1891, Bd. II, § 414, Note 4.When a compromise is entered into with regard to a trust, and afterwards codicils are found; I ask, if the mother of the deceased has received less through the compromise than her share, ought she to receive what is lacking by virtue of the trust? The answer was that she ought. 2A debtor whose pledge had been sold by his creditor compromised for a smaller sum with Mævius, who claimed to be the heir of the lawful creditor, and afterwards the will of the creditor having been produced, it appeared that Septicius was the heir. The question then arose whether, if the debtor brought suit against Septicius for the property pledged, he could make use of an exception on the ground of the compromise made with Mævius, who was not the legal heir at that time; and can Septicius have a right to recover the money which was paid by the debtor to Mævius as the heir, on the ground that it was received by him under the pretext of inheritance? The answer was that this could not be done, according to the facts stated, for the reason that Septicius did not himself make a compromise with him, nor was Mævius, when he accepted it, acting as the agent of Septicius.

4Ul­pia­nus li­bro qua­dra­gen­si­mo sex­to ad Sa­binum. Aqui­lia­na sti­pu­la­tio om­ni­mo­do om­nes prae­ce­den­tes ob­li­ga­tio­nes no­vat et per­emit ip­sa­que per­emi­tur per ac­cep­ti­la­tio­nem: et hoc iu­re uti­mur. id­eo­que et­iam le­ga­ta sub con­di­cio­ne re­lic­ta in sti­pu­la­tio­nem Aqui­lia­nam de­du­cun­tur.

4Ulpianus, On Sabinus, Book XLVI. The Aquilian stipulation absolutely changes and annuls all preceding obligations, and is itself annulled by a release; and this is now our practice. Therefore, even bequests which are made conditionally come under the Aquilian stipulation.

5Pa­pi­nia­nus li­bro pri­mo de­fi­ni­tio­num. Cum Aqui­lia­na sti­pu­la­tio in­ter­po­ni­tur, quae ex con­sen­su red­di­tur, li­tes, de qui­bus non est co­gi­ta­tum, in suo sta­tu re­ti­nen­tur. li­be­ra­li­ta­tem enim cap­tio­sam in­ter­pre­ta­tio pru­den­tium fre­git.

5Papinianus, Definitions, Book I. When the Aquilian stipulation is made use of, the consent of the contracting parties is implied, and any actions which they had not yet thought of remain in their former condition; for the interpretation of persons learned in the law is opposed to all captious liberality.

6Gaius li­bro sep­ti­mo de­ci­mo ad edic­tum pro­vin­cia­le. De his con­tro­ver­siis, quae ex tes­ta­men­to pro­fi­cis­cun­tur, ne­que trans­igi ne­que ex­qui­ri ve­ri­tas ali­ter pot­est quam in­spec­tis co­gni­tis­que ver­bis tes­ta­men­ti.

6Ad Dig. 2,15,6Windscheid: Lehrbuch des Pandektenrechts, 7. Aufl. 1891, Bd. II, § 414, Note 12.Gaius, On the Provincial Edict, Book XVII. In controversies arising out of a will no compromise can take place, nor can the truth of the facts be inquired into, unless an examination and interpretation of the words of the will is made.

7Ul­pia­nus li­bro sep­ti­mo dis­pu­ta­tio­num. Et post rem iu­di­ca­tam trans­ac­tio va­let, si vel ap­pel­la­tio in­ter­ces­se­rit vel ap­pel­la­re po­tue­ris. 1Si fi­de­ius­sor con­ven­tus et con­dem­na­tus fuis­set, mox reus trans­egis­set cum eo, cui erat fi­de­ius­sor con­dem­na­tus: an trans­ac­tio va­leat quae­ri­tur: et pu­to va­le­re, qua­si om­ni cau­sa et ad­ver­sus reum et ad­ver­sus fi­de­ius­so­rem dis­so­lu­ta. si ta­men ip­se fi­de­ius­sor con­dem­na­tus trans­egit, et­si trans­ac­tio non per­emit rem iu­di­ca­tam, ta­men eo quod da­tum est rele­va­ri rem iu­di­ca­tam opor­tet. 2Us­que ad­eo au­tem quod da­tum est et­iam­si non pro­fi­cit ad trans­ac­tio­nem, ex­te­nuat ta­men rem iu­di­ca­tam, ut in­de sit et dic­tum et re­scrip­tum cir­ca ali­men­to­rum trans­ac­tio­nem ci­tra prae­to­ris auc­to­ri­ta­tem fac­tam, ut quod da­tum est pro­fi­ciat ad ali­men­ta: ita ut, si quid am­plius ex cau­sa ali­men­to­rum de­be­ri pot­est, id prae­ste­tur, quod au­tem da­tum est, im­pu­te­tur.

