De servo corrupto
(Concerning the Corruption of a Slave.)
1Ulpianus, On the Edict, Book XXIII. The Prætor says: “Where anyone is alleged to have harbored a male or female slave belonging to another, or have persuaded him or her maliciously to do anything which would depreciate the value of him or her, I will grant an action for double the value of the property.” 1He will not be liable under this Edict who purchases a slave in good faith, nor can he bring an action for the corruption of the slave, because he has no interest in the slave not being corrupted; and, in fact, if anyone should admit that this is true, the result would be that an action would lie in favor of two parties for the corruption of the slave, which is absurd. We are of the opinion that this action cannot be brought by a party whom a free man is serving as a slave in good faith. 2When the Prætor says “harbors,” we understand this to mean where anyone takes under his protection a slave belonging to another; and this, properly speaking, signifies giving him refuge for the purpose of concealing him, either on his own premises, or in a place or building belonging to another. 3“To persuade” does not exactly mean to compel and force anyone to obey you, but it is a term of moderate signification; for anyone can persuade another by either good or bad advice, and therefore the Prætor adds “maliciously,” by which he “diminishes the value,” hence, a party does not commit the offence unless he persuades the slave to do something by which his value may be lessened, and therefore, where a party solicits a slave either to do something or to contrive something which is dishonorable, he is held to be subject to this Edict. 4Shall a person, however, be liable where he has driven a slave of good habits to commit a crime, or instigates a bad slave, or shows him how to perpetrate the act? The better opinion is that even if he showed the bad slave how to perpetrate the offence he will be liable. And, in fact, if the slave had already intended to take to flight, or to commit a theft, and the person referred to should have approved of his intention, he will be liable, for the malice of the slave should not be increased by praising him; therefore, whether he made a good slave bad or a bad slave worse, he will still be held to have corrupted him. 5He also makes a slave worse who persuades him to commit some injury or theft, or induces him to take to flight, or instigates the slave of another to do these things, or to confuse his peculium, or to be a lover of women, or to wander about, or to devote himself to magical arts, or to be present too often at exhibitions, or to be riotous; or to persuade a slave who is a court official either by words or by bribery to mutilate or falsify the accounts of his master, or even to render an account of which he has been placed in charge unintelligible;
2Paulus, On the Edict, Book XIX. Or makes him extravagant or disobedient, or persuades him to indulge in debauchery.
3Ulpianus, On the Edict, Book XXIII. By the addition of the term “maliciously” the Prætor refers to the deceit of the party who persuades the slave, but if anyone should depreciate the value of the slave without malicious intent, he does not incur disgrace; and he is not liable if he does this for a joke. 1For this reason a question arises if anyone should persuade a slave belonging to another to climb up on a roof, or to descend into a well, and he, obeying, ascends or descends and breaks a leg or any other limb, or loses his life; will the party be liable? If he did this without malicious intent he will not be liable, but if he did it maliciously he will be;
4Ad Dig. 11,3,4ROHGE, Bd. 10 (1874), S. 404: Beschädigung einer körperlichen Sache. Utilis actio ex lege Aquilia.Paulus, On the Edict, Book XIX. It is more convenient, however, to hold him liable to a prætorian action under the Lex Aquilia.
5Ulpianus, On the Edict, Book XXIII. The term “maliciously” also has reference to a person who harbors a slave, so that he is not liable unless he acted maliciously in doing so. If, however, anyone harbors a slave in order to hold him for his master, or, induced by humanity or pity, or for some other reason which is praiseworthy and just, he will not be liable. 1Where anyone maliciously persuades a slave whom he thought to be free to commit some act, it seems to me that he should be held liable; for he is guilty of a greater offence who, thinking a man is free, corrupts him, and therefore if he is a slave the party will be liable. 2This action is for double damages, even against a party who confesses, although the Lex Aquilia only imposes this penalty upon one who makes a denial. 3Where a male or female slave is said to have committed the act, an action is granted with the privilege of surrendering the slave by way of reparation. 4This action has reference to the time when the slave was corrupted or harbored, and not to the present time; and therefore if the slave should die, or be sold or manumitted, the action can, nevertheless, be brought; and where the right has once arisen, it is not extinguished by manumission;
6Paulus, On the Edict, Book XIX. For the estimate of former value is made for the purposes of this action;
7Ulpianus, On the Edict, Book XXIII. Since bad slaves may perhaps obtain their freedom, and sometimes good reasons may arise subsequently for their manumission.