7Ulpianus, Disputations, Book VII. A compromise is valid even after judgment has been rendered, if an appeal has been, or can be taken. 1Where a surety was sued, and judgment rendered against him, and afterwards the principal made a compromise with the party who obtained the judgment against the surety; the question arises, was the compromise valid? I am of the opinion that it was, and that every cause of action against both principal and surety was removed. If, however, the surety himself made the compromise after he lost his case, while the judgment was not annulled by the compromise, still, it should be considered as settled, so far as anything which was paid is concerned. 2It is so true, however, that what was paid in this case even though it does not dispose of the compromise still diminished the amount of the judgment, that it may be held, and it is, in fact, contained in a rescript in a case where a compromise was entered into without permission of the Prætor, that what had been paid should be applied to the furnishing of maintenance, and whatever, in addition, was due on account of maintenance must be provided, but what had already been paid should be credited.

8Idem li­bro quin­to de om­ni­bus tri­bu­na­li­bus. Cum hi, qui­bus ali­men­ta re­lic­ta erant, fa­ci­le trans­ige­rent con­ten­ti mo­di­co prae­sen­ti: di­vus Mar­cus ora­tio­ne in se­na­tu re­ci­ta­ta ef­fe­cit, ne ali­ter ali­men­to­rum trans­ac­tio ra­ta es­set, quam si auc­to­re prae­to­re fac­ta. so­let igi­tur prae­tor in­ter­ve­ni­re et in­ter con­sen­tien­tes ar­bi­tra­ri, an trans­ac­tio vel quae ad­mit­ti de­beat. 1Eius­dem prae­to­ris no­tio ob trans­ac­tio­nem erit, si­ve ha­bi­ta­tio si­ve ves­tia­rium si­ve de prae­diis ali­men­tum le­ga­bi­tur. 2Haec ora­tio per­ti­net ad ali­men­ta, quae tes­ta­men­to vel co­di­cil­lis fue­rint re­lic­ta si­ve ad tes­ta­men­tum fac­tis si­ve ab in­tes­ta­to. idem erit di­cen­dum et si mor­tis cau­sa do­na­ta fue­rint re­lic­ta vel ab eo, cui mor­tis cau­sa do­na­ta sunt, re­lic­ta. sed et si con­di­cio­nis im­plen­dae gra­tia re­lic­ta sunt, ad­huc idem di­ce­mus. pla­ne de ali­men­tis, quae non mor­tis cau­sa do­na­ta sunt, li­ce­bit et si­ne prae­to­re auc­to­re trans­igi. 3Si­ve igi­tur in men­ses sin­gu­los si­ve in dies si­ve in an­nos fue­rint re­lic­ta, ora­tio lo­cum ha­bet. sed et si non fue­rint per­pe­tuo re­lic­ta, sed us­que ad an­nos cer­tos, idem est. 4Si in­te­gra quan­ti­tas ali­cui fue­rit le­ga­ta, ut ex usu­ris eius se alat et mor­tis tem­po­re pe­cu­nias re­sti­tuat: non ces­sa­bit ora­tio, li­cet non in an­nos sin­gu­los vi­dea­tur id re­lic­tum. 5Sed et si sit cer­ta quan­ti­tas re­lic­ta Ti­tio vel res ita, ut in­de ali­men­ta Se­io prae­sten­tur: ma­gis est ut trans­ige­re Ti­tius pos­sit, nec enim trans­ac­tio­ne Ti­tii mi­nuun­tur ali­men­ta Se­ii. idem­que est et si per fi­dei­com­mis­sum ali­men­ta ad hoc le­ga­ta­rio fue­rint re­lic­ta. 6Eam trans­ac­tio­nem ora­tio im­pro­bat, quae id­cir­co fit, ut quis re­prae­sen­ta­tam pe­cu­niam con­su­mat. quid er­go si quis ci­tra prae­to­ris auc­to­ri­ta­tem trans­ege­rit, ut quod per sin­gu­los an­nos erat ei re­lic­tum, con­se­que­re­tur per sin­gu­los men­ses? aut quid si, quod per sin­gu­los men­ses ei re­lic­tum erat, con­se­que­re­tur per sin­gu­los dies? quid de­in­de si, quod con­sum­ma­to an­no ut ac­ci­pe­ret, in­itio an­ni con­se­qua­tur? et pu­to eam trans­ac­tio­nem va­le­re, quia me­lio­rem con­di­cio­nem suam ali­men­ta­rius ta­li trans­ac­tio­ne fa­cit: no­luit enim ora­tio ali­men­ta per trans­ac­tio­nem in­ter­ci­pi. 7Ni­hil au­tem in­ter­est, utrum li­ber­ti­ni sint qui­bus ali­men­ta re­lic­ta sunt an in­ge­nui, sa­tis lo­cu­ple­tes an mi­nus. 8Vult igi­tur ora­tio apud prae­to­rem de is­tis quae­ri: in pri­mis de cau­sa trans­ac­tio­nis, de­in de mo­do, ter­tio de per­so­na trans­igen­tium. 9In cau­sa hoc erit re­qui­ren­dum, quae cau­sa sit trans­igen­di: si­ne cau­sa enim ne­mi­nem trans­igen­tem au­diet prae­tor. cau­sae fe­re hu­ius­mo­di so­lent al­le­ga­ri: si ali­bi do­mi­ci­lium he­res, ali­bi ali­men­ta­rius ha­beat: aut si de­sti­net do­mi­ci­lium trans­fer­re al­ter11Die Großausgabe liest al­ter­uter statt al­ter. eo­rum: aut si cau­sa ali­qua ur­gueat prae­sen­tis pe­cu­niae: aut si a plu­ri­bus ei ali­men­ta re­lic­ta sint et mi­nu­ta­tim sin­gu­los con­ve­ni­re dif­fi­ci­le ei sit: aut si qua alia cau­sa fuit, ut plu­res so­lent in­ci­de­re, quae prae­to­ri sua­deant trans­ac­tio­nem ad­mit­te­re. 10Mo­dus quo­que pe­cu­niae, quae in trans­ac­tio­nem venit, aes­ti­man­dus est: ut pu­ta quan­ti­tas trans­ac­tio­nis. nam et­iam ex mo­do fi­des trans­ac­tio­nis aes­ti­ma­bi­tur. mo­dus au­tem pro ae­ta­te eius, qui trans­igit, ar­bi­tran­dus est et va­le­tu­di­ne: nam alias cum pue­ro, alias cum iu­ve­ne, alias cum se­ne trans­igi pa­lam est: con­stat enim ali­men­ta cum vi­ta fi­ni­ri. 11Sed et per­so­na­rum con­tem­pla­tio ha­ben­da est, hoc est, cu­ius vi­tae sint hi, qui­bus ali­men­ta re­lic­ta sunt: utrum fru­gi vi­tae hi sint, qui alias suf­fi­ce­re si­bi pos­sint, an se­quio­ris, qui de ali­men­tis pen­deant. in per­so­na eius, a quo ali­men­ta re­lic­ta sunt, haec erunt spe­cien­da: in qui­bus sunt fa­cul­ta­ti­bus, cu­ius pro­pos­i­ti, cu­ius opi­nio­nis. tunc enim ap­pa­re­bit, num­quid cir­cum­ve­ni­re ve­lit eum, cum quo trans­igit. 12Qui trans­igit de ali­men­tis, non vi­de­bi­tur ne­que de ha­bi­ta­tio­ne ne­que de ves­tia­rio trans­egis­se, cum di­vus Mar­cus spe­cia­li­ter et­iam de is­tis trans­igi vo­lue­rit. 13Sed et si quis de ali­men­tis trans­ege­rit, non ha­be­bit ne­ces­se et­iam de ha­bi­ta­tio­ne vel ce­te­ris in­vi­tus trans­ige­re: pot­erit igi­tur vel de om­ni­bus si­mul vel de qui­bus­dam fa­ce­re trans­ac­tio­nem. 14De cal­cia­rio quo­que ar­bi­trio prae­to­ris trans­igen­dum est. 15Si uni plu­ri­bus­ve fun­dus ad ali­men­ta fue­rit re­lic­tus ve­lint­que eum dis­tra­he­re: ne­ces­se est prae­to­rem de dis­trac­tio­ne eius et trans­ac­tio­ne ar­bi­tra­ri. sed si plu­ri­bus fun­dus ad ali­men­ta fue­rit re­lic­tus et hi in­ter se trans­igant: si­ne prae­to­ris auc­to­ri­ta­te fac­ta trans­ac­tio ra­ta es­se non de­bet. idem est et si ager fue­rit in ali­men­ta ob­li­ga­tus: nam nec pig­nus ad hoc da­tum in­con­sul­to prae­to­re pot­erit li­be­ra­ri. 16Ar­bi­tra­tu prae­to­ris vel de uni­ver­sis ali­men­tis vel de par­te eo­rum trans­igi opor­te­re plus quam ma­ni­fes­tum est. 17Si prae­tor ad­itus ci­tra cau­sae co­gni­tio­nem trans­igi per­mi­se­rit, trans­ac­tio nul­lius erit mo­men­ti: prae­to­ri enim ea res quae­ren­da com­mis­sa est, non neg­le­gen­da nec do­nan­da. sed et si non de om­ni­bus