8Paulus, On the Edict, Book XIX. An heir, whose slave was corrupted, is entitled to this action, not only where the slave continues to be a portion of the estate, but also where he has ceased to be such; for instance, where he has been bequeathed.
9Ulpianus, On the Edict, Book XXIII. The question is asked by Julianus in the Ninth Book of the Digest, whether a party who corrupts a slave owned in common by myself and him, can be held liable to this action; and he says that he can be held liable by the other joint-owner; and, moreover, that suit can be brought against him for the partition of common property, and also on the ground of partnership, if the joint-owners are partners. But why does Julianus make the condition of the partner worse when he brings suit as such, than where he institutes proceedings against a stranger? Where an action is brought against a stranger, this can be done whether he harbored or corrupted the slave, but when it is brought on the ground of partnership, this is done without the alternative, that is to say, without the allegation of harboring him; for perhaps Julianus thought that this did not affect the partner, for no one can harbor his own slave; but if he did so for the purpose of concealing him, it can be maintained that he is liable. 1Where I have the usufruct in a slave and you the mere ownership, and the said slave is deteriorated by me, you can institute proceedings against me; but if you committed the act, I can proceed against you by means of a prætorian action; for this action is applicable to all kinds of corruption, and it is to the interest of the usufructuary for the slave in whom he enjoys this right to be of good habits. The usufructuary is also entitled to a prætorian action if another party should harbor or corrupt the slave. 2This action is also granted for double the value of the property. 3But it is still a question whether an estimate of the damage sustained by the slave in body or disposition should only be made, that is to say, of the amount of diminution of the value of the slave, or whether other things should be also taken into consideration. Neratius states that the party guilty of corrupting the slave should be compelled to pay damages to the amount to which the value of the slave is diminished on account of his being corrupted.
10Paulus, On the Edict, Book XIX. In this case an appraisement of the property which the slave took away with him is also included, as all the loss is doubled, and it makes no difference whether the property was brought to the defendant or to another, or was even consumed; for it is more just that the party who was the principal in the offence should be held liable, than for him to be sought for to whom the property was brought.
11Ulpianus, On the Edict, Book XXIII. Neratius says that where thefts are committed afterwards, they are not to be included in the estimate. This opinion I think to be correct, for the words of the Edict, “As much as the value of the property,” embrace all damage. 1I persuade a slave to deface notes of debtors, and I undoubtedly will be liable; but if, on account of the habit of committing breaches of the law which he has contracted, the slave steals, defaces, or destroys, other documents of this kind, it must be said that the person who corrupted him is not liable on account of these acts. 2Ad Dig. 11,3,11,2Windscheid: Lehrbuch des Pandektenrechts, 7. Aufl. 1891, Bd. II, § 326, Note 8.Although an action will lie for the corruption of slaves with reference to property which is stolen, we can, nevertheless, bring an action for theft, as it must be held that the articles were removed with the aid and advice of the party who made the solicitation; nor will it be sufficient to bring either one of the actions, because the employment of one does not cause the other to be dispensed with. Julianus says the same thing with reference to a party who harbors and conceals a slave, and deteriorates him; for the offences of theft and of deteriorating a slave are distinct. In addition to this, the party will be liable to a personal action for the recovery of the property; for although the other may have obtained the slave by means of a suit of this kind, as well as a penalty by an action for theft, still, he is entitled to an action for the corruption of the slave to the amount of his interest:
12Paulus, On the Edict, Book XIX. For the reason that the defendant is still bound, although the property has been restored.