in­qui­sie­rit, quae ora­tio man­dat, hoc est de cau­sa de mo­do de per­so­nis trans­igen­tium, di­cen­dum est, quam­vis de qui­bus­dam quae­sie­rit, trans­ac­tio­nem es­se ir­ri­tam. 18Sed nec man­da­re ex hac cau­sa iu­ris­dic­tio­nem vel prae­ses pro­vin­ciae vel prae­tor pot­erit. 19Trans­ac­tio­nes ali­men­to­rum et­iam apud pro­cu­ra­to­rem Cae­sa­ris fie­ri pos­sunt: sci­li­cet si a fis­co pe­tan­tur ali­men­ta. se­cun­dum quae et apud prae­fec­tos ae­ra­rii trans­igi pot­erit. 20Si cum lis qui­dem es­set de ali­men­tis, trans­ac­tum au­tem de li­te fuis­set: trans­ac­tio va­le­re in­con­sul­to prae­to­re non pot­est, ne cir­cum­ve­nia­tur ora­tio. fin­gi enim li­tes pot­erunt, ut trans­ac­tio et­iam ci­tra prae­to­ris fiat auc­to­ri­ta­tem. 21Si ei­dem ali­men­ta et prae­ter­ea le­ga­tum prae­sen­ti die da­tum sit, et trans­ac­tum fue­rit ci­tra prae­to­ris auc­to­ri­ta­tem: id quod da­tum est im­pu­ta­bi­tur prius in le­ga­tum quod prae­sen­ti die da­tum est, su­per­fluum in ali­men­ta­riam cau­sam. 22Si quis de ali­men­tis trans­ege­rit si­ne prae­to­ris auc­to­ri­ta­te, id quod da­tum est in prae­ter­ita ali­men­ta ce­det. nec in­ter­est tan­tum in quan­ti­ta­te sit de­bi­ta, quan­tum da­tum est, an mi­nus, an plus: nam et si mi­nus sit, ad­huc ta­men id quod in so­lu­tum da­tum est in prae­ter­ita ali­men­ta im­pu­ta­bi­tur. sa­ne si is, qui de ali­men­tis trans­egit, lo­cu­ple­tior fac­tus sit ea so­lu­tio­ne: in quod fac­tus sit lo­cu­ple­tior ae­quis­si­mum erit in eum da­ri re­pe­ti­tio­nem: nec enim de­bet ex alie­no dam­no es­se lo­cu­ples. 23Si in an­nos sin­gu­los cer­ta quan­ti­tas ali­cui fue­rit re­lic­ta ho­mi­ni ho­nes­tio­ris lo­ci vel­uti sa­la­rium an­nuum vel usus fruc­tus, trans­ac­tio et si­ne prae­to­re fie­ri pot­erit: ce­te­rum si usus fruc­tus mo­di­cus ali­men­to­rum vi­ce sit re­lic­tus, di­co trans­ac­tio­nem ci­tra prae­to­rem fac­tam nul­lius es­se mo­men­ti. 24Si cui non num­mus ad ali­men­ta, sed fru­men­tum at­que oleum et ce­te­ra, quae ad vic­tum ne­ces­sa­ria sunt, fue­rint re­lic­ta: non pot­erit de his trans­ige­re, si­ve an­nua si­ve mens­trua ei re­lin­quan­tur. si ta­men ita si­ne prae­to­re trans­ege­rit, ut in vi­cem eo­rum num­mum quot­an­nis vel quot­men­si­bus ac­ci­pe­ret et ne­que diem ne­que mo­dum per­mu­ta­vit, sed tan­tum ge­nus: vel ex con­tra­rio si pac­tus fue­rit, ut in ge­ne­ri­bus ali­men­ta ac­ci­pe­ret, quae in num­mis ei re­lic­ta fuis­sent: vel si vi­num pro oleo vel oleum pro vi­no vel quid aliud com­mu­ta­vit: vel lo­cum per­mu­ta­vit, ut quae erant ei Ro­mae ali­men­ta re­lic­ta, in mu­ni­ci­pio vel in pro­vin­cia ac­ci­pe­ret vel con­tra: vel per­so­nam com­mu­ta­vit, ut quod a plu­ri­bus erat ac­cep­tu­rus, ab uno ac­ci­pe­ret: vel alium pro alio de­bi­to­rem ac­ce­pe­rit: haec om­nia ha­bent dis­cep­ta­tio­nem prae­to­ris et pro uti­li­ta­te ali­men­ta­rii re­ci­pien­da sunt. 25Si ad ha­bi­ta­tio­nem cer­ta quan­ti­tas sit an­nua re­lic­ta et ita sit trans­ac­tum si­ne prae­to­re, ut ha­bi­ta­tio prae­ste­tur, va­let trans­ac­tio, quia fruc­tus ha­bi­ta­tio­nis prae­sta­tur, li­cet rui­nae vel in­cen­dio sub­iec­ta trans­ac­tio est. per con­tra­rium quo­que si pro ha­bi­ta­tio­ne, quae erat re­lic­ta, plac­ue­rit cer­tam quan­ti­ta­tem prae­sta­ri, trans­ac­tio ra­ta est et ci­tra prae­to­rem.

8The Same, On all Tribunals, Book V. When those to whom provision for maintenance has been left, were ready to make a compromise, and were satisfied with a moderate sum to be paid to them at once; the Divine Marcus stated in an Address delivered in the Senate: “That no compromise with reference to maintenance should stand, unless it was made under the authority of the Prætor.” Therefore the Prætor is accustomed to intervene and decide between the contracting parties whether the compromise is one which should be admitted. 1Whether provision for a house, or for clothing, or for maintenance dependent on real-estate is bequeathed, the inquiry of the same Prætor with reference to the compromise must be held. 2The above-mentioned Address relates to provision for maintenance left either by will or codicil, whether it was added to the will, or the party died intestate. The same rule is applicable where the provision was made by a donation mortis causa or where a charge was imposed upon anyone. Where bequests are made for the purpose of fulfilling a condition, we say that the rule is the same. It is evident that a compromise can be entered into without the authority of the Prætor when provision for maintenance is not made mortis causa. 3The Address applies to sums to be paid monthly or daily or annually, and the same rule is applicable where they are not left for life, but only for a certain term of years. 4Where a certain sum is bequeathed to anyone in order that he may support himself with the interest of the same and restore the entire amount at the time of his death; the Address will still apply, although the amount cannot be held to be paid annually. 5Where, however, a certain sum of money, or a certain amount of property is left to Titius, in order to provide for the support of Seius, the better opinion is that Titius can compromise; for by this act of Titius the maintenance of Seius is not diminished. The same rule applies where property was left to the legatee under a trust in order to provide for maintenance. 6The Address forbids a compromise which is made in such a way that anyone can spend at once the amount which is given him. What would be the case then, if a party made a compromise without the authority of the Prætor, to the effect that whatever was payable to him annually by the bequest, he should receive each month? Or what should be done if he received every day what had been left to him to be paid every month? Or how would it be if what he had a right to receive at the end of a year, should be received by him at the beginning? I am of the opinion that an arrangement of this kind is valid, because the party to be supported improves his condition by such a transaction; and that the Address of the Emperor did not intend that the maintenance of persons should be cut off by a compromise. 7It makes no difference whether the parties for whom provision for maintenance is made are freedmen, or freeborn, rich, or poor. 8The Address also directs inquiry to be made before the Prætor with reference to the following matters; in the first place, concerning the cause of the compromise; second, concerning its terms; third, concerning the personal characters of the parties to the transaction. 9With reference to the cause, it must be ascertained what reason exists for making the compromise for the Prætor will hear no one who desires to make a compromise without sufficient cause. The reasons which are usually alleged are the following, namely: where the heir and the party to be supported reside in different places; or where either of them intends to change his residence; or where there is some urgent reason for a sum of money to be paid at the time; or where provision for maintenance has been charged upon several heirs, and it is difficult for them to distribute small sums of money among different persons; or where any other reason exists among those which usually arise, and which may induce the Prætor to sanction the compromise. 10The amount of money involved in the transaction must also be considered, for the good faith of the parties is to be determined in this way. The amount must also be estimated according to the age and condition of health of the person who is making the compromise, as it is clear that it must vary in the cases of a boy, a young man, or one who is old; and it is evident that a provision for maintenance will end with the life of the party for whose benefit it was made. 11The character of the persons must also be taken into consideration; that is to say, what are the habits of life of those for whom provision is made, whether they are frugal and have sufficient for their maintenance from other sources; or whether they are of an inferior class, who will be compelled to depend entirely upon the provision made for them. With regard to the person who is charged with furnishing maintenance, these things must be investigated namely, what his means are, as well as his intentions and his opinions, for it will then be apparent whether he desires to ever reach the party with whom he makes the compromise or not. 12A compromise made with respect to maintenance, does not apply to lodging or clothing; as the Divine Marcus ordered that special arrangements should be made with reference to these matters. 13Where, however, anyone makes a compromise with respect to maintenance, it will not be considered necessary for him, against his will, to make any arrangement concerning lodgings, or other matters; he can, therefore, enter into an agreement with reference to all things at once, or only concerning a few. 14A compromise with respect to a provision for shoes must also be made under the authority of the Prætor. 15Where real-estate charged with maintenance has been left to one or several persons, and they desire to alienate it, it is necessary for the Prætor to decide concerning both the alienation and the compromise. Where real-estate charged with maintenance is left to several persons, and these make a compromise among themselves without the consent of the Prætor, the compromise should not be sustained. The same rule applies where land is given as security for maintenance, for, where a pledge is given for this purpose, it cannot be released without the authority of the Prætor. 16It is perfectly manifest that the consent of the Prætor is necessary where a compromise is made for the entire amount of the maintenance, or only for a portion of the same. 17If, when application is made to the Prætor, he permits a compromise to be made without an investigation of the case, the transaction will be void; for the matter is referred to the Prætor to be examined, and not to be neglected, or given up. If, however, he does not make inquiry about everything which he is directed to do by the Address; that is to say, about the cause, the amount, and the character of the parties to the transaction, it must be held that even though he investigates some matters, the compromise is void. 18Neither the Governor of the province, nor the Prætor can delegate his jurisdiction in a matter of this kind. 19Compromises with respect to maintenance can also be made in the presence of the Imperial Procurator; for example, where maintenance is claimed from the Treasury, and hence this can be done in the presence of the Prefect of the Treasury. 20Where an action is pending with reference to provision for maintenance, and a compromise is made, it will not be valid without the authority of the Prætor; as otherwise the Address of the Emperor might be evaded; for pretended suits could be brought, in order that a compromise might be arranged without the consent of the Prætor. 21Where provision for maintenance is left to anyone, and in addition to this a legacy which is to be paid immediately, and a compromise is made without the authority of the Prætor; whatever may be paid is first credited on the legacy which was made payable without delay, and the remainder on the provision for maintenance. 22Where anyone makes a compromise with reference to maintenance, without the authority of the Prætor, whatever is paid will be applied to the settlement of what is due on the maintenance; for it makes no difference how much the arrears were, or whether they were more or less than the amount paid; for if they are less, still the payment must be credited on the arrears of the provision for maintenance. And it is clear that if he who made the compromise with respect to maintenance, became more wealthy by the payment, it will be perfectly just that the other party should have an action to recover the amount by which he became more wealthy, for no one ought to profit by the loss of another. 23Where a certain sum to be paid annually, as, for instance, an annual pension or an usufruct has been left by anyone to a man of superior rank, a compromise can be made without the authority of the Prætor. But, if a moderate usufruct has been left, instead of a provision for maintenance, I say that a compromise made without the authority of the Prætor is of no force or effect. 24Where provision has been made for the maintenance of a person, not in money but in grain, oil, and other articles which are necessary for subsistence, a compromise cannot be arranged with respect to them, whether the payments are to be made to him annually, or monthly. Where, however, the compromise made without the Prætor’s authority was, that he should, instead of the articles, receive a certain sum of money payable either annually, or monthly, and neither the date nor the amount was changed, but only the nature of the article; or if, on the other hand, he agreed to receive subsistence in kind, which had been left to him in money; as where he changed wine for oil, or oil for wine, or anything else of this description; or changed the place so as to receive the provision left to him at Rome, in some town, or in some province, or vice versa; or if he changed the person, so as to receive from one what he should have received from several; or accepts one debtor instead of another; all these things must be submitted to the decision of the Prætor, and be determined for the benefit of the party entitled to maintenance. 25Where a certain sum, payable annually for lodging, has been left, any transaction which is entered into for the furnishing of lodging without the authority of the Prætor is valid; since the party obtains the benefit of the lodging, although the compromise may afford a lodging liable to demolition, or fire. On the other hand also, if he agrees that a stated sum shall be paid him instead of the lodging which was bequeathed, the transaction is valid, even without the Prætor’s authority.