13Ulpianus, On the Edict, Book XXIII. This action is a perpetual one, and is not limited by time, and lies in favor of the heir and other successors; but it will not be granted against an heir, because it is a penal one. 1A party is also liable to this action if he corrupts a slave belonging to an estate; and he is also liable in a suit for the estate as a depredator,
14Paulus, On the Edict, Book XIX. So that the action for the recovery of an estate may have the same scope as this action. 1This Edict does not apply in the case of the corruption of a son or a daughter under paternal control, as the action was established for corrupting a slave who is part of our property, and it is one in which the owner can prove that he has become poorer, although the honor and reputation of his family remain unimpaired. An equitable action for damages, however, will lie for an amount to be decided by the judge, since it is for our interest not to have the minds of our children corrupted. 2Where a slave who is owned in common by yourself and me corrupts a slave who is mine individually; Sabinus says that an action cannot be brought against the joint-owner any more than if my own slave had corrupted another of my slaves. Moreover, if a slave owned in common corrupts one owned by another, it should be considered whether an action can be brought against both joint-owners, or against each separately, in the same way as other offences which are the subject of noxal actions. The better opinion is that each owner is liable for the entire amount, but if one of them pays, the other will be released. 3Where a slave in whom I have an usufruct corrupts a slave belonging to me, I have a right of action against the mere owner of the property. 4A debtor is entitled to this action on account of a slave who has been given in pledge for the debt. 5In this action the double damages are not estimated in addition to the property, for what was doubled is the loss sustained. 6The result of this is that if it is proved that you have persuaded my slave to steal something from Titius; you will not only be liable to the extent to which the slave is deteriorated, but also for what I shall be obliged to pay to Titius. 7Ad Dig. 11,3,14,7ROHGE, Bd. 15 (1875), Nr. 19, S. 48: Interesse, der dem Dritten vom Beschädigten gezahlte Betrag.Again, you will be liable to me not only if the slave caused me loss on account of your advice, but also if he caused it to a stranger as well, because I am responsible under the Lex Aquilia; but if I am liable to anyone for hiring because I leased a slave to him, and he became deteriorated through your influence, you will be liable on this account, and also under similar circumstances. 8The estimate of damages made in this action depends upon how much the value of the slave was diminished, which is the question to be decided by the judge. 9Sometimes, in fact, the slave becomes worthless, so that it is of no advantage to have such a slave. In this instance, can the party who influenced him be compelled to pay the value of the slave, and the owner still hold him and profit by this; or should the owner be compelled to surrender the slave and accept his value? The better opinion is, that the owner should have the choice as to whether he would prefer to retain the slave and receive damages equal to double the amount to which the slave was deteriorated; or to surrender the slave, if he has the power to do so, and accept his value; and if he has not power to do this, he should still accept his value, and assign to the party who solicited the slave his right of action to recover the slave at his own risk. Whatever has been stated with reference to the surrender of the slave is only applicable where the slave is alive when proceedings are instituted. But what if proceedings were instituted after the slave was manumitted? The defendant will not readily be heard by the judge, if he alleges that he manumitted him because he did not wish to have him in his house, as he desired to obtain the money as well as the freedman.
15Gaius, On the Provincial Edict, Book VI. The mind of a slave is corrupted if he is persuaded to treat his master with contempt.
16Alfenus Varus, Digest, Book II. The owner of a slave who had employed him as a steward manumitted him, and subsequently caused him to produce his accounts, and finding that they were not correct, he ascertained that the slave had spent the money on some woman. The question arose whether he could bring suit against this woman for corrupting the slave, as the slave was already free? I answered that he could, and that he could also do this for theft on account of the money which the slave had given her.