9Idem li­bro pri­mo opi­nio­num. Qui cum tu­to­ri­bus suis de so­la por­tio­ne ad­mi­nis­tra­tae tu­te­lae suae ege­rat et trans­ege­rat, ad­ver­sus eos­dem tu­to­res ex per­so­na fra­tris sui, cui he­res ex­ti­te­rat, agens prae­scrip­tio­ne fac­tae trans­ac­tio­nis non sum­mo­ve­tur. 1Trans­ac­tio quae­cum­que fit, de his tan­tum, de qui­bus in­ter con­ve­nien­tes pla­cuit, in­ter­po­si­ta cre­di­tur. 2Qui per fal­la­ciam co­he­redis igno­rans uni­ver­sa, quae in ve­ro erant, in­stru­men­tum trans­ac­tio­nis si­ne Aqui­lia­na sti­pu­la­tio­ne in­ter­po­suit, non tam pa­cis­ci­tur quam de­ci­pi­tur. 3Ei qui, non­dum cer­tus ad se que­rel­lam con­tra pa­tris tes­ta­men­tum per­ti­ne­re, de aliis cau­sis cum ad­ver­sa­riis pac­to trans­egit, tan­tum in his in­ter­po­si­tum pac­tum no­ce­bit, de qui­bus in­ter eos ac­tum es­se pro­ba­tur. his tan­tum trans­ac­tio ob­est, quam­vis ma­ior an­nis vi­gin­ti quin­que eam in­ter­po­suit, de qui­bus ac­tum pro­ba­tur. nam ea, quo­rum ac­tio­nes com­pe­te­re ei post­ea con­per­tum est, in­iquum est per­emi pac­to. id de quo co­gi­ta­tum non do­ce­tur.

9The Same, Opinions, Book I. A party brought an action against his guardians with reference to his share of the estate administered under their guardianship, and compromised the case. If, having become an heir of his brother, he brought suit against the same guardians as his brothers’ representative, he will not be barred by their pleading the compromise which was effected. 1Where a compromise of any description is made, it is considered to be restricted to those matters concerning which the parties have agreed among themselves. 2Where a party, being ignorant of all the existing conditions of the case through the deceit of his co-heir, executed an instrument of compromise without the Aquilian stipulation, he is held rather to have been deceived than to have made an agreement. 3Where a son who is not yet informed that he has a right to bring an action to set aside the will of his father, compromises other matters with his adversaries by an agreement; the agreement which he entered into will only prejudice him with reference to such things as it is proved that they were intended to do, even though one party who made the compromise was over twenty-five years of age; for, as far as relates to anything ascertained afterwards for which he was entitled to bring an action, it would be unjust to hold that the transaction extinguished rights which had not yet been considered.

10Idem li­bro pri­mo re­spon­so­rum. De re fi­lio­rum, quos in po­tes­ta­te non ha­buit, trans­igen­tem pa­trem mi­ni­me eis ob­es­se pla­cet.

10The Same, Opinions, Book I. It is settled that where a father makes a compromise with reference to the rights of sons who are not under his control, they are not prejudiced by it.

11Idem li­bro quar­to ad edic­tum. Post rem iu­di­ca­tam et­iam­si11Die Großausgabe liest et­iam si statt et­iam­si. pro­vo­ca­tio non est in­ter­po­si­ta, ta­men si ne­ge­tur iu­di­ca­tum es­se vel igno­ra­ri pot­est an iu­di­ca­tum sit: quia ad­huc lis sub­es­se pos­sit, trans­ac­tio fie­ri pot­est.

11The Same, On the Edict, Book IV. After judgment has been rendered, even if no appeal is taken, still, where the fact that judgment has been rendered is denied, or it is possible for the party to be ignorant whether the judgment was rendered or not; then, as a trial may still take place, a compromise can be effected.

12Cel­sus li­bro ter­tio di­ges­to­rum. Non est fe­ren­dus qui ge­ne­ra­li­ter in his, quae tes­ta­men­to ei re­lic­ta sunt, trans­ege­rit, si post­ea cau­se­tur de eo so­lo se co­gi­tas­se, quod pri­ma par­te tes­ta­men­ti ac non et­iam quod pos­te­rio­re le­ga­tum sit. si ta­men post­ea co­di­cil­li pro­fe­run­tur, non im­pro­be mi­hi dic­tu­rus vi­de­tur de eo dum­ta­xat se co­gi­tas­se, quod il­la­rum ta­bu­la­rum, quas tunc no­ve­rat, scrip­tu­ra con­ti­ne­re­tur.

12Ad Dig. 2,15,12Windscheid: Lehrbuch des Pandektenrechts, 7. Aufl. 1891, Bd. II, § 414, Note 4.Celsus, Digest, Book III. It should not be tolerated that a party may make a compromise with reference to legacies left to him in general terms by will, and afterwards claim that his object was not to compromise except with reference to what was left him in the first part of the will, and not with reference to what was left him in the last part. But where codicils are produced, I think that he could not improperly say to me that he only was thinking about what was contained in those pages of the will of which he knew at the time of the transaction.

13Ae­mi­lius Ma­cer li­bro pri­mo ad le­gem vi­cen­si­mam he­redi­ta­tium. Nul­li pro­cu­ra­to­rum prin­ci­pis in­con­sul­to prin­ci­pe trans­ige­re li­cet.

13Æmilius Macer, On the Five Per Cent Law Respecting Inheritances, Book I. It is not lawful for an Imperial Procurator to make a compromise without the authority of the Emperor.

14Scae­vo­la li­bro se­cun­do re­spon­so­rum. Con­tro­ver­sia in­ter le­gi­ti­mum et scrip­tum he­redem or­ta est ea­que trans­ac­tio­ne fac­ta cer­ta le­ge fi­ni­ta est: quae­ro cre­di­to­res quem con­ve­ni­re pos­sunt? re­spon­dit, si idem cre­di­to­res es­sent, qui trans­ac­tio­nem fe­cis­sent, id ob­ser­van­dum de ae­re alie­no, quod in­ter eos con­ve­nis­set: si alii cre­di­to­res es­sent, prop­ter in­cer­tum suc­ces­sio­nis pro par­te he­redi­ta­tis, quam uter­que in trans­ac­tio­ne ex­pres­se­rit, uti­li­bus ac­tio­ni­bus con­ve­nien­dus est.

14Ad Dig. 2,15,14Windscheid: Lehrbuch des Pandektenrechts, 7. Aufl. 1891, Bd. III, § 566, Note 3.Scævola, Opinions, Book II. A controversy arose between an heir-at-law and a testamentary heir, and a compromise having been made, the matter was settled under certain conditions. I desire to know against whom the creditors can bring an action. The answer was that if the creditors were the same who made the compromise, whether others were present or not, on account of the uncertainty of the succession, an action should be brought against each one of the heirs for the share of the estate which each obtained by virtue of the compromise.

15Pau­lus li­bro pri­mo sen­ten­tia­rum. Pac­to con­ven­to Aqui­lia­na qui­dem sti­pu­la­tio sub­ici so­let: sed con­sul­tius est huic poe­na­lem quo­que sti­pu­la­tio­nem sub­iun­ge­re, quia re­scis­so for­te pac­to poe­na ex sti­pu­la­tu pe­ti pot­est.

15Paulus, Sentences, Book I. It is customary for the Aquilian stipulation to be inserted in every contract, but it is more prudent to add to it a penal stipulation, because if the contract is rescinded, suit can be brought for the penalty under the stipulation.

16Her­mo­ge­nia­nus li­bro pri­mo iu­ris epi­to­ma­rum. Qui fi­dem li­ci­tae trans­ac­tio­nis ru­pit, non ex­cep­tio­ne tan­tum sum­mo­ve­bi­tur, sed et poe­nam, quam, si con­tra pla­ci­tum fe­ce­rit ra­to ma­nen­te pac­to, sti­pu­lan­ti rec­te pro­mi­se­rat, prae­sta­re co­ge­tur.

16Hermogenianus, Epitomes of Law, Book I. He who breaks faith in a lawful compromise is not only barred by an exception, but also can be forced to pay the penalty which he has promised in proper form to pay to the stipulator if he violated the contract.

17Pa­pi­nia­nus li­bro se­cun­do quaes­tio­num. Ven­di­tor he­redi­ta­tis emp­to­ri man­da­tis ac­tio­ni­bus cum de­bi­to­re he­redi­ta­rio, qui igno­ra­bat ven­di­tam es­se he­redi­ta­tem, trans­egit: si emp­tor he­redi­ta­tis hoc de­bi­tum ab eo ex­ige­re ve­lit, ex­cep­tio trans­ac­ti neg­otii de­bi­to­ri prop­ter igno­ran­tiam suam ac­com­mo­dan­da est. idem re­spon­den­dum est et in eo, qui fi­dei­com­mis­sam re­ce­pit he­redi­ta­tem, si he­res cum igno­ran­te de­bi­to­re trans­egit.

17Ad Dig. 2,15,17Windscheid: Lehrbuch des Pandektenrechts, 7. Aufl. 1891, Bd. II, § 331, Note 9.Papinianus, Questions, Book II. The vendor of an estate having assigned his rights to the purchaser, made a compromise with a debtor to the estate who did not know that it had been sold. The purchaser of the estate should take measures to collect the debt, and an exception on the ground of business transacted is granted the debtor because of his ignorance. The same rule applies to the case of a man who received an estate by virtue of a trust, if the heir makes a compromise with a debtor who is not aware that this has been